The sweat of the brain: representations of intellectual labour in the writings of Edmund Burke, William Cobbett, William Hazlitt and Thomas Carlyle by Ganobcsik-Williams, Gruffudd Aled
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/3086
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
The Sweat of the Brain: 
Representations of Intellectual Labour in the Writings of Edmund 
Burke, William Cobbett, William Hazlitt, and Thomas Carlyle 
by 
Gruffudd Aled Ganobcsik-Williams 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of English and Comparative Literary Studies 
University of Warwick 
July 2001 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments iii 
Abstract iv 
Chapter One. Head Work: Intellectuals and Labour 1-67 
Chapter Two. The Sweat of the Mind: 
Edmund Burke's Mental Labour 68-146 
Chapter Three. Labour of Limbs and Labour of Mind: 
William Cobbett's "United Body for Reform" 147-221 
Chapter Four. The Division of Labour in William Hazlitt's 
Republic of Letters 222-301 
Chapter Five. Daily Bread and Bread of Life: 
Thomas Carlyle and the Labour of Guidance 302-363 
Afterword 364-370 
Bibliography 371-401 
11 
Acknowledgments 
My thanks go to my supervisor, Professor Anne Janowitz, for advice and example. 
Thanks, too, to Professor Frank Jordan, for his careful readings of each chapter and 
his many insights. Also, to Neil Lazarus, thanks for discussing with me the ideas in 
this thesis. I want to acknowledge the support of all the faculty and staff of the 
English departments at the University of Warwick and at Miami University of Ohio, 
especially Dr. Laura Mandell and Dr. Mary Jean Corbett. Finally, my gratitude is to 
my wife, Dr. Lisa Ganobcsik-Williams, and to my family, whose support in all things I 
have been able to take for granted. 
111 
Abstract 
This thesis examines representations of intellectual work in the writings of Edmund 
Burke, William Cobbett, William Hazlitt, and Thomas Carlyle, focusing on their 
tendency to draw on an analogy between mental and manual labour when representing 
their own work to themselves and to their readers. It is my argument that while the 
assimilation of intellectual to physical labour can be seen as a symptom of political bad 
faith--suggesting, as it does, that thinking and writing are as painful or as difficult as 
digging and ploughing--the primary purposes of the analogy in the works of these four 
cultural commentators are, first, to forge rhetorical alliances with ordinary labourers, 
and, second, to attack other intellectuals engaged in what are alleged to be less 
arduous and less valuable forms of intellectual endeavour. By blaming the 
irresponsible activity of disaffected literary men for the political upheaval of the French 
Revolution, Burke set the terms for debate about the role of educated and literate men 
in society, a debate in which, for the first time, intellectuals competed for the 
allegiance of the labouring population. The analogy with manual labour was a key 
rhetorical site in the struggle to define an ideology for intellectuals, since it claims to 
ground the speaker or writer in the labouring community at large. For each author, I 
undertake close readings of several key texts to demonstrate the prevalence of the 
comparison with manual labour in the representation of intellectual activity. The 
political-ideological valence of the analogy is never straightforward, I contend, and it 
often occurs alongside an impulse to emphasise, as well as to elide, what are assumed 
to be the fundamental differences between mental and manual activity. We witness in 
the writings of Burke, Cobbett, Hazlitt, and Carlyle a recognisable mode of self- 
representation, for the desire to assimilate intellectual to material work has persisted. 
While most accounts of intellectuals' self-definition stress the ideal of detachment or 
equanimity, my argument suggests that we can see, in the combative prose of these 
four polemicists, a different historical prototype for the representational practices by 
which intellectuals have forged their own identities. 
iv 
All intellectuals represent something to their audiences, and in so doing represent 
themselves to themselves. Whether you are an academic, or a bohemian essayist, or a 
consultant to the Defense Department, you do what you do according to an idea or 
representation you have of yourself as doing that thing. 
Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual, xv 
V 
Chapter One. Head Work: Intellectuals and Labour 
This thesis examines representations of intellectual work in British culture 
between 1790 and 1840, focusing on the tendency of writers to draw on an analogy 
between mental and manual labour when representing their own work of thinking and 
writing to themselves and to their readers. Although the analogy has a pre-history, I 
argue that following Edmund Burke's blistering indictment, in his Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (1790), of the activities of men of letters responsible for 
instigating revolution, writers' self-representations were endowed with a new 
ideological force, becoming both a declaration of political loyalties and a stance on the 
proper role of intellectuals. I examine the occurrence of the analogy between mental 
and manual labour in the writings of four influential social and cultural commentators: 
Burke, William Cobbett, William Hazlitt, and Thomas Carlyle. The suggestion that 
thinking and writing are as difficult as digging and ploughing may be seen, on one 
hand, as a symptom of political bad faith, but the assimilation of mental to manual 
work may also evince a sympathy for the labouring poor. The articulation of a 
particular attitude towards, and even solidarity with, the labouring population is not 
the only intention of the analogy, however. In the works of these four public 
intellectuals, I contend, a further motive for the assimilation of mental to manual 
labour is to differentiate oneself, politically, from other intellectuals, writers and 
politicians, engaged in what are alleged to be less arduous, less valuable, or less 
integrated kinds of intellectual activity. ' 
1 
In the period covered by this thesis there were material changes in the working 
conditions of the majority of British people, the impact of which was marked, for 
instance, by the Luddite response to changing work practices. 2 There were also 
transformations in the representational value of work and labour: the difference, for 
example, between Burke's view of labour as a curse, mankind's common doom, and 
Carlyle's incantatory celebration of his Gospel of Work. Despite these changes, the 
analogy between mental and manual labour persists throughout the period as a way of 
imaging the work of writing and of conceiving of the relationship between distinct 
activities. The recurrence of the metaphors and figures of speech which attempt to 
yoke together mental and manual work is all the more striking because the assertion of 
an identity between intellectual and physical toil conflicts with the more general 
cultural belief that these were not only distinct but incompatible activities, and that the 
same man or class of men could not do both. 
The world of work in mid-nineteenth-century America, according to Nicholas 
Bromell, was "understood primarily by way of a distinction between manual and 
mental labor, " a division which was crucial in defining and legitimating a hierarchical 
relationship between classes and sexes, and which was underpinned by the already 
existent ontological dichotomy of mind (or soul) and body (7-9,22-4). Nevertheless, 
Bromell concludes that the writers he studies eventually found inadequate their 
culture's defining separation of mental and manual labour as a way of thinking about 
their own work and the work of others. At the same time as they continued to 
conceive of the organisation of social labour through the conventional division--and 
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remained attached to the privileges that accrued to them as a result of this division-- 
Bromell argues that the writers he studies resisted this distinction for its "erotic 
inadequacies and its political inequities" (241-2). In early nineteenth-century Britain, as 
in ante-bellum America, the separation between the toil of the body and the toil of the 
head was fundamental to conceptions of society. Certainly for the writers discussed 
here, the division between physical and intellectual activities was axiomatic, and all 
four writers, even the materialist Cobbett, take for granted the superiority of mind 
over body. It is this principle, for instance, which informs Burke's "chain of 
subordination" in a hierarchical rural society: 
For in all things, whatever, the mind is the most valuable and most important; 
and in this scale the whole of agriculture is in a natural and just order; the beast 
is as an informing principle to the plough and cart; the labourer is as reason to 
the beast; and the farmer is as a thinking and presiding principle to the 
labourer. An attempt to break this chain of subordination in any part is equally 
absurd. (Writings and Speeches 9: 125) 
In Burke's scheme, each class of person is allocated a fixed place in society according 
to an innate mental superiority, which Burke takes to be the providential basis for a 
social distinction between rich and poor. The same idea informs Carlyle's "Occasional 
Discourse On the Negro Question, " where he argues that the purpose of all 
government is to order human relationships so that the secular order corresponds to 
the one clearly intended by the divine allocation of capabilities: "If precisely the Wisest 
Man were at the top of society, and the next-wisest next, and so on till we reached the 
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Demerara Nigger (from whom downwards through the horse, etc., there is no question 
hitherto), then were this a perfect world, the extreme maximum of wisdom produced 
in it" (Works 29: 361). Despite these assumptions about the essential difference 
between human beings, however, Burke, Cobbett, Hazlitt, and Carlyle, like their 
American counterparts, had reasons to elide as well as emphasise the differences 
between mental and manual labour, and had motives for reuniting the conceptually 
separated activities through the analogy of mental and manual work. In the period 
1790-1840, the figures of speech which hitch intellectual to physical labour were, this 
thesis argues, deployed in order to declare a position on the political role of the 
intellectual. While Bromell's project is to map the cultural meanings of "work" and 
"labour" in the ante-bellum period by examining the way American writers described 
their own work and the work of others (4-6), 1 examine intellectuals' representations 
of their own work not in order to elaborate the meaning of work/labour, but to 
describe the conflicting ideological effects of the analogies that assimilate mental to 
manual labour. 
What, then, are the political or ideological valences of intellectuals' 
identification of mental with manual work? It could be argued, and indeed it often is 
argued, that any theory of labour that fails to disaggregate "work" serves primarily to 
deceive the ordinary worker. Hence, J. K. Galbraith, in his influential The Affluent 
Society, calls the effort of economists to assert "the identity of all classes of labour"-- 
physical, mental, artistic, or managerial--"one of the oldest and most effective 
obfuscations in the field of social science. " While declaring the homogeneity of work 
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has enabled economists to construct a general theory of wages, the possibility of 
identifying themselves with those who do hard physical labour has also served to 
assuage the democratic conscience of the more favoured groups in both capitalist and 
communist societies (260-61). The fact that the worthiness of labour is proclaimed by 
the ideologues of both capitalist and socialist societies suggests a high degree of 
consensus on fundamental values between these competing orthodoxies, as Galbraith 
intimates (Anthony, The Ideology of Work 7-8). It is important to note that both those 
accounts of the labouring process which view all labour alike as an unfortunate 
necessity and those which celebrate the dignity of all labour are potentially deceptive. 
On one hand, the view of labour as a common curse, the result of original sin, tends to 
generalise the physical labourer's suffering to all men in order to reconcile the 
labourers to their lamentable condition; conversely, those ideas of labour which stress 
its dignity are intended to mislead the common labourer into believing that his or her 
suffering is somehow laudable. Part of the problem of all representations of work is 
that they are written from the point of view of the intellectual. As Galbraith puts it: 
"Since the man who does physical work is intellectually disqualified from comparing 
his toil with that of the brainworker, " the propositions of the latter--such as, for 
instance, the proposition that mental labour is just as taxing as, or even more taxing 
than, physical labour--are "uniquely unassailable" (261). 
In the Marxian tradition of criticism the metaphors which assimilate mental to 
manual work get even shorter shrift. The identification of intellectual work with the 
"real" work which goes on the fields or factories is usually dismissed as an attempt to 
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deceive the labourers and to appropriate their pains in order to alleviate the 
intellectual's anxieties about the lack of social utility or economic value of intellectual 
activity. 3 Fredric Jameson has clearly articulated the materialist refutation of the 
attempt to obscure, through the assimilation of thinking to arduous physical toil, the 
privileges that result from the social division of labour. In the first chapter of The 
Political Unconscious, where he attempts to define a "properly Marxist hermeneutic, " 
Jameson discusses at length the challenge of Althusserian (structural) Marxism to 
"traditional models of interpretation" (23). In the course of a lengthy and sometimes 
difficult discussion, largely addressed to theoretical disputes within the Marxist 
movement, Jameson remarks that Althusser's critique of "expressive causality" in 
Reading Capital is best deployed to attack "the structural notion of homology (or 
isomorphism, or structural parallelism), " a practice of criticism that Jameson associates 
in particular with Lucien Goldman. He also has in mind, however, all those attempts to 
create a "'materialist theory of language"' that depend on the homology between the 
"'production' of language in writing and speech, and economic production" (43-5). 
Jameson recognises that emphasising the "production" of texts has helped to divest us, 
as readers and critics, of the tendency to think of texts merely as objects, unified and 
static, but then goes on to argue that the metaphor of productivity, thus deployed, 
does not add very much to the conception of text as process. On the other hand, 
Jameson cautions, the metaphor possesses much "potential for use or misappropriation 
by a new ideology" : 
6 
One cannot, without intellectual dishonesty, assimilate the "production" of 
texts [... ] to the production of goods by factory workers: writing and thinking 
are not alienated labor in that sense, and it is surely fatuous for intellectuals to 
seek to glamorize their tasks--which for the most part can be subsumed under 
the rubric of the elaboration, reproduction, or critique of ideology--by 
assimilating them to real work on the assembly line and to the experience of the 
resistance of matter in genuine manual labor. (45) 
To labour the point somewhat: the identification of intellectual to "real" or "genuine" 
(that is, physical) work is a move--made by the "producers" of ideology--which 
disguises the "work" of ideological reproduction, by confusing what Marx called "the 
superstructure" with what he termed "the base. "4 
It is not immediately clear to what Jameson refers when he writes of a "new 
ideology. " He implies, I think, that the metaphor might be appropriated by other, less 
well-intentioned, intellectuals who attempt to pass off their own endeavours as 
equivalent to the labour of those who support the material life of the nation. Jameson's 
fears have been realised, at least according to Jeremy Seabrook, who in 1988 claimed 
that the work ethic had been recycled by the rich "for their own purposes" (17,41). 
"Never in the history of labour, " Seabrook believes, "has there been such a competitive 
claim for recognition, for the tributes due to such feats of toil as are undertaken today" 
(12). Ironically, while so much labour in the past was concerned with the "stern 
materialities" of mining and manufacture, and was consequently energy-sapping and 
body-deforming, the "new votaries of labour" are engaged in far more "nebulous" or 
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"impalpable" activities--banking, finance, insurance, administration, research and 
knowledge-work, consultancy, planning, media-work, advertising, design, image- 
making, entertainment--in short all those to whom Galbraith referred when he claimed 
in The Affluent Society to identify the emergence of a "new class" (Seabrook 10,13). 5 
Seabrook lists figures of speech by which the rich and famous have audaciously 
"colonised the language of work and made it their own, " and observes that this recent 
"expropriation of function is the least remarked and most subtle of all the manifold 
expropriations of the poor" (11-12,15,18,20-1). For the ideological effect of this 
colonisation is to justify the increase in economic inequity in the eyes both of the 
expropriators and expropriated; having laboured to earn what they have, the rich have 
no need to conceal their wealth and can indulge in the most conspicuous consumption 
(28,37). 
It might be that, as Galbraith, Jameson and Seabrook suggest, there is 
something new at work in this recent appropriation by the rich of the labour of the 
poor, though, as I shall discuss, there is certainly nothing novel about the yoking of 
mental to manual work. If we accept, for the sake of argument, Jameson's proposition 
that all writing or intellectual activity is finally subsumable to the "elaboration, 
reproduction, or critique of ideology" (45), then what we want to know is what are the 
particular ideological motives and effects of a particular representation of mental work 
in this or that context. Of course, the linking of mental to material labour by 
intellectuals can be self-serving: it allows writers to give to thinking and writing the 
appearance of something solid and substantial and rescues mental work from the 
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charges of inutility and triviality. As Zygmunt Bauman has emphasised, however, all 
definitions of intellectuals and of intellectual labour are self-representations. 
Representing is what intellectuals do--it is the activity itself, as Edward Said says--so 
all representations of intellectuals participate in the process of self-definition and self- 
legitimation (Bauman 8-9,18; Said xv, 11). While the writers whom I discuss are 
certainly attempting to define the intellectual's role, their representations of intellectual 
labour are as frequently intended to distinguish between different kinds of intellectual 
performances as to draw boundaries between mental and manual work. I want to 
discriminate, too, between what Jameson calls homology, or isomorphism, and 
analogy. When Cobbett and Hazlitt want to give the analogy a radical inflection, for 
example, they are at pains to point out the metaphoric status of their assimilation of 
mental to manual labour. 
I am seeking to understand the persistence of the analogy between mental and 
manual work in intellectuals' self-representations, which was already something of a 
cliche by 1790 and has endured beyond the Romantic period. Why do four such 
rhetorically sophisticated writers resort to this cliche? The prevalence of the analogy 
over time and within different political contexts suggests that its ideological meaning 
needs to be explained, rather taken for granted. I am not, therefore, looking at how the 
representational practices of writers and speakers construct the labouring poor, but at 
the way in which the labouring population is invoked in intellectuals' self- 
representations. 6 This is not to say, of course, that it does not matter how the poor are 
depicted. I take for granted--as do Cobbett, Hazlitt, and Carlyle--that the assimilation 
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of intellectuals' activity to physical labour is problematic. 7 At the same time, it is 
impossible to ignore that intellectual labour is almost always defined contrapuntally, in 
relation, that is, to material labour. From 1790,1 shall claim, the analogy with physical 
labour was a recurring trope, a rhetorical figure to be struggled over, in what Jeffrey 
Cox has called a "battle" to define the political ideology of intellectuals (57). 
In the work of these four writers, I argue, the analogies linking mental and 
manual work are employed primarily in a polemic against other head-workers, writers 
and politicians. Hence, when, in the following passage from the third of his Letters on 
a Regicide Peace (1796), Burke speaks of labour as the curse of mankind, "our 
common doom, " the assimilation of mental and manual work seems, on one hand, to 
reproduce ideology in the most straightforward manner: 
We have heard many plans for the relief of the "Labouring Poor. " This puling 
jargon is not as innocent as it is foolish. In meddling with great affairs, 
weakness is never innoxious. Hitherto the name of Poor (in the sense in which 
it is used to excite compassion) has not been used for those who can, but for 
those who cannot labour--for the sick and infirm; for orphan infancy; for 
languishing and decrepid [sic] age; but when we affect to pity as poor those 
who must labour or the world cannot exist, we are trifling with the condition of 
mankind. It is the common doom of man that he must eat his bread by the 
sweat of his brow, that is by the sweat of his body, or the sweat of his mind. If 
this toil was inflicted as a curse, it is as might be expected from the curses of 
the Father of all Blessings--it is tempered with many alleviations, many 
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comforts. Every attempt to fly from it, and to refuse the very terms of our 
existence, becomes much more truly a curse [ ... 
]. I do not call a healthy 
young man, chearful in his mind, and vigorous in his arms, I cannot call such a 
man poor; I cannot pity my kind as a kind, merely because they are men. This 
affected pity, only tends to dissatisfy them with their condition, and to teach 
them to seek resources where no resources are to be found, in something else 
than their own industry, and frugality, and sobriety. Whatever may be the 
intention of those [ ... 
] who would discontent mankind with this strange 
pity, they act towards us in the consequences, as if they were our worst 
enemies. (Writings and Speeches 9: 355-6) 
With his suggestion that the burden of labour falls equally on all, mental as well as 
manual workers, Burke seems to attempt to reconcile the labouring poor to their lot. It 
is important to remember, however, that Burke is not addressing the workers directly. 
When he uses a trope like "the sweat of the mind" he differentiates himself from other 
intellectuals, such as those intellectuals who, he believed, were attempting to foment 
disorder at home by making the poor dissatisfied with their situation. As I shall discuss 
in more detail in chapter two, Burke suspects that the "puling jargon" and the display 
of an "affected pity" are motivated not by a genuine sympathy for the poor, but by a 
desire to alter the domestic power-balance by inciting unrest among the populace. 
Those writers and thinkers who affect compassion for the labourers deny the terms of 
human life by suggesting that the situation of the labouring poor could be substantially 
ameliorated. In contrast, Burke presents himself as a realist, who sees that the 
necessary and unalterable condition of human existence is labour, manual or mental. 
His opponents are mere dreamers, theorists whose utopian fantasies cost them 
nothing, and who, therefore, themselves avoid the real (mental) labour of proposing 
practical and implementable policies. Burke's "sweat of the mind, " that is, does double 
duty because it can be stressed in two ways. Mental work is a way of differentiating 
his own endeavour from that of the manual workers, even as he implies that both 
classes of workers were amending in equal portion for an original sin; mental work, on 
the other hand, marks a distinction from other non-manual workers, from speculative 
intellectuals whose activities are less grounded than Burke's in the inescapable realities 
of material life. 
By blaming the irresponsible intellectual activity of disaffected literary men for 
political upheaval in France, Burke initiated a debate about the role of educated and 
literate men in society. One way in which radical intellectuals challenged Burke's 
depiction of the ungrounded intellect was by reappropriating the analogy from Burke 
and deploying it either in their own self-definitions, or in a polemic against reactionary 
intellectuals and writers. For Cobbett, Hazlitt and Carlyle, the representation of 
intellectual labour was both a way of positioning themselves in the conflict between 
the two polarised social classes--rich and poor, ruling and ruled, oppressors and 
oppressed, non-working aristocracy and productive labourers--and a means of 
situating themselves with respect to other intellectuals. The analogy is used critically, 
for instance, in Cobbett's attack on the pro-ministerial pensioned press, in Hazlitt's 
attack on the "aristocracy of letters, " and in Carlyle's berating of a "unworking" 
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aristocracy. All three writers, at some point, declare the common cause of 
discontented intellectual workers with material labourers, in a solidarity which 
ostentatiously excludes a non-working ruling class. Thus, the same analogy that Burke 
uses for reactionary political purposes could be employed to announce a radical, 
potentially revolutionary, political programme. The ideological significance of the 
analogy between mental and manual labour during the period 1790-1840 emerges only 
in the context in which it occurs--each writer represents his activity in a particular 
polemical context and to a specific audience--though the occasion for the analogy is 
most often, I argue, a political dispute with other intellectuals. 
Paying attention to the particular polemical contexts in which they are 
engaged, I undertake close rhetorical readings of several of the key texts of each of 
these writers. My focus is on rhetorical complexity, on the tension between the 
declarative and performative aspects of written works, and on the contradictions that 
arise as a result of the tendency to both distinguish and compound mental and material 
activity. My case is enabled and enriched, here, by Anne Janowitz's reading of 
Romanticism as the literary site for the meeting and contending of communitarian and 
individualistic vocabularies, values, and versions of identity (1-8,12). Janowitz's 
conception of Romanticism provides a framework for talking about the tensions 
between connection and division, between exemplariness and singularity, tensions that 
are manifested in the writings of the prose writers I discuss here. For each of these 
writers, the possession of extraordinary mental prowess--the idea of genius in 
Romantic aesthetics--is a mark of distinction, signifying originality, individuality and 
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uniqueness. While all four writers are tempted to play up their own mental 
exceptionalism, however, they also emphasise their own typicality and ordinariness as 
labourers when they suggest that intellectual endeavour is undifferentiated from sheer 
hard graft of other workers. The analogy with manual labour, therefore, is one trope 
around which the writer's common identity with other populations is asserted in the 
face of the competing claims of solitary genius and Romantic individuation. ' 
Although this thesis is a work of literary criticism, my thinking has been 
informed by historical and sociological accounts of intellectuals and intellectual work. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I wish to clarify the terms and concepts 
employed in this thesis. I consider, first, the terms "labour" and "mental labour" and 
explore the development of the analogy linking mental and manual labour in British 
culture. I then review, insofar as they are relevant to my study, twentieth-century 
studies of intellectuals. In the course of my discussion, I demonstrate that the analogy 
with physical labour has been a durable component--a staple, we might say--of 
intellectuals' self-representations, even though it could be invested with various 
ideological significations. 
I use "work" and "labour" interchangeably because during the Romantic period 
there was already a great deal of overlap between the two terms. If anything--then, as 
now--"labour" was somewhat more specific in its connotation of painful, difficult, and 
even compulsory exertion. Johnson's dictionary suggests this specificity of labour, 
defining a labourer as someone employed in "coarse and toilsome work. " By the 
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eighteenth century, according to the OED, both terms were used to designate mental 
as well as bodily toil. Though it sounds commonsensical enough to us, however, there 
is nothing obvious about the concept of mental labour. In the early middle ages, 
according to Keith Thomas, "labour" was thought of exclusively as physical labour. In 
his introduction to The Oxford Book of Work, Thomas writes that during the Middle 
Ages society was perceived as being divided into three orders--the priest, the soldier, 
and the man who cultivated the soil--of which only the last was thought to labour. The 
idea of "work" as an "undifferentiated abstraction comprehending an almost infinite 
variety of different activities" was a later development: "Only gradually, " Thomas 
states, "did the concept of intellectual or mental labour develop" (xiv-xv). 9 The 
history of the concept is in some respects the history of the process of its 
naturalisation, until today, to Jameson's consternation, there has ceased to be anything 
jarring in the conjunction of "intellectual" and "labour. " At the same time, even as the 
concept becomes more compact, the nebulous nature and counter-intuitive character 
of mental work keeps surfacing, which is one reason why intellectuals seem vulnerable 
to critique and why so much of the content of intellectual work is devoted to 
persuading others that what they do is in fact "real" work. lo 
During the eighteenth century there were, in large part as a result of the 
discourse of political economy, changes in the representational value of "labour" or 
"work. " The virtue attached to labour was inflected, specifically, by an economic 
argument. As labour came to be valorised as an activity which through the creation of 
wealth increased national power, it also became a way of securing social esteem. " 
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Without down-playing too much the changes which occurred then, it should be 
stressed that the idea that labour was worthy and idleness, by the same token, 
disgraceful, certainly preceded the eighteenth century. It is possible perhaps to talk 
about the emergence of a "work ethic, " but it is more accurate, though more vague, to 
refer to a "set of injunctions to work"--religious, moral, economic--which gradually 
saturated the culture over the course of several centuries (Joyce, The Historical 
Meaning of Work 4,20; McClelland 184). It is not my purpose to discuss the 
evolution of the various, often ideologically opposed, discourses which celebrated 
work, but to trace one register of this high valorisation of work: the desire of non- 
manual workers to claim for themselves some of the social esteem that attended hard 
labour. 
In the sixteenth century, Thomas Starkey's Dialogue Between Reginald Pole 
and Thomas Lupset (1533-1536) envisioned the nation as a human body and argued 
that the health of the commonwealth depended upon a just contribution from each part 
of the body politic. Starkey's aim was to admonish the English nobility, the "head" of 
the nation, whom he rebuked for their "idul pastymys and vayne, " for wasting their 
time in hunting, eating, and playing cards (52). The nobility, Starkey believed, needed 
to be reformed and educated so that they could adequately fulfill their role in civic life. 
All men, chides Pole, Starkey's mouthpiece in the Dialogue, have to earn their right to 
exist: 
[Man] is borne to labur and travayle [... ] and not to lyve as Homer sayth some 
dow as an unprofytabul weyght and burden of the erthe, for man is borne to be 
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as a governour, rular and dylygent tyllar and inhabytant of thys erthe, as some 
by labur of the body to procure thyngys necessary for the mayntenance of 
mannys lyfe, some by wysdome and pollycy to kepe the rest of the multytude in 
gud ordur and cyvylyte, so that non be borne to thys idulness and vanyte, to 
the wych the most parte of our pepul ys much gyven and bent [... ] though hyt 
be so that hyt ys no thyng necessary al to be laburarys and tyllarys of the 
ground, but some to be prestys and mynysturys of goddys word, some to be 
gentylmen to the governance of the rest. (53) 
That rulers and ruled constitute the head and hands of the political body is a figure that 
persists into the nineteenth century and is present in the work of Cobbett and Carlyle. 
Anticipating Carlyle, too, is the criticism of the idle, game-loving aristocracy who 
consumed the material products of the nation's labourers without rendering anything in 
return. The equation in Starkey's Dialogue of the labours of the rulers with those of 
the ruled ("rular and dylygant tyllar") is made in order to persuade the aristocracy that 
they, too, have a duty to perform in leading and guiding the multitude, though the 
effect is also to legitimate the fundamental division of labour. One doesn't have to 
make too much of an imaginative leap to see that Carlyle is drawing on this age-worn 
trope in texts like Chartism and Past and Present, with his call for a "real working 
aristocracy" to preside over the nation. Carlyle's demand is provocative in the way that 
Starkey's is not, of course, because his writings could be read as feeding, through their 
wide dissemination, more radical agendas. 
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The text for Starkey's Dialogue might have been from the second of Paul's 
epistles to the Thessalonians--If any man will not work, neither should he eat (2 
Thessalonians, iii. 10)--an adage that was repeatedly invoked in the nineteenth century 
both by Malthusian apologists for the New Poor Law, in their attack on the recipients 
of poor relief, and by radicals like Cobbett in their attacks on the idle aristocracy. If to 
this biblical injunction is added a second, that of having to eat one's bread by the sweat 
of one's brow, then non-manual workers must produce at least metaphorical sweat to 
justify their right to exist. In his commentary on the Thessalonians, the sixteenth- 
century Bishop of Salisbury, John Jewel, acknowledges that Paul's speech was 
addressed to those "who under the pretence of the gospel lived idly and would not 
labour, " and defends the labours of bishops, preachers, and other guides of the people, 
princes and learned men: "Now, if we by our labour minister to you the bread which 
cometh from heaven, is it much that you give us the bread of the earth? " (2: 939,940). 
Jewel's justification for the existence of bishops, preachers, and other brainworkers is 
repeated virtually verbatim by Carlyle in Sartor Resartus in his defence of the man of 
letters. But bread from heaven is not, after all, as essential to human existence as real 
bread, and Jewel shrewdly anticipates the objections to his metaphor: 
But you will say, kings, and counsellors, bishops, preachers, and all sorts of 
learned men, neither plough nor sow, nor hedge nor ditch, nor use such painful 
labour of the body: they sit at rest and live idly. They that so think are 
deceived. The toil which princes take, and the great cares wherewith they are 
occupied, pass all other cares in the world [... ]. If a bishop or minister 
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study the scriptures, preach the gospel, catechize the children and take a care 
of the souls of God's people; if he sow the Lord's field, feed the Lord's flock, 
thresh the Lord's corn, [... ] if he do the work of an evangelist and make his 
ministry fully known; he shall find himself occupied, and not be idle. (2: 941-2) 
Obviously, the claim that the toils and cares of kings and bishops surpass all others is, 
in Galbraith's term, "unassailable" (261). Jewel is not finished, however; warming to 
his task, he supports his argument through another analogy, by invoking the metaphor 
of the ship of state, to which vessel, he claims, the prince, his ministers and counselors 
are as captains: 
The master of the ship seemeth to be idle, to sit still, and to do nothing. He 
stirreth not the pump, he driveth not the oars, he soundeth not the deep, he 
rideth not the ropes, he scaleth not the shrouds, he runneth not hither and 
thither, forward or backward, under the hatches or above, [... ] in appearance 
[he] doth nothing. But his labour passeth all the rest. Without his labour, all the 
pains which the other mariners take were lost. Were it not for his labour, the 
ship would soon strike upon rocks, and be stayed in the sands, and they all 
should perish. (Jewel 2: 942) 
"In appearance he doth nothing" yet "his labour passeth all the rest" : The mental 
worker's labour is figured as something that looks to the casual observer like idleness, 
and that only a closer and more discerning view would reveal to be labour after all. 
The problem is that the brain does not appear to sweat and strain and bend like the 
body. This unlucky circumstance plagues representations of brain work into the 
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nineteenth century. In Ford Madox Brown's famous painting, titled simply Work, 
finished in 1863 and exhibited in 1865, Carlyle is depicted in a suit and white collar 
talking to fellow intellectual, the Christian Socialist Frederick Denison Maurice, and 
leaning somewhat ostentatiously on a walking-stick (see Figure 1). The two men stand 
to the right of a group of excavators, watching the physical labourers performing their 
work. In Brown's own comments on the painting, the excavators, at the centre of the 
canvas, stand as the "outward and visible type of work, " and they are watched by "two 
men who appear as having nothing to do. These are the brain-workers, who, seeming 
to be idle, work, and are the cause of well-ordained work and happiness in others" 
(Hueffer 189-90). Though silent and invisible, and looking for all the world like 
idleness, brain-work, it is proposed, is no less labourious than the more visible labours 
of the body. 
To be sure, the apparent stillness of mental labour ("he runneth not hither and 
thither") might be adduced as a unique advantage; the inactivity of the ship's captain, 
while all about him are engaged in a frenetic activity, could be viewed as steadfastness 
rather than indolence. It is the master's unmoving position at the hub, so to speak, 
which allows him to contemplate and command the motions at the circumference. This 
is essentially the position that Adam Smith assumes in the opening pages of The 
Wealth of Nations when he imagines the division of labour in a pin factory "placed at 
once under the view of the spectator" (1: 14-15). Coleridge drew on the same trope 
when he pictured a national Clerisy--the guardians of a nation's learning--as "the points 
of relative rest" without whom there can be no harmony in any complex Community. 12 
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What strikes me about Jewel's text, however, is his defensiveness, his attempt to 
exonerate "kings and counsellors, bishops, preachers, and all sorts of learned men" 
from the charge of idleness. Some labour with their mind and some with their body; it 
seems straightforward enough. What troubles Jewel is that mental work could be seen 
as a mask for idleness. Even when passivity is glorified for the perspective it provides 
on human affairs, the invisibility of head work is a cause for concern: the analogy with 
bodily toil tries to make the labour of the mind visible to all. 
Starkey and Jewel explain or justify mental labour through an analogy with 
bodily labour; physical labour came first and is the norm or criterion in relation to 
which mental labour is defined. By the mid-eighteenth century, the toil of the mind 
was becoming normalised, could stand alone, and could, therefore, be identified less 
self-consciously, and with less of a palaver, with the toil of the body. In A Word to the 
Wise (1749), a pamphlet in which he admonishes his fellow Irishmen for their aversion 
to labour and for their "innate hereditary sloth, " George Berkeley recommended the 
salutary benefits of labour. Without the sense of a countervailing argument which 
disturbs Jewel, Berkeley briskly identifies the two activities as instances of the same 
species, labour: "There can be no such thing as a happy life without labour, and [... ] 
whoever doth not labour with his hands, must, in his own defence, labour with his 
brains" (235,23 8). Berkeley's maxim yokes the two activities together in the same 
way as Jewel's "divers sorts of labour, some of the mind and some of the body; " the 
difference between them is that Berkeley (like Burke in his "sweat of his body or the 
sweat of his mind") is not moved to elaborate on his identification of the two 
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activities, suggesting, I think, that by this point in time the notion of "mental labour" 
had become obvious enough, at least to intellectuals. 
While Berkeley, in an antecedent to Carlyle's view of labour as something 
uniquely fulfilling, claimed that a life without labour was not worth living, other 
eighteenth-century writers were acknowledging that physical labour was a curse rather 
than a source of happiness, and that only physical necessity could compel it. Most 
eighteenth-century commentators on the economy conceded that the labouring classes 
were responsible for producing the wealth of the nation, but they also believed that to 
reward them too generously would remove the incentive to produce. This belief was 
widespread and persistent: Burke, Malthus, and, on occasion, the radical Cobbett 
concurred with Arthur Young's view that "The lower classes need to be kept poor, or 
they will never be industrious" (Young 311,320,329,350-56,361). One way to 
resolve these two contradictory accounts of labour is to point out--as Marx did in his 
criticism of Adam Smith in the Grundrisse--that the idea that labour was a burden or 
sacrifice simply naturalises the specific historical forms in which physical labour has 
been embodied (260-1). In the view of some earlier writers, too, there was no reason 
why manual labour any more than mental work should necessarily be objectionable. 
For Gerrard Winstanley, the spokesman for the ultra-radical, seventeenth-century 
"Diggers, " the sorrow was not manual labour-- "plowing, digging, and all kinds of 
manuring"--but its unequal distribution and the element of compulsion. "Bare and 
simple working in the Earth, according to the freedome of the creation, though it be in 
the sweat of mans browes, is not the curse, " wrote Winstanley: "But for one part of 
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Mankind to be a Task-master and to live Idle; and by the Beast-like power of the 
sword, does force another part of Mankind to worke as a servant and a slave, this is 
the power of the curse, which makes mankind eat his bread in sorrow by the sweat of 
his browes" (423-4). Essentially the same argument was put forward by Cobbett a 
century and a half later: honest labour honestly recompensed was no cause for 
complaint. 
The eighteenth-century's economic valorisation of labour was decisively 
influenced by the discourse of political economy and, in particular, by Adam Smith's 
The Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith's treatise elevated the division of labour to an 
explanatory principle underlying all social and economic life. Though he was not the 
first to do so, Smith famously treats all labour as a commodity, as something abstract 
and undifferentiated. According to Smith, therefore, "philosophy or speculation 
becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a 
particular class of people" (1: 21). In an ideal commercial society all labourers live by 
exchanging their products or services with one another, so that every man "becomes in 
some measure a merchant" (36); the nature of the commodity one brings to the 
market, then, is irrelevant. Even as he represents labour as a single entity, 
comprehending the labours of the mind as well as those of the body (100), however, 
there is a suggestion that Smith thinks of labour primarily as manual labour. Mental 
labour is considered "labour" only in a derivative sense, and cannot be unambiguously 
identified with its bodily counterpart. Hence, in his chapter "On the real and nominal 
price of commodities, or their price in labour, and their price in money, " Smith argues 
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that labour is the "real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities" (47). 
The real price of anything, he writes, is the "toil and trouble" of acquiring it; that is, 
the value of what we pay for in money is the toil and trouble it saves us, and, 
therefore, what is paid for in money is "purchased by labour as much as what we 
acquire by the toil of our own body" (47). Toil and trouble correspond to bodily 
labour, and "real" value is, as it were, the product of real, that is to say physical, toil. 
In the same way, Smith's tendency to use the metonymy of "hands" to talk about all 
labourers suggests that he equates productive labour specifically with manual work 
(332). 
The Wealth of Nations appears to codify previous assumptions--hinted at by 
writers like Starkey and Jewel--that the division of labour is a neutral way of parcelling 
out the productive tasks of a society, so that activities are distributed to those with 
special aptitude or talent for them. The notion that different men had different abilities 
that fitted them for a certain kind of work was widely held; Burke, Cobbett, Hazlitt 
and Carlyle all believed, at some level, that there was a natural division of society, 
where those who were innately equipped for intellectual employments ought to govern 
or guide the activities of those suited only to manual employments. Authority for this 
view could not be unequivocally obtained from Smith's discussion of the division of 
labour, however. Although Smith did claim that the division of labour in society 
originated because the tendency to truck and barter encouraged every man to "apply 
himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever 
talent or genius he may possess, " he also argued, surprisingly, that, on the whole, the 
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division of labour creates the different talents and "natural" aptitudes rather than 
following from them: "The difference of natural talents in men is, in reality, much less 
than we are aware of, and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men 
of different professions [... ] is not upon many occasions so much the cause as the 
effect of the division of labour" (1: 27-9). Even radical writers like Cobbett or Hazlitt 
were not always careful to make this distinction; they appear, generally, to subscribe to 
the view that individuals are simply fitted from birth for a certain occupation and a 
particular social station. 
Smith's terms and arguments were frequently appropriated by the writers of the 
Romantic period, though not always with either fidelity or precision. The discourse on 
labour was, for example, profoundly affected by the separation, crucial to The Wealth 
of Nations, of productive and unproductive labour. For Smith, productive labour is 
that labour employed in the production of vendible commodities, and the wealth of a 
nation is regulated, he says, by the proportion between those who are employed in 
productive labour and those, unproductive workers or non-workers, who are not so 
employed (104-5). 13 Smith does not attach an ethical dimension to this differentiation; 
he says that the labour of some of the most respectable members of society--some of 
"the gravest and most important" as well as some of the "most frivolous professions"-- 
is, from the economic point of view, unproductive: "churchmen, lawyers, physicians, 
men of letters of all kinds" (1: 330-32). Despite Smith's insistence that his categories 
do not entail a moral discrimination, his equation of "productive" with "useful" labour 
implies the contrary (11). Certainly his consignment of men of letters to the category 
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of unproductive labourers could make writers appear socially and economically 
marginal. Who, after all, would want to be an "unproductive" member of society? At 
the very least, as Bromell notes, Smith's distinction raises the (for writers) unwelcome 
questions of what work is and who the workers are (21). 
This is not a thesis in economics and it is no part of my intention to defend a 
particular interpretation of Smith's work. It is important to note, however, that Smith's 
terminology and ideas had considerable currency, and that writers of opposing political 
tendencies drew on him as a source of authority. Smith's book is by no means a 
straightforward apology for commercial capitalism, nor indeed for the division of 
labour (Wealth of Nations 2: 781-5). Although his theories were turned against the 
labourers by defenders of the free-market like Burke and Malthus, his instinctive 
sympathies seem to have been with the labourers and his thought was often 
appropriated by radicals in the nineteenth century to criticise social and economic 
inequalities (McNally, Against the Market 43,53-5,59). We should note, too, that 
when Smith's terms and concepts were adopted they were not always employed with 
strict adherence to the original meanings. Hence, although Cobbett made use of the 
productive/ unproductive opposition, he did so for the polemical purpose of 
distinguishing between those who work and pay taxes and those who live in idleness 
off those taxes, between the population at large, on one hand, and a corrupt 
government and its lackeys on the other. The ambiguous way in which Smith's terms 
were appropriated meant that references to the division of labour or to productive 
labourers, for example, could crop up in unlikely--and sometimes, as I shall discuss in 
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chapter four, in seemingly inappropriate--places, such as in Hazlitt's definition of 
artistic genius. 14 
The figures of speech conflating mental and manual labour had, as I have 
shown, a long history. Although none of the four writers I discuss can quite divest the 
analogy of the ideological baggage that it entails, namely the attempt to naturalise the 
fundamental division of labour in society, in the fifty years following the French 
Revolution, this hackneyed trope was put into the service of other ideological agendas. 
The analogy was invoked, I argue, to articulate a view about the political role of 
intellectuals in society. Following 1790, and Burke's incendiary reflections on the 
French Revolution, the function of the intellectual was debated in British culture, if not 
for the first time, then for the first time with a clear sense of the ideological stakes 
which still mark our current cultural discourse about intellectuals and their role in 
society. While the initial democratic ideals of the French Revolution were soon to be 
abandoned as practical political goals, they had a lasting impact on political discourse; 
the entry of the masses into the political arena meant that the acquiescence of the 
labouring poor could not be taken for granted. Burke's rapid response to events in 
France--with his emphasis on the material consequences of ideas and his indictment of 
the activities of the producers of those ideas--made clear that conservative political 
discourse had to compete, on an ideological battleground, for the allegiance of the 
labouring population. Intellectual authority, the authority of doctrine, as well as 
political authority, needed to be based, figuratively at least, in the life of the nation as a 
whole. In Burke's political economy of the revolution, the assimilation of mental to 
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physical labour is made in order to claim that his own intellectual endeavour, for 
example, is more rooted in material life, than the abstract intellectual activity of radical 
philosophers. In this way, Burke invokes the labouring community at large in support 
of his own political ideology and denies to the radical theorists the possibility of 
grounding their speculations in the assumed allegiance of the labourers of, for, and 
sometimes to whom they claimed to speak. The figures of speech linking mental and 
manual work become contested terrain, as they had not been prior to 1790, because 
the analogy was a site for the struggle to define the political ideology of intellectuals, a 
rhetorical move in a discourse on intellectuals, within a cultural climate where 
intellectuals were attacked for the abstract, ungrounded, unintegrated nature of their 
activity. Like Burke, Cobbett, Hazlitt, and Carlyle all draw on the analogy for 
polemical purposes, even as they adopt it for very different ideological programmes. " 
In this thesis, I focus on the writer as a particular kind of intellectual worker. 
Occupying a position within the middle strata of society, the writers I discuss here did 
not derive their income from any of the three sources by which political economists 
divided society--rent on land, profits on capital, and the wages of labour (Perkin 252- 
4)--though Hazlitt did work for a time as salaried reporter for a daily paper. I use the 
terms "intellectual, " then, to refer to men who, as Berkeley puts it, "labour with their 
brains, " to men who earn a living--either by selling their products on the market or by 
offering services to a patron--and who do so in an occupation where mental effort 
outweighs physical exertion. The category of "the intellectual" is one of the key issues 
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in modern sociology, and my thinking has been shaped by the writings of sociologists 
like Pierre Bourdieu, Ron Eyerman, Antonio Gramsci, Alvin Gouldner, and Edward 
Shils, and of literary/ cultural critics like Edward Said and Raymond Williams, 
although the evidence of their influence is, in general, confined to the footnotes. I want 
now to comment on the historical and theoretical literature on the topic of 
intellectuals; and since sociological studies, for the most part, attempt to set out the 
conditions for the possibility of the emergence of a particular form of intellectual life 
rather than trying to pin down a specific date for that emergence, I first address the 
possible objection that my use of the term "intellectual" is ahistorical or anachronistic 
when applied to the period 1790-1840.16 
In Keywords, Raymond Williams writes that the use of the word "intellectual" 
as a noun "to indicate a particular kind of person or a person doing a particular kind of 
work" dates from the early nineteenth century, when, he claims, its implications were 
the mainly negative ones of coldness and abstraction (140). The most important 
reason for these associations, as Williams says, was the opposition in British culture, 
following the French Revolution, to "social and political arguments based on theory or 
on rational principle" (141). This aversion was connected, in turn, to the Romantic 
opposition to the separation of reason and emotion. Williams argues, too, that the 
emergence of the concept of a special category of persons called intellectual was 
dependent on the growing independence starting in the eighteenth century of some 
intellectuals from established political and religious institutions (140-42). While I agree 
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in broad terms with Williams' account, I want to expand on his necessarily compressed 
discussion. 17 
Williams' version of the history of the emergence of intellectuals has been 
challenged by T. W. Heyck, who argues that Williams' dates are too early. "In the 
early and mid-Victorian periods (1830-70), " writes Heyck, "the English did not think 
of their society as having a separate, distinct class of people known as intellectuals" (9, 
16). According to Heyck, neither the concept nor the term intellectual in any of the 
modern senses of the term existed until the middle of the century and probably not 
until the later Victorian period (1870-1900). Twentieth-century sociological 
definitions of the intellectual are therefore anachronistic when applied to pre-1870 
society: "one should [... ] attempt [... ] to see how the Victorians thought about 
themselves and their intellectual needs" (14-15). It is only the emergence of the idea 
and the vocabulary of intellectuals during the Victorian period, Heyck argues, that 
"have made it possible for modern sociologists to think of all societies [... ] as having 
intellectuals" (15). He is quite severe in his censure of Perry Anderson, Tom Nairn, 
and E. P. Thompson, for "the heavy-handedness of their generalizations and the 
casualness of their usage of terms like 'the intellectuals' and 'an intelligentsia"' (19). 
Despite his avowedly historical orientation, Heyck's evidence is largely 
confined to the absence of the term intellectual in nineteenth-century dictionaries and 
encyclopedias. There may be something to be said for relying solely on the terms and 
concepts that an earlier period might have deployed to describe itself, but Heyck's out- 
and-out rejection of the analytic category of "intellectual" may prevent him from 
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identifying evidence, in earlier periods, of processes and phenomena that bear some 
resemblance to the idea of intellectuals so-called. One point of attempting the 
theoretical definition of any historical phenomenon, I take it, is to help to make explicit 
concepts and distinctions that writers in earlier periods would perhaps have felt 
without being able to fully articulate. Doing away with the term "intellectual" to talk 
about the period would be like dispensing with the term "class" or any of the other 
analytic categories that enable us to make intelligible earlier processes and events. I 
don't think, in sum, that Heyck proves that the concept, as opposed to the term, 
"intellectual" was absent in the early nineteenth century; contrary to Heyck's claim, 
sociological theory and the history of ideas suggest an earlier appearance of the notion 
of intellectual. 
There is a further, more serious criticism to make of Heyck. The 
transformation in the intellectual life of the nation, which Heyck meticulously charts, 
produces as its outcome the "doctrine of a separate class of learned men, shielded from 
the public by means of endowment but claiming the authority of priests of true 
knowledge and correct thinking" (217). For Heyck, intellectuals are defined by their 
"aloofness, " "elevation, " and "detachment" from ordinary life (217). The image of the 
intellectual as a detached and contemplative observer is based on an aristocratic model 
of intellectual activity, as we shall see, and whether the ideal is embodied in 
Coleridge's clerisy, in the aestheticism of artists, or in the professionalisation of 
academic scientists, the type is a persistent one in representations of intellectuals. 
While the ideal of separateness is certainly an alluring one, and one which each of the 
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four authors I discuss is occasionally attracted to, in my view this is too rarefied an 
ideal of what the intellectual is. Burke, Hazlitt, Cobbett, and Carlyle do not maintain 
the contemplative stance for long and, indeed, the use of the analogy with manual 
labour is partly meant to abolish the charge of detachment. To a large extent, then, we 
all construct our object of study; if Heyck is looking for a prototype of the intellectual 
that he has already defined as aloof and exalted above the public, he is unlikely to find 
that type embodied in the activity of the four combative polemicists I study here. 
It is important to stress that the formation of the idea of the intellectual was 
not a single event but a process, commencing in all likelihood with Voltaire and then 
consolidating around the final three decades of the nineteenth century with the 
formation of "a distinct class of people. i18 The conditions for the possibility of the 
concept had arisen during the Renaissance; both Gouldner and Bourdieu emphasise the 
importance of secularisation, the breakdown of the old feudal system of aristocratic 
and ecclesiastical patronage, and the growth of an anonymous exchange-market for 
cultural goods as conditions necessary for the emergence of a class of cultural 
producers, formally autonomous in being dependent on the market for their income 
(Gouldner 1-2; Bourdieu, "The Market of Symbolic Goods" 14-15). As I shall make 
clear in chapter two, Burke's interpretation of the French Revolution is fully cognisant 
of the process which these sociologists describe. Here is Burke, for example, in a 
famous passage from the Reflections, warning of the dangers of learned and 
enterprising men freed from the tutelage of church and state: 
32 
The nobility and the clergy, the one by profession, the other by patronage, kept 
learning in existence [... ]. Learning paid back what it received to nobility and 
to priesthood; and paid it back with usury, by enlarging their ideas and by 
furnishing their minds. Happy if they had all continued to know their 
indissoluble union, and their proper place! Happy if learning, not debauched by 
ambition, had been satisfied to continue the instructor, and not aspired to be 
the master! Along with its natural protectors and guardians, learning will be 
cast into the mire, and trodden down under the hoofs of a swinish multitude. 
(Writings and Speeches 8: 130) 
In virtually all his texts in the 1790s, Burke emphasizes the critical role of ambitious, 
newly-politicised men of letters, calling to mind Habermas' account of the emergence 
of a political public out of an earlier literary public sphere, an occurrence that 
Habermas dates earlier in Britain than in France or Germany (Structural 
Transformation 27-43,57-73). Burke does not use the term "intellectual, " but it is 
surely no anachronism to employ Bourdieu's terminology to elucidate Burke's 
reasoning. 
It is common to divide the different theories for thinking about intellectuals 
into three over-arching traditions: 1) the notion of the intellectual as a protector of 
cultural standards; 2) the idea of the intellectual as a political dissident; and 3) the idea 
of the intellectual as a determinate place on the social division of labour. 19 Although 
they are worth separating for analytical purposes, in practice, most theories of 
intellectuals contain aspects of all of these traditions. The last describes the 
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institutional position or occupational role of the intellectual rather than being a mission 
statement of his or her social function. It is this third group of theories which underlies 
structural or sociological definitions of intellectuals such as Bourdieu's or Gouldner's. 
As I have already suggested, while these theories originate in the twentieth-century, 
many of the terms they supply, such as Bourdieu's idea of cultural capital, might 
profitably be adapted to explicate the discourse on intellectuals in the early nineteenth 
century. 
It is the potential for conflict between the first two theories that is most 
relevant to this thesis, however. The first of these notions refers to what is sometimes 
termed the doctrine of the "defenders of the faith. " In its broadest sense, this idea of 
the intellectual as a preserver or depository of cultural values can be taken to refer to a 
phenomenon that is supra-historical, since its archetype is the religious priest. In the 
twentieth century this sense of the intellectual as a defender of traditional or 
transcendental standards has been closely associated with Julien Benda and his 
accusation that intellectuals had betrayed their calling: the treason of intellectuals ("la 
trahison des cleres' ). Benda's view was that intellectuals--clercs or clerics--were a 
small group of intellectually endowed, morally courageous, and materially 
disinterested men who acted as a society's conscience by upholding eternal standards 
of truth and justice. He defines the clercs in opposition to the lay-people: "All those 
whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their 
joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation, in short in the 
possession of non-material advantages" (30). Intellectuals constitute an effective 
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clerisy for Benda, defending the fundamental values of their civilisation. The "treason" 
of intellectuals, at the end of the nineteenth century, was their abandonment of non- 
material and non-immediate aims (God, Art, Knowledge) in order to take a practical 
interest in secular affairs. In so doing they had added their voices to the political 
hatreds between nations and classes, which, if they had always been powerless to 
prevent, they had at least refused to dignify with thought (3 0-1). The second of the 
traditions for thinking about intellectuals is the one which has most influenced 
twentieth-century ideas about the special political responsibility of intellectuals as a 
dissenting elite opposed to power. Jean Paul Sartre and Edward Said, for example, are 
two writers who can be said both to theorise and to enact this role. The notion derives 
most obviously from the oppositional cultures of the Russian intelligentsia and the 
French Dreyfusards of the late nineteenth century. Again, though, the idea of the 
intellectual as dissenter has its provenance in the previous century; Jerzy Szacki and 
Zygmunt Bauman point out that the prototype of the political intellectual is the French 
philosophe of the eighteenth century, and Said himself mentions Voltaire as an early 
example of an individual who "spoke the truth to power" (Szacki 235; Bauman 21-37; 
Said 7-8). 
The discord between the idea of the intellectual as cultural conserver and the 
idea of the intellectual as political dissenter is relevant to an understanding of cultural 
conflict in the period 1790-1840, for it can be argued that, in the British context, an 
open ideological conflict about the role of the intellectual-writer is apparent for the 
first time during this period. Historians and literary scholars, less fastidious than Heyck 
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about the use of anachronisms, have drawn on these theories to argue that Burke's 
indictment of intellectuals was a perception of the conflict between the literary-cultural 
and political responsibilities of public intellectuals. J. G. A Pocock, for instance, has 
urged that Burke interprets the revolution as a betrayal of the intellectuals (207). 
Burke, claims Pocock, found the causes of the Revolution in the machinations of the 
gens de lettres and philosophes, in the activities of an "organised and unpatronised 
intelligentsia" (Pocock 198,203-7). The Revolution, for Burke, was a distant effect of 
a process in which the religious priest is supplanted by the political dissenter. Burke, 
Pocock argues, by tracing the Revolution to secular ambitions of a class of educated 
men who had previously been tied to the aristocracy or the church, anticipated Benda's 
later version of the treason of intellectuals. Benda criticised intellectuals for betraying 
their calling in their praise of the practical and for inflaming political passion by 
doctrine; a century earlier, in a similar but not identical indictment, Burke accused men 
of letters of taking political ideas to the marketplace and adding physical force to 
doctrinal disputes. The French Revolution was, Burke said, an "armed doctrine" 
(Writings and Speeches 9: 199). 
In The Idea of the Clerisy in the Nineteenth Century, Ben Knights suggests 
that the response to the French Revolution initiated a debate in Britain on the role of 
the intellectual. Coleridge's idea of the clerisy, he argues, emerged in the wake of the 
French Revolution in response to the perception that the excesses of reason and 
rationalism of eighteenth-century theorists led to the Revolution: "The Revolution had 
attracted attention to the social activities of intellectuals, since it was already a 
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commonplace that they had played a substantial part in bringing it about" (4,39). 
Coleridge appears to be refining Burke's view of the revolutionary impact of the 
emancipation of learning when he speaks ominously of "three silent revolutions" that 
had occurred in England: " 1. When the Professions fell off from the Church. 2. When 
Literature fell off from the Professions. 3. When the Press fell off from Literature" 
(Collected Works 14, Table Talk 1: 285). Both Burke and Coleridge see a falling off 
of the clerical function of men of letters, and try to re-affirm the proper cultural role of 
the intellectual. The clerisy then, as Knights makes clear, developed as an ideology for 
intellectuals, articulating an ideal role for the educated individual in relation to society 
and dispelling the idea that intellectuals were somehow opposed in their interests to 
the best interests of society as a whole (7). Similarly, Jeffrey Cox contends that we 
witness, in the vehement polemical disputes among the factions of the literary republic 
in the immediate wake of the Napoleonic wars, "a battle to shape the ideology of what 
we would call the intelligentsia and which Coleridge called the clerisy" (57). 1 would 
add only that the first salvo in this battle is fired by Burke in 1790.20 
I repeat that I am not, in this thesis, making a claim about the date of the 
creation of the modern intellectual, nor claiming that such a case could be adequately 
demonstrated. The idea of the intellectual arose slowly over the course of perhaps two 
centuries. I suggest that what we observe in the Romantic period is the emergence of a 
recognisable discourse about intellectuals, a certain mode of representation and self- 
representation provoked by a particular kind of criticism. That is, I am less concerned 
to show that the late twentieth-century intellectual has his or her origin in the 
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Romantic period than to suggest the endurance of strategies of representation. If there 
is one claim on which I want to rest the significance of this thesis, it is that the urge to 
affirm the materiality of their own work and the desire to assert a solidarity with the 
wider labouring population persists as an imperative in intellectuals' self- 
representations. For these reasons intellectuals have continued to draw on the rhetoric 
of labour in their representations of their own activity. 
Irena Grudzinska Gross has advanced a different thesis regarding the formation 
of the modern intellectual in the wake of the French Revolution. In a fascinating study 
of Alexis de Tocqueville and Alphonse de Custine, Gross argues that the displaced 
noblemen of the Revolution transformed themselves into intellectuals, an aristocracy of 
spirit rather than of birth. Threatened with extinction, or at the very least irrelevance, 
and "socially isolated" in their own country, they travelled abroad, and while remaining 
outside--physically or metaphorically--the land and the culture of their origin, they 
managed to turn that position into a vantage point by showing that only the view from 
outside can illuminate a society. In the way Custine and Tocqueville shaped a viable 
public role, she alleges, we can observe "the creation of modern intellectuals, and the 
process through which they carved out for themselves a place in their own society" 
(Gross xiii, 5,167-8). Gross' thesis will enable me restate my own argument and also 
help me to make clear the particularity of the British historical experience. 
In a lecture addressed to a Japanese audience, Sartre claimed that attacks on 
intellectuals who had abandoned their culturally conservative for a critical and negative 
identity are "everywhere more or less the same" (228). He described the keynote of 
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these criticisms as an attack on the dogmatic and abstract point of view: intellectuals 
question "received truths and accepted behaviour" by invoking intangible but universal 
ideals as arbitrary principles for judgment (229-30). It is this characterisation of 
intellectual activity as abstract and intangible which underlies the reproach that the 
intellectual's political intervention is an attempt to interfere in a domain beyond his or 
her field of competence (230). Sartre's claim that this criticism of the intellectual is 
global and trans-historical would be difficult to substantiate; nevertheless, there does 
seem to be an element of truth in this generalisation. In a darkly comic passage, Milan 
Kundera notes the efficacy of such a line of criticism in post-war communist 
Czechoslovakia. Kundera recalls that in the political jargon of the 1950s, the term 
"intellectual" was used as an insult: 
It indicated someone who did not understand life and was cut off from the 
people. All the Communists who were hanged at the time by other Communists 
were awarded such abuse. Unlike those who had their feet solidly on the 
ground, they were said to float in the air. So it was only fair, in a way, that as 
punishment the ground was permanently pulled out from under their feet, that 
they remained suspended a little above the floor. (6-7) 
As Sartre contends, the accusation made against intellectuals, especially leftist 
intellectuals, that they are concerned with mere abstractions rather than real life, that 
they are unconnected to material issues and actual people, and that they are detached 
from the lived existence of the community is a familiar one. My contention is that we 
can identify a specific articulation of this discourse in early-nineteenth-century Britain. 
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Burke's distinction between mere theory and the practical knowledge of the 
experienced politician is possibly the earliest culturally-significant articulation of this 
charge against intellectuals. The period from 1789 to 1832 was, at the very least a 
significant moment in the construction of the "intellectual as an enemy. "21 
By claiming that his own intellectual practice is more embedded in the actual 
life experience of the people than that of radical thinkers, Burke aims to make radical 
discourse ineffectual. Burke's use of the analogy with physical work to describe his 
own mental efforts is aimed at pulling the ground from under his radical adversaries, to 
leave them "suspended, " in Kundera's phrase, by denying them the possibility of 
forging a connection to the labouring poor. The trope linking mental to manual work 
was claimed, by radical writers such as Cobbett and Hazlitt, not because they wanted 
to contribute to the ideological deception of manual labourers, but because the analogy 
became an important rhetorical site in the battle to define the responsibility of 
intellectuals. Their assimilation of their own work to that of other labourers, I argue, is 
precisely meant to deny the airy disconnectedness attributed to intellectuals by Burke. 
Hence, as I shall detail in chapter four, when Hazlitt attacks the social and 
geographical detachment of his radical allies, Shelley and Byron, he does so to dispute 
the view that the intellectual can be a distant observer of his own society. Pace 
Grudzinska Gross, detachment or outsideness was not a situation that any of the 
writers discussed here would have considered an advantage. In the British context, the 
idea of the intellectual owes as much to a combat between "middle-class, " working 
writers as to the self-fashioning of displaced aristocrats, and as much to the insistence 
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on a lived relationship to the ordinary labouring population as to the valorisation of the 
view from outside. 22 
It is not surprising that Burke's successful strategy--of attacking intellectuals 
for the abstract and impalpable quality of their activity--should have been repeated by 
reactionary forces since. Nor is it surprising that progressive intellectuals have, 
following the example of Cobbett and Hazlitt, tried to repossess the analogy for its 
"proper" use, and to give back to radical thought the political purchase to be gained 
from the sense of a shared labouring identity with the mass of people. In clause four of 
the constitution of the Labour Party (1918), for example, the now defunct clause 
which committed the party to the implementation of socialist goals, Sidney Webb 
wrote of the need "to secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruits of 
their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon 
the basis of common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable 
system of popular administration and control. " While the document was designed to 
appeal to a post-war radical sentiment in the party, the evasiveness over the issue of 
control, it has been widely recognised, reflected Webb's distaste for workers' control in 
all its forms. What we might term the ideological ambiguity of clause four is 
compounded by Webb's apparently untroubled conjoining of mental and manual labour 
in the phrase "producers by hand or by brain. " Webb brilliantly constructs a rhetorical 
solidarity between the Labour party's constituents of manual workers and left 
intellectuals, but he also seems to acknowledge that a division of labour--between 
management and workers, say--would survive the implementation of socialism. 
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Indeed, Webb's authorship of the document, in which he encoded his particular 
political preferences, performs the division of labour--I'll tell you what to do and you 
do it--whose significance the careful phrasing partially elides. As I show in chapter 
three, the same problem of how to create a solidarity of mental and manual workers 
troubled Cobbett's "Address to the Journeymen and Labourers. " And when Raymond 
Williams, in pointing out the limitations of Cobbett's radicalism, comments that 
Cobbett's assertion of the permanence of the division of labour creates a specific 
relationship with his audience, it is the kind of political relationship instanced by 
Webb's document that he is criticising (Cobbett 17). 
Today's humanist intellectuals lodged in the modern University are hardly likely 
to be as unreflectively optimistic as Webb about the identity of class interests. It is not 
to be expected, either, that academics would resort to the analogy with physical work 
in order to stress the value of what they do. It is possible, nevertheless, to detect in the 
widespread acceptance of the criterion of "productivity, " for instance, a wish to 
endow "intellectual production" with a more than metaphoric significance. 23 In 
addition, the claim to speak for, and to otherwise represent, larger communities 
outside the academy continues as a way of shoring up and substantiating intellectual 
practices. The imperative persists, as Jameson in The Political Unconscious was quick 
to notice, to ground mental activity in more immediately recognisable kinds of labour, 
and by positing a connection to a population outside the intellectual community. The 
point cannot be reaffirmed too often that intellectuals are constantly evoking the 
labouring population to position themselves against other intellectuals. From this 
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perspective, indeed, we might venture that Jameson's own maneuver in The Political 
Unconscious, of chastising the intellectual practice of others by invoking the assembly 
line worker, is not so different from the ruse he criticises, a point I will return to at the 
end of chapter five and in my "Afterword. X24 To illuminate these points I will look in 
detail at one of the most challenging accounts of intellectuals and intellectual 
representations to have been published in recent years: Edward Said's Representations 
of the Intellectual. Said has been a theoretical touchstone for my thinking about 
intellectual representations of the Romantic period, but I want to suggest the ways in 
which his account is, at the same time, implicated in the terms of debate of that period. 
Throughout his book, I will show, Said deploys the rhetoric of labour in order to 
differentiate his own intellectual practice from those of his political opponents. 
The title of Said's book, Representations of the Intellectual, is deliberately 
ambiguous. On one hand, as Said succinctly puts it, "intellectual representations are 
the activity itself' (20). The salient feature of Said's definition is that: 
[T]he intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty for representing, 
embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion 
to, as well as for, a public, [... ] it is the intellectual as a representative figure 
that matters--someone who visibly represents a standpoint of some kind, and 
someone who makes articulate representations to his or her public despite all 
sorts of barriers, [... ] intellectuals are individuals with a vocation for the art of 
representing. (11-13) 
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The book is also about the way in which intellectuals are represented by other 
intellectuals and by themselves. In representing something, intellectuals also "represent 
themselves to themselves, " and they do what they do according to this idea they have 
of themselves (xv). Intellectuals' representations are always self-representations, or a 
stance on the proper role of intellectuals in society. Representations of the 
Intellectual, then, represents the possibility of politically engaged and oppositional 
intellectual activity and suggests that one danger of a purely functionalist definition of 
intellectuals is that the representation is, in a sense, self-fulfilling. 
Said's is, on one hand, a stout defence of Benda's romantic idea of intellectuals 
as gifted "thoroughgoing individuals" against more inclusive, functionalist definitions 
of the intellectual (7). Said contends that the greatest threat to intellectual 
responsibility, as he imagines it, is not mass society, but professionalism, the possibility 
that all intellectuals might be reduced to mere technicians working for the media, for 
political bureaucracies, or for massive corporations. While he "takes for granted" the 
late twentieth-century realities described by Gramsci, his intent is to prevent the "real, " 
heroic intellectual from being crowded out, both conceptually and in fact, by the 
inclusive definition according to which almost any non-manual worker--"anonymous 
functionaries and careful bureaucrats"--can claim to be an intellectual (8,11,13). Said 
is careful, however, that his definition of the intellectual does not tip over into 
Coleridge's clerisy, as Benda's non-secular and very conservative definition does, for 
he adds the important proviso that only those individuals who go against the prevailing 
social norms and who side with the weak and oppressed are intellectuals properly 
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speaking (x, 22-3,36). In effect, Said is melding two opposed ideas of the intellectual 
role, Benda's exceptional, altruistic, non-partisan individual and the idea of the 
intellectual as political dissident, a conjoining which allows him to refute in advance 
the charge that his own political interventions are in any way ideological. Hence, by 
reiterating the importance of secularism he means not merely that true intellectuals are 
unconstrained by religious orthodoxy, but also that they remain attached to universal 
principles rather than to a party line or to professional methods: "for the true secular 
intellectual" there are "no gods to be worshipped and looked to for unwavering 
guidance" (xiv, 113-20). The critical factors in Said's definition, then, are the faculty of 
representation, secularism, the opposition to power, and an inveterate individualism. 
The intellectual is, in a nice phrase: "the author of a language that tries to speak the 
truth to power" (xvi). 
This is also a self-justification, of course. Said's representation of the 
intellectual is a representation of what he considers to be legitimate intellectual 
activity, and the historical figures he discusses are those on whom he models his own 
intellectual practice. These figures are, for the greater part, twentieth-century figures 
like Sartre, Adorno, Cesaire, and Chomsky, although he does mention Voltaire. Said 
neglects to discuss the debate on the French Revolution and does not talk about any of 
the intellectuals of this period, apart from a passing aside on Tom Paine (20). This is 
surprising, for what has made Said's intervention in the contemporary debate on 
intellectuals within Anglo-American culture a useful theoretical perspective for my 
thesis is that his view seems decisively influenced by the ideas and literary 
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representations of the Romantic period. It could be contended that writers like Paine 
and William Godwin, as well as Cobbett and Hazlitt, were defining the intellectual as a 
secular and principled individual, and that these writers are precursors of Said's model 
of the intellectual. Indeed, as I shall suggest in chapter four, Said's thinking seems to 
me to stand squarely in the tradition of which Hazlitt is an important forerunner, both 
as theorist and practitioner. Said's attack on the "aesthetics of recantation, " for 
example, leveled, in particular, at fellow-travelers who had abandoned their principles 
at the collapse of the former communist regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s (xii- 
xiii, 110-14), could have been written by Hazlitt or Cobbett as they viewed with 
dismay the desertion of former allies from the cause of liberty. 
The description of the "true" intellectual as a "thoroughgoing" and secular 
individual in permanent opposition would have been intelligible to Cobbett and Hazlitt. 
Although Hazlitt has been criticised for the way in which his liberal individualism 
compromises his democratic political sentiments, it is important to note that it is the 
same tradition of intellectual practice that is being valorised by Said. I argue in chapter 
four that Hazlitt uses the analogy with manual labour in part to intimate a rhetorical 
alliance between the isolated writer and other artisanal workers. What I want to 
propose now is that Said's own representation of the intellectual draws on the same 
rhetoric, placing his discourse within the tradition discussed here. Although Said is too 
careful a rhetorician to assimilate the intellectual's activity to physical work--not for 
him "the sweat of the mind"--this strategy of representation persists in his writings in a 
more subtle form. 
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The whole point of the intellectual vocation, in Said's terms, is the maintenance 
of a constant "critical sense, a sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or 
ready-made cliches, or the smooth, ever-so-accommodating confirmation of what the 
powerful or conventional have to say" (23). The intellectual vocation, Said remarks, 
demands "a stance of constant alertness, of a perpetual willingness not to let half- 
truths or received ideas steer one along, [... ] this involves a steady realism, an almost 
athletic rational energy" (23). The same opposition, between easy acquiescence and 
the athletic and energetic intellect, is again employed in order to validate the global 
ideals of Said's enlightenment intellectual, his or her commitment to universal 
principles of freedom and justice. Universality means not having access to the "easy 
certainties provided us by our background, language, nationality, which so often shield 
us from the reality of others; " under these conditions, he says, "the social terrain is not 
only diverse, but very difficult to negotiate" (xiv). Difficulty is opposed to ease in 
order to distinguish between the political stances of intellectuals. Further, Said's 
representations of the intellectual are materialised by a connection to the voiceless and 
unrepresented: they are "always tied to and ought to remain part of an ongoing 
experience in society" (113). It is through such connections that the intellectual is able 
to articulate universal standards even in a post-modern world: "Yes, you have 
conviction and you make judgment, but they are arrived at by work, and by a sense of 
association with others, other intellectuals, a grassroots movement, a continuing 
history, a set of lived lives" (emphasis added) (120). "Work" is here aimed not just at 
careerist professionals and apostate radicals, but also at those post-modern 
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intellectuals of the pseudo-left who, having given up all false gods, have relinquished 
the hope of ever articulating meaningful standards. Those who prize "competence, not 
universal values like truth or freedom, " have also made their peace with the powers: 
"Lyotard and his followers are admitting their own lazy incapacities, perhaps even 
indifference, rather than giving a correct assessment of what remains for the 
intellectual a truly vast array of opportunities despite post-modernism" (emphasis 
added) (18). Said's genuine intellectual is hemmed in on all sides, by the pressures of 
co-optation on the right and by cynical indifference on the left. The terms he uses to 
distinguish "real" intellectual work--difficulty, struggle and athletic energy versus the 
easy acceptance by the lazy mind--are much the same terms that writers like Lobbett 
and Hazlitt drew on both to differentiate themselves from time-serving intellectuals, 
such as government placemen and pensioned writers, who had been corrupted by the 
attractions of an easy existence, and to moor their own practice in a solidarity with 
other workers. 
It is necessary to recall, however, that the same rhetoric was adopted by Burke 
when he castigated radical intellectuals who, espousing universal principles, ignored 
the nitty-gritty of lived existence. For what intellectual, after all, would confess to 
being lazy, to avoiding difficulty, to being unconnected to the lives of the populace? 
While it is not at all my purpose to criticise Said's powerfully articulated view of the 
possibility of oppositional intellectual activity, I am struck by the terms in which he 
defends one kind of intellectual vocation or political stance or ideological performance 
over others: through the opposition of work to laziness, difficulty to ease. He does not 
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explicitly make the analogy between his own labour and that of manual workers, but 
he does try to make his own activity of representing concrete, as it were, by 
establishing a relationship with the unrepresented and voiceless. The rhetoric of 
"work" is bolstered by claiming a connection with those who really do labour, rather 
than merely think or represent things. And, at the same time, there is an imputation 
that those who can claim the value of labour for themselves are justified in 
democratically aligning themselves with the oppressed populations on whom the 
world's work falls. 
The four intellectuals whom 1 discuss here are all male prose writers and, 
before offering a summary of each chapter, I will say a word in explanation of my 
selection. In his recent book on Romanticism and masculinity in which he treats three 
of the writers investigated here--Burke, Cobbett, and Hazlitt--Tim Fulford argues that 
the Romantics were "seeking to revise the versions of masculinity that were powerful 
in the state, " versions that were modeled on the sublime masculinity that Burke 
recommended as necessary to secure the state through fear and domination (16,12- 
13). Fulford claims that these representations of masculinity occurred in a period 
(1790-1832) in which traditional aristocratic versions of "authority and gender had 
been discredited without being successfully replaced" (9). It is possible to argue that 
one way in which responsible and independent middle-class masculinity came to be 
defined, and its moral superiority to the aristocracy affirmed, in the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries was through employment, occupation, and industry. 25 For 
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the male writer, perhaps made effete, rather than manly, by purely intellectual 
employment, there might be still more compelling reasons for insinuating his 
resemblance to a sturdy physical labourer (Bromell 17). But the argument that these 
authors asserted their manliness by equating writing and manual worker requires care, 
for constructing masculinity through association with the labouring classes was 
potentially an unreliable strategy. During this period, the labouring classes were in a 
sense becoming emasculated, as Cobbett and Carlyle realised, by poverty, by 
dependence on wage labour and on relief, and by discourses like Malthus' which 
threatened to withhold from labourers the very basic rights of reproducing their kind. 
I analyse prose writers rather than poets because I am interested in writing that 
is directly interventionist, writing which makes no bones about its status as polemic. 
All four writers seem to me be primarily engaged in attacking their intellectual 
opponents, however their antagonists are defined. Obviously these authors are writing 
at different moments and are engaged in different polemical conflicts; this enables me 
to claim the continuity of the assimilation to physical labour as a form of intellectual 
self-representation. It seems significant, too, that all four writers make their living from 
their writing, for what motivates their use of the analogy with manual labour, in part, is 
the sense that under certain conditions writing and thinking are as arduous as any other 
kind of labour. Burke's attack on Charles Fox, on the Pitt government, and on the 
Duke of Bedford, Cobbett's censure of the pensioned press, Hazlitt's criticism of 
Shelley and Byron, all arise from a sensitivity to the privileges enjoyed by some 
intellectuals, either from birth or from political favour. 
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Finally, and most importantly, in order to explore intellectuals' self- 
representations, I did not want to look, primarily, at theories that conceptualise 
intellectuals and their activities. If this had been my intention, it would have been 
important to discuss Coleridge's idea of the clerisy in more detail, for as Knights and 
Prickett have chronicled, Coleridge's doctrine of an endowed learned class was 
influential for nineteenth-century intellectuals; his ideas certainly had an effect on 
Carlyle and Mill, both of whom I discuss in chapter five. Rather than looking at 
theories of intellectual practice, however, I am interested in observing the practice 
itself, the practice, that is, of the activity of representing. In other words, I want to 
look at how these authors' view of the intellectual's role is embodied in 
representational performance, in the rhetorical figures by which they represent 
themselves to themselves and to their audiences. 
In chapter two, I re-examine an important and persistent issue in the secondary 
literature on Burke: the ambiguity of his political affiliation. Although he appears as 
the defender of the old aristocratic order and the propertied classes, he also defines 
himself as the champion of the interests of unpropertied but upwardly mobile men of 
talent and ability, of which he himself was a representative. My aim is not to resolve 
this tension but to refocus it; I concentrate my analysis, therefore, on Burke's 
representation of his own "labours, " which he places within two, potentially 
competing, models for viewing the work of thinking and writing. These two paradigms 
draw respectively on the discourses of political economy and civic humanism, which 
roughly correspond to the political ideologies of the two different socio-economic 
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groups whose interests Burke wants to reconcile, the bourgeoisie and the landed 
aristocracy. Burke the political economist comprehends his work as a labour as 
arduous as any other, and resorts to the analogy with physical work. He also wants to 
locate his thinking within an earlier, aristocratic tradition, however, which sees 
political thought as the preserve of a natural aristocracy who have the leisure to 
contemplate and reflect. 26 
Although Burke's rhetorical virtuosity often succeeds in containing these 
contrasting ideological projects, their contradictions come out into the open when he 
appropriates the analogy of mental and manual labour in order to attack his radical 
opponents: to differentiate his own thinking and writing from the airy, abstract, 
immaterial thinking of revolutionary philosophers in France and of reformers at home 
(variously referred to as theorists, men of letters, speculators, and metaphysicians). 
The problem with this strategy is that his use of the analogy to emphasise his own 
unremitting labours aligns him with the leveling impulse he is attacking and severs him 
from the aristocratic community he claims to defend. As I have already suggested, 
Burke's attempt to cut the ground from under radical intellectuals by depriving them of 
the ballast of an alliance with other labourers has been a conventional reactionary 
stratagem. My chapter suggests that if this attack has been effective, it is, nonetheless, 
rhetorically unstable. 
In chapter three, I show how Cobbett, responding to Burke's problematic use 
of the analogy, yokes intellectual to manual labourers in order to construct a rhetorical 
solidarity of different categories of productive workers against an unproductive and 
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idle ruling class. His identification of himself as a productive worker, akin to labourers 
and journeymen, is supported by his criticism of government "hirelings" like Burke and 
Southey, who, he contends, sold their talents and their political principles for a 
pension. At the same time as he asserts his identity with the labourers and 
journeymen, Cobbett studiously avoids Burke's easy assimilation of the bodily pains of 
labour by insisting on the metaphorical basis of his own identification. In his defence of 
the rights of labourers, for instance, Cobbett puts forth the Lockean view that labour 
on the land is the original basis of all property. Those who work with their minds can 
have a right of ownership, too, through money given in exchange, but this turns out to 
be a poor derivative of the original right: "The foundation of their property is labour as 
completely as if they had first broken up the earth, subdued it, and made it fruitful by 
the labour of their bodies" (emphasis added) (A Legacy to Labourers 46-9). 
Cobbett's project in his political writings after 1816 is to diminish the distance opened 
up by that "as if, " by maintaining that his political writings--as opposed to the writings 
of the corrupt press--return, indirectly, to fructify the land by helping to reduce the 
oppression and exploitation of rural labourers. 27 
I demonstrate, in chapter four, that the replication of the mental/ manual 
distinction in the field of letters allows Hazlitt to distinguish between the real work 
done by those who have to write in order to make a living and the dilettante activity of 
the gentleman scholar. Hazlitt presents himself as a hack writer who has to earn his 
bread by the sweat of his brow, in order to criticise aristocratic privilege as it is 
manifested in the cultural sphere. The main use of the analogy with physical activity in 
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Hazlitt's work is to articulate distinctions in the field of letters, and, whereas for the 
other writers discussed here, cultural conflicts are refracted through the discourse on 
the labouring poor, for Hazlitt, sympathy for the poor appears only obliquely through 
his attack on "the learned. " Nevertheless, the frequency of the analogy with manual 
labour in Hazlitt's writings obliges the reader to consider the implications of his 
attempt to ally the writer rhetorically with other labourers. For Hazlitt, confusingly, 
the notion of an "aristocracy of letters" is both a positive phenomenon, signifying, 
through the concept of genius, transcendental powers of mind, and a negative one, 
which describes the way social distinctions are reproduced and reinforced in the 
literary-artistic domain. While he is often taken to be a straightforward apologist for a 
characteristically Romantic and idealist view of artistic creation, Hazlitt's curious and 
repeated borrowing of Smith's concept of the division of labour to explain his notion 
of "genius" evinces his ambivalence about his favourite critical idea. The image of the 
labouring writer is crucial to Hazlitt's self-understanding, and suggests that, for him, 
the intellectual was not part of an elite but embedded within a population of ordinary 
workers. 
28 
Chapter five argues that in the 1830s Carlyle deployed the analogy of mental 
and manual labour to berate an idle ruling class for eschewing the noble work of 
guidance, and to incite the secular and spiritual aristocracy to be equal to the task of 
presiding over an industrious and loyal people. The metaphor suggests that in a healthy 
polity a relationship of reciprocal labours between governors and governed ought to 
prevail. What is remarkable about Carlyle's conjoining of mental and physical labours 
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is that in his hands the analogy changes from being a medium for a radical critique to 
being a vehicle for a reactionary agenda. Throughout the 'thirties, as the work of 
guidance is imaged through the analogy with physical labour, Carlyle forgets the 
metaphorical status of his assimilation of mental and manual labour, and he begins to 
imagine the labouring classes as raw material to be fashioned. In his problematic 
employment of the analogy Carlyle, I argue, draws attention to the constitutive force 
of intellectuals' self-representations. What begins as an attack on the ruling classes and 
a demand for effective government ends, as the exhortation to "work" is redirected 
from the ruling class to the manual labourers, as an argument for physical coercion. 29 
John Stuart Mill responded to Carlyle's flamboyant and provocative 
assimilation of mental to manual labour by asserting the fundamental difference 
between mental and manual occupations. If Carlyle dramatises the conflicting 
ideological valences of the analogy between intellectual and physical labour, Mill's 
reply to Carlyle in 1850 highlights the problem of alluding to real (manual) work in the 
elaboration of intellectual conflicts, an issue I briefly take up in the "Afterword. " 
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Notes 
1 One aspect of the sympathy for ordinary workers was, to be sure, the 
compassion felt by guardians for their wards (Bauman 78). Nevertheless, in a period 
when social revolution seemed a real possibility, each of these writers, even Burke, 
committed himself, on occasion, to a political solidarity with the labouring poor. 
2 The long-term changes in economic and social life between 1650 and 1850 
have been amply documented: urbanisation, industrialisation, secularisation, the 
rational organisation of the work-place, the progressive division of labour, the 
application of science and technology to agriculture and manufacturing. Between 
about 1780 and 1832, workers of all kinds experienced the erosion of their 
independence and their reduction to "the status of an 'instrument"' (E. P. Thompson, 
The Making of the English Working Class 202-3). On the transformation of working 
life by the triumph of the free market for labour, see Polanyi, E. P. Thompson, "Time, 
Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism" and McNally, Against the Market (30- 
42) 
3 The suspicion with which intellectuals and their activities have traditionally 
been treated in some schools of Marxist thought may be attributed, in part, to the fact 
that mental workers have always seemed anomalous in a movement founded on the 
self-emancipation of the labouring class and dedicated to the eradication of, among 
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other discriminations, the distinction between mental and manual work. Marx himself 
did not formulate a theory of intellectuals. 
4 For an example of a strong materialist reading which aims to demystify the 
poetic use of the analogy between cultural and physical labour, see Lloyd's unforgiving 
essay on Seamus Heaney (21-3,33-6). Like Jameson, Watkins has noticed a change in 
"analogical perspective" in literary criticism, from Romantic organicism to material 
production, and a corresponding lexical shift, from "creativity" to "labour. " Watkins 
argues, however, that the analogy between material and ideological production might 
be pursued, not to create obfuscation, but to show how "structurally similar 
distinctions" obtain between them (80,90-1). In his study of the work of English 
departments in the United States, Watkins is careful to point out the limitations of this 
parallel, but claims that understanding workplace organisation in English departments 
helps explain the ideological work done by literary critics: "thinking about the 
organisation of work in English departments hardly installs you at some more 'primary' 
level of concreteness, 'beneath' the mysteries of ideologies [... ]. The point is not still 
another new way to 'demystify' ideological discourse from somewhere else; it's to stay 
there long enough to understand the work of ideological production and what it might 
explain about the social function of intellectuals who work in English" (81). Watkins' 
research is influenced by Gramsci's attempt to understand the transformation of 
intellectual work in his own time, and he cites Gramsci's dictum that the training of 
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scholars, too, is a "process of adaptation, " one which habituates "muscles and nerves 
as well as intellect" to "effort, tedium, and even suffering" (79-80,85). 
5 For a sample of the extensive literature on the "new class" see, in addition to 
Galbraith, Bell, Gouldner, Ehrenreich, Larson, and Derber. 
6 The frequent juxtaposition of the terms "work and writing" or "labour and 
literature" in recent literary criticism demonstrates the growing interest in what 
Bromell calls "work studies" (2). 1 am attempting to explain why the writers I discuss 
made frequent use of the analogy between mental and physical labour, and to unpack 
the different and contradictory ideological effects of these analogies. To distinguish my 
own study from other critical work in the field, let me also say what I am not doing. I 
am not looking at the depiction of the labouring poor. In this tradition of criticism, see 
Barrell's The Dark Side of the Landscape, Harrison, Heinzelman, "The Uneducated 
Imagination: Romantic Representations of Labor. " I wish to distinguish my study, too, 
from that of Siskin, Brian Goldberg, and Schoenfield, who have written on the 
discursive construction of professional identity in the Romantic period. See, also, 
footnote 16. These critics are primarily interested in the way Romantic authors 
discursively enforced a hierarchy of mental and manual labour (Siskin, The Work of 
Writing 24). By contrast, I argue that by invoking manual labourers for polemical 
purposes in their own self-representations, the writers I study are as interested in the 
formation of rhetorical alliances between intellectuals and ordinary labourers as in the 
creation of distinctions. Whenever the analogy between mental and material labour has 
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been noticed, it has been summarily criticised, in Jamesonian fashion, as a transparent 
attempt to alleviate the writer's anxiety about the inutility of intellectual production. 
Wordsworth's poetry has been a particular object of criticism on this account. See, for 
example, Liu (352-3); Simpson (Wordsworth's Historical Imagination 34-5); and 
Patterson (278). Finally, I should make the point that I am not exploring economic 
metaphors for poetic labour, in the manner of Levinson and Heinzelman, The 
Economics of the Imagination. Other relevant studies of literary labour in the period 
are those by Jonathan Grossman and Spiegelman. Outside the Romantic period, I have 
benefited from the work of Goodman, Guillory ("Dalila's House"), Gartner, and 
Weinstein. 
On "representation" as an issue in discourses on "class, " see Stuart Hall, 
Hitchcock, and Spivak. 
81 make this argument tentatively. If labour on the one hand indicates sociality, 
it also indicates, in a tradition of thought extending from John Locke through Adam 
Smith, independence; one's labour was the exemplary form of private property. The 
discourse on labour in the hands of these intellectuals was a discourse about writerly 
independence, merit, and individuation as much as it was about the commonality of all 
labourers. 
9 Thomas' anthology has been an invaluable resource in my attempt to track the 
development of the concept of mental labour. Like Bromell, Thomas points out that 
the concept of work or labour is difficult to define because the meaning of the word 
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changes in different historical periods and because it embodies ideological and political 
points of view (xv-xvi; Bromell 4-6). Again, the publication, by Bradshaw and 
Ozment, of another anthology of writings on work, is evidence of the critical interest 
in "work studies. " 
lo I should note one direction consciously not taken in this thesis. The 
substantive "labour, " insofar as it indicates bodily labour rather than mental or manual 
labour, could also refer to the labour of childbirth. The earliest use documented by the 
OED of labour in this sense occurs in 1595, and the earliest figurative use--to describe 
some momentous and impending event--occurs almost contemporaneously, in 1606. 
No less than the labour of the field-hand, the labour of women in childbirth was 
available for figurative appropriation; but this would be another study. 
11 Barrell is the literary historian who has written most extensively on the 
challenge posed by the discourse and values of the new "science" of political economy, 
with its economic understanding of what it meant to be human, to the older 
aristocratic discourse of civic humanism (English Literature in History 21-25; The 
Birth of Pandora xiv-xv). On the re-evaluation of "work'" in the eighteenth century, 
see also Jordan (1-14). 
12 See Coleridge's Table Talk entry for 7 April 1832: "All harmony is founded 
on a relation to rest--on relative rest. Take a metallic plate, and strew sand on it; sound 
an harmonic chord over the sand, and all the grain will whirl about in circles or other 
geometrical figures, but always round or as it were depending on some point of sand 
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relatively at rest; sound a discord, and every grain will whisk about without any order 
at all, in no figures and with no points of rest" (Collected Works 14: 284). 
13According to the OED, Smith's is the first use of the adjective "productive" 
to designate an activity which, engaged in the production of commodities for 
exchange, creates wealth and value. Marx, for analytical reasons, used "productive" to 
designate only that labour employed in the creation of surplus value (Capital, Volume 
One 1038-49). For a sample of the vast literature on the productive/ unproductive 
dichotomy, see Resnick and Wolff (132-41). Bromell suggests that writers eventually 
replaced the productive/ unproductive with the mental/ manual distinction because it 
was more amenable to writers' sense of their own worth (22). 
14 What made Smith's book a useful weapon in the hands of apologists for 
capitalism, like Burke, was his acceptance, as both natural and just, of the capitalist 
relation of production and his tendency to appeal to economic self-interest to defend 
moral conclusions (McNally, Political Economy 261; McNally, Against the Market 
61; Anthony, The Ideology of Work 56-7). On the issue of productive versus 
unproductive labour, as on other economic questions, Cobbett seems to have followed 
Paine: "There are two distinct classes of men in this nation, those who pay taxes, and 
those who receive and live upon the taxes" (The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine 
2: 478). 
is Another reason for the emergence of a discourse on intellectuals at this time 
has been suggested by Wahrman, who argues that whether the decades after 1790 
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"were singular or not in terms of social change, they were surely characterised by 
distinct and dramatic political strains. " This highly-charged political atmosphere made 
representational practices matter: conceptualisations of society were, in these decades, 
imbued with a particular ideological force because they were implicated "in the 
struggle over the social and political order" (9-10). If representations mattered, I 
would add, then the representation of intellectuals--those on whom the labour of 
representing depended--was of no less political importance. 
16 In his seminal The Origins of Modern Modern English Society, Perkin notes the 
anomalous position of the non-capitalist, professional middle-class. By their shared 
source of income, he argues, these mental workers--doctors, lawyers, public officials, 
as well as writers--constitute a distinct class who are remunerated in the form of a 
(non-competitive) fixed salary or fee. The value set on services is fixed by the 
profession itself, and its ability to monopolise the provision of a certain skill or service, 
rather than by direct bargaining in the market (252-4). This class of intellectuals 
emancipated itself from the patronage of the rich with the increased demand for its 
services as a result of urbanisation and rising living standards (254). Perkin views the 
rise of the profession of letters--"the most intellectual of professions"--as a token of 
what he takes to be the rise in the status of the professional intellectual in society 
(255). Authorship, he says, "was no longer a pastime for gentlemen like Dryden, 
Addison and Pope and a low-paid occupation for Grub Street hacks like Defoe or 
Johnson, but a regular profession at which a Walter Scott, a Southey or a Cobbett 
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might make a comfortable, sometimes a handsome living" (255). On Romantic 
professionalism, see Siskin, Schoenfield, and Brian Goldberg, and see footnote 6. 
The emergence of the intellectual and the rise of the modern professions are 
clearly consanguineous processes, though, equally obviously, the two categories are 
not identical. I would distinguish the status of the "professional" writer--someone who 
made his or her living, and derived his or her main source of identity, from writing-- 
from that of the professions as such. At the very least, the ability to monopolise the 
provision of this service through strict accreditation is limited, and the use-value to 
society of a writer's services is less certain than that of a doctor or lawyer; anyone, as 
Hazlitt lamented, could be a "mere author" (Complete Works 8: 79). Historically, as 
Frances Ferguson has remarked, the intellectual has been "imperfectly 
professionalized" ("Forum: The Intellectual in the Twenty-First Century" 1125). For 
this reason, the writer is more obviously engaged in what Jameson calls the 
"elaboration, reproduction, or critique of ideology" (The Political Unconscious 45). 
17 Simpson has written at length on the origin of the antitheoretical and 
antimethodical prejudice of Anglo-American culture--which may be a counterpart to 
the anti-intellectual bias--in the debate upon the French Revolution (Romanticism, 
Nationalism, and the Revolt against Theory 3-4). Simpson claims, in fact, that the 
antirationalist sentiment of 1790 appealed to a previously constituted tradition of 
common sense in English intellectual life (38). 
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18 The consolidation of the intellectuals as a self-conscious class, possessing a 
collective sense of its own identity, was almost certainly a phenomenon of the late 
nineteenth century, and historians usually trace its origins to Russia and eastern 
Europe (intelligentsia) or to France during the Dreyfus affair (intellectuals). Habermas 
is surely right to suggest that what we witness in the mid-to-late nineteenth century is 
the self-definition of the intellectuals as what Mannheim called a "free-floating" 
stratum. This group imagined itself free not just from the bourgeois public within 
which it germinated, but from every social location (The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere 174). As I shall continue to emphasise, however, not one of the 
writers I discuss would have considered himself detached from social location, or have 
considered detachment as a cause for self-congratulation; each employed the analogy 
of mental and manual labour to imply his connectedness. From this perspective, 
intellectuals' self-definition as an unattached social group can be seen as an attempt to 
make the best of a bad hand. 
19 In this and the following paragraph I draw quite heavily on the parallel 
accounts of a number of theorists. In particular, the following three writers divide 
theories of intellectuals in roughly similar ways: Eyerman (1-31); Ross (209-32); and 
Szacki (229-46). In the interests of brevity, I have tended to flatten the differences 
between these authors, but I am not misrepresenting the general body of thought. 
Eyerman remarks, correctly I think, that all these later theories of intellectuals are the 
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offspring of the Enlightenment and of the eighteenth-century debate on the possibility 
of progress, the uses of knowledge, and the proper application of human reason (27). 
20One way of interpreting the anti-intellectualism of intellectuals during the 
period 1790-1840--I am adapting here Raven's explanation of the self-criticisms of the 
new middle class in the late eighteenth century--is as part of a wider discourse aimed 
at defending legitimate intellectual practice (Raven 9-14). That is, anti-intellectualism, 
the strategy of identifying scapegoats, was part of an attempt to legitimate the social 
and political ascendancy of some intellectuals by demonstrating that they could use 
their power responsibly to criticise the unacceptable use of intellectual capital. Guillory 
makes a similar point regarding the anti-intellectualism within our own culture: the use 
of the term "intellectual" as an insult involves the singling out (by more conservative 
intellectuals) of a particular radical sector from the broad class of intellectual workers, 
and generalising them as "intellectuals per se" ("Literary Critics as Intellectuals" 112). 
21 The phrase is Habermas' ("Heinrich Heine" 75). As Neil Lazarus pointed out 
to me in conversation, just as Habermas makes room for national difference within his 
broad sociological category of the bourgeois public sphere, so we can identify different 
historical trajectories in the development of the universal category of the intellectual. 
22 1 put quotation marks around the term middle-class because social class is at 
issue in any discussion of intellectuals. As Guillory has summarised, intellectuals have 
always provided difficulties for a Marxist class-analysis because of their uncertain 
relationship to the economic system of production ("Literary Critics as Intellectuals" 
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123-4). While I don't directly address this sociological issue, throughout this thesis i 
presuppose that the writer's "class position" is inadequate as an explanation for what 
he writes. Class, rather, is the category that requires explanation. 
23 On the internalisation of the "spurious" "norm of productivity" in academic 
self-justification, see Guillory, "Preprofessionalism" (97). 
24 On the "exploitation" of the "unmetaphysical masses in a rhetorical gesture 
of moral one-upmanship" in some current forms of academic discourse, see the recent 
exchange in the London Review of Books between Laura Mandell and Hal Foster: 
LRB, 21 September 2000; LRB, November 2000; LRB, 9 November 2000.1 am 
grateful to Dr. Mandell for allowing me to see a longer version of her published letter. 
25This point is made briefly by Davidoff and Hall (30). For a development of 
this thought, see Jordan (9-11). 
26 The key tensions in Burke's thought, between his aristocratic and bourgeois 
values, have been defined by Kramnick, MacPherson, Reid, Freeman, and Furniss 
(Edmund Burke `s Aesthetic Ideology). 
27 My chapter on Cobbett builds on the early work of Williams and E. P. 
Thompson. I follow the lead of more recent critics, such as Dyck, Olivia Smith, 
Nattrass, and Gilmartin, who have taken Cobbett seriously as an intellectual and as a 
rhetorically aware prose writer. 
28 My thesis modifies Natarajan's portrait of Hazlitt as an unrepentant idealist 
and challenges the common critical view--argued most cogently by Barrell, The 
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Political Theory of Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt, and Dart, Rousseau, 
Robespierre and English Romanticism--that Hazlitt's radical democratic political 
commitments were constantly compromised by his intellectual and artistic allegiances. 
My reading is closest to Paulin's, who attends in detail to Hazlitt's use of physical 
processes as metaphors for his own work. While Paulin's is an intertextual reading that 
relies on an elucidation of the Dissenting tradition with which Hazlitt was familiar, I 
am interested in the immediate polemical contexts in which Hazlitt's essays are written. 
It is worth noting that Hazlitt's ambiguous use of the phrase "aristocracy of letters" has 
led to erroneous readings of his views. Bate's is one instance of this misunderstanding 
("Shakespeare and Original Genius" 94). 
29Not surprisingly there has been more critical attention to Carlyle's use of the 
terms "labour" and "work" than to any of the other authors I discuss. The most 
relevant recent studies of are those by Ulrich, Treadwell, and Plotz. Surprisingly, 
however, no critic has discussed Carlyle's obsessive use, the word is not too strong, of 
the mental/ manual analogy. 
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Chapter Two. The Sweat of the Body and the Sweat of the Mind: 
Edmund Burke's Mental Labour 
In the previous chapter, I quoted at length from the third of Edmund Burke's 
Letters on a Regicide Peace (1796), where he yokes together bodily and physical 
labour to suggest that the burden of labour falls equally on all men. The context for 
Burke's remarks is the lack of enthusiasm in Britain for pursuing the war against the 
French republic, and the Letters on a Regicide Peace were written primarily to 
discourage pacification and to kindle a national ardour for the conflict with 
revolutionary France. In the third Letter Burke counters arguments from opponents of 
the war who claimed that Britain was physically unable to bear the cost of sustaining 
its campaign. According to Burke, it was the will to continue the war that was lacking, 
and in his opinion many of the opponents of the war in Britain were in reality friends of 
the new republic who were doing their best to weaken national morale and to 
undermine popular zeal for a prolonged fight. 
In order to know whether or not "great distress and misery have been the 
consequence of this war, " Burke avers, he must ascertain on whom and in what 
manner the burden of war presses. First he considers the situation of the lower classes. 
Burke claims to be able to demonstrate that, far from being diminished by the war, the 
lowest class, "the common people [whose] "stock is in their persons and in their 
earnings, " have thrived during it; he finds that the able-bodied population has increased 
and that the rates of wages they receive have been "greatly augmented" (Writings and 
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Speeches 9: 352-4). 1 To the objection that the war had been responsible for the high 
price of provisions during the year 1796, Burke replies that the price of food is a result 
of short supply, a scant harvest, rather than of the war. He then argues powerfully, in 
the passage I alluded to in the previous chapter, against any government initiative to 
alleviate the distress caused by the high price of food. Because this dense passage 
brings together many of the themes and ideas in Burke's writings that I wish to discuss, 
this chapter can be considered as an extended commentary on this extract. For this 
reason I quote it again, here, without ellipses: 
An untimely shower or an unseasonable drought; a frost too long continued, or 
too suddenly broken up, with rain and tempest; the blight of the spring, or the 
smut of the harvest; will do more to cause the distress of the belly than all the 
contrivances of all Statesmen can do to relieve it. Let Government protect and 
encourage industry, secure property, repress violence, and discountenance 
fraud, it is all that they have to do. In other respects the less they meddle in 
these affairs the better; the rest is in the hands of our Master and theirs. We are 
in a constitution of things wherein--"Modo sol nimius, modo corripit imber. " 
[Now too much heat, now too much rain destroyed the crops. ] But I will push 
this matter no further. As I have said a good deal upon it at various times 
during my publick service, and have lately written something on it, which may 
yet see the light, I shall content myself now with observing, that the vigorous 
and laborious class of life has lately got from the bon ton of the humanity of 
this day, the name of the "labouring poor. " We have heard many plans for the 
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relief of the "Labouring Poor. " This puling jargon is not as innocent as it is 
foolish. In meddling with great affairs, weakness is never innoxious. Hitherto 
the name of Poor (in the sense in which it is used to excite compassion) has not 
been used for those who can, but for those who cannot labour--for the sick and 
infirm; for orphan infancy; for languishing and decrepid age; but when we 
affect to pity as poor those who must labour or the world cannot exist, we are 
trifling with the condition of mankind. It is the common doom of man that he 
must eat his bread by the sweat of his brow, that is by the sweat of his body, or 
the sweat of his mind. If this toil was inflicted as a curse, it is as might be 
expected from the curses of the Father of all Blessings--it is tempered with 
many alleviations, many comforts. Every attempt to fly from it, and to refuse 
the very terms of our existence, becomes much more truly a curse, and heavier 
pains and penalties fall upon those who would elude the tasks which are put 
upon them by the great Master Workman of the World, who in his dealings 
with his creatures sympathizes with their weakness, and speaking of a creation 
wrought by mere will out of nothing, speaks of six days of labour and one of 
rest. I do not call a healthy young man, chearful in his mind, and vigorous in 
his arms, I cannot call such a man poor; I cannot pity my kind as a kind, merely 
because they are men. This affected pity, only tends to dissatisfy them with 
their condition, and to teach them to seek resources where no resources are to 
be found, in something else than their own industry, and frugality, and sobriety. 
Whatever may be the intention (which because I do not know, I cannot 
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dispute) of those who would discontent mankind with this strange pity, they 
act towards us in the consequences, as if they were our worst enemies. (9: 
354-356) 
As in his more sustained attempt to discourage the state's efforts to regulate markets, 
Thoughts and Details on Scarcity--the "lately written something" referred to above-- 
Burke makes a case for a laissez-faire economic policy by equating the laws of the 
market with natural and, therefore, divine law; accordingly, any move to interfere with 
the operation of these economic laws, such as through the Speenhamland system of 
proportioning poor relief supplements to the price of bread, was for Burke an attempt 
to amend the fundamental law of existence, that man must honestly earn his bread by 
the sweat of his brow. 2 The "commonness" of this law is confirmed by the 
metaphorical assimilation of manual and mental activity, "the sweat of his body, or the 
sweat of his mind. " 
Turning to consider the war burden borne by the higher classes, Burke asserts 
that they have escaped the burden of the war effort altogether. The rich and powerful 
do not normally contribute their "persons" to the war effort; that is to say they are not 
likely to be killed, but, instead, supply the means of carrying on the war, through 
taxation; in addition, they furnish "the mind that actuates the whole machine" (356). It 
is the mind--the intellect and character--that has been lacking in the present war, writes 
Burke: a lack of mental resilience, a want of courage and enterprise (357-8). The 
military strategy of the British was defensive, and this mode of conduct had "prevented 
even the common havock of war in our population, and especially among that class, 
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whose duty and privilege of superiority it is, to lead the way amidst the perils and 
slaughter of the field of battle" (358-9). It is this higher class of people, government 
ministers and other national public leaders, whom he wants to fire with enthusiasm, for 
they will, in turn, command the respect and inspire the zeal of the lower classes. This 
activity, we may deduce, is an example of the "sweat of the mind. " We can note that 
when Burke suggests that the labours of the body and the labours of the mind are 
equivalent, he implies a distinction as well as an identity. Just as the burden of war 
was shouldered equally, though not in the same way, by the rich and the poor, so, 
while the analogy between the sweat of the body and the sweat of the mind suggests 
that the burden of atoning for original sin is borne equally by rich and poor, the 
sacrifice demanded of the two classes is not of the same kind. The pains of those who 
are appointed by their position in society to labour with their minds rather than their 
bodies are equal and analogous, though not identical, to the pains suffered by the 
"vigorous and laborious class of life" misnamed "the labouring poor. " 
It is important to remember that Burke is not talking to the lower orders, the 
manual labourers; hence, while this passage articulates a mystifying ideological 
perspective, the intent is not primarily to mystify. The text is about the importance of 
ideology, and its assumed audience is other writers, intellectuals, producers of 
ideology. Nevertheless, at some level the analogy of mental and manual labour in the 
quoted passage is apologetic in nature, as it serves to generalise the physical pains of 
the labourer. The claim that all men must labour, the equation of all labour with pain 
and difficulty, and the anti-enlightenment view that misery and suffering are inherent in 
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humanity's fallen condition rather than in the effects of an economic or political system 
are all intended to reconcile the labourers to their situation and thereby secure a 
tractable and productive work force for the capitalist and the land-owner. When 
Cobbett and Hazlitt employ figures of speech linking mental and manual work, they 
usually do not do so unreflectively. In Burke's text, the assimilation of mental and 
manual labour is unquestioning, and for this reason I want to draw out the 
contradictions in his figuration of mental work. 
As I hinted in chapter one, the real polemical energy of the passage is aimed at 
other head workers--politicians, writers, and other public figures--whom Burke 
accused of instigating unrest among the common people. Earlier in the same letter, 
Burke writes that while it is natural to feel pity for the suffering of others, mankind 
cannot be "relieved in the gross, " and hence the mind's "elective affections" are the 
strongest evidence of our real affinities (307). The display of "affected pity" in the 
epithet "labouring poor"--the "wicked [... ] political canting language, 'The Labouring 
Poor"' Burke called it (121)--did not, in Burke's opinion, evince a genuine concern, but 
was a tactic employed by the politically ambitious. The opposition to the war, the 
affectation of pity for the poor, and the criticism of the existing political, social and 
economic systems were all of a piece in Burke's view: mere rhetoric to stir up 
discontent and garner popular support for unscrupulous and ambitious men. As early 
as 1790, in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Burke suspected that part of 
the impetus for the Revolution came from the ambitions of certain members of the 
nobility, who had espoused democratic and egalitarian ideas in order to place 
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themselves above their natural fellows: "turbulent, discontented men of quality, in 
proportion as they are puffed up with personal pride and arrogance, generally despise 
their own order. One of the first symptoms they discover of a selfish and mischievous 
ambition, is a profligate disregard of a dignity which they partake with others" (8: 97- 
8). In A Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, published in the following year, 
Burke accused members of the French nobility (the reference is to the Duc d'Orleans) 
of leveling themselves with their footmen, "that through this degradation they might 
afterwards put themselves above their natural equals" (8: 329). Where government and 
power rested on opinion rather than force, democratic sentiments could be 
irresponsibly championed by some superior men to bolster their own political capital. 
In a sustained attack on Charles Fox and his followers, An Appeal from the New to the 
Old Whigs (1791), Burke remarked that "those who speculate on change always make 
a great number among people of rank and fortune, as well as amongst the low and 
indigent" (110). The rich and the great who expressed revolutionary sentiments were 
gambling on political outcomes, Burke believed (109-10). His most pointed comment 
on the Fox faction was his Observations on the Conduct of the Minority (1793), 
where he accused them of adopting the French ideas of liberty and equality to make 
the multitude the instruments of their ambitions. "Under a specious appearance (not 
uncommonly put on by men of unscrupulous ambition) that of tenderness and 
compassion to the Poor, " Fox and his cohorts opposed the war with France. This 
opposition was dangerous, Burke pointed out, because it undercut support for the war 
among the poor, who must, after all, do the bulk of the actual fighting (8: 433-5). 
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Already France, a nation that claimed to be the "deliverer" of the poor from the 
oppressions of the rich and powerful, possessed an advantage over England in the 
propaganda war for the hearts and minds of the populace (435). 
Those members of the nobility and those intellectuals who talked of 
compassion for the poor, in Burke's view displayed "their humanity at the expense of 
their honesty, or their understandings" (9: 352). 3 Social inequality, he insisted, was 
divinely ordained, and, therefore, not only inevitable, but necessary, and just. Different 
classes of people were naturally fitted for different occupations. The complex 
organism of society depended, for its effective functioning, on the unequal portioning 
of status and wealth, so that the mass of mankind, who were adapted for bodily toil, 
might be compelled to undertake the necessary labour of supporting life. Compassion, 
or pity, Burke warned, was a dangerous emotion, because it might raise the 
expectations of the labourers and foster resentment when those expectations were 
disappointed. Such sentiments might serve as a pretext for expanding the work of 
government, and it was this "restless desire of governing too much" that had led 
directly to the overthrow of the French monarchy: "All [... ] that happened amiss in 
the course even of domestic affairs, was attributed to the Government" (9: 144). Not 
only do discontented intellectuals hold out to the poor the dangerous, impossible-to- 
fulfill promise of escaping from the burden of labour ("this strange pity"), but they 
themselves avoid the real intellectual labour of dealing with the world and with 
mankind as it was. However, if Burke here hard-headedly emphasises that ethical 
sentiments need to be kept separate from economic policy decisions, elsewhere he is 
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less scrupulous in doing this; as I shall go on to show, when it suits him, Burke appeals 
to pity or compassion as a supplement to an economic argument. 
Throughout this chapter I will demonstrate the centrality of images and 
metaphors of labour in Burke's writings on the Revolution, as he distinguishes his own 
labour as a political thinker and practical statesman from the work of radical thinkers 
and revolutionary politicians. I argue that Burke relies on the term "labour" to 
articulate the difference between himself and his political opponents, whom he accuses 
of laziness, of not engaging in the real, arduous work of political thought. The "sweat 
of the mind" not only separates Burke from manual workers, but differentiates him 
from those intellectuals who, in advocating unimplementable policies to remedy the 
plight of the poor, refused to admit that labour was a necessary part of the human 
condition. Utopian social fantasies and extravagant political theories did not engage 
with the actual miseries of life (8: 114). If those who advertised their compassion for 
the poor were guilty of evading a fair share of the world's labour, the apparently 
uncompassionate Burke, on the other hand, does fulfill his share of that burden. By a 
rhetorical sleight of hand, then, Burke seems more closely allied to the cares of the 
common people than those who were their most passionate advocates. 
It is not surprising, in one respect, that Burke would make use of the category 
"labour" to distinguish himself from his adversaries. As a self-made, unpropertied man 
of talent, it is part of Burke's ethos that ability and sheer hard work should be 
rewarded. From his perspective as a bourgeois political economist, it is, above all, the 
vocabulary of merit--industry, talent and enterprise--that assigns worth. But while 
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Burke makes great use of the term "labour" in his discourse on the French Revolution, 
his use of that term is neither straightforward nor consistent. For, as a number of 
scholars have noted, there is a conflict between Burke the bourgeois political 
economist and Burke the defender of hereditary privilege (MacPherson 6). Jacobinism 
he famously defined as "the revolt of the enterprising talents of a country against its 
property" (9: 241). His defence of aristocratic privilege is, thus, frequently couched in 
terms directly opposed to the meritocratic principle, and he lays much of the blame for 
the French Revolution on the ambitions of men of talent and ability--men like himself 
This conflict appears throughout his writings in the 1790s and, consequently, "labour" 
can have a different inflection depending both on the persona Burke is adopting and on 
the identity of those he is attacking. On one hand, from the point of view of the 
political economist, his opponents are lazy and tend to take "tricking short-cuts; " from 
the perspective of the defender of aristocratic privilege, on the other hand, he accuses 
the revolutionaries of working too much, of being too industrious and zealous and 
leaving little time for reflection. Conversely, while Burke usually emphasises the 
magnitude of his own labours, he sometimes plays them down, constructing his labour 
more on the paradigm of hereditary privilege and aristocratic ease. 
My strategy is not to try to resolve these tensions, but to trace Burke's curious 
and contradictory reliance on the term labour to differentiate himself from other non- 
manual workers. 4 The contradictions in Burke's political thought--between his defence 
of merit and his championing of the principle of ascribed status--surface most 
obtrusively in his apologia pro vita sua, A Letter to a Noble Lord (1796), a fact 
77 
noticed by Burke's contemporaries and remarked on by numerous critics since (De 
Bruyn 89). It is in this pamphlet, too, that we find his most comprehensive and 
ambiguous treatment of his mental labour. In A Letter to a Noble Lord, Burke 
proposes a resolution of sorts to these ideological contradictions, but the terms of the 
resolution show Burke himself shying away from the arduous work of political 
arrangement. In A Letter to a Noble Lord, the arguments Burke advances to 
demonstrate his merit and prove his own industriousness are supplemented by an 
appeal to the compassion of his auditors. By his own criteria, his arguments are 
rendered specious, and are evidence the shirking of hard labour, of which he constantly 
accuses his adversaries. 
Before taking leave--for the moment, at least--of the excerpt from the Third 
Letter on a Regicide Peace, I want to make one further point about Burke's use of the 
term "labour, " which will serve to reiterate and clarify my argument. In his tract, 
Thoughts and Details on Scarcity--written in 1795 though not published until 1800-- 
which is his most theoretical defence of market economics, Burke takes his stand 
against the various local initiatives to alleviate hunger on the grounds that the market 
alone can determine the price of labour and of provisions. "Labour is a commodity 
like every other, " he repeats, "and rises or falls according to the demand" (9: 1223, 
126,130). Any attempt to arbitrarily fix the wages of the poor will fail to achieve what 
it intends, because an increase in wages will rebound in the form of a diminished 
demand for manual toil or an increase in the price of the provisions that are the result 
of that toil. The laws of commerce are as elementary, and as certain in their operation, 
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as any other law of nature, and the statesman who attempts to defy them might as well 
fight the law of gravity: "the stone which we had pushed up the hill would only fall 
back upon them [the labourers] " (123). The laws of commerce are not only immutable 
but also beneficial and just: beneficial, since the desire of the capitalist-landlord to 
maximise his profits is to the advantage of everyone in society, and just, since the 
wages of the labourer are the outcome of a free and fair contract between the 
employer and his employees (124-5). Burke's metaphors allude to the retribution that 
must inevitably follow the violation of God's law: "Then the wheel turns round, and 
the evil complained of falls with aggravated weight on the complainant" (127). As in 
the Third Letter on a Regicide Peace, the terms of the contract between employer and 
employee are transmuted into "the terms of our existence, " the evasion of which 
produces only "heavier pains" (9: 355). 
In urging that the wages of labour should not be arbitrarily adjusted or 
"equalised, " Burke makes a further argument: 
Nothing is such an enemy to accuracy of judgment as a coarse discrimination; a 
want of such classification and distribution as the subject admits of Encrease 
the rate of wages to the labourers, say the regulators--as if labour was but one 
thing and of one value. But this very broad generic term, labour, admits, at 
least, of two or three specific descriptions: and these will suffice, at least, to let 
gentlemen discern a little of the necessity of proceeding with caution in their 
coercive guidance of those whose existence depends upon the observance of 
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still nicer distinctions and sub-divisions, than commonly they resort to in 
forming their judgments on this very enlarged part of the economy. (127) 
The sub-divisions Burke describes here, between able-bodied men, on the one hand, 
and the old and infirm or women and children, on the other, are listed only to show 
that the interfering magistrate could never guarantee a fair or efficient proportioning of 
wages and sustenance, since different classes of people are not equally productive and, 
therefore, require different amounts of nourishment (127-8). It is worth pausing, 
however, over Burke's claim that labour is a coarse, generic term that obscures the 
nice distinctions between different kinds of human work. 
The first and most obvious point to make is that, in this text, it is the political 
economist himself who equalises labour by his insistence that all labour is a 
commodity. As Marx explained, what characterises the commodity as such is that in it 
all labour becomes abstract, generic (socially necessary) labour. ' The second point to 
make, and here I refer back to the extract from the Third Letter on a Regicide Peace, 
is that Burke frequently does proceed as if labour were indeed "but one thing and of 
one value" (127). In this passage, it will be recalled, Burke not only conflates mental 
and manual labour ("the sweat of the brow, " "our common doom") but also conflates 
labour in the restricted sense of a commodity for exchange with labour in the sense of 
a quasi-divine human creative capacity ("creation wrought by mere will out of 
nothing"), a confusion which gives the sanction of timelessness to what is, after all, an 
historically specific productive relation. Nevertheless, at the same time as he has a 
tendency to "coarse discrimination, " Burke also insists on "nicer distinctions" when he 
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is attempting to clarify the differences between himself and his political opponents, 
often relying, paradoxically enough, on the analogy between his own work and manual 
toil in order to make these differentiations. As I shall argue, in A Letter to a Noble 
Lord Burke virtually admits the failure of his nice distinctions, as he is unable or 
unwilling to distinguish himself either from his radical opponents or from his 
aristocratic foe. In this late text, Burke has finally to concede the rhetorical nature of 
his analogy between mental and manual work, and, thus, he confesses to a coarseness 
of discrimination of his own. 
Before examining Burke's representation of his own labour, it is important to 
provide a background for my analysis. I will first discuss Burke's attack on intellectuals 
for inflaming revolutionary sentiment, and will then summarise the contradictions of 
Burke's stance on the Revolution insofar as it involves a conflict between his bourgeois 
and aristocratic values. 
The Reflections on the Revolution in France were provoked by a sermon 
welcoming the French Revolution given by the dissenting minister Richard Price to the 
Revolution Society in November 1789. "I have lived to see a diffusion of knowledge, " 
Price enthused, "which has undermined superstition and error" (Burke, Writings and 
Speeches 8: 115). Burke was less sanguine about the progress and dispersal of 
knowledge. With masterly understatement, Burke begs leave to differ with "this 
political preacher" about the benefits that might be expected to accrue to the human 
race as a consequence of the extension and dissemination of knowledge: "Dr. Price 
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seems to overvalue the great acquisitions of light which he has obtained and diffused in 
this age [... ]. The age has not yet the compleat benefit of that diffusion of knowledge 
that has undermined superstition and error" (105,116,123). With this remark he 
begins the famous passage in the Reflections on the "rape" of the Queen of France; for 
Burke, the most significant "work of our new light and knowledge, " was the 
dissolution of the chivalric manners--"this mixed system of opinion and sentiment"-- 
that had underpinned the feudal social relations of the ancien regime (125,127). In 
consequence, the age of chivalry had been rudely supplanted by that of "sophisters, 
oeconomists, and calculators" (127). 
The very prosperity of Europe at the outbreak of the Revolution, Burke 
contended, had depended on "the spirit of our old manners and opinions, " the 
superstitions and prejudices which were now being eroded by the "barbarous 
philosophy" of rationalism (126-7). William Godwin, with an optimism equaling that 
of Price, would announce that the forces of commerce and learning had eroded the old 
ascribed distinctions of birth and place by showing that wealth and knowledge were 
not the monopoly of the privileged few (791-2). The conjunction of the two was 
significant, for the spread of commerce had freed learning from its dependence on 
patronage (792). In contrast, Burke suspected that both commerce and learning owed 
more than they knew to manners and opinions and to the social relations they 
authorised. In a passage from the Reflections, which I quote again, Burke laments that 
learning had cut itself free of its traditional patrons: 
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The nobility and the clergy, the one by profession, the other by patronage, kept 
learning in existence, even in the midst of arms and confusions [... ]. Learning 
paid back what it received to nobility and to priesthood; and paid it back with 
usury, by enlarging their ideas and by furnishing their minds. Happy if they had 
all continued to know their indissoluble union, and their proper place! Happy if 
learning, not debauched by ambition, had been satisfied to continue the 
instructor, and not aspired to be the master! Along with its natural protectors 
and guardians, learning will be cast into the mire, and trodden down under the 
hoofs of a swinish multitude. (8: 130) 
Ambitious intellectuals, Burke forecasts, by propagating equality, will not only level 
the distinctions between themselves and their superiors, but at the same time between 
themselves and those below them, and thus abolish the system of proper subordination 
which supported their own practice. Of course Burke must have known that radicals 
like Price and Priestley did not want summarily to abolish private property; he argued, 
rather, that by attacking the legitimacy of church property, for example, radical ideas 
were undermining the principle of property itself. Formal reason would be used against 
the reasoners themselves: "the peasants give you back that coin of sophistic reason, on 
which you have set your image and superscription" (270). Radical ideas were 
subverting the foundations of all order: the continued subordination of the poor, 
labouring mass of mankind. 
It is not possible to overestimate the importance Burke gives to the influence 
of ideas in causing the French Revolution. In Burke's reading, the Revolution of 1789 
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was the first "compleat revolution" because it was in effect a reorganisation of the 
"constitution of the mind of man" (Writings 9: 147). It was the attempt to root out the 
principles of "natural" deference and subordination in mankind that gave the 
Revolution its truly radical character. In the Reflections, for instance, Burke refers to 
that "most important of all revolutions [... ]I mean a revolution in sentiments, 
manners, and moral opinions" (8: 13 1). 6 This revolution in nature, "of the moral 
constitution of man, " could only have been effected by the dispersal of subversive 
ideas through the medium of print (347-8). The conditions which had made the 
French Revolution possible were, first, the advent of print technology, and, second, 
the growth of the market for cultural goods, which together had enabled writers and 
intellectuals to free themselves from protection and domination by aristocratic 
tutelage. In a taut exposition of this idea, written in 1796, Burke writes that a "silent 
revolution in the moral world" preceded and prepared the way for a political 
revolution (9: 291). The growth of the power and influence of the ambitious middle 
classes had broken the chain of subordination that had existed between the great and 
the populace. The rise of print and the growth of the power of the press, which had 
made every government, in essence, democratic by making legislative and executive 
bodies dependent on opinion, made it easy for this commercial and literary class to 
propagate their and and destructive principles (9: 291-6). In perhaps his most telling 
description of the character of the French Revolution and of the nature of the war in 
which Britain was engaged, Burke warned the British government that the nation was 
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at war with an "armed doctrine [... ] a faction of opinion, and of interest, and of 
enthusiasm, in every country" (9: 199). 
In the Reflections, and in all of his subsequent writings on the Revolution, 
Burke insisted on the importance of radical ideas in providing an impetus to that event, 
and also on the part played in the Revolution by intellectuals, men of letters and 
philosophers, in disseminating those ideas. In the Reflections Burke blames two 
classes of men, the monied interest and the political men of letters, for the upheaval (8: 
158-60), The latter had acted as propagandists for the new money: 
Writers, especially when they act in a body, and with one direction, have great 
influence on the publick mind; the alliance therefore of these writers with the 
monied interest had no small effect in removing the popular odium and envy 
which attended that species of wealth. These writers, like the propagators of all 
novelties, pretended to a zeal for the poor, and the lower orders, whilst in their 
satires they rendered hateful, by every exaggeration, the faults of courts, of 
nobility, and of priesthood. (162) 
This "literary cabal, " Burke explains, had persecuted hereditary privilege and the 
Christian religion, and undermined support for the ancien regime. The pretended 
sympathy with the lower orders was a vehicle for the insidious infiltration of opinion 
by radical ideology. Any declaration, however well-meant, of sympathy with the lower 
orders was potentially subversive. Raising the expectations of those who could never, 
from their situation, expect anything other than a life of hard labour, was to play fast 
and loose with the very foundations upon which civilised society depended. 
85 
J. G. A. Pocock has argued that by 1795, while the monied interest had 
become less visible in Burke's explanation of the French Revolution, Burke never 
stopped emphasising that the genius of the Revolution lay in the skeptical ideas of the 
philosophes and gens de lettres, and in the political theorists who were implementing 
their ideas. Above all, argues Pocock, the Revolution, in Burke's interpretation, is a 
trahison des clercs, or the desertion by intellectuals of their place and responsibility in 
the social order (204-9). In A Letter to William Elliot (1795), which Michael Freeman 
praises as Burke's best account of the causes of the French Revolution, Burke claims 
that the prosperity of France in 1789 contained "the seeds of its own danger": 
In one part of the society it caused laxity and debility. In the other it produced 
bold spirits and dark designs. A false philosophy passed from academies into 
courts, and the great themselves were infected with the theories which 
conducted to their ruin. Knowledge, which in the past two centuries either did 
not exist at all, or existed solidly on right principles and in chosen hands, was 
now diffused, weakened, and perverted [... ]. Men of talent began to compare 
in the partition of the common stock of public prosperity, the proportion of the 
dividends, with the merits of the claimants. As usual, they found their portion 
not equal to their estimate (or perhaps to the public estimate) of their own 
worth. (Writings 9: 39; Freeman 195) 
This clear explanation only amplifies the account already presented in the Reflections. 
The diffusion of knowledge creates a class of men whose capital consisted in their 
ability to produce and disseminate knowledge, who were not now dependent on the 
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nobility or the church for their livelihood and who could use knowledge as a weapon 
in a class war. In the Reflections, Burke's warnings about the dangerous influence of 
literary men culminates in an extraordinary passage in which he laments that the 
capacity to influence public opinion had made the "intolerance of the tongue and of the 
pen" formidable enough to strike at "property, liberty, and life" (161). ' 
We must be alert, however, to how potentially contradictory Burke's stance as 
a defender of hereditary privilege was. As a number of critics have argued, Burke's 
social position is not essentially different from the revolutionary intellectuals he 
attacks. In the paragraph immediately prior to the extract cited above from A Letter to 
William Elliot, Burke claims that he had defended the hereditary order with the only 
arms he possessed: his pen and his voice, the same instruments that had undermined 
property and religion in the old regime (39). Burke himself was, like the intellectuals 
he opposed, a man of talent without property who had had to make his way by his 
own industry and ability. He too, was a man of letters, who had made his mark in 
eighteenth-century English society as a publicist for the Whig party, and an Irishman, 
who was seen by the English political establishment as an outsider and an upstart 
(MacPherson 6; Furniss, Aesthetic Ideology 256). Moreover, as well as sharing their 
social position, Burke also articulated the meritocratic ideology of these new men, as 
his political economic writings testify. 
Most Burke scholars address in some way the tension between Burke the 
aspiring bourgeois politician and man of letters and Burke the defender of hereditary 
privilege. Burke was committed to the principle of merit, the fair reward for industry 
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and talent, and attached to the aristocratic values of respecting one's place in the given 
order. The first to insist on the two sides of Burke was Isaac Kramnick, who argued 
that Burke's ambivalence reflects the central ideological tension of his age: the conflict 
between the dominant aristocratic principles and values and emergent bourgeois ones 
(Kramnick 7,109). Burke expresses a confrontation between the values of merit and 
equality of opportunity--the bourgeois equation of "worth and identity with 
achievement and work" and the demand that careers in public life be open to talents-- 
and the values of ascribed status and privilege by right of birth (17,109,193). In 
attacking dissenting radicals, Kramnick argues, Burke was repudiating that part of 
himself which identified with the parvenu bourgeois (111). Like Kramnick, 
Christopher Reid attends to Burke's ambiguous social position: "As a consequence of 
his own social experience and political career, Burke owed allegiance to two closely 
allied classes: the landed and politically dominant aristocracy, and the professional, 
mercantile and manufacturing bourgeoisie" (Reid 220-1). Burke's desire to express his 
sense of his own worth in terms of industry and achievement comes into conflict with 
the more deferential attitude expected from someone who relied for his place in 
society on the patronage of the Whig aristocracy (79,83-4). 8 
Building on Kramnick's work while contesting his psycho-biographical 
explanation, C. B. MacPherson argues for the coherence of the two positions, that of 
the defender of hierarchy and that of the free market liberal. He contends that Burke 
saw that the "traditional order was already a capitalist order" (7,5,63). Burke was a 
firm advocate of Smithian laissez-faire economics and limited government and he 
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believed, as we have seen, that the self-regulating market was providential. He was 
also a supporter of the aspirations of talent and ability, and believed that British public 
life should be more open to careerists like himself (MacPherson 51-70). But Burke, 
according to MacPherson, saw that the capitalist order, of which he was such a 
enthusiastic proponent, needed the sanction of traditional ideology (61-2). He saw that 
republican-democratic ideas were attractive to the lower orders and that capitalism 
needed an ideology that would legitimate and secure the unequal social and economic 
relationship on which the accumulation of wealth depended (61-2). Throughout his 
writings on the French Revolution, Burke urged that capitalist accumulation depended 
on the acceptance by the labouring classes of their subordinate status (69). Tom 
Furniss adds that the Revolution, far from leading Burke to repudiate his former 
bourgeois principles, "leads him to insist still more emphatically on the primacy of 
economic 'laws' over interventionist policies in the name of 'humanity"' (Aesthetic 
Ideology 188). "There is nothing surprising or inconsistent, " concludes MacPherson, 
"in Burke's championing at the same time the traditional English hierarchical society 
and the capitalist market economy, " the latter, in Burke's view, still needed the former 
(63). 
MacPherson's thesis has been enormously influential, and I agree with the 
substance of his argument. As we shall see, Burke emphasised over and again that 
capitalism could not do without the ideology which legitimated subordination. It is 
important to stress, however, that there is at the very least a conflict of vocabulary and 
rhetoric; in this respect Kramnick and Reid are correct. Kramnick points out, for 
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example, that the refutation of the aristocratic principle of status involved 
fundamentally "the notion that status should be achieved through the play of innate 
differences and abilities, of talent, energy, hard work, and merit" (145). Furthermore, 
while the Reflections laments the effect the abstract norms and logical procedures of 
"sophisters, oeconomists, and calculators" had had on the dissolution of chivalric 
manners, from the point of view of the modernising economist the trappings of the old 
order are simply superfluous. In his famous Speech on Oeconomical Reform (1780), 
for instance, Burke, from the perspective of the cost-counting economist, attacked the 
"waste and superfluity" of the royal household (Kramnick 161-2; Reid 58-63). A 
tension always exists, as Sartre has insisted, between the objective needs of the 
dominant class and "the myths, values and traditions with which it needed to infect 
other classes in order to ensure its hegemony" (246). The contradictory ideological 
notions with which Burke legitimates things as they are have been exhaustively 
identified by Freeman: the conflict between the idea of the paternal state and the 
laissez-faire notion that forbids the parent to feel pity for his starving children, for 
example (69,134). 9 
I want to expand a little on Reid's point about the importance of Burke's 
ambiguous social position. The differences between Burke and Paine, as David Aers 
has argued, can be attributed in part to the differences in their political and cultural 
capital (157-8). The chief form of capital possessed by Burke was his dependence on a 
personal relationship with those in power (De Bruyn 28-9), while Paine, in Aers' 
characterisation of him, is an early example of what Gouldner would call a "new class" 
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of intellectuals who were able to take advantage of the market for cultural products in 
order to free themselves from dependence on the nobility or church (Aers 158). As a 
result, Paine favoured a "more politically liberal form of capitalism in which 
knowledge, the administrative and propagandist skills of the educated bourgeoisie and 
artisanate would be rewarded on an open market" (157). Burke was engaged in a 
conflict, therefore, that took place "within the bourgeois intelligentsia" itself (157-8). 
We can see Burke's attack on radical intellectuals, I suggest, as an attempt to 
legitimate the ambitions of the class of intellectuals as a whole, by repudiating the 
excesses of some members of that class. Burke believed that in furthering their own 
ambitions, these "turbulent" men were in danger of undermining the principles of 
subordination on which culture and letters, as well as property and wealth, rested. The 
rhetorical contradictions in Burke's thought, expressive of the ideological conflicts of 
his age, have been adequately exposed; I want to focus my analysis of those same 
rhetorical tensions by seeing Burke as engaged in more local disagreements with other 
intellectuals: what is the proper activity of literary men? how can this activity be 
legitimately represented? who has the right to rhetorically invoke the "body" of the 
English nation and for what purposes? 
The way Burke separates himself from the radical intellectuals, I argue, is via 
the category "labour. " He differentiates himself from British radicals and French 
theorists by suggesting that they evade, in their superficialities, the real mental labour 
of dealing with actually existing misery. By claiming that his own intellectual work was 
more arduous and difficult than theirs, Burke aimed to undercut the radicals' 
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assumption that they alone were qualified to speak of and for ordinary labourers. 
While Burke tirelessly criticised the radicals' strategy of mobilising the populace, 
however, in affirming his own relationship to the "labourers and mechanics, " he 
effectively acknowledged that the political terrain had altered fundamentally. Bruce 
James Smith has argued that, for Burke, political conflicts had become doctrinal 
disputes over the nature of sovereignty, and that what had made these disputes over 
doctrine dangerous was the "heretofore unknown alliance of the intellectuals and the 
multitude" (109-10). By its integration into the ordinary life of the masses, "abstract 
theory had become 'armed doctrine, "' a weapon with which intellectuals could 
overthrow governments (110-11,145). The pro-revolutionaries, Burke knew, began 
with the upper-hand in the battle for the allegiance of the "labourers and mechanics" 
(8: 434); for this reason, he was not prepared to let their rhetorical strategies pass 
unchallenged. 
Burke's maneuver was difficult, though, for reasons that should be apparent: 
"labour" is not only the term by which Burke distinguishes his thinking from that of 
intellectuals like Paine, but was also the term through which Paine and his ilk would 
attack aristocratic privilege. Burke himself acknowledged that precisely what 
distinguishes the French state from the English one--and English radicals from the 
English aristocracy--are the (anti-aristocratic) principles of industry and energy. 
Consequently, Burke often places his own thinking in an aristocratic lineage, which 
stresses the importance of being the legitimate heir of tradition rather than the virtue of 
sheer hard work. It was natural enough for Paine to stress his own industry and merit 
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in his attack on the hereditary principle (The Rights of Man 219); it was a more 
difficult enterprise to attempt, as Burke did, to marry labour to the defence of 
privilege, and we should expect contradiction to ensue. 
In The Rights of Man, Man, Paine argues that the violent excesses of the French 
Revolution had been lessons that the populace had learned from the previous 
governments they had lived under, and he uses a popular radical metaphor that 
expresses the intention of the reform movement: "Lay then the axe to the root, and 
teach governments humanity. It is their sanguinary punishments which corrupt 
mankind" (58). The image "lay the axe to the root" suggests honest sweat, a 
wholesome rustic labour clearing the terrain of some deep-rooted and noxious growth. 
In his first published parliamentary address on the events across the channel, Burke 
had already deployed the radicals' image against them. During a debate on the army 
estimates, in February 1790, Burke responded to Fox's praise for the Revolution by 
asserting that the doctrine of the rights of man, by attacking the property of land and 
church, had eroded the sentiment of subordination among the lower classes. The 
revolutionaries had "with the most atrocious perfidy and breach of all faith among 
men, laid the axe to the root of all property, and consequently of all national property, 
by the principles they established, and the example they set, in confiscating all the 
possessions of the church" (Speech on the Army Estimates 313-14). Burke later 
makes use of the same radical self-representation in his Scarcity tract, where he assails 
government plans to regulate the price of labour or of provisions. It is the balance of 
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consumption and production that determines price, he insists. Those who interfere 
with this divine mechanism "directly lay their axe to the root of production itself' 
(Writings 9: 133). Burke draws on the same metaphor to convey the threat posed by 
government regulators to the capitalist productive relation and to describe the way the 
French Revolution, through principle and example, had undermined respect for all 
property; this suggests how closely Burke identified the survival of capitalism with the 
preservation of the relationship of subordination. 
The image of hacking at the roots of a tree serves, for Burke, as an example of 
immature political work. What had been for Paine an image of a healthy, manly, 
vigorous labour becomes, in Burke's hands, an image of irresponsible and unthinking 
activity. Burke warns that destroying an organic entity--the British constitution, for 
instance, or the old regime of France--is unwise, since the roots of a tree grow and 
spread over time and cannot easily be replaced by man's artifice. In a slightly different 
metaphor he argues that solid foundations are necessary to the stability of any building, 
and that the radicals who destroy old foundations in order to erect society anew are 
rarely willing to do the time-consuming work of laying new foundations. To work 
within the constraints not only of physical nature but of specific social and cultural 
circumstances--"at once to preserve and reform"--is more intellectually demanding (8: 
216). It is this "inability to wrestle with difficulty which has obliged the arbitrary 
assembly of France to commence their schemes of reform with abolition and total 
destruction, '' and to rely on "untried speculations" and "loose theories" (216,214). In 
Burke's view, the axe-men obliterate obstacles instead of confronting difficulties, 
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hoping by a few lusty strokes to elude the tiresome work of political arrangement. The 
work of destroying and pulling down is easy, albeit invigorating, because it is assisted 
by gravity: "The fall from an height was with an accelerated velocity; but to lift a 
weight up to that height again was difficult and opposed by the laws of physical and 
political gravitation" (Speech on the Army Estimates 308). Furthermore, the work of 
destruction does not require any special skill. "Your mob can do this as well at least as 
your assemblies. The shallowest understanding, the rudest hand, is more than equal to 
that task. Rage and phrenzy will pull down more in half an hour, than prudence, 
deliberation, and foresight can build up in an hundred years" (216). The unseen work 
of laying sound foundations is not as rewarding as the labour of destroying: it is 
arduous, obscure, and unapplauded. 1° 
Burke doubted that France would be able to rebuild society as it existed before 
the Revolution. The French, he argued, have forgotten that society rested upon the 
principle of subordination. And just as it is easier to knock down than to lay 
foundations, it is easier to teach rebelliousness than to teach obedience to the 
labouring populace (Speech on the Army Estimates 310). In the Reflections, Burke 
stressed the importance of a tractable and contented labour force to social order, to 
the security of property and to the accumulation of wealth: 
Good order is the foundation of all good things. To be enabled to acquire, the 
people, without being servile, must be tractable and obedient. The magistrate 
must have his reverence, the laws their authority. The body of the people must 
not find the principles of natural subordination by art rooted out of their minds. 
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They must respect that property of which they cannot partake. They must 
labour to obtain what by labour can be obtained; and when they find, as they 
commonly do, the success disproportioned to the endeavour, they must be 
taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice. Of this 
consolation, whoever deprives them, deadens their industry, and strikes at the 
root of all acquisition as of all conservation. He that does this is the cruel 
oppressor, the merciless enemy of the poor and wretched; at the same time that 
by his wicked speculations he exposes the fruits of successful industry, and the 
accumulations of fortune, to the plunder of the negligent, the disappointed, and 
the unprosperous. (Writings 8: 290) 
The whole edifice is made to rest, in Burke's account, on order and the respect of 
labour for property, which in turn depends on the acceptance of the sentiment of 
natural hierarchy enforced by religion. The principle of equality struck at the root of 
traditional order by breaking this chain of subordination. The real object of the 
Revolution was: 
[T]o level all those institutions, and to break all those connections, natural and 
civil, that regulate and hold together the community by a chain of 
subordination; to raise soldiers against their officers; servants against their 
masters; tradesmen against their customers; artificers against their employers; 
tenants against their landlords; curates against their bishops; and children 
against their parents. (Speech on the Army Estimates 315) 
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The French republic had destroyed all prejudices, and consequently the only way of 
compelling obedience that remained was through the army. Without the unquestioned 
respect of the lower for the higher classes, society must be governed by force. But 
what if the soldier, too, decided to exercise his right of equality? The theory of equal 
rights opened the door to anarchy and arbitrary possession (Speech on the Army 
Estimates 314-15; Writings 8: 267-9). 
By undermining the base--the submissiveness of the lower orders--Burke 
believed that those who promulgated the doctrine of the rights of man attempted to 
build without foundations, to rest society on thin air rather than on solid ground. The 
revolutionaries had inverted the order of nature. The ground of all the good things in 
life--order, property, wealth, and culture--is the labour of ordinary men; the continued 
existence of property and of all the principles on which society rests depend, in the 
final analysis, on a tractable and productive labouring class. Those who affect 
compassion for the poor are, therefore, "trifling with the condition of mankind" (9: 
355). Burke is ready to honour every man who works diligently at his occupation, but 
each man is born to an occupation fitted to his capacities (8: 100). Men from low 
occupations were not born or made to occupy the position of legislators; the tailor and 
carpenters whom Burke believed constituted the republic of Paris are a sound body but 
not a wise head. By attempting to equalise the different classes of society, by placing 
the lowest members of society at its head, Burke avers, the levelers "pervert the 
natural order of things; they load the edifice of society, by setting up in the air what 
the solidity of the structure requires to be on the ground" (100). Theory, abstract and 
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ungrounded thinking, produces an ungrounded a society without substantive 
foundations. 
The metaphor of firmness or solidity to describe the British constitution occurs 
throughout Burke's writings on the Revolution. It suggests a political system which 
had grown over time, a system which had resulted from the combined efforts of many 
minds. Conversely, he makes use of the image of inversion, of a building resting on air, 
to describe the French constitution, which had abandoned all it had inherited from the 
past and which was only "based" in some abstract "theory of a constitution" (8: 332). 
Because the French state is reconstituted "as often, and as much, and in as many ways 
as there are floating fancies or fashions, " there can be "nothing stable in the modes of 
holding property, or exercising function, [that] could form a solid ground on which 
any parent could speculate in the education of his offspring, or in a choice of their 
future establishment in the world" (145-6). Without the guarantee of order based on 
the acceptance of principles derived from the past, there could be no incentive to 
acquire or accumulate wealth and property or even to invest in an education. This 
stability requires the connection with the past, argues Burke, which is to be found in 
custom, habit and prejudice, as well as in laws and the principles of inheritance. 
Without these organic ties to the past, he laments, there would be no connection 
between men in society, and men "would be little better than the flies of a summer" 
(145). In the final paragraphs of the Reflections Burke once again draws a comparison 
between the firm and substantial British system of government and its theoretic 
counterpart: "standing on the firm ground of the British constitution, let us be satisfied 
98 
to admire rather than attempt to follow in their desperate flights the aeronauts of 
France" (8: 293). Paine makes reference to this image, and countered Burke's attempt 
to ground the Reflections in the collective life of the nation by dismissing his 
adversary's verbal dexterity: "He has [... ] mounted in the air like a balloon, to draw 
the eyes of the multitude from the ground they stand upon" (75). By exposing Burke 
as a mere rhetorician, Paine cuts Burke free from the ground to which he had 
audaciously laid claim. Paine was aware that Burkes appropriation of the firm ground 
was also meant to deprive the radicals of their claim to connect to the population at 
large, and so reminded his readers that Burke had prostituted his talent in the service 
of the nobility, while he, Paine, had earned his literary reputation through his own 
labours (The Rights of Man 51,124,219,270-1). 11 
Burke frequently claimed to sympathise with the poor, to be their true, rather 
than theoretical, advocate, and his rhetoric does sometimes place him on the side of 
the poor, 12 In his public speeches on the Revolution, however, Burke consistently 
emphasises that the first requirement of all civil society is that the poor know their 
place and respect the principle order which places others above them. In a passage in 
the Reflections that illustrates this point nicely, Burke argues that the existence of a 
non-labouring class is necessary to the economy. The income of the capitalist, he says, 
is the surplus produced by labour, and his expenditure on luxury provides the demand 
which keeps the economy moving: "this idleness is itself the spring of labour; this 
repose the spur to industry" (8: 209). On this basis, Burke also defends the existence 
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of the Catholic monks, whose property had recently been abolished by the French 
constitution: 
[The monks] are as usefully employed [in their present cloistered state] as if 
they worked from dawn to dusk in the innumerable servile, degrading, 
unseemly, unmanly, and often most unwholesome and pestiferous occupations, 
to which by the social oeconomy so many wretches are inevitably doomed. If it 
were not generally pernicious to disturb the natural course of things, and to 
impede, in any degree, the great wheel of circulation which is turned by the 
strangely directed labour of these unhappy people, I should be infinitely more 
inclined forcibly to rescue them from their miserable industry, than violently to 
disturb the tranquil repose of monastic quietude. (Writings 8: 209) 
The rhetoric here dovetails with the defence of a capitalist society in the Scarcity tract, 
the wheel of circulation being a metaphor for the self-regulating economy (9: 127). 
The passage seems to concede somewhat imprudently that the poor suffer 
inordinately, and Freeman even suggests that Burke's language in this passage sides 
with "forcible rescue" (177-8). The key to the rhetoric of the passage, however, is that 
it shows Burke, the political realist, subordinating his humanity to his economic sense, 
his compassion to his honesty: he would rescue the poor if he could, but this would be 
to the disadvantage not only of the rich, but also, in the long term, of the poor 
themselves. 
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By preserving the ancient principles of subordination, loyalty and honour, the 
French nation might have enjoyed all the benefits of a free and prosperous nation. 
Above all, he writes: 
you would have had a protected, satisfied, laborious, and obedient people, 
taught to seek and to recognise the happiness that is to be found by virtue in all 
conditions; in which consists the true moral equality of mankind, and not in 
that monstrous fiction, which by inspiring false ideas and vain expectations into 
men destined to travel in the obscure walk of laborious life, serves only to 
aggravate and imbitter that real inequality, which it never can remove; and 
which the order of civil life establishes as much for the benefit of those whom it 
must leave in an humble state, as those whom it is able to exalt to a condition 
more splendid, but not more happy. (8: 87-8). 
While the human condition made it necessary that the great majority of mankind must 
continue to earn their bread by hard physical labour, the rights of man would 
encourage the ambition of even the lowest workers to escape this curse. A few 
paragraphs further on, Burke elaborates on the psychology behind this view when he 
discusses the composition of the National Assembly by "inferior, unlearned, 
mechanical, merely instrumental members of the [legal] profession" (93). Men of 
humble origin, suddenly elevated to power, would become intoxicated with their new 
situation: "Who could conceive that men who are habitually meddling, daring, subtle, 
active, of litigious dispositions and unquiet minds, would easily fall back into their old 
condition of obscure contention and laborious, low, unprofitable chicane? " (93-4). In 
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his Letter to a Member of the National Assembly, written a few months after the 
Reflections, Burke offers the same psychological explanation for the attractiveness of 
the doctrine of equality: 
The people of France, almost generally, have been taught to look for other 
resources than those which can be derived from order, frugality, and industry 
[... ]. Besides this, the retrograde order of society has something flattering to 
the disposition of mankind. The life of adventurers, gamesters, gipsies, 
beggars, and robbers, is not unpleasant. It requires restraint to keep men from 
falling into that habit. The shifting tides of fear and hope, the flight and pursuit, 
the peril and escape, the alternate famine and feast, of the savage and the thief, 
after a time, render all course of slow, steady, progressive, unvaried 
occupation, and the prospect only of a limited mediocrity at the end of long 
labour, to the last degree tame, languid, and insipid. Those who have been 
once intoxicated with power, and have derived any kind of emolument from it 
[... ] never can willingly abandon it. (8- 301) 
Along the same lines, again, Burke talks in his Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs 
(1791) of the novelty of the French constitution and the seduction by the "specious, 
untried, ambiguous prospects of new advantages [that] recommended themselves to 
the spirit of adventure, which more or less prevails in every mind" (15). And again in 
his Remarks on the Policy of the Allies (1793), he writes that it is impossible that men 
from the lowest class should return to "become humble, peaceable, laborious, and 
useful members of society" (Writings 8: 496). The men from humble and laborious 
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occupations are the obscure but firm foundations on which society is built; however, 
such men are easily seduced from their boring and laborious existence by the promise 
of a revolutionary change in their circumstances. Ideological or physical restraint was 
necessary, then, to the stability of society. 13 
To recapitulate: over and again Burke insists that the French theorists build 
without a foundation (8: 305,313,315,330). The rights of man, atheism, and so on 
were fit principles on which to plan the destruction of authority, but they provided no 
basis upon which to erect order, morality, submission to laws. A stable and solid 
government could not be constructed with the instruments and materials appropriate 
to the work of rebellion. Encouraging men to earn their living through confiscation 
rather than through steady, though unfulfilling, labour, the revolutionaries would find 
that the elements which had supplied the foundation of the original edifice now desired 
to be the ornaments of the new building. Moreover, Burke insinuates that just as the 
theorists of the rights of man had forgotten that society's foundations are the continued 
ideological subordination of the labouring poor, so, by that token, these intellectuals 
are themselves guilty of avoiding the hard mental labour of engaging with the real 
difficulties of material life. By holding out to the populace the prospect of escaping 
from the curse of labour, they elude the arduous and obscure work of laying 
foundations for the easier and more immediately observable work of pulling down. In 
an associated argument, as I shall now detail, Burke also claimed that the organic 
British constitution was sounder than the theoretical French one, in part, at least, 
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because the former had resulted from a more earnest and laborious engagement of the 
mind with difficulty. 
In a crucial passage in the Reflections, Burke argues that the British method of 
transmitting political institutions--the form of government and the rights of subjects--is 
modeled by way of a "philosophic analogy" with the British manner of transmitting 
property (84). Burke calls this "working after the pattern of nature, " or "preserving the 
method of nature in the conduct of the state, " presumably because it is "natural" to 
pass on one's property to one's offspring. The British political system, therefore, is 
"placed in just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world" (84-5). The 
organic British constitution, which retains and adapts the past, is contrasted with the 
theoretical French constitution: "The very idea of the fabrication of a new government 
is enough to fill us with disgust and horror. We wished at the period of the Revolution 
[of 1688], and do now wish, to derive all we possess as an inheritance from our 
forefathers. Upon that body and stock of inheritance we have taken care not to 
inoculate any cyon alien to the nature of the original plant" (81). Similarly, the freedom 
and rights of Englishmen are "a patrimony derived from their forefathers, " rather than 
the fabrication of abstract theory (82). This is an important point, which Burke 
emphasises by repetition as well as by typography: "It has been the uniform policy of 
our constitution to claim and assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived to 
us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity" (83). In whatever they 
do or say, indeed, the British are always acting "as if in the presence of canonized 
forefathers" (85). Hence, as Bruce James Smith observes, Burke conceives of all 
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knowledge, too, as an inheritance (16). Burke constantly repeats that the most reliable 
guide to action in the present is habit and prejudice, the customary, pre-theoretical, 
knowledge of the past: "we continue to act on the early received, and uniformly 
continued sense of mankind" (142-3). The British, he says again, have wisely not 
despised "the patrimony of knowledge which was left to us by our forefathers, " which 
has been the basis of all the improvements in the sciences and in the arts that Britain 
has contributed to the civilised world (150). 14 
Burke's representation of his own intellectual labour, also, is modeled by 
analogy with British political institutions, and, therefore, by analogy with the system of 
inheriting property. Burke characterises his own work as a political theorist as a 
collaboration with tradition, and implies that this is how all intellectual endeavour 
should proceed: "Political arrangement, as it is a work for social ends, is to be only 
wrought by social means. There mind must conspire with mind. Time is required to 
produce that union of minds which alone can produce all the good we aim at" (217). 
Burke readily admits the charge of gradualism. The work is so gradual, in fact, as to be 
invisible: it is one of the benefits of "a method in which time is one of the assistants, 
that its operation is slow, and in some cases almost imperceptible" (217). If the 
architect must exercise caution when destroying and building with "brick and timber, " 
then circumspection is still more of a virtue when the materials are "sentient beings" 
(217). This method of collaboration--co-operation with the past, with the meditations 
of dead men--allows Burke to be able to claim authority to speak for tradition and for 
what he refers to as "the body" of the English people. Hence, he writes: "I do not aim 
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at singularity. I give you opinions which have been accepted amongst us from very 
early times to this moment, with a continued and general approbation, and which 
indeed are so worked into my mind, that I am unable to distinguish what I have 
learned from others from the results of my own meditation" (149). Burke's theory of 
influence is, at the same time, an account of legitimate intellectual labour, an account 
which would prohibit the adoption of radical ideas on the grounds that they could not 
have been the products of the accumulated wisdom of ages. 
The French constitution, Burke maintains, values only novelty. One of Burke's 
consistent themes is that the revolutionaries had despised everything bequeathed to 
them from the past and had acted, in consequence, as if they had everything to begin 
anew. Instead of preserving and adapting what they found in the state and in society as 
they already existed, they had cast everything out: "We have discovered, it seems, that 
all which the boasted wisdom of our ancestors has laboured to bring to perfection for 
six or seven centuries, is nearly all altogether matched in six or seven days, at the 
leisure hours and sober intervals of Citizen Tom Paine" (9: 82). If Burke's own 
intellectual labour, his own method of composition, is constructed by analogy with the 
very political system he wants to defend, this is because his method is a critique of the 
values implicit in the procedures of the new composition, and of the political systems 
that are allegedly the products of such a foreshortened approach to mental work. 15 
The work of theory is repeatedly made to look like a kind of laziness, a short 
cut which claims to be able to stand comparison with the long, accumulated labour of 
centuries; Burke's thinking, by contrast, is identified with the endeavour of "time" 
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itself As David Simpson has argued: "instead of being a ready and easy way that 
speeds up mental and social processes and economizes on human energy, Burke's 
'method' is almost identical with the slow passage of recorded time" (Romanticism, 
Nationalism, and the Revolt Against Theory 58). Institutional change of any kind, in 
Burke's view, has to occur by a slow evolution, building on what is established and 
discarding only after long deliberation, and the mental work of political arrangement 
should mimic this glacial movement of social processes. Theory, by contrast, is a kind 
of intellectual laziness that takes the line of least resistance, eluding, though not finally 
escaping, the difficulties of working in the real world. In the Reflections, for instance, 
Burke censures the members of the French Assembly for the sloppiness of their 
intellectual effort: 
Their purpose everywhere seems to have been to evade and slip aside from 
difficulty [... ]. They get nothing by it. Commencing their labours on a 
principle of sloth, they have the common fortune of slothful men. The 
difficulties which they rather had eluded than escaped, meet them again in their 
course; they multiply and thicken on them; they are involved, through a 
labyrinth of confused detail, in an industry without limit, and without direction; 
and, in conclusion, the whole of their work becomes feeble, vitious, and 
insecure. (8: 215) 
Wrestling with difficulty is not to be evaded, says Burke, for it "obliges us to an 
intimate acquaintance with our object [... ]. It will not suffer us to be superficial" 
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(215). The French, on the contrary, have "a degenerate fondness for tricking short- 
cuts, and little fallacious fallacies" (215). 
Already in the Reflections, Burke had censured the tactics of the 
revolutionaries as "criminal means" which offered a "shorter-cut to the object than 
through the highway of moral virtues" (132-3). In 1790, Burke was confident that 
such short methods would eventually backfire on the agents themselves. In 1796, in 
the Second of the Letters on a Regicide Peace, Burke's criticism of criminal methods is 
tinted with a grudging admiration. He again accuses the French revolutionary state of 
discovering labour-saving methods: they had "found the short cut to the productions 
of Nature, while others in pursuit of them, are obliged to wind through the labyrinth of 
a very intricate state of society. They seize upon the fruit of the labour; they seize 
upon the labourer himself' (9: 288-9). Now the Jacobinal system is not only a way 
evading difficulty, but evidence of enterprise; the French constitution has its benefits, 
that is, in the efficiency of its design (287). Nevertheless, in seizing on the fruits of 
others' labour, the French legislators are still guilty of wanting to live off something 
other than the resources of their own labours. 
The value of honest industry, the ethos of industriousness, underpins Burke's 
critique of radical mental activity. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the exertions of the 
sagacious politician are compared to that of the skilled workman: "There are moments 
in the fortunes of states when particular men are called to make improvements by great 
mental exertion [... ]. A politician, to do great things, looks for a power, what our 
workmen call a purchase; and if he finds that power, in politics as in mechanics he 
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cannot be at a loss to apply it" (8: 206). It behooves modern politicians not to discard 
materials and instruments which they find ready to hand. Burke avers that the 
monastic institution was such a power that might have been used to great good. But 
instead of directing the mental and bodily labour of the monks and the wealth and 
resources of religion for public benefit, the fruits of the confiscation had been simply 
sold and destroyed (206-7). For Burke, it was an unforgivable profligacy to destroy a 
power growing in nature. He makes a similar point in the Third Letter on the Regicide 
Peace, where he argues that the desire for acquisition--or, the greed of the capitalist-- 
was the principle of all prosperity, and a natural power that the statesman might direct 
to public benefit, rather than, say, censure or subdue (9: 347-50). The French 
politicians are unable to act with the requisite political acumen because they do not 
understand their trade and are "destitute of mental funds" (8: 207). He is not even 
deserving of the name of statesmen, says Burke, who "having obtained the command 
and direction of such a power as existed in the wealth, the discipline, and habits of 
such corporations, as those which you have rashly destroyed, cannot find a way of 
converting it to the great and lasting benefit of his country" (207). Although the work 
ethic is made to support Burke's critique of other intellectuals, I would stress that 
Burke's appropriation of the virtues of labour for his own thought is, as Paine realised, 
a rhetorical accomplishment. As I will now argue, Burke models his own intellectual 
work on what is, in essence, an aristocratic model of intellectual activity. 
Burke continually refers to the organic nature of the British constitution, and 
identifies it with his own labour. Innovation, by contrast, was not to be relied upon, 
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because the theorists had not laboriously absorbed the accumulated wisdom of the past 
in the way that Burke, for example, had done; instead, they had rejected all opinion, all 
custom, and all prejudice (8: 138). In An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, 
Burke reiterates his view that the British Constitution was the result of collected 
wisdom: it had "not been struck out at an heat by a set of presumptuous men [... ]. It 
is the result of the thoughts of many minds in many ages" (113). Just as the British 
constitution is a complicated and multi-faceted work that could not be the result of 
one mind or one age, so, Burke affirms, its advantages cannot be appreciated by 
"superficial understandings" (113). True political wisdom requires intelligent men to 
know the limits of their own understanding and when to avail themselves of the 
accumulated intelligence of the past: without "the foregone studies of men reputed 
intelligent and learned we shall be always beginners" (113-14). Pace Simpson, it is 
Burke's method of proceeding which now looks like one that "economizes on human 
energy" and provides a short cut to political wisdom (Romanticism, Nationalism, and 
the Revolt Against Theory 58). Collaboration with tradition, in other words, is like 
walking on a beaten track, and allows Burke to avoid unnecessary labour. If Burke 
distinguishes his own political writing and thinking from radical speculators by 
invoking the past in the form of venerable predecessors whose legacy he is protecting 
and extending, the presence of other minds vouching for Burke's own political wisdom 
might, at the same time, render problematic the very labour, qua labour, in which 
Burke is engaged. It is difficult to see how Burke can measure the value of his own 
labours, for example, if he cannot distinguish what he has learned from others "from 
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the results of [his] own meditations" (8: 149). What Burke values, in placing 
foundation above innovation, is not hard work, but a continued line of descent. 
John Barrell has argued that the eighteenth-century discourse of civic 
humanism legitimates the possession of political authority of the traditional landed elite 
by claiming that that "political authority is rightly exercised by those capable of 
thinking in general terms; which usually means those capable of producing abstract 
ideas" (Barrell, The Birth of Pandora 41). To develop the ability to generalise, "a man 
must occupy a place in the social order where he has no need to devote his life to 
supporting himself, " where he has no narrow or self-serving professional interests, and 
where he does not form an experience of the world primarily through the performance 
of manual labour (42). Generality was equated with comprehensiveness and 
disinterestedness. To have an occupation of any kind limited one's outlook; the pursuit 
of "any specific profession, trade, or occupation might occlude [one's] view of society 
as a whole" (English Literature in History 33; The Birth of Pandora 42). This view, 
in effect, justified the restriction of political office to those, primarily gentlemen of 
landed property, with a large enough unearned income to allow them leisure to reflect 
and time to devote themselves to public life (The Birth of Pandora 51). As the century 
progressed, the credibility of the gentleman's claim to special status became 
increasingly undermined, as Barrell has made clear, by the sense of society as a 
complex and diversified organism, unavailable to the single comprehensive gaze. In 
particular, political economy, the discourse of the division of labour, countered the 
landed gentleman's claim to disinterest, by re-evaluating both "labour" and "interest; " 
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society was portrayed by Adam Smith, for example, as a collective of specialised 
labourers, each pursuing their own special interests, the outcome of which was 
generally beneficial to all (English Literature in History 21-5; The Birth of Pandora 
xiv-xv; The Wealth of Nations 1: 10-36). 
As De Bruyn has demonstrated, despite this challenge to the comprehensive 
view, Burke, among others, "remained committed to finding modes of representation 
that reaffirmed the gentleman's intellectual and political authority" (130). We can point 
to an remarkable sentence in An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, for instance, 
where Burke argues that a "true natural aristocracy is not a separate interest in the 
state" (129). This class possesses qualities which can only be the result of a life of 
leisure 
To be bred in a place of estimation; to see nothing low and sordid from one's 
infancy; to be taught to respect oneself; to be habituated to the censorial 
inspection of the public eye; to look early to public opinion; to stand upon such 
elevated ground as to be enabled to take a large view of the wide-spread and 
infinitely diversified combinations of men and affairs in a large society; to have 
leisure to read, to reflect, to converse; To be enabled to draw the court and 
attention of the wise and learned wherever they are found; To be habituated to 
armies to command and obey; To be taught to despise danger in the pursuit of 
honour and duty; To be formed to the greatest degree of vigilance, foresight, 
and circumspection, in a state of things in which no fault is committed with 
impunity, and the slightest mistakes draw on the most ruinous consequences-- 
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To be led to a guarded and regulated conduct, from a sense that you are 
considered as an instructor of your fellow-citizens in their highest concerns, 
and that you act as a reconciler between God and man--To be employed as an 
administrator of the law and justice, and to be thereby amongst the first 
benefactors to mankind--To be a professor of high science, or of liberal and 
ingenuous art--To be amongst rich traders, who from their success are 
presumed to have sharp and vigorous understandings, and to possess the 
virtues of diligence, order, constancy, and regularity, and to have cultivated an 
habitual regard to commutative justice--These are the circumstances of men 
who form what I should call a natural aristocracy, without which there is no 
nation. (129-30) 
Although Burke's ruling class is opened up to exceptional men from some professional 
fields--it can contain some lawyers, learned professors, clergymen, rich traders--the 
burden of the passage is to impress the reader with the idea that a life of comparative 
leisure is essential to fit a mind for the highest office. Burke's language in the 
Reflections, for example, often suggests that statesman ought to possesses this 
aristocratic outlook, and that tradesmen or professional men are disqualified from 
political office on this account: "It cannot escape observation, that when men are too 
much confined to professional and faculty habits, and, as it were, inveterate in the 
recurrent employment of that narrow circle, they are rather disabled than qualified for 
whatever depends on the knowledge of mankind [... ] on a comprehensive connected 
view of the various complicated external and internal interests which go to the 
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formation of that multifarious thing called a state' (8: 95,100-101,291). It may be, as 
De Bruyn argues, that Burke saw himself embodying the political ideal of the 
gentleman "that the hereditary political leadership of his country was, to his mind, 
increasingly abandoning" (159). Indeed, the long sentence from An Appeal from the 
New to the old Whigs, quoted above, may be intended to perform the very quality--'"a 
large view of the wide-spread and infinitely diversified combinations of men and 
affairs"--it somewhat laboriously describes. 
Elsewhere, Burke even more explicitly argues that leisure, even idleness, is one 
of the conditions necessary for intellectual practice. While he accuses the leaders of 
the National Assembly of intellectual sloth, he also claims, paradoxically, that that the 
mischief which the National Assembly had done was the result of too much labour. 
Freedom from the necessity of labour is a prerequisite for the disinterested judgment 
of a true statesman: 
In England we cannot work so hard as Frenchmen. Frequent relaxation is 
necessary to us [... ]. At present, this your disposition to labour is rather 
encreased than lessened [... ]. This continued unremitted effort of the members 
of your Assembly, I take to be one among the causes of the mischief they have 
done. They who always labour, can have no true judgment. You never give 
yourselves time to cool. You can never survey, from its proper point of sight, 
the work you have finished, before you decree its final execution. You never 
go into the country, soberly, and dispassionately to observe the effect of your 
measures on their objects [... ]. These are among the effects of unremitted 
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labour, when men exhaust their attention, burn out their candles, and are left in 
the dark. (8: 334-5) 
Burke recommends retirement to the country perhaps because, as Barrell observes, 
"the town, buried in smoke and divided by interest, inhibits a clear and disinterested 
vision of the world" (English Literature in History 60-1). In any case, we can safely 
assume that Burke's recommendation to "frequent relaxation" is not intended for all 
labourers alike, certainly not for those who, subjected to "the common doom" of 
mankind, must labour both to provide their own daily bread and to support the 
physical life of the higher classes. Rest from labour is here recommended as necessary 
only to intellectual workers, specifically to statesmen, whose attention might be taxed 
by overwork. 
Burke is torn between two ideological paradigms of intellectual activity, we 
can summarise, both of which he puts in the service of critique of radical intellectuals: 
a bourgeois one derived from political economy and an aristocratic one derived from 
civic humanism. On one hand, Burke sees mental work as akin to any other kind of 
toil--our common doom--and censures the members of the French Assembly, from 
within the norms of the work ethic, for evading the difficult labour of political and 
social arrangement. On the other hand, he sees these same intellectual workers as 
exempted from the unremitting cycle of labour, and suggests that intellectual labour 
cannot be effective without leisure, the relaxation of frequent rural residence. 16 The 
problem, as I have argued, is that Burke models his own political work on an analogy 
with the political and social system of hereditary privilege that he is trying to defend, 
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while, at the same time, he is unwilling to give up, for the purposes of critique of his 
intellectual adversaries, the resources of the language of labour, derived from the ethos 
of the class of men to whom he belonged both by social origin and ideological 
inclination. The difficult, one could say impossible, task Burke attempts, through the 
representation of his own mental labour, is to make privilege seem more laborious, 
more deserving, than mere industry and talent. 
The bourgeois character was, for Burke, active and energetic, and, as 
Kramnick has argued, tends to be described in his writings by adjectives such as bold, 
adventurous, independent, enterprising, spirited, ambitious, assertive, and industrious. 
The nobility, on the other hand, were passive, and characterised by the opposite terms: 
listless timid, idle, irresolute, languid, indolent, complacent, and supine. Throughout 
his career, as Kramnick demonstrates, Burke saw these two forces contending in the 
social order (Kramnick 109,121-2). In the Reflections, for example, Burke stresses 
that every country must make a place for its talents and abilities in its highest offices, 
but that property must be represented in government in disproportion to its numerical 
weight in society. Because ability is a "vigorous and active principle" while property is 
"sluggish, inert, and timid, " property must be protected from envy and rapacity by a 
massive representation in the state (8: 101-2). Hence, it is right, he says, that both the 
house of Peers and, to a great extent, the Commons, are dominated by landed 
aristocracy. At the very worst, says Burke, the large property owners serve as "the 
ballast in the vessel of the commonwealth" (102). The property of the great 
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landowners forms a "natural rampart about the lesser properties in all their gradations" 
(102). The security of great masses of property in the hands of a few noble men 
secures all property in principle. Although every commonwealth must give a "due and 
adequate" representation to its talents and abilities, because ability is so vigorous and 
assertive advancement ought to be made difficult: "the road to eminence and power, 
from obscure condition, ought not to be made too easy, nor a thing too much of 
course'" (101). The principle of property must be protected from the ambitious 
politicking of the talented, by making advancement as difficult as possible for the 
latter. 
The opposed principles of passivity and activity also mark the respective 
national characters of the British and the French. The British, according to the radicals' 
depiction of them, are, says Burke, conservative because they are complacent: "I know 
that we are supposed a dull sluggish race, rendered passive by finding our situation 
tolerable; and prevented by a mediocrity of freedom from ever attaining to its full 
perfection" (106). In a much-cited passage, Burke turns complacency into a 
conservative political virtue: "Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make 
the field ring with their importunate chink, while thousands of great cattle, reposed 
beneath the shadow of the British oak, chew the cud and are silent, pray do not 
imagine, that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field" (136). 
Dullness makes the British cherish their prejudices and renders them averse to 
innovation in politics: "Thanks to our sullen resistance to innovation, thanks to the 
cold sluggishness of our national character, we still bear the stamp of our forefathers" 
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(137). The suggestion is that the pre-eminence of the principle of property in their 
political constitution accounts for the conservatism of the British national character, 
their resistance to untried experiments in politics. The British people tend to be 
sluggish and dull, because they are animated, so to speak, by the inert principle of 
property that dominates in the British state. 
These virtues could be a liability, however. A theme that would appear 
regularly in the texts of Burke's last years is that while obedient labourers--passive, 
sober and contented--were the solid ground on which society was built, the same 
characteristics made those men uncommitted--languid and tame--in the defence of the 
nation. Dullness, indolence and inertia are, on one hand, the qualities that inoculate 
Britain from revolutionary contagion. On the other hand, Burke fears, that they will 
prove inadequate for the task of resisting the demonic revolutionary spirit. From 1791 
Burke's project was to create zeal for the status quo, to inspire the same enthusiasm 
for the defence of the old as for the proliferation of novelty. In this endeavour his 
adversaries are not radical intellectuals, but the torpid and complacent political and 
social establishment of England, who, Burke believed, were slow to recognise the 
extent of the danger posed by the new revolutionary state and the subversive ideals it 
tirelessly propagated. Interestingly, even though the identity of his political opponents 
has changed, Burke deploys the same vocabulary of labour against his more august 
antagonists that supported his criticism of the radicals. 
The security and prosperity which the British had, thanks to the constitutional 
settlement of 1688, enjoyed for more than a century, was a source of discontent 
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among some and of complacency in others. In his Letter to William Elliot, Burke 
argued that the germ of revolution lay in the prosperity of France. Security had bred, 
in one part of society, "laxity and debility, " while encouraging, in the other part, "bold 
spirits and dark designs" (9: 39). In Britain, too, the security and general prosperity 
that the nation had enjoyed during the eighteenth century contained its own dangers. 
Hence, in the Reflections, Burke argues that security and prosperity were not enough 
to excite the imagination of intellectuals like Richard Price: "There must be a great 
change of scene, there must be a magnificent stage effect; there must be a grand 
spectacle to rouze the imagination, grown torpid with the lazy enjoyment of sixty years 
security, and the still unanimating repose of public prosperity" (Writings 8: 115). The 
same phrase "lazy enjoyment" occurs in Burke's attack on the Duke of Bedford in A 
Letter to a Noble Lord: the aristocracy's sense of entitlement leads to the "lazy 
enjoyment of undisturbed possessions" (9: 175). Burke fears that, as it tends to 
inertia, property also tends to complacency, "supine security, " and a lack of zeal in its 
own defence (Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs 108-9). 
If the British people are in general passive, the French, after 1789, were--like 
the meritocratic principle that animated the new Republic--bold and active. Burke 
characterised the Jacobins as zealous, energetic, enterprising, talented men attacking 
the inert and timid privileged order (Kramnick 145). "There is no vigour anywhere, " 
wrote Burke in 1792, "except the distempered vigour and energy of France. That 
country has but too much life in it, when everything around is so disposed to tameness 
and languor" (8. - 3 91). And in 1793 Burke listed the "innumerable defects" of the 
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Jacobins--men of no rank, full of levity, arrogance, and presumption, without morals 
or prudence--only to conclude that they had one quality: "but that one thing is worth a 
thousand--they have energy" (480). Here, where Burke is trying to animate the zeal of 
the British government for a protracted war against France, the dull solidity and 
passivity of the British character is a liability. The principle which preserves domestic 
order does not secure the nation from a threat from abroad. While Burke wants the 
British people to remain in their contented docile state--obedient, tractable and 
laborious--so that they might continue to cherish their prejudices, he also wants to fire 
them with the same energy as the Jacobins possessed in order that they may be better 
equipped to resist the enemy. 
The British Constitution, Burke lamented in 1791, is at best "coldly tolerated" 
while the French is "rapturously praised" (An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs 
96). Four years later, in the Letter to William Elliot of 1795, Burke insisted that the 
British constitution too must have its "warm advocates and passionate defenders" and 
not merely "heavy, discontented acquiescence" (9: 40,223). The defence of the old 
order, he feared, was "cold, unimpassioned, dejected, melancholy" (110-11). 
Opposition to the French system must bear some resemblance to the force it exerted, 
Burke maintained (290). The republican spirit that animated France and the French 
faction in England must be matched by a "republican" spirit in defence of monarchy 
(41-2). But Burke does not explain how the old order will inspire the same zeal as the 
new, built as it was to reflect and encourage the opposite virtues of security of 
property, slow, steady labour, and cud-chewing docility. '7 The energy of the Jacobins 
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derived from the same revolutionary principles that they had enshrined in the new 
constitution of their state: "We have not considered as we ought the dreadful energy 
of a State, in which the property has nothing to do with the Government, [... ] in 
which the property is in complete subjection, and where nothing rules but the mind of 
desperate men" (289). France was formidable because of its spirit and its principles, 
which gave the Jacobins the full use of their native capacities; the Jacobins were 
superior to the British, in Burke's sober evaluation, "in ability, in dexterity, in the 
distinctness of their views" (225,266). 
Within the terms of labouring subjectivity, Burke castigated the radical 
intellectuals as lazy; at the same time, it is the industry and zeal of the Jacobins--their 
energy and ambition--that is most threatening. By the same logic, the obedience and 
contentment that Burke claimed to admire and venerate in the British character were 
sources of anxiety to him, since these same characteristics seemed to make the British 
acquiesce in their own defeat. The tensions in Burke's rhetoric were given a concise 
expression in a number of paradoxical descriptive phrases. In the Reflections, for 
instance, he accuses the revolutionaries of avoiding honest labour, but of being 
zealous, restless and industrious in the pursuit of their ambitions; in all their activities, 
he writes, the French politicians are governed by a "lazy but restless disposition which 
loves sloth but hates quiet" (8: 216). Again, in An Appeal from the New to the Old 
Whigs, Burke says that the British people, both in Parliament and out of doors, will 
sometimes acquiesce, through insufficient attention or decision, to political schemes 
they would normally have opposed, and that the nation will, therefore, be lost by an 
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"activity of inertness" (97). Or, in yet another paradoxical formulation that 
encapsulates the contradictions in Burke's rhetoric of labour, he describes the 
disposition of the nobility whose idle imaginations have been seduced by the 
revolutionaries as "the over-laboured lassitude of those who have nothing to do" (8: 
152). 18 
It was the responsibility of the British government, Burke believed, to inspire a 
decent, contented, but dangerously complacent people with enthusiasm for the war (9: 
236). Unfortunately, the government had been unable to kindle zeal in the people 
because they themselves were "cold as ice, " were "flat and languid, feeble and evasive" 
(9: 229). The way to meet the enemy, Burke urged in his Remarks on the Policy of the 
Allies, was with energy and vigour, and not with doubts and fears, nor with "a languid, 
uncertain hesitation [... ] which never sees a difficulty but to yield to it, or at best to 
evade it" (8: 480). This passage may be compared to the one, cited earlier, in which 
Burke accuses the French theorists of trying to "evade and slip aside from difficulty" 
(8: 215). Even though the identity of his adversary has changed, from the slothful 
French politicians to the flat and feeble Pitt government, he uses the same terms to 
castigate these different opponents; in both cases, in contrast to his shiftless enemies 
Burke's counter-labours are figured as arduous physical effort. On more than one 
occasion, for example, Burke would point out to the nobility the irony of a situation in 
which he alone seemed desirous of upholding the order of things under which they 
prospered: "I am not Hercules enough to uphold those orbs which the Atlases of the 
world are so desirous of shifting from their weary shoulders. What can be done against 
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the magnanimous resolution of the great to accomplish the degradation and the ruin of 
their own character and situation? " (9: 37). What was needed, then, as illustrated by 
Burke himself, was a "sweat of the mind, " a readiness on behalf of the great and 
powerful part of the British nation to do their share of suffering in the national war 
effort 
In the text with which I began this chapter, the third of the Letters on a 
Regicide Peace, Burke contends that the efforts of the Pitt Government to negotiate a 
peace with France were mistaken in intent and must inevitably be unsuccessful in the 
execution. The advances of the British were misguided, Burke argued, because there 
could never be a treaty, or even a dialogue, between the two parties, as the French 
directory rejected out of court any of the conventional rules of international diplomacy 
between nations and did not even respect the principle of national sovereignty. The 
aim of the directory was not to maintain a balance of power, but rather to encourage a 
universal revolution in all nations on the model of the French one. The purpose of the 
French Assembly's foreign diplomacy, in short, was the subversion of all legitimate 
national governments (9: 340). Moreover, the diplomacy of the British government in 
suing for peace could not be successful because it had pursued too eagerly the 
cessation of hostilities; too anxious to secure peace at any price, the Pitt ministry 
merely succeeded in communicating to the French Assembly its willingness to submit 
to almost any additional humiliation rather than risk the continuation of aggression 
(301) 
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The Third Letter on the Regicide Peace was written in large part to answer the 
question "whether the inability of the country to prosecute the war, did necessitate a 
submission to the indignities and the calamities of a Peace with the Regicide Power" 
(9: 352). The only excuse which might be admitted as a legitimate reason for following 
what Burke calls the "mendicant diplomacy" of peace at any price is that such a policy 
was founded on "absolute necessity" (344). This defence, says Burke, at least 
deserves consideration; however, he then makes a distinction between moral and 
physical necessity: 
moral necessity is not like metaphysical or even physical. In that category, it is 
a word of loose signification, and conveys different ideas to different minds. 
To the low-minded the slightest necessity becomes an invincible necessity 
[... ]. But when the necessity pleaded is not in the nature of things, but in the 
vices of him who alleges it, the whining tones of common-place beggarly 
rhetorick, produce nothing but indignation; because they indicate a desire of 
keeping up a dishonourable existence, without utility to others, and without 
dignity to itself, because they aim at obtaining the dues of labour without 
industry; and by frauds would draw from the compassion of others, what men 
ought to owe to their own spirit and their own exertions. (344-5) 
According to Burke, the British government could not attribute its unwillingness to 
prosecute the war to the absence of resources--either material or moral--within the 
British nation (345-6). In an analysis of the economic health of the country, Burke 
claims to demonstrate its physical ability to sustain the economic burdens of a 
124 
prolonged war. For example, the loan collected by open subscription in December 
1796 showed, according to Burke, that the British people lacked neither martial spirit, 
nor material wealth, nor confidence in the Government (345-6). All that was needed in 
order to prosecute the war successfully was an adequate leadership. The government°s 
appeal to necessity as the grounds for making peace with France was, therefore, 
simply an attempt to reduce its own culpability, for its lack of zeal for the war was an 
abandonment of the proper labours of statesmanship. We can note that Burke criticises 
the government's poltroonery here for the same reasons he criticises the plans to 
relieve the labouring poor in this same letter: the government's excuses solicit 
compassion in order to obtain what should be procured only by their own exertions; 
the "beggarly rhetoric" excites pity only in order to evade labour. 
A similar distinction between the moral and physical worlds is made in A Letter 
to William Elliot, in which Burke is trying to convince his contemporaries that the 
British system of liberty and government would not perish under its own weakness but 
only by the neglect of those in authority. Here, the distinction is made in order to 
suggest that the analogy between political states and human bodies is inapt, and may 
simply be a cover-up for intellectual cowardice and laziness: 
I am not of the opinion that the race of men, and the commonwealth they 
create, like the bodies of individuals, grow effete and languid and bloodless, 
and ossify by the necessities of their own conformation, and the fatal operation 
of longevity and time. The analogies between bodies natural and politick, 
though they may some times illustrate arguments, furnish no argument of 
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themselves. They are but too often used under the colour of a specious 
philosophy, to find apologies for the despair of laziness and pusillanimity, and 
to excuse the want of all manly efforts, when the exigencies of our country call 
for them the more loudly. (40-1) 
As in the previous excerpt, Burke identifies zeal for the cause with a willingness to 
labour against difficulty, and he attacks the lack of zeal of the British leaders who 
invent excuses rather than engage in "manly" industry. Specious arguments derived 
from false analogies manifest a desire to avoid hard labour, the sweat of the mind. As I 
will now suggest, however, with reference to A Letter to a Noble Lord, by these 
exacting standards, Burke himself is guilty of superficial reasoning and deceptive 
rhetoric when he defends his crown pension; thus he evinces his own desire to obtain 
the dues of labour without industry. 
Burke's Letter to a Noble Lord was published on 24 February 1796 in answer 
to criticism in both houses of parliament, during the previous year, of his acceptance of 
a crown pension. In 1794, Burke's political friends persuaded Pitt of the need to do 
something for Burke in his financial exigency. By August 1795 Burke's debts were 
estimated to have been around thirty thousand pounds. The initial idea was to procure 
for Burke a peerage, and Burke's son Richard canvassed Pitt to this effect. The King 
refused, however, and in lieu of this Burke was awarded an annual pension of 1,200 
pounds, the maximum amount permitted under his own 1782 Civil List Act. In 
September 1795 his total pension was increased to 3,700 pounds per annum by an 
additional sum, paid out of the Crown's reserved revenue and, therefore not subject to 
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the restrictions imposed by the Act of 1782. While political pensions were often 
attacked for undermining the independence of thought essential to public service, 
criticism of Burke's pension was aggravated by other factors. To his critics Burke's 
acceptance of the pension clashed with the spirit at least of his earlier rhetoric against 
royal patronage in his Speech on Oeconomical Reform, and even sympathisers 
regretted that it had not been brought forward in the form of a parliamentary grant. It 
seemed to his detractors that the pension had been awarded by the Pitt ministry as a 
payment for Burke's propaganda against the French Revolution. Burke was especially 
incensed by attacks on him by two Foxite Whig peers in the House of Lords, John 
Fussell, Duke of Bedford and James Maitland, Earl of Lauderdale. Bedford spoke in 
the Lords of "pensions of almost unparalleled profusion" which had been "lavished 
upon the avowed advocates of economy; nay upon the very man who had 
distinguished himself at one time as the rigid advocate of economy" (Writings 9: 9). In 
his defence, Burke concentrated his attack on the young and wealthy Bedford. Like 
the Duke of Norfolk whom Burke had already attacked in A Letter to William Elliot, 
Bedford and Lauderdale were examples of the rich nobility who had, from boredom or 
secret ambition, embraced radical ideas. '9 
To the reproach that his pension had been a pay-off for his anti-Gallic posture, 
Burke could with justice reply that at the time he wrote the Reflections, he did not 
know what the administration's stance on the revolution would be (Correspondence 8: 
341). But in order to fully justify his pension Burke had to insist, in his reply to 
Bedford, on his merit, that his labours proved his worthiness: "If I am unworthy, the 
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Ministers are worse than prodigal" (9: 149). Burke contrasts his own industry with 
the Duke's aristocratic idleness and points out that Bedford owed his own fortune to 
the grants made by the tyrant Henry VIII to Russell's ancestor, the first Duke (9: 166- 
9,164-5). Burke's ambivalence about aristocratic privilege is nowhere more evident 
than in A Letter to a Noble Lord. This was immediately remarked upon by Burke's 
contemporaries, such as Coleridge and John Thelwall, and has been noted by astute 
critics since. According to Kramnick, for example, it is here that Burke displays most 
openly his ideological ambivalence and most obviously affiliates himself with the social 
position and with the ideology of the Jacobins. Burke's attack on Bedford is 
uncomfortably reminiscent to the anti-aristocratic writing he deplored (5-6,147-8). In 
a similar vein, Aers writes that A Letter to a Noble Lord becomes "both an attack on 
inherited privilege and wealth, the basis of aristocracy, and a defence, even a proud 
celebration, of specifically bourgeois values and an ethos whose outcome is a 
bourgeois meritocracy rather than an aristocratic order" (152). The problem for Burke 
is that by asserting his own industry, he declares his independence from patronage and, 
thereby, renounces the relationship of deference. As Reid summarises, Burke's 
difficulty in his apologia is that he has to assert his independence from patronage 
; "without repudiating the social relationship of which it was a particular instance; " he 
must "acknowledge and disavow the relation of patronage (the relation confirmed by 
the grant of the pension)" (74,89). 20 
Looking back on his career as a politician, Burke emphasises that advancement 
and recognition have depended on his labour and his ability: "I have laboured hard to 
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earn what the noble Lords are generous enough to pay" (146). 21 As in his earlier Letter 
to William Elliot, Burke represents himself as one of the obscure and laborious men: 
one of "poor outcasts of the plebeian race, " a "scribbler" (33,34). Unlike Bedford, 
who had been "swaddled, and rocked, and dandled into a Legislator, " Burke has had 
to demonstrate his qualifications at "every step of my progress in life" (160). 
Throughout the Letter, Burke contrasts Bedford's privilege with his own industry: "I 
cannot recognise in his few and idle years, the competence to judge of my long and 
laborious life" (149-50). Burke boasts of "a long life, spent with unexampled toil in the 
service of my country" (148), and, as he often does when he is emphasising his 
industriousness, he imagines his own labour as analogous to manual labour. Thus in 
his description of his plan for economic reform, he characteristically describes his 
endeavours in the vocabulary of physical exertion: "I heaved the lead every inch of the 
way" (157); his exertions have cost him "pains incredible" (151) and, he says, his 
"constitution sunk under [his] labour" (159). As in A Letter to William Elliot--where 
he is the Hercules holding up the hereditary system, while members of the nobility, the 
beneficiaries of the system, have abandoned their responsibilities--Burke points out the 
ironies of Bedford's attack on him. Lowly Burke had "omitted no exertion" to support 
the prejudices "which buoy up the ponderous mass of [Bedford's] nobility, wealth, and 
titles" (162). "I have strained every nerve, " he adds, with perhaps justifiable 
exaggeration, "to keep the Duke of Bedford in that situation, which alone makes him 
my superior" (162). 22 
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Burke defends himself by claiming that he has merited, by having worked to 
achieve, the reward of a pension. Furthermore, Burke prides himself on the fact that he 
has always served his country by encouraging the abilities of others for the service of 
the nation: "I was always ready, to the height of my means [... ] to forward those 
abilities which overpowered my own" (154). And, again: "I have on an hundred 
occasions, exerted myself with singular zeal to forward every man's even tolerable 
pretensions" (160). His economical reforms were not intended to abolish the award of 
state pensions to deserving recipients: "I did not dare to rob the nation of all funds to 
reward merit" (158). At the same time, Burke claims, somewhat paradoxically, that he 
has done all he could to discourage the radicals' "enquiries into the fortunes of those, 
who hold large portions of wealth without any apparent merit of their own" (162). 
Burke's merit, that is, consists both in his promotion of merit in others and in his 
defence of unmerited privilege. The defence of talent and merit sits uneasily with the 
defence of privilege, however, and Burke's self-defence continually crosses into an 
attack on aristocratic status. Hence, he points out the absurdity of the comparison 
between the proportion of service to reward in Bedford's case and his own: "Why will 
his Grace, by attacking me, force me reluctantly to compare my little merit with that 
which obtained from the Crown those prodigies of profuse donation by which he 
tramples on the mediocrity of humble and laborious individuals" (164-5). The 
comparison between them was ludicrous, for Bedford had no merits of his own: "My 
merits, whatever they are, are original and personal; his are derivative" (165). If the 
proportion between merit and reward had always been observed, Burke claims, "we 
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should not now have an overgrown Duke of Bedford to oppress the industry of 
humble men" (162). 
Burke pursues the contrast between his own situation and Bedford's. 
Accustomed to having everything provided for him, Bedford, says Burke, cannot even 
"comprehend the transaction he condemns. What I have obtained was the fruit of no 
bargain; the production of no intrigue; the result of no compromise; the effect of no 
solicitation" (148). The Duke's fortunes, on the other hand, were the outcome of a 
political intrigue; the Bedford fortunes, he remarks, originated in a grant to the first 
Duke of Bedford as a reward for "being a minion of Henry Eighth, " a grant raised out 
of a capital engrossed by the dissolution of the monasteries (164,166-7). However, it 
should be remembered that as a matter of historical accuracy, Burke's pension, too, 
was the result of political intercessions on his behalf: by Windham to Pitt, for example, 
and by Pitt to the King. When the Duke of Portland and his followers determined to 
give the Pitt administration their open support, provision for Burke in his old age was 
one of the points discussed when negotiations began (Correspondence 7: 550). 
Richard Burke, in a letter to Windham, regretted that a peerage or a larger pension 
was not forthcoming, but asserted that his father would not, could not, from injured 
pride refuse whatever was offered: "some sacrifice of dignity must be made to ease" 
(Correspondence 8: 551). Finally, Burke's language, in a letter to Windham, implied 
that he considered himself in debt to the Pitt ministry for its generosity: "I am willing 
to take my part of it [this civil war of Europe] wherever you please. Tell this to Mr 
Pitt, and assure him, that he has not betrayed his master by recommending his bounty 
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to me" (Correspondence 8: 345). Burke's pension, then, quite clearly was the outcome 
of political compromise, of bargaining, and of solicitation. Indeed, as the Letter to a 
Noble Lord continues, Burke increasingly insists not on the difference between himself 
and Bedford, but for the analogy between their situations. 
This is the curious strategy of the Letter to a Noble Lord. As the Letter 
progresses, Burke advances another argument, simultaneous with the first, in which he 
points out that his own situation is not essentially different from the Duke's, who also 
owed fortune to the grants conferred by the state (164). Most critics have commented 
on Burke's open affiliation with the Jacobins in his attack on Bedford. As De Bruyn 
notes, just as compelling is the correspondence between Burke and Bedford (41-2). 
Burke's "main concern, " according to De Bruyn, "is to distance himself from the 
Duke" by arguing that "his subsidy is a legitimate recognition of merit and ability" (41- 
2). This is not quite correct, for Burke is trying to separate himself from Bedford and 
the radicals; if he insists too vigorously on his merit, to differentiate himself from 
Bedford, he only succeeds in identifying still more closely with the Jacobins. Burke is 
practically forced to confess that there is no proportion between political work and its 
rewards and that all state awards are arbitrary. What starts as a defence of his 
labourious life ends as an offer of a non-aggression pact: if Bedford ceases his attacks 
on Burke's pension, Burke will relinquish his inquiries into the origin of the Duke's 
fortunes 
Speaking of the persecution of the clergy, in the Reflections, Burke says that 
the revolutionaries had not been able to find any reason for their persecution in any 
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existing vices: "They find themselves obliged to rake into the histories of former ages 
(which they have ransacked with a malignant and profligate industry) for every 
instance of oppression and persecution which has been made by that body or in its 
favour, in order to justify, upon very iniquitous, because very illogical principles of 
retaliation, their own persecutions and their own cruelties" (8: 188-9). Burke 
continually points out the dangers of historical research. In the fourth of the Letters on 
a Regicide Peace, again, he writes that the Jacobin sympathizers in Britain attempted 
to justify the massacres of the regicides by "recourse to history; and found out all the 
recorded cruelties, that deform the annals of the world, in order that the massacres of 
the regicides might pass for a common event" (9: 106). Ironically, inquiring into the 
Duke's fortune is exactly what Burke does in the Letter to a Noble Lord: "Let us turn 
our eyes to history, in which great men' have always a pleasure in contemplating the 
heroic origin of their house" (166). It is Burke, now, who rakes into the past in order 
to make a political point. This was the danger which John Thelwall, among others, was 
quick to catch in Burke's "mischievous pamphlet: " Burke had torn asunder, instead of 
protecting--as he claimed to be doing--"the venerable veil of prescription, " and thus he 
had undermined "the foundations of hereditary property" (Thelwall 12,11). The first 
"complete leveler, " Burke had in effect represented all wealth and territorial 
possessions as "plunder and usurpation" (15). 
The purpose of Burke's historical inquiry, of course, was to show that the 
award of his own pension was no more or less arbitrary than the way in which the 
Duke of Bedford acquired his own wealth and his own title. But by turning to history 
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to compare the origins of his own reward with those of his adversary, Burke, instead 
of establishing that both he and Bedford were equally meritorious or deserving, 
suggests that both grants were equally the outcome of arbitrary political favour. He 
effectively argues that any reward for political service depends to some extent on the 
colour of one's politics, and he more or less concedes that his own merit will not bear 
close scrutiny: "There will always be some difference of opinion in the value of 
political services" (9: 162). Even when he stresses most forcibly the value of his own 
services, Burke only manages to suggest that there is no obvious corollary between 
mental work and payment. "My exertions, whatever they have been, were such as no 
hopes of pecuniary reward could possibly excite; and no pecuniary compensations can 
possibly reward them. Between money and services of this kind [... ] there is no 
common measurer" (150). If there is no way of accurately estimating the worth of 
political service, then all reward for that kind of work may be the fruits of political 
favour 
Burke's use of history is carefully calculated; it is a strategic move aimed at 
convincing the Duke of Bedford that it was better not to inquire at all into the 
proportion between political work and reward. It is not for nothing that Burke 
presents himself as a "reluctant" historian, for he demonstrates the danger for any kind 
of privilege of an historical or rational inquiry into its origins. 23 The invitation to 
Bedford to "turn our eyes to history" is a rhetorical one; it is not a proposal to engage 
in a collaborative historical inquiry, but a threat accompanied by the offer of an 
accord: "Let him remit his rigour on the disproportion between merit and reward in 
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others, and they will make no enquiry into the origin of his fortune" (169). As long as 
the "triple cord" of the realm--Monarchy, Lords, and Commons--endures, each 
pledging to ensure "each others being, and each others rights, " then, concludes Burke, 
"we are all safe together--the high from the blights of envy and the spoliations of 
rapacity; the low from the iron hand of oppression and the insolent spurn of contempt" 
(172-3). The high, Bedford, and the low, Burke, are safe together in a conspiracy of 
silence. Hereditary property, transmissible wealth, ancestral titles, and state pensions 
all depended on the determination of the privileged to accept their indivisibility; each 
was as vulnerable as the next to rational inquiry and the strict proportioning of reward 
to merit. While Burke dismissed the view that his pension was the result of political 
bargain or compromise, he offers here what amounts to a peace treaty. 
The mock overture to Bedford--"Let us turn our eyes to history, in which great 
men have always a pleasure in contemplating the heroic origin of their house"--has a 
further, unintended irony, since Burke presents himself as a champion of past lineages, 
and delights in contemplating the venerable origins of his own thought in the 
accumulated thoughts of previous writers and politicians. As I have argued, by 
placing himself in a long line of political thinkers whose legacy he is extending, Burke 
seems to imagine his own labours by an analogy with the hereditary (aristocratic) 
privilege he is protecting. That is to say, Burke, too, invokes an heroic past, in the 
form of the great minds of previous generations, that vouches for the legitimacy of his 
own thinking. Here again, in A Letter to a Noble Lord, although Burke draws on the 
terms labour, industry, and merit to defend his pension, the proposed analogy between 
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his own position and Bedford's appears to construct his mental labour more on the 
model of aristocratic privilege. 
Mary Wollstonecraft, James Mackintosh, and Tom Paine all paid tribute to, 
even as they disparaged, Burke's remarkable facility for papering over weak arguments 
by rhetorical effects. As I discussed in my introductory chapter, Burke's audacious 
rhetorical strategy, of pulling the ground from under the feet of his radical adversaries 
by claiming to have a closer connection than they to the material life of the nation, has 
been repeated many times since. It is worth observing, therefore, just how unstable 
Burke's rhetoric is. Burke begins his reply to Bedford by positing his own work as 
analogous to arduous physical work. He ends by proposing a treaty. In admitting the 
analogy between his situation and Bedford's, Burke seems to acknowledge the 
inadequacy of the initial analogy. The analogy between mental and manual labour, 
through which he tries to make his labours convincing, is revealed as nothing more 
than a rhetorical device, even a false analogy, which Burke utilises merely to 
distinguish himself from his opponents and to defend his pension as the fair reward for 
work rendered. Applying to Burke his own unforgiving criteria--criteria which he used 
to censure the French revolutionary theorists and their British admirers, to upbraid 
languid government ministers, and to scold supine hereditary peers--this rhetoric is an 
index of his desire to elicit pity, to "draw from the compassion of others" what he 
ought to owe to his own exertions, and an attempt to obtain, by means of this 
fraudulent emotion, "the dues of labour without industry" (9: 344-5). The pension 
awarded to Burke was indeed an act of compassion, offered to help him in his financial 
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straits. This is what the Letter to a Noble Lord never openly confesses. For pity is the 
dangerous sentiment that Burke, by invoking the curse of labour as the immutable 
condition of existence, forbids his readers to indulge towards the manual labourers: it 
only "teach[es] them to seek resources where no resources are to be found, in 
something else than their own industry, and frugality, and sobriety" (9: 355). While 
Burke repeatedly conflates his own mental activity with manual labour--in what we 
might call, using Burke's own terms, a "coarse discrimination""--to make "nice 
distinctions" between himself and his political opponents, the use he makes of the 
analogy finally places him outside the pale of the labouring population altogether. 24 
Burke's achievement was, nevertheless, a substantial one. He was remarkably 
successful in arrogating to himself the right to speak for ordinary labourers. "I have no 
man's proxy. I speak only from myself, " insisted Burke on more than one occasion (8: 
136; ). Yet, in spite of this disclaimer, Burke repeatedly disavows any "singularity" of 
opinion, and writes as if his thought is sanctioned by the collected wisdom of ages and 
authorised by the "body" of the people of England (8: 66,76,137; An Appeal from 
the New to the Old Whigs 3-4,7). Burke's collective "we" is constructed, often quite 
specifically, on the model of a united, hierarchical, rural community, encompassing 
both the metaphorical head and figurative body of the country. "Shall I be pardoned, " 
he inquires in the Fourth Letter on a Regicide Peace, "if I attempt a word on the part 
of us simple country folk? " (9: 48). Similarly, in the tract on Scarcity, as in the 
passage from the Third Letter on a Regicide Peace with which I began, Burke invokes 
the collective pronoun in order to unite the different classes of the community through 
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the assimilation of their labours: "We, the people, ought to be made sensible that it is 
not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and consequently 
the laws of God, that we are to place our hope of softening the divine displeasure to 
remove any calamity under which we suffer" (137). 
As I shall argue in the next chapter, the ideological implications of Burke's easy 
assimilation of mental to manual work were not lost on the radical journalist William 
Cobbett. Cobbett recognised the force of Burke's appropriation of the analogy with 
manual labour both to support his own position and to undermine radical rhetoric, and 
did not allow Burke's appropriation of the analogy to go uncontested. The difficulty 
for Cobbett can be thought of as the problem bequeathed to radical rhetoric by Burke. 
On one hand, in his own practice as a political writer, Cobbett studiously avoids the 
glib identification of writing and ploughing by insisting on the specificity of physical 
labour. On the other hand, Cobbett stresses the similarity between his own labour as a 
writer and that of the physical labourers, both in order to align himself in a radical 
solidarity with the labouring classes, and in order to differentiate himself from 
pensioned intellectuals like Edmund Burke. This tension, I show, appears in various 
forms throughout Cobbett's political writings from 1816, producing enormous 
contradictions and, as Cobbett writes to resolve this tension, some of the most 
inventive figurative language of the Romantic period. 
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Notes 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all references are to The Writings and Speeches o. f 
Edmund Burke, cited by volume and page number. 
2 Burke frequently invokes the law of God and the law of nature to insist on 
the necessity of labour. In a letter to his Bristol constituents in May 1778, for 
example, he writes: "The Author of our Nature has written it strongly in that Nature, 
and promulgated the same Law in his written word, that man shall eat his Bread by his 
Labour" (Correspondence 3: 442). 
3 As Tan Harris observes, the publication early in Burke's career of Rousseau's 
Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality (1755), in which Rousseau 
argued that social inequality was a perversion of man's natural state, gave Burke an 
opponent at which to tilt (xx). As Harris points out, Burke "came to argue that society 
depended for its prosperity on inequality" and that the poor as well as the rich would 
benefit from this state of affairs (xxii). The essence of property and the essence of 
aristocracy were to be unequal, so that both institutions were constituted on the 
pattern of nature, in which God had made men unequal (Harris xxiv). 
4 Methodologically, therefore, I heed Furniss' advice: "The challenge for 
Burke's readers is not to find a key which will 'solve' those contradictions, but to trace 
as carefully as possible the way they are dramatised in the structure and figurative 
strategy of his texts" (Aesthetic Ideology 4). 
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5 In the first volume of Capital, for example, Marx writes: "The disappearance 
of the useful character of the products of labour [... ] entails the disappearance of the 
different concrete forms of labour. They can no longer be distinguished, but are all 
reduced to the same kind of labour, human labour in the abstract" (128). 
6 Burke keeps returning to this point (8: 181,315). In An Appeal from the 
New to the Old Whigs, he refers to those endeavours to "alter all the principles and 
opinions which have hitherto guided and contained the world" (17). 
Pocock is right to insist on the central role played by intellectuals in Burke's 
view of the Revolution. In 1796, for instance, Burke wrote: "Never, before this time, 
was a set of literary men converted into a gang of robbers and assassins. Never before, 
did a den of bravoes and banditti, assume the garb and tone of an academy of 
philosophers" (9: 174). 1 think Pocock places too much stress on the Revolution as a 
conspiracy of intellectuals, however. Although Burke does use terms like "cabal" and 
"illuminati, " Freeman points out that, in addition to a conspiracy theory, Burke 
formulates a sociological explanation of the Revolution based on changing social 
relations (198). 
' Burke's political career depended on the patronage of aristocratic political 
figures, first the patronage of William Gerard Hamilton (1759-65) and then from 1765 
to 1782 of the enormously wealthy Whig landowner Charles Watson-Wentworth, the 
second Marquess of Rockingham. After Rockingham's death in 1782, Burke continued 
to rely on the patronage of the Rockingham family through Rockingham's nephew and 
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heir William Wentworth Fitzwilliam, fourth Earl Fitzwilliam. Burke not only relied on 
the aristocracy for support but came to adopt their values and imitate their behaviour. 
For example, Burke aped his noble Whig patrons by setting up a landed estate at 
Beaconsfield. His ambitions were to some extent to assimilate to the great (Harris 107; 
De Bruyn 47-9,61-3). 
9 On the essential contradiction between the reward for talent and labour, on 
one hand, and the hereditary principle on the other, see also Godwin (442,472-5,484) 
and Paine (The Rights of Man 140,172-6). It is fair to say, I think, that most 
commentators on Burke accept the broad lineaments of MacPherson's argument while 
arguing that there is still an antagonism between the terms in which Burke eulogises 
the old order and the rational rhetoric of the political economist. For example, Furniss 
agrees, with some differences of emphasis, with MacPherson's explanation: that the 
ideology of the rights of man makes capitalism virtually "unworkable by striking at its 
very roots (the capital-labour relation)" (187). See also De Bruyn (108-10). Furniss, 
like Reid, is less convinced than MacPherson about the rhetorical consistency that 
Burke is able to achieve in his marrying of the principle of privilege and the principle 
of achievement (188). 
lo There is an echo of Burke's critique of purely critical activity in Carlyle's 
memorable description of the philosophical work that had prepared the way for the 
French Revolution by clearing away the debris of the old order: 
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"Active hands drive in their wedges, set to their crow-bars; there is a comfortable 
appearance of work going on. Instead of here and there a stone falling out, here and 
there a handful of dust, whole masses tumble down, whole clouds and whirlwinds of 
dust, [... ] of all labourers, no one can see such rapid extensive fruit of his labour as 
the Destroyer can and does" (Works 28: 179-80). 
11 Furniss analyses this exchange between Burke and Paine in the context of his 
fascinating discussion of the connection, in the Reflections, between speculation in 
politics and speculative finance ("Burke, Paine, and the Language of Assignats" 69- 
70) 
12 In 1781 Burke made a speech in the Commons in which he claimed that if it 
should ever come to a point where he would be forced to choose between the rich and 
powerful and the poor and weak, he would take his "fate with the poor, the low and 
the feeble" (cited in Freeman 113). Again, some of Burke's speeches on Ireland 
reinforce the view that he had sympathy with the "Jacobinism" that had its origin in 
hunger and oppression rather than in speculation (Correspondence 8: 378; 9: 162). 
13 Interestingly, this is one of the places where Burke's psychologising puts him 
at odds with Adam Smith, who confronted the problem that it was exactly the 
"uniformity of stationery life" that was attractive and made the factory worker 
unwilling to take up arms in defence of his country. The slow, languid existence of 
steady labour, which Burke felt men would avoid, is precisely what Smith feared 
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would make men regard with "abhorrence the irregular, uncertain and adventurous life 
of the soldier" (Wealth of f Nations, 2: 782,787). 
14 On this analogy, see De Bruyn (59-61). Furniss points out that for Burke, 
political institutions as well as property can be legitimated through longevity or 
prescription (Aesthetic Ideology 206-8). 
15 Burke implies that the rage for novelty in the realm of discourse mirrors, or 
perhaps helps to drive, the penchant for innovation in politics. New models of written 
composition, he says in the fourth of the Letters on a Regicide Peace, recommend 
themselves to us simply by virtue of their novelty: "Everything is new, and according 
to the fashionable phrase, revolutionary. In former days authors valued themselves 
upon the maturity and fullness of their deliberations. Accordingly they predicted 
(perhaps with more arrogance than reason) an eternal duration to their works. The 
quite contrary is our present fashion. Writers value themselves now on the instability 
of their opinions and the transitory life of their productions" (9: 45-6). Again: 
"Everything we hear from them is new, and to use a phrase of their own, 
revolutionary; everything supposes a total revolution in the principles of reason, 
prudence, and moral feeling" (101). 
16 The only critic to comment on the contradiction of terms in Burke's criticism 
of the mental labour of the revolutionaries is Furniss, who claims that Burke is 
accusing the French of an unbalanced understanding of the nature of political work": 
they are either too active, or they shun all exertion (Aesthetic Ideology 64-5). 
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17 Hence, Burke writes: "Our Constitution has more impediments than helps. 
Its excellencies, when they come to be put to this sort of proof, may be found among 
its defects" (9: 111). As Kramnick points out, Burkes call to the British aristocracy to 
be more active in the defence of their own interests was strangely contradictory, since 
he believed that they were rendered inert by the very nature of their situation (118-19). 
18 Burke is fond of such paradoxical formulations, in part at least, because they 
show that he has thought more deeply than his antagonists about the contradictory and 
complex character of the world; their simple and straightforward solutions evince a 
superficial analysis. See, for example, the passage in the Reflections on the wisdom 
needed to combine the principle of liberty and the principle of restraint in a "free 
government" (8: 290-1). Furniss also notes Burkes extensive use of oxymoronic 
terms (Aesthetic Ideology 175,212-13,227). 
19 My summary of the circumstances of Burke's pension is indebted to the 
editors of Burke's Writings (9: 8-15); to Kramnick (171-3); to Reid (85-92); and to 
De Bruyn (19-58,89-108). 
20A Letter to a Noble Lord warns of the danger from intellectuals, philosophers 
and men of letters, whose careers, unlike Burke's, had not depended on the patronage 
of the politically dominant aristocracy. Advertently or not, Burke identifies himself 
quite closely with these intellectuals: "These philosophers are fanaticks; independent of 
any interest, which if it operated alone would make them much more tractable [... ]. I 
am better able to enter into the character of this description of men than the noble 
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Duke can be. I have lived long and variously in the World. Without any considerable 
pretension to literature in myself, I have aspired to the love of letters. I have lived for a 
great many years in habitudes with those who professed them. I can form a tolerable 
estimate of what is likely to happen from a character, chiefly dependent for fame and 
fortune, on knowledge and talent, as well in its morbid and perverted state, as in that 
which is sound and natural" (9: 176). When literary men throw off religion and come 
"to act in corps, a more dreadful calamity cannot arise out of Hell to scourge mankind" 
(176) 
2i The juxtaposition of "earn" and "generous" in this sentence illustrate clearly 
Reid's point that the vocabulary of political economy-- "labour, earn, pay, merit"-- 
comes into conflict with the language of patronage and deference--"obligation, bounty, 
gratitude, favour" (91). 
22 There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Burke's claims in his own 
defence. In response to an attack on his pension made in the Commons by a Whig 
member, John Christian Curwen, he wrote to William Windham in November 1795: "I 
have Labourd I have strong reason to be persuaded far more combining time and 
quantity together than any Member, that ever sat in that House" (Correspondence 8: 
340). Burke's management of the impeachment of Warren Hastings, for example, was 
a long and thankless task, which required great resilience. His industry on the affairs 
of the India were those which Burke himself valued most: "most for the importance; 
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most for the labour; most for the judgment; most for constancy and perseverance in 
the pursuit" (9 : 159). 
23 Bruce James Smith comments on Burke's belief that the radicals' "historical 
prying was bound to turn up something for any faction to 'talk up"' (105,122). In the 
Rights of Man, Paine remarked on Burke's aversion to history: "A Monarchical 
reasoner never traces government back to its source, or from its source [... ]. A 
certain something forbids him to look back to a beginning, lest some robber or some 
Robin Hood should rise from the long obscurity of time, and say, I am the origin" 
(118) 
24 Wollstonecraft, Mackintosh and Paine reminded their readers of the 
theatrical, spectacular aspect of Burke's performance, and of Burke's uneven 
portioning of compassion. His tears, Wollstonecraft saw, were reserved for "the 
declamation of the theatre, or for the downfall of queens" (25-6); Mackintosh 
perceived that Burke's sensibility was only moved by "splendid sorrows of royalty" and 
not by the "homely miseries of the vulgar" (v-vi); and for Paine, it was not real 
distress but its "showy resemblance" that caught Burke's imagination: "He pities the 
plumage, but forgets the dying bird" (51). Burke's description of the suffering of 
Marie Antoinette, or of the French clergy, was a calculated appeal to the sensibilities 
of his audience which enabled him to deflect attention from the less palatable aspects 
of the system he was defending: the real suffering of the poor. 
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Chapter Three. Labour of Limbs and Labour of Mind: William Cobbett's 
"United Body for Reform" 
In the previous chapter I argued that Edmund Burke comprehended his own 
mental labour via two potentially contradictory models of intellectual work, one which 
elides the differences between mental and manual labour and another which 
emphasises the distinctions between them. Burke presents his own intellectual activity 
in terms of material labour in order to distinguish his endeavours from the airy, 
ungrounded theoretical work of the French philosophes and their British counterparts. 
I demonstrated, however, that there is a problem for Burke in his alignment of himself 
with other labourers, since he also wants to locate his thinking within an aristocratic 
lineage which sees political thought as the preserve of leisured gentlemen, of a natural 
aristocracy who, from their social location, possess the time and education to 
contemplate society as a whole. I will contend in this chapter that we can identify a 
similar tension--between wanting to stress the similarity of, and desiring to emphasise 
the difference between, writing and other kinds of work--operating in the writings of 
the radical journalist William Cobbett. 
Born in 1763, the son of a small farmer and publican, Cobbett's career from 
"plough-boy" to famous political journalist and public figure was a remarkable one, as 
he himself often boasted. He made his name as a combative journalist and pamphleteer 
by attacking, while resident in the United States in the 1790s, the anti-British 
sentiments of the American democratic press. His writings of this period owe a great 
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deal to the conservative views and rhetoric of Burke. In his first American pamphlet, 
"Observation on Priestley's Emigration" (1794), for example, Cobbett attacked Joseph 
Priestley's "inflammatory discourses" and "Parisian propagande, " and compared the 
new system of liberty in France unfavourably with the tried and trusted freedoms of 
the British constitution (17). The English Dissenters were, wrote Cobbett, "system- 
mongers" who aimed to "destroy a constitution which has borne the test and attracted 
the admiration of ages; and to establish in its place a new system, fabricated by 
themselves" (25,17). Cobbett's pro-ministerial, anti-Gallic stance was appreciated by 
the Pitt Government, and, when he returned to Britain in 1800, he claimed to have 
been offered the running of two Government newspapers. After about 1804, however, 
Cobbett became progressively disillusioned with Pitt (and his prime ministerial 
successors) and with the system of war finance, which he believed had "woven venality 
into the fabric of the constitution" (Collected Writings 1: ix-xxiii). From this time, 
Cobbett would later claim, all his endeavours were aimed at bettering the condition of 
oppressed labourers, particularly of rural labourers. 
Cobbett's radicalisation was reflected in his changed estimation of Burke. 
Cobbett had praised Burke in the preface to his American edition of Burke's Letter to 
a Noble Lord, and when Burke died Cobbett lauded his "Herculean, invaluable and 
immortal labours" (Olivia Smith 202; Collected Writings 1: xii n13). Reverential 
mention of Burke's immortal labours was later replaced by slighting references to 
Burke's acceptance of a state pension and by depictions of him as a state hireling who 
became a tool of power: "this pensioned hack, " "sycophant Burke" (CPR 31 [16.11. 
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1816]: 503-4; CPR 32 [16.08.1817]: 630). ' Cobbett's praise of Burke's great labours 
in the 1790s are paralleled, in the 1830s, by talk of his own writings as "Herculean 
labours" in behalf of the oppressed labouring classes (CPR 69 [10.04.1830]: 473). In 
January 1831, for example, he wrote of his "earnest endeavour to protect and cherish 
the labourers. This has, indeed, been upwardest in my mind all my life long, or, " he 
adds, in a characteristic qualification, "at least ever since I was able duly to estimate 
their toils and their hardships" (CPR 71 [15.01.1831]. 160,164). Again in 1831, 
Lobbett wrote that he had "constantly and most earnestly laboured, during thirty of the 
sixty years of my life" for the benefit "of the industrious, virtuous, and hardly-used 
labourers of England, amongst who I was born and bred" (CPR 73 [30.07.1831 ]: 
258) 
When Cobbett referred to his "Herculean labours, " he was hardly exaggerating; 
it has been estimated that over his lifetime he published between 20 and 30 million 
words (Spater 2; Dyck 3). In his 1830 "Address to the Tax-Payers of England and 
Scotland on the Subject of the Seat in Parliament, " for example, Cobbett simply 
enumerated his published works in order to show his credentials for a place in 
parliament: 
A Register every week; nearly 500 Registers, more than enough to occupy the 
whole time of any other man; my French Grammar, Woodlands, Gardening 
Book, Cottage Economy, Sermons, Protestant Reformation, Corn Book, 
Advice to Young Men, and Guide to Emigrants, besides all my labours and 
cares about trees, seed, corn, straw-plait, and about everything I could possibly 
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think of, tending to the good of my country. (CPR 69 [10.04.1830]: 473, 
477) 
Several months later, he declared that, above all, he desired to be remembered as "the 
most laborious man that ever lived" (CPR 71 [8.01.1831]-. 67). The question with 
which Cobbett is always confronted is how his mental work "tends to the good" of the 
nation, for it clearly does not do so in the demonstrable way that ploughing land, for 
example, does. Cobbett might wish to be remembered as the most laborious writer 
who ever lived, but how can we begin to compare his labour with the exhausting 
labour of the field hands? What is the relationship between Cobbett's labours and the 
physical labour of those on whose behalf he wrote? On one hand, I shall be arguing, 
Cobbett consistently stressed the resemblance between them. While Burke employs 
the analogy between mental and manual labour to universalise the physical labourer's 
bodily effort and pain and thereby reconcile the manual labourer to his condition ("our 
common doom"), Cobbett yokes intellectual to manual labourers in order to construct 
a rhetorical alliance of different categories of productive workers against an 
unproductive and idle ruling class. On the other hand, I will contend, Cobbett 
studiously avoids Burke's easy assimilation of bodily pains, by insisting on the merely 
metaphorical nature of his identification with other workers. Cobbett stresses the 
differences between his own labours and the physical labour of others in part to boast 
of his own exceptional talents, but also to give the real labourers their due and to 
acknowledge what he, as an intellectual, owes to those who do the work that supports 
the material life of the nation. 
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Cobbett's identification of himself as a productive worker, akin to the labourers 
and journeymen, is strengthened by his criticism of government pensioners like Burke. 
As he changed his political views, Cobbett also changed his ideas about the 
responsibility of intellectuals for the French Revolution. In 1794 he intimated that the 
"infidel philosophy of Voltaire, Rousseau, Gibbon, Priestley, and the rest of the 
enlightened tribe" played a part in bringing about the Revolution ("Observations on 
Priestley's Emigration" 31). In 1816 he argued that that the revolutionary excesses had 
been caused by the refusal of the old regime to allay the physical suffering of the 
people, and that this unresponsiveness was a result of conservative intellectuals: "it 
was surrounded by panders and parasites who told it nothing but flattering 
falsehoods. " Radical intellectuals were the government's true friends, for bringing to 
their attention the discontent of the people (CPR 31 [2.11.1816] : 442-46). A great 
deal of Cobbett's criticism is directed against the literary parasites of the British 
government, writers like Burke, Robert Southey, and William Gifford--"insolent 
hirelings, " "emissaries of corruption'"--who, he claimed, had prostituted their principles 
for place and pay, and who misrepresented the causes of the labourer's oppression and 
misery (CPR 31: 446; CPR 32 [16.08.1817] : 617). The only moral use of the power 
of the press, given that all writers, even government writers, must finally depend for 
their physical existence on the taxes raised from the labour of the people, was to 
oppose tyranny by exposing and censuring the abuse of power. The political system 
could not survive if the press were to do its duty (Rural Rides 262-3,266-7,322) 
508). When ordinary labourers commit acts of fraud or deception, argued Cobbett, 
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they are called criminals; but fraud was exactly what was being practiced by those who 
hired out their literary talents to the government, and who were paid out of taxes, 
taken from the people, in order to "cajole and deceive" the people (CPR 33 [13.06. 
1818] : 690-1). To distinguish himself from the writers and speakers who lived off the 
favours of the state, Cobbett refers over and over again to his own decision to turn 
down a government offer of money and maintain his independence and integrity by 
working for his living (Manchester Lectures 96). 
In the first part of this chapter, I examine how, in his writings for the Political 
Register of 1816-17, Cobbett tries to fashion a rhetorical "we" to bring together 
mental and manual labourers into "one firm and united body in the cause of reform" 
(CPR 32 [16.08.1817]: 615). Cobbett is not clear, I shall argue, about the basis for 
such an alliance, and this uncertainty is manifested in an unresolved issue, at the heart 
of Cobbett's texts, of the relationship between the head and hands of the reform 
movement. Cobbett wavers, that is, over a question he would like to answer as 
straightforwardly as possible: who are the productive labourers of the nation? In the 
second part of the chapter, I argue that, in the writings after 1817, Cobbett continually 
returns to the question of the relationship between writing or thinking and physical 
labour and to the question of why writing is valuable or useful work. What kind of 
labour is representing, and how is that labour to be represented to those who do 
labour rather than think and write? While he always affirms the primacy of labour on 
the land, Cobbett also claims that his own work of political writing helps to lift the 
burden of oppression on the physical labourers who, materially, support him. Unlike 
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Burke, and the rest of the hireling crew who live off state pensions funded by the 
people's taxes, he returns to the labourers something of what he owes them, and 
through this reciprocal endeavour anchors his writing in the material work of others. 
Cobbett achieved his greatest influence during 1816-17 when, as Leonora 
Nattrass says, he was read by "everyone from government ministers to ploughboys, " 
and when it is estimated that issues of his weekly Political Register sold between 
40,000 and 70,000 copies (3-4). His "Address to the Journeymen and Labourers, " 
published on the 2 November 1816, was perhaps the best-known and single most 
significant article that he wrote for the Political Register. The "Address" was the first 
article in which Cobbett spoke to the labouring classes directly, and, as Nattrass points 
out, Cobbett addressed his intended audience practically as well as figuratively (109- 
10). In October 1816, Cobbett had started publishing a cheap two-penny edition of 
the Political Register. By off-printing the leading article onto both sides of a single 
open broadsheet, he evaded the stamp duty, which had added four and a half pence to 
the price of every newspaper, and thus expanded his potential readership. By 
announcing that the cheap edition could be reprinted by anyone, Cobbett ensured that 
the two-penny Register would achieve the widest possible audience (Dyck 78-9, 
243n7). According to Cobbett's calculation, 6000 copies of the Register were sold on 
the first day, 20,000 in the first week, and 200,000 in the two months. He further 
estimated that, before the Government's legislative attack on the seditious press in 
1817, a single Register would be read by 100 to 200 people in reading rooms around 
153 
the country. Cobbett continued to publish his "Two-penny Trash" until the end of 
March 1817, when he left England for the United States to escape the possibility of 
prosecution following the suspension of Habeas Corpus. By the time Cobbett 
returned to England in 1819, the government had closed the legal loophole by which 
the cheap Register had formerly escaped the stamp duty (CPR 32 [2.08.1817]: 545- 
63; Spater 347,353; Olivia Smith 231). 
As an instance of what he called the seditious tendency of the radical press, 
Southey, in two articles in the Quarterly Review, singled out Cobbett's "Address to the 
Journeymen and Labourers" (31: 273-5). In Southey's view: "Of all engines of 
mischief which were ever yet employed for the destruction of mankind, the press is the 
most formidable, when perverted in its uses" (273); "all the other causes of discontent 
are trifling in themselves and light in their consequence compared to the seditious 
press" (Quarterly Review 32: 551). What made the cheap Register so potentially 
explosive in the eyes of the Government and its supporters was the post-war economic 
slump, aggravated by massive demobilisation, which led to discontent among the 
labouring classes. A succession of good harvests to 1815 brought down the price of 
wheat, and this led to falling wages and unemployment in the rural areas. Then, to 
compound the distress of the agricultural workers, a freak poor harvest in 1816 caused 
a severe food shortage which led to high food prices. The manufacturing labourers, 
already suffering from unemployment as a result of the falling off of government 
wartime orders and of the saturation of export markets, were also affected by high 
food prices. In the months immediately following the peace, there were a number of 
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popular demonstrations against distress: in March 1815 there were anti-Corn Law 
riots in London, and, in the following year, food riots in East Anglia; while in the East 
Midlands there was a resurgence of machine-breaking in 1816.2 
Although Southey charged Cobbett with incendiarism, critics now agree that 
there was nothing new or especially radical in the content of the early cheap 
Registers. 3 Most commentators follow the analysis of Cobbett himself, who claimed 
that by raising their political awareness he had turned the discontented workers away 
from direct action (Nattrass 111). In the "Address to the Journeymen and Labourers" 
and in the texts that immediately followed, most notably his "Letter to the Luddites, " 
Cobbett directed the workers towards what he termed the "real" cause of their 
distress: the enormous taxes levied disproportionately by the Government on the 
labouring poor. For Cobbett, taxes were the primary means by which the nation's 
resources were taken out of the hands of those who actually worked and given to 
those who, without doing any real work, got wealthier: landowners, who leased land 
at exorbitant rents, government creditors, and the growing number of government 
placemen and pensioners. The national debt after the war was 900 million pounds, the 
annual interest on which was a third of all government expenditure. The burden of 
repayment was borne disproportionately by the poor, since, with the abolition of 
wartime income tax, the Government levied high rates of tax on everyday commodities 
such as salt, tea, and candles. In addition to the taxes required to service the debt, 
another five million a year was needed to pay the retirement costs of military officers. 
The beneficiaries of this system were the holders of the government debt 
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("fundholders`° and "money jobbers") who lived, according to Cobbett, in idleness on 
the revenue raised out of taxes. Taxes, he summarised, are "the sum taken from those 
who labour to be given to those who do not labour" (CPR 31 [30.11.1816] : 577). 4 In 
recommending a campaign of petitioning as a political strategy towards the reform of 
parliament, Cobbett was endorsing Francis Burdett's earlier address to the Hampden 
Club, in which he had advocated mass petitioning. Like Burdett, Cobbett was worried 
that the food riots and machine-breakings would alienate the middle classes and set 
back the cause of reform. A primary goal of the cheap Registers was to counter the 
nefarious influence of the corrupt government press, which had attempted, Cobbett 
believed, to redirect the anger of the labourers away from the government and towards 
farmers, employers, various traders, and towards machinery (CPR 31 [30.11.1816]: 
561-92). "The writers and speakers, who labour in the cause of corruption, have taken 
great pains to make the labouring classes believe, that they [the farmers and 
employers] are not taxed, " and "set one part of the people against the other part" 
(564-5). By explaining to the labouring classes the "real cause" of their misery (high 
taxes) and by proposing a course of action (petitioning) which would lead to a desired 
end (parliamentary reform), Cobbett's writings during 1816-17 tried to prevent 
bickering between the social classes: his writings, he declared in 1817, "tended to 
withdraw the attention of the people from these petty disputes; they tended to make 
them one firm and united body in the cause of Reform" (CPR 32 [16.08.1817] : 615). 
Social and economic reconstruction, Cobbett informed his readers, would 
follow political reform. The strategy of the "Address to the Journeymen and 
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Labourers" and of the Registers that followed was to create a coalition for reform, by 
constructing union among different kinds of productive workers, a unity which 
included that between the writer and his audience. What complicates the attempt to 
create an alliance is Cobbett's vacillation over the basis of the relationship between 
those who work with their hands and those who work with their minds. As a result of 
this indecision, Cobbett's definition of the oppressed and exploited classes and his 
articulation of the connection between the constituencies of the reform movement are 
unclear. To look closely at the language of the "Address, " which is exemplary of the 
early cheap Registers in its rhetoric, I quote at length from the opening paragraphs: 
Friends and Fellow Countrymen, 
Whatever the pride of rank, of riches, or of scholarship, may have induced 
some men to believe, or to affect to believe, the real strength and all the 
resources of a country, ever have sprung and ever must spring, from the labour 
of its people; and hence it is, that this nation, which is so small in numbers and 
so poor in climate and soil compared with many others, has, for many ages, 
been the most powerful nation in the world: it is the most industrious, the 
most laborious, and, therefore, the most powerful. Elegant dresses, superb 
furniture, stately buildings, fine roads and canals, fleet horses and carriages, 
numerous and stout ships, warehouses teeming with goods; all these, and 
many other objects that fall under our view, are so many marks of national 
wealth and resources. But all these spring from labour. Without the 
journeyman and the labourer none of them could exist; without the assistance 
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of their hands, the country would be a wilderness, hardly worth the notice of 
an invader. 
As it is the labour of those who toil which makes a country abound in 
resources, so it is the same class of men, who must, by their arms, secure its 
safety and uphold its fame. Titles and immense sums of money have been 
bestowed upon numerous Naval and Military Commanders. Without calling 
the justice of these in question, we may assert, that the victories were obtained 
by you and your fathers and brothers and sons, in co-operation with those 
Commanders, who, with your aid, have done great and wonderful things; but, 
who, without that aid, would have been as impotent as children at the breast. 
With this correct idea of your own worth in your minds, with what 
indignation must you hear yourselves called the Populace, the Rabble, the 
Mob, the Swinish Multitude [... ]. But suppress your indignation, until we 
return to this topic, after we have considered the cause of your present misery 
and the measures which have produced that cause. 
In the fifth paragraph, Cobbett states the cause of the people's distress: "it is the 
enormous amount of the taxes, which the Government compels us to pay for the 
support of its army, its placemen, its pensioners, &c., and for the payment of the 
interest of its debt. " But Cobbett interposes an important paragraph, in which he states 
that the object of the "Address" is to produce an alliance among different productive 
orders of society to campaign for parliamentary reform: 
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The times in which we live are full of peril. The nation as described by the very 
creatures of the Government, is fast advancing to that period when an 
important change must take place. It is the lot of mankind, that some shall 
labour with their limbs and others with their minds; and on all occasions, more 
especially on an occasion like the present one, it is the duty of the latter to 
come to the assistance of the former. We are all equally interested in the peace 
and happiness of our common country. It is of the utmost importance, that in 
the seeking to obtain those objects, our endeavours should be uniform, and 
tend all to the same point. Such an uniformity cannot exist with an uniformity 
of sentiment as to public matters, and to produce this latter uniformity amongst 
you is the object of this address. (CPR 31: 433-5) 
Throughout the article Cobbett encourages the labourers to cooperate with 
other classes. When Cobbett asserts in the first paragraph that the labour of its people 
is the source of a nation's wealth and strength, the reader assumes that he is talking of 
the manual labour of the journeymen and labourers, since the objects which stand for 
national wealth are all material objects: clothing, furniture, buildings, roads, ships, and 
warehouses fill of goods. In the final sentence of the paragraph, Cobbett reinforces 
the point: it is the assistance of the labourers' hands that make the wildernesses fertile. 
Later in the article, Cobbett uses the same word, assist, in a slightly different sense: 
"There can exist no riches and no resources which [the unfortunate journeymen and 
labourers] by their labour have not assisted to create" (emphasis added) (CPR 31: 
448). Now, it is the labour of the manual workers in co-operation with other kinds of 
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labour that is responsible for the strength and wealth of the country. The same 
ambiguity is evident in the second paragraph. In the first sentence Cobbett simply 
reasserts that the resources and the security of the nation depend on "the labour of 
those who toil. " It is manual labourers--whom Cobbett identifies by the telling 
metonyms "hands" and "arms"--who produce wealth and fight the battles. The same 
qualification appears again, however; it is the "co-operation" of arms and head, of foot 
soldiers and commanders, which is said to do great and wonderful things. If the 
particular division that Cobbett is trying to reconcile in the first paragraph is that 
between employer and his labourers; in the second paragraph it is that between the 
foot soldier and his officers. The point Cobbett wants to make is that without the 
hands and arms of the journeymen and labourers, the commanding officers could not 
have achieved anything, indeed they "would have been impotent as children at the 
breast. " The weight of the rhetoric of the first two paragraphs, while urging co- 
operation between head and hands, is to assert that it is the manual workers, not their 
social superiors, who do the real labour and who provide the real strength. At the 
same time, Cobbett carefully plays down the full, potentially revolutionary, 
implications of the doctrine that labour is the sole creator of all wealth. 
The word "co-operate" prepares the reader for Cobbett's key assertion in the 
third sentence of the fourth paragraph: "'It is the lot of mankind, that some shall labour 
with their limbs and others with their minds. " In the fourth paragraph it is the 
separation between the intellectual and the manual worker, between the writer and his 
audience, which is the pertinent division. Cobbett tries to bring together manual and 
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mental labourers in the cause of reform. It is the duty of the intellectual workers, 
Cobbett contends, to assist the manual workers. Now the "assistance" comes from the 
other direction: if the head is weak without the body when it comes to making 
products or fighting battles, then it is the body which is weak when it is a question of 
political action. If manual labour supported the physical life of the country and 
defended its security, then the duty of mental workers who had benefited from this 
exertion was to work for reform, and to labour to better the life conditions of the 
poor. The relationship between the toils of the mind and the labours of the body were, 
for Cobbett, not only reciprocal but, ideally, analogous. In 1832, for example, Cobbett 
described the mental attitude needed to embark on the "great task" of reform by 
evoking the frame of mind required to undertake more palpable kind of labour: "The 
thing, to be done well, and to make this reform really satisfactory to the nation, must 
be set about in right earnest; must be begun, as men begin to plough a field, or to 
weave a piece of cloth" (Manchester Lectures 12-13). 
In what is still the most incisive criticism of the "Address to the Journeymen 
and Labourers, " Raymond Williams comments on these opening paragraphs: "With 
this candid assertion of the permanence of this fundamental division of labour within 
class society, Cobbett establishes a specific relation to his new popular audience. The 
remedies of the ruling class are cruel and deceptive, but the people's own uninstructed 
responses can be dangerous" (Cobbett 17). For Williams, Cobbett's article is a model 
for the way in which an "intense phase of self-organisation and protest by a still- 
forming working and labouring class was intervened in and in part appropriated by a 
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primarily middle-class reforming movement, in the interest of small employers" (17). 
While Williams is correct to say that Cobbett establishes a hierarchical relationship 
between himself and his audience, I would emphasise that Cobbett endeavours also to 
dispel the perception of hierarchy, presenting himself according to what E. P. 
Thompson calls his myth of himself as a "plain Englishman unusually belligerent and 
persevering, but not especially talented, [... ] more normal than he was" (The Making 
of the English Working Class 753-4). Cobbett reminded his reader that he, too, had 
been a ploughboy, and a common soldier. In his "Letter to the Luddites" of November 
1816, in a passage that Thompson might have cited in support of his claim, Cobbett 
denies that he was talking down to his audience: 
I am not one of those, who have the insolence to presume, that men are 
ignorant because they are poor. If I myself have more knowledge and talent 
than appears to have fallen to the lot of those who have brought us into our 
present miserable state, it ought to convince me, that there are thousands and 
thousands, now unknown to the public, possessed of greater talent, my 
education having been that of a common soldier grafted upon the ploughboy. 
Therefore, I beg you not to suppose, that I address myself to you as one who 
pretends to any superiority in point of rank, or of natural endowment. (CPR 31 
[30.11.1816]: 563-4) 
The two perspectives represented by Williams and Thompson are both correct, since 
Cobbett, paradoxically, both established a social distance and attempted to abolish that 
gap. Cobbett's ambiguous presentation of the relationship between those who toil with 
162 
their minds and those who toil with their bodies is not a problem that is confined to the 
period 1816-17; the same problem surfaces elsewhere in Cobbett's writings. The 
labour of the mind is the paradoxical figure for Cobbett's ambivalence, for his desire 
for a relationship of solidarity and familiarity with the labourers, and his simultaneous 
assertion of a distinction based on the separation of mental and manual labours. 
The uncertain cohesion among the various productive classes--specifically, the 
difficulty of creating solidarity between the writer and his audience--is encapsulated by 
Cobbett's deployment of pronouns. In the final two sentences of the fourth paragraph, 
Cobbett says that "our endeavours" should be uniform in pursuing the good of "our 
common country, " but then adds that the object of the "Address" is to produce 
uniformity "amongst you. " Is Cobbett producing unity by instructing the factious 
manual labourers (you, the mob), or is he trying to produce unity between two 
different factions--mental and manual--of the labouring classes, each presently 
pursuing its partial interest (we, the mob)? Most commentators on the "Address" and 
on the early cheap Registers notice Cobbett's use of pronouns; Dyck, for example, 
remarks upon Cobbett's "rapid and confident deployment of first and second person 
pronouns" (79). Cobbett's shift from collective first-person to second-person form of 
address, however, is more a sign of his uncertainty than his confidence. ' In the 
"Address, " Cobbett referred to the insults heaped on the labourers by the corrupt 
government press: "With what indignation must you hear yourselves called the 
Populace, the Rabble, the Mob, the Swinish Multitude" (2), The pronoun here is 
clearly "you, " as Cobbett says that it is the manual labourers who are thus treated. 
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Three months later the "you" becomes "we": "There may be, as there have been, men 
to call us the 'Swinish Multitude"' (CPR 32 [1.02.1817] : 151). The "us" includes the 
writer among the rabble multitude and tries to bridge the gap between the head and 
hands 
In his slightly later article "On the Corruption of the English Press"(CPR 33 
[13.06.1818]: 679-98), written while he was in his second period of exile in the 
United States, Cobbett criticises the use of the pronoun "we" by the writers of the 
Quarterly Review. The collective pronoun, Cobbett points out, is used to lend 
authority to their works by indicating that the persons writing are of a high place in 
society with a right to censor the productions of other writers. "We" is a cover which 
keeps the actual identity of the writers from public view. In reality these writers are 
"mean-spirited, dependent creatures, eating their bread daily out of the hands of the 
Treasury clerk, " who are employed solely to oppose the extension of political and civil 
liberties. The public would read them with less respect if they saw them as "needy 
men, writing for so much a page" (682-3,685). Cobbett's is a lucid account of the way 
the pompous form of address conveys cultural authority. His own difficulties with 
pronouns, in the "Address to the Journeymen and Labourers, " arise, in part, from 
Cobbett's determination to avoid this easy assimilation of writer and labourer. 
The fluid use of pronouns in the "Address" is, in part, a consequence of 
Cobbett's uncertain use of the distinction between productive and unproductive labour, 
which the pronouns are meant to express. The real cause of the misery of the country, 
Cobbett repeated, was that the "fruit of productive labour is now taken and given to 
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unproductive labour in such a large proportion that production and reproduction, with 
all their wonderful effects, are daily and hourly diminishing" (CPR 32 [1.02.1817] : 
140). But does Cobbett's writing count as productive labour, or is he an idler living off 
the labour of others? In Adam Smith's founding definition, Cobbett, as a man of 
letters, would be classed as an unproductive worker as he is not contributing to the 
wealth of the country by adding economic value to raw material. In Cobbett's hands 
the distinction is a form of polemic against those who lived off the taxes paid by 
workers. Following Paine, Cobbett thinks of the productive/ unproductive distinction 
as being aligned with the distinction between tax-payers and tax-receivers. Hence, he 
wrote that by 1829 the nation had been divided into two classes, tax payers and tax 
receivers, and that the burden of taxes had become so great that no one who belonged 
to the former category could survive (Emigrant's Guide 6-8). According to this 
definition, of course, Cobbett, as a tax-payer, would count as a productive worker. 
On the other hand, Cobbett's own rhetoric sometimes indicates that he, like Smith in 
The Wealth of Nations, tends to view manual labour alone as really "productive" or 
useful 
For example, Cobbett sometimes sees himself as a dependent, one of those 
living off the real material labour of others: "I have always, so far as I have had any 
little power, " he said in 1830, "been the advocate for doing justice to those who work- 
-to those who give us all that we eat, and drink, and wear [... ] called the lower 
orders" (Eleven Lectures on the French Revolution, Lecture 1: 1). In this passage the 
distinction between those who toil and "we" who live off that toil is frankly made, and 
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Cobbett resists the easy identification of writing and thinking with the real, material 
work done in the fields. It is the admission of the intellectual's dependence on the 
labourer which fuels his political feelings: "It was owing to accident that I was not a 
labourer all my life. I feel this at any rate; and unnatural should I be, if I had not great 
consideration for all that class of men, who, performing as they do, the toils of the 
community, are entitled, when they experience distress, to our most solicitous regard 
and kindest compassion" (CPR 41 [1.06.1822]: 533-4). At the same time, Cobbett 
identifies his own labour with material labour, since he, too, pays taxes to support 
government idlers. In his Plan of Parliamentary Reform (1830) he speaks of Lord 
Grenville as "this devourer of the fruit of our skill and our labour" (1). Cobbett claims 
that his work is as productive as that of the manual worker because he, too, earns his 
living and pays taxes which support an unproductive and idle ruling class. It might be 
objected that Cobbett's definitions change according to his audience. Cobbett often 
makes these different claims in the same text, however; in the second of his Lectures 
on the French and Belgian Revolutions, for instance, he makes reference both to the 
work of writing as idleness ["we, who live in idleness; we, who are worked for and 
clothed and fed by you, are bound in duty to make you see and understand"] and to 
the writer as co-labourer with his audience ["We are in the habit of pulling off our 
hats, and bowing and curtseying to these very people who are living on our toil'"] (2: 3, 
13). In the space of a few pages, Cobbett says "your" toil (which supports us) and 
"our" toil (which supports them). The category of productive labourers is fluid, and 
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either expands to include the tax-paying writer, or contracts to exclude all those who 
do not work with their hands to support the physical existence of society. 
Cobbett once explained his use of the collective pronoun: "I say WE, because I 
never can separate myself from the Labouring Classes" (cited in Dyck 3). But the 
pronoun does not explain the basis of Cobbett's attachment to the labourers. Cobbett, 
we might say, has two strategies for allying himself with the labouring poor. The first 
is to acknowledge his dependence on them for his physical survival; the problem with 
this admission is that it seems to put him in the same category as the writers who 
depended on state pensions, who effectively consume the fruits of productive labour 
while giving nothing of value in return. The second strategy is to insist that writers, 
such as Cobbett himself, who earn their living by selling their productions to the 
public, rather than by living on taxes, are a part of the productive classes. In this case, 
Cobbett leans towards the identification of mental and physical labour in order to 
distinguish his own intellectual endeavours from those who had, like Burke, 
prostituted their talents: tract writers like Hannah More, the hack writers on the 
Quarterly Review, and the rest of the kept press. 
As I have observed, in his criticism of the "Address to the Journeymen and 
Labourers, " Williams draws attention to the way Cobbett's careful differentiation 
between those who toil with their limbs and those who labour with their minds 
establishes a social relation between the instructing writer and uninstructed labourers. 
However, Cobbett adopts the role of political instructor to those at the top as well as 
those at the bottom of the social pyramid. While in his "Address to the Journeymen 
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and Labourers" Cobbett tries to convince manual labourers that they must co-operate 
with their employers, in his "Address to the Country-Gentlemen showing that their 
only remaining choice is between Reform and total ruin, " he tries to persuade the 
landlords to side with the labourers in the work of reform; at this moment, Cobbett 
still believed that the landlords could be convinced that they needed to take a leading 
role in the country reform movement. The landlords opposed parliamentary reform, 
Cobbett averred, only because they had been led by the corrupt press into believing 
that a change in the system of political representation would lead to the confiscation of 
their property (CPR 31 [21.12.1816]: 777). When the landowners had realised the 
truth of the matter, they would become "friends and fellow-labourers" in the cause of 
reform ("Mr. Cobbett's Taking leave of his Countrymen" CPR 32: 6). It was the high 
taxes for debt repayment, Cobbett informs them, which were degrading property and 
leading to the break up of landed estates. He tells the landlords that their own fate is 
bound up with the well-being of the labourers, since without their labour "the country 
would become a wilderness again" (CPR 31 [21.12.1816]: 777). There is a danger, 
he warned the landlords, in keeping aloof from the people since they could never hold 
their property in contempt of the people, and, even if they could, that property would 
be worth nothing without the people's labour. In order to reconcile themselves with 
the labouring poor, then, Cobbett urges the landlords to take the lead in the cause of 
reform 
In this article, as in the "Address to the Journeymen and Labourers, " while 
Cobbett insists that the mind of the community was ineffectual without the labouring 
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body, he also suggests that the country reform movement needed the guidance of a 
head. "You have only to place yourselves at their head, " Cobbett tells the landlords, 
"to obtain for them the full accomplishment of their wishes" (CPR 31: 800). If the 
landlords do not volunteer themselves as leaders of the reform movement the people 
will produce their own leaders, Cobbett warns. The people have acquired political 
knowledge; they are no longer a "shouting, huzzaing rabble" but a "well-informed 
body" who understand the causes of their own misery, and "unless they [the Country 
Gentlemen] place themselves at the head of the people, in the work of Reform, the 
people will find leaders amongst their own body" (780-1). Cobbett's warning to the 
landlords is also a caution to reform leaders, like Cobbett himself perhaps, not to keep 
aloof from the body of the reform movement. His reader might legitimately enquire 
what reason the people have for applying to their social superiors for leadership at all; 
if the body can form its own mind, then the mind clearly needs a labouring body more 
than body needs a thinking head. I want, therefore, to look more closely at Cobbett's 
metonymies of body parts (head and hands) which stand for the labours of the mind 
and the toils of the body. Cobbett wants to create "one firm and united body" for 
reform, but his figures of speech (like his pronouns) express his uncertainty about the 
basis for a relationship between mental and manual workers. 
In his 1817 Quarterly Review articles on the radical press, Southey argued for 
using the law to silence the seditious radical press. For Cobbett the resort to the law 
was the height of cowardly behaviour, and was proof that the government press could 
not match him by their arguments. In a passage which Cobbett indignantly quoted in 
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the Political Register, Southey contended that the organic body of British society was 
being lacerated by the activities of the seditious press: 
The press may combat the press in ordinary times and upon ordinary topics 
[... ]. But in seasons of great agitation, or on those momentous subjects in 
which the peace and security of society, nay the very existence of the social 
order itself is involved, it is absurd to suppose that the healing will come from 
the same weapon as the wound. (Southey, Quarterly Review 31: 275; CPR 32 
[2.02.1817]: 253) 
Drawing on similarly visceral images, Cobbett imagined the united body of reform 
would be mutilated as a result of the counter-attacks on him by the pro-ministerial 
press. In this article of February 1817, for example, he accused the government press 
of attacking him in order to divide the reform movement. Southey had proposed that 
the government should enact legislation to meet the threat of the seditious press. 
Cobbett responded that the connection between him and his working-class readers was 
so intimate that writers like Southey would have to resort to physical means to prevent 
him from communicating with them: 
They [the writers of the Quarterly Review] would tear me to pieces for 
writing; they would tear the people to pieces for reading; they would chop off 
my hand, and pluck out the people's eyes; and this, or something very near to 
this, they, or somebody else, must do, before I shall cease to write, or the 
people cease to read. (CPR 32: 255) 
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it is worth noting that, here, it is the hand rather than the head which stands in for the 
writer's activity. This is an attempt, perhaps, to render the writer's work less rarefied; 
for the use of the metonymy of hands and head to talk about manual and mental toll 
and about the body and leadership of the reform movement already admits to a 
fundamental separation of mental workers from manual workers, a separation that 
Cobbett accuses the government writers of trying to induce. Despite the confusing use 
of figures, Cobbett's meaning is clear enough: he argues that the effect of his writings 
has been to produce enlightenment in the labourers, to "produce thinking and call forth 
the reasoning faculties of the mind, " and this had led to a decrease in violence (CPR 
32: 253-4). Because the labouring classes can now think for themselves, the efforts of 
the Quarterly writers to sunder him from his readers are in vain. The result of his 
endeavours have been, he says, "to take one head, full of useful knowledge, and to 
clap it safe and sound upon every pair of shoulders in the kingdom" (255). This 
preposterous, but somehow memorable, image of decapitation as a metaphor for 
political enlightenment counters the attempt of government writers to dismember the 
reform movement. 
There is no question that Cobbett was proud of having brought about the 
political education of the labourers. In his ironically titled, "Letter to the 'Deluded 
People"' of March 1817, Cobbett again makes the point that the law was being used to 
separate the head of reform movement from the body. In this article, Cobbett 
addresses the Government's decision, through the suspension of Habeas Corpus in 
February and the Seditious Meetings Act in March, to legislate against the influence of 
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the radical press. The harsh laws had been introduced solely to counter the influence of 
the cheap Register on the minds of the people, Cobbett claimed. But the Government's 
effort to sever the body of reform aimed at dividing the head from the body would not 
succeed, he alleged, because the people had already been enlightened and could think 
for themselves. His words have already inculcated the important ideas and principles 
on people's minds and "those principles will never be eradicated, and never cease to 
actuate the minds of Englishmen" (CPR 32 [22.03.1817]: 364). Cobbett makes this 
same point in "Mr. Cobbett's Taking leave of his Countrymen, " the last Register he 
produced before embarking for the United States in March 1817 following the 
suspension of Habeas Corpus. He defended his decision to leave the country by 
claiming that he would be of more service to his country and the cause of reform by 
continuing to write and publish his Register from across the Atlantic (CPR 32: 3-6). 6 
He reassured his readers that the Government's legislative assault was futile, because 
the people's political enlightenment was permanent; they have read Cobbett's writings 
and have been taught to think for themselves. 
While Cobbett holds, in these articles, that his writings had already produced 
the political education that the government was acting to prevent, his rhetoric works 
against his argument, because the reductive substitution of "hands" for manual 
workers does not suggest that the labourers were able to think for themselves. Thus, 
in his leave-taking article, for instance, Cobbett expresses concern about the impact on 
the body of its separation from the mind: "every blow which is aimed against the men 
who have taken the most prominent part in the cause of Reform, is aimed against the 
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cause itself and at every person who is attached to the cause, just as much, just as 
effectually, as a blow aimed at the head of a man is aimed at his fingers and his toes" 
(13). While Cobbett asserts, on one hand, that the government legislates too late 
because the people have already been enlightened--have had Cobbett's head placed on 
their shoulders--now he appears to doubt that the acephalous reform movement could 
survive the government's attack on the Political Register. In the same article, Cobbett 
warns the labouring people that the government press may attempt to calumniate him 
in his absence; he worries, in particular, that some unscrupulous authors will try to 
publish falsehoods under his name. He consoles himself and his readers, however, with 
the following analogy: "I am not much afraid of your being imposed upon in this way, 
for, amidst the crowd of writers, I hope you will now as easily distinguish my voice as 
a lamb does that of its mother, though there be hundreds of others bleating at the same 
moment" (29-30). This is a touching image but not one that makes the labourers 
appear either physically or intellectually autonomous. Generally, in Cobbett's view, the 
head is impotent without the productive hands, but in the work of reform it is the body 
that needs the guiding head. At the same time that he wants to claim that the body of 
the people has been sufficiently enlightened to make up its own mind, Cobbett wants 
to make the '"labours of the mind" necessary to the work of reform. 
The hesitation between stressing his own power and attributing agency to the 
workers is evident, too, in a tension between Cobbett's egotism--his tendency to claim 
exclusive credit for political events--and his generosity, his willingness to assign credit 
to others for his achievements. Cobbett sometimes claimed that his writing alone--"the 
173 
wonderful effects produced by his talents"--had been responsible for the political 
opposition to the government. After he started publishing his Register from the United 
States, Cobbett published a series of six letters, "A History of the Last Hundred Days 
of English Freedom, " in which he affirmed that the government's repressive measures 
were aimed at silencing the cheap Register: the government's "mean and outrageous 
acts" have been "in opposition to the talents of one single man, unassisted and 
unsupported by any thing on earth but the resources of his own mind" (CPR 32 [26. 
07.1817] : 528). At other moments, he declared not only that the demand for suffrage 
originated in the people's experience, but that that he had learnt more from the people 
than they had learnt from him: "All the celebrity which my writings have obtained [... ] 
I owe less to my own talents than to that discernment and that noble spirit in you, 
which have at once instructed my mind and warmed my heart" ("Mr. Cobbett's Taking 
leave of his Countrymen" CPR 32: 31). If the first passage is an instance of Cobbett's 
outrageous self esteem, the second is an instance of his generosity, of what E. P. 
Thompson calls, citing a similar passage, an acknowledgment of "the dialectical nature 
of the very process by which his own ideas were formed" (The Making of the English 
Working Class 758). Hence, while Cobbett often boasted that he had been the guiding 
light of the reform movement, on other occasions, he could simply state: "I always say 
that I have derived from the people [... ] ten times the light that I have communicated 
to them" (cited in Thompson 758). Kevin Gilmartin argues that Cobbett's gesture of 
"self-effacement" is a tactical and politically circumspect one, given that the 
government was intent on persecuting the radical press (188-9). But there is, I have 
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been arguing, a genuine and persistent difficulty about how to describe the relationship 
between writing and other kinds of labour and about where to locate political agency. 
The toil of the mind is both a way of distinguishing the writer and a way of embedding 
him in the labouring population. I will return to the tension between Cobbett's egotism 
and his self-effacement and to the question of agency at the end of this chapter. ' 
The difficulty Cobbett experienced in articulating the connection between the 
mind and body of the reform movement, and in expressing the relationship between the 
writer and the rest of the working community, shows up again, in an amusing coda, in 
Cobbett's retrospective commentary on the problem of petitioning, the tactic which he 
had recommended to the working classes in his "Address to the Journeymen and 
Labourers. " In January 1817, a meeting of radical leaders at the Crown and Anchor 
tavern in London agreed upon a campaign of mass petitioning, and a large number of 
petitions were addressed to Parliament from across the nation in 1817 and 1818. One 
reason for Parliament's refusal to admit the petitions, according to Olivia Smith, was 
the "language in which they were written" (30). In the parliamentary debates on 
popular petitions, however, the main objections expressed by MPs were that they were 
not the true sentiments or the authentic language of the people at all, but the 
compositions of a small number of dissatisfied intellectuals who had mass-produced 
petitions to parliament to give the impression of popular support for reform. Similarity 
of form and expression was taken to be evidence "that they had all proceeded from the 
same hand and mind" (Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 35 (1817): 861,1003). A 
common complaint about the petitions was that they were printed instead of hand- 
175 
written, especially if they happened to be printed by the same (London) printer (859- 
60,917,1003); other reasons given for refusing petitions was that the signatures were 
written in the same hand, that the signatures were appended on a separate sheet from 
the petition, or that the wording on separate petitions was identical (861,913-15). 
These were taken to be evidence of a "manufactured petition, " one which had been 
pre-prepared for the people by a few "'designing men" (237,1002). One member 
wondered "how far those petitions were to be considered as the genuine and authentic 
language of the petitioners, or how far they were the dictation of certain factious 
demagogues who were now agitating the question of reform throughout the country" 
(91). Another wondered whether there was a "bureau in town for the manufacture of 
petitions, and another in the country for procuring signatures? And might not some 
demagogues join the operation of the two without any authority from the persons 
whose names were employed? " (95-6). This tactic of assigning the labourers' 
discontent to the intervention of "designing" intellectuals who claimed to speak for the 
people is exactly the kind of separation between the head and hands of the reform 
movement that Cobbett wrote to overcome. 
In 1830, when he was again advising the labouring classes to petition for 
reform, Cobbett answered the objection that the petitions were the work of one man: 
As to the petitions being the work of the same man. How preposterous! 
Whence is to come the complaint, or the petition? It must be some one man to 
propose it. It must emanate from somebody. All minds may be occupied about 
the same thing, but it must come from one hand only. All cannot take up the 
176 
pen and write a petition; and what objection, therefore, can there be, that the 
same petition come from Manchester and Southwark? None. (Lectures on the 
French Revolution 2: 9) 
The writer here is no longer the leader and guiding head of the reform movement--an 
intellectual disconnected from the physical body--but its faithful amanuensis, merely 
reporting the collective will. Cobbett solves the problem of the collective nature of the 
movement by reversing the roles of leader and led, and by making the mental worker 
the manual servant of the people's mind. Countering his own previous rhetoric about 
the separation of head and body, he both gives the writer a material role in the reform 
movement and pays respect to the political intelligence of the people. The "you" and 
"I" becomes a "we" when the head and hands change places, when the writer lends his 
own hand to the cause of reform. 
I have shown how, in the Political Registers of 1816-17, Cobbett's attempt to 
suture together the labours of mind and body into a united body for reform show up 
as inconsistencies in his texts. In the second half of this chapter, I look at Cobbett's 
writings following his emigration to the United States in March 1817, to consider his 
vacillation over the relative importance of mental and manual labour. When he talks of 
bodily labour, Cobbett refers to those who, by producing food and drink, buildings and 
clothing, support the physical existence of the nation, and he is always acutely aware 
that writing and thinking are only equivocally and indirectly connected to this primary 
sector of production. In Cobbett's scheme of things, labour on the land is of 
fundamental importance, and it has something like the significance for him that the 
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"base" had for Marx. Writing and thinking depend on that prior material labour. 
Nevertheless, Cobbett also wants to claim that his writings are as valuable to his 
country as the more obviously essential work of those who had laboured their whole 
lives in the fields. To demonstrate the importance of intellectual labour, he suggests 
that his writings return, as in the writing of petitions, to lend a hand to those who 
laboured primarily with their limbs. 
Cobbett left England at the suspension of Habeas Corpus and arrived in New 
York in May 1817; he lived there, in this second period of exile, for over two years, 
eventually arriving back in England in November 1819. In the United States Cobbett 
wrote two books which he hoped would provide the income to relieve his financial 
situation: A Year's Residence in the United States and Grammar of the English 
Language. In each book, Cobbett both suggests the primacy of bodily labour and 
makes the case for the still greater importance of the mental work of political writing. 
In one of the first Registers addressed to his compatriots from across the 
Atlantic, Cobbett announced his intention to move closer to the land in order to make 
his living: 
I must eat and drink [... ]. I have not the least doubt that we shall be able to 
get plenty of both from the earth, which is never niggardly towards those, who 
will apply to her with earnestness and with care. To the earth, therefore, the 
untaxed earth, I will apply. It would be affectation to pretend, that I have not 
the means of living here by my pen; but it is my intention to be a downright 
farmer, and to depend solely upon what I can get in that way. I begin by 
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counting upon nothing but what I can raise from the ground. (CPR 32 [26.07. 
1817]: 522) 
Cut off from the labouring poor of England whose toil had supported his own 
industry, he will have to move closer to the earth himself. Cobbett's emphatic 
vocabulary--"downright ... 
depend solely ... count upon nothing"--conveys the 
significance of the land in his thinking. In times of crisis, Cobbett advocates moving 
closer to the land. Hence in one of his best-known works, The Poor Man's Friend, 
Cobbett recommends, as one way of escaping the high taxes on everyday necessities, 
buying goods in as-near-to-raw state as possible. Illustrating this precept, 
characteristically, by citing his own behavior, Cobbett sums up his philosophy with a 
typically home-spun image: "I jostle myself in as nearly as I possibly can to the land" 
(para. 124). However, although it is to the land, not to the pen, that he will resort to 
make his living, the land only serves to support his writing: 
[Although] I mean to place my sole dependence for a living, upon the fidelity 
of the earth, I beg you not to suppose, that I mean to cease, for one moment, 
in my efforts to aid in the restoration of the freedom of my country. That shall 
be the constant object of my life. That nothing shall prevent me from pursuing, 
and by all the means, of all sorts, that my mind can invent, or that it can avail 
itself of (CPR 32: 527) 
Cobbett moves closer to the occupation of those for whom he writes in order to 
authorise his political writings, for dependence on the land signifies independence from 
the Government. 
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The same motion is evident in A Year's Residence, a book which purports to 
offer advice to would-be emigrants on various aspects of farming and gardening in the 
United States. A great part of the book consists of a journal of his first year in America 
in which he recorded useful details about climate, soil, and so on. He heartily 
recommends emigration, for "a farmer here depends on nobody but himself' (A Year's 
Residence 6). Cobbettf s persona is that of a "downright" farmer, and he is a writer, he 
implies, only in the intervals between sowing and harvesting his crops. He concedes 
that he is known primarily as a writer and, as such, his readers might think of him as a 
city-dweller. To establish his qualification to speak on country matters, therefore, 
Cobbett refers to his upbringing; he was born and bred into a farming family and had 
been a gardener all his life (7-9). Later in the book, however, Cobbett reverses this 
position. The real work of his life is his labour in the cause of reform: "Let not my 
countrymen, who may happen to read this suppose, that these, or any other pursuits 
will withdraw my attention from, or slacken my zeal in, that cause, which is common 
to us all. That cause claims, and has, my first attention and best exertion; that is the 
business of my life. These other pursuits are my recreation" (A Year's Residence 145). 
His experience of working with his hands gives him credibility as a farmer, but it also 
shores up his political writings by anchoring them in material production. In his 
Grammar, Cobbett takes on a very different persona from that of A Year's Residence-- 
a self-taught grammarian, rather than a downright farmer--but he makes the same 
move: first, he establishes the primacy of material production and then insists on the 
greater importance of writing, so long as that writing remains in touch with the soil. 
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Though Hazlitt was exaggerating when he said that Cobbett's Grammar was 
"as entertaining as a story book" (Complete Works 8: 53), the Grammar is 
entertaining, and this in great part is because the examples Cobbett chooses to 
illustrate a grammatical principle often do double duty to illustrate political ones. It is 
in this way that he indirectly takes up the question of the relationship of writing to 
bodily labour. Hence, when he models the conjugation of a regular verb, he chooses 
the verb to work: I work, You work, we work, and so on; and to demonstrate that the 
present participle can be used as a verb, noun, or adjective he gives the following 
sentence: "I am working; working is laudable; a working man is more worthy of 
respect than a titled pensioner who lives in idleness" (59-60,117,123). Cobbett 
intends, perhaps, to remind his reader that his own work of writing is as legitimate as 
any other trade or employment, and that William Cobbett is certainly not idling on the 
taxes of the people while he composes his Grammar of the English Language. A few 
pages on, when he explains the correct use of the demonstrative pronoun, the example 
he chooses comments more directly on the division of mental and manual labour: 
"They, who can write, save a great deal of bodily labour, " is very different 
from, "Those who can write, save a great deal of bodily labour. " The those 
stands for [... ] any persons in general, who can write; whereas the they, as 
here used, relates to some particular person; and the sentence means, that these 
particular persons are able to write, and, by that means, they save a great deal 
of bodily labour. (101) 
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Cobbett intimates that he is working, yet he is also among those who by writing save 
themselves physical labour. Cobbett neglects to say here whether writing is as laudable 
as the labour that occurs in the fields. What, the reader might ask, is the significance 
of "save" in this passage? 
In the Grammar, Cobbett attacked the learned fellows of the two universities 
who do not contribute anything to society and "live by the sweat of other people's 
brows" (74-5). Again, in 1821, Cobbett claimed that book learning was viewed by 
parents as a means of enabling their own children to escape their share of bodily 
labour: "The taste of the times is, unhappily, to give to children something of book- 
learning, with a view of placing them to live, in some way or other, upon the labour of 
other people" (Cottage Economy 6). Toward the end of his life he even suggested that 
all mental labourers were, at least according to the letter of divine command, defectors 
from the land: 
We are all, we who are at anything else, deserters from the plough. God said to 
mankind: "this is ground, there are ploughs, use the latter on the former, and 
bread and meat and flax and wool and leather and wood shall come; and you 
shall eat, drink, be clad and be lodged. " So that this was the business of us all; 
and all who do not follow it are, in fact, deserters. (CPR 81 [29.09.1833]: 
827) 
The land is where the real labour is done, and those who have been able by good 
fortune or "extraordinary powers of mind" to escape the land have a responsibility to 
those left behind (Cottage Economy 7). 
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As in his Year's Residence, however, while he recognises the priority of work 
on the land, Cobbett also maintains in his Grammar that writing is the most valuable 
labour of all; by working with the pen, he can be of more service to mankind than by 
digging the soil, for history shows that "tyranny has no enemy so formidable than the 
pen" (32). Facility with language gives the writer influence, the capacity to transform 
the lives of others, and the chance to assault the powerful. In Cobbett's eyes, talent is 
meritorious only when it is allied to exertion in the cause of truth and justice, 
knowledge only when applied to help the weak and oppressed. Mental labour is 
valuable in the extent to which it supports the poorer portion of the community (29- 
31) 
Never, therefore, esteem men merely on account of their riches, or their 
station. Respect goodness, find it where you may. Honour talent wherever you 
behold it unassociated with vice; but honour it most where accompanied with 
exertion, and especially where exerted in the cause of truth and justice; but, 
above all, when it steps forward to protect defenceless innocence against the 
attacks of powerful guilt. (151) 
The reason why a surgeon's labour is more valuable than a thatcher's--and, by the same 
token, why a lawyer's labour is more valuable than that of a surgeon, a statesman's 
than a lawyer's--is that it brings greater benefits to more members of the community. 
Just as great acquirements are potentially more laudable, however, so their misuse is 
more deserving of censure, and this holding to account of the powerful was, for 
Cobbett, the particular role and responsibility of the press (30-1). 
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One political motive of the Grammar is to undercut the assumed intellectual 
superiority of the ruling classes. In 1823 Cobbett added a chapter called "Six Lessons 
Intended to prevent Statesmen from Using False Grammar and from Writing in an 
Awkward Manner, " in which he gives specimens of defective writing by contemporary 
politicians and literary men. The purpose of his often amusing and sometimes nit- 
picking criticism of the writings and speeches of politicians and men-of-letters is to 
demonstrate the deficiency of the nation's rulers "in that sort of talent which appears to 
me necessary in men intrusted with great affairs" (152). Neither title nor great wealth 
was proof of great ability (153). An expensive education and a knowledge of the 
learned languages are not enough to prevent men from writing faulty English, though 
the same privileges may be used to legitimate the possession of power (89,105,117). 
By exposing the blunders of politicians and literary men, Cobbett shows that the 
wrong people are in the positions of power. In his criticism of one of Castlereagh's 
writings, for instance, Cobbett concludes by exclaiming: "What can you say of such a 
man, but that nature might have made him for a valet, for a strolling player, and 
possibly for an auctioneer; but never for a Secretary of State! " (168). Similarly, he 
writes of Lord Hardwicke, the president of the Board of Agriculture, that he "ought to 
be working in the field or mending his Majesty's High-ways" (A Year's Residence in 
the United States 115-16). 8 Saving bodily labour by writing was only legitimate for 
those who use their intellectual capacity in a responsible way. At the same time, and 
not just incidentally, Cobbett's purpose is to demonstrate his own superiority as a 
writer and thinker to those who presumed to be the nation's natural ruling class. "How 
184 
many false pretenders to erudition have I exposed to shame merely by my knowledge 
of grammar! " he later claimed: "How many of the insolent and ignorant great and 
powerful have I pulled down and made little and despicable! " (Advice to Young Men 
48-9) 
Basic literacy, then, would benefit all members of society. The stated intention 
of the Grammar was to impart a knowledge of correct writing and speaking to all 
classes. Literacy would enable the common people themselves to expose the 
intellectual pretensions of the ruling classes. As the editors of the 1983 reprint 
Grammar of the English Language assert, Cobbett has political motives for teaching 
the rudiments of accurate usage to his countrymen: by showing them how to "write 
clearly and precisely he hoped to develop their critical sense and so, as it were, 
inoculate them against political oppression" (9). 9 On the other hand, there is a strategy 
in the book of demystifying book-learning, by pointing out that facility with language 
was no different to any other skill that arises from the specialisation of employment. 
Ignorance is not a want of ability to speak correctly, Cobbett argues, but a want of 
knowledge of your particular trade or profession. A plough-boy is not to be called 
ignorant if he is unable to read or if he speaks ungrammatically, since what one 
demands of a plough-boy is that he can plough a straight line (Advice to Young Men 
42-3,131). Knowledge of grammar, Cobbett insists, is what society requires of those 
professions, such as of men-of-letters, scholars, and politicians, who make their living 
by the manipulation of words (Grammar 96). The suggestion here is that the 
agricultural workers cannot be expected to learn to read and write. 
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The reference to the illiterate plough-boy, who is yet able to plough a straight 
line, supports Cobbett's criticism of inept politicians; at the same time, in 
demonstrating his own ability as a grammarian, Cobbett shows that he is able to handle 
the writer's tools with the same facility that a plough-boy handled a plough. However, 
while the plough-boy is a convenient rhetorical device, it is not clear whether or not 
Cobbett actually believed that the plough-boy should or could be educated out of his 
condition. While the full title for the Grammar implies that Cobbett intended his book 
to be "for the use of Schools and of young persons in general; but more especially for 
the use of Soldiers, Sailors, Apprentices, and Plough-boys, " his rhetoric and mode of 
address in the book suggest that he had in mind, primarily, the middle classes whom he 
was trying to educate to use their talents responsibly in the cause of political reform. 
As the editors of the Grammar point out, although A Grammar of the English 
Language sold very well--50,000 by the end of 1822 in Britain and the United States-- 
the price of two shillings and sixpence would have been out of the reach of a farm 
labourer, and it is probable that the book was read primarily by the middle classes and 
by the better-off artisans (13,18). Although Cobbett claims to be addressing the 
plough-boy, the rural labourer is mainly a figure of speech through which Cobbett 
addresses to his middle class readers his criticism of the political abuses of literacy. '0 
In the chapter in the Grammar on figurative language, Cobbett uses a 
metaphor that reinforces the idea that words and the rules of grammar are the tools of 
a writer's or an orator's trade, when he remarks that rhetoric is an especially dangerous 
tool and that it should be used sparingly: "figures of rhetorick are edge tools and two 
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edge tools too. Take care how you touch them, [... ] if you use figures of rhetorick, 
you ought to take care that they do not make a nonsense of what you say, nor excite 
the ridicule of those to whom you write [... ]. Beware of them! " (Grammar 150-1). 
Just as he delights in showing that politicians and literary men are unable to employ 
grammar accurately, so he demonstrates that they are unable to handle figurative 
language with any skill. He makes notable use of this strategy in a famous article, his 
"Letter to Parson Malthus on the rights of the poor; and on the cruelty recommended 
by him to be exercised towards the poor, " written in February 1819 while Cobbett was 
still resident in the United States. 
In his Essay on the Principle of Population, Thomas Malthus had argued that 
because of the constant pressure of food shortages on population growth, mankind 
was condemned to a perpetual cycle of misery. From his premise that the rate of 
population growth must always be far greater than the rate of increase of the food 
supply, Malthus arrived at the conclusion--which, while it was derided by radicals like 
Cobbett and Hazlitt, achieved enormous cultural influence--that "the difficulty of 
subsistence" was a decisive argument against "the possible existence of a society, all 
the members of which should live in ease, happiness and comparative leisure" (71-2). 
The first edition of Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population, published in 1798, 
was a polemic against Godwin's utopianism, demonstrating, by purportedly scientific 
means, that "in the vain endeavour to attain what in the nature of things is impossible, 
we now sacrifice not only possible but certain benefits" (102). Malthus repeatedly 
refers to his discovery of the disproportion between the increase in production and the 
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increase in reproduction as a natural law; the Essay makes unbridled use of phrases 
such as the law of nature, the nature of things, the strong law of necessity (72). This 
was the element of the Essay that provided ammunition for those who wanted to argue 
on ideological grounds that the poor had no right to relief While Malthus did not 
explicitly argue that it would be wrong to introduce any measures to relieve the 
condition of the poor, he did suggest that such well-intentioned policies were futile in 
the face of the inescapable operation of his natural law. Malthus' stance in the essay, 
rather like Burke's in the Scarcity pamphlet, is that of a realist reluctantly submitting to 
evidence that confounds his sentiments. He argued, for example, that the English 
poor-law system, though humanely meant, tended to further depress the poor in two 
ways: by giving an incentive to increasing population without a corresponding increase 
in food supply and by removing incentives to industry through making the labourers 
dependent on the state (99-100). If there was no work for the poor, or if there was 
work but only at a below-subsistence wage, it was interfering with the laws of nature 
to supplement their earnings; doing so would only enable them to marry, procreate, 
and bring yet more unwanted labourers to the job market, and to place still more strain 
on the price of subsistence. It is not difficult to see how Malthus' supposedly 
"scientific" refutation of Godwinism could also serve quasi-objective support for a 
laissez-faire market in labour, in which the balance of supply and demand fixed the 
price for labour. Malthus revised his gloomy predictions in later editions of his essay, 
but this did not deter others from latching on to his arguments and his rhetoric to 
question the point of any social amelioration whatsoever. 
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Malthusian principles buttressed arguments against the poor laws throughout 
the first three decades of the nineteenth century; Cobbett attacked Malthus because his 
refutation of utopian thought was an apology for the poverty of the labourer. " In 
answer to poor law amenders, Cobbett could, as he did in his Legacy to Labourers 
(1834), argue historically, to show that the right to relief was a legal right enshrined in 
the constitution. In his 1819 reply, however, his strategy is to turn Malthus' rhetoric 
back on him by arguing that in the law of nature there would be no security of 
property at all, because the land originally belonged to all in common. The poor would 
be justified, therefore, in helping themselves to the common produce of nature to 
provide for themselves and their families (CPR 34 [8.05.1819]: 1024-6). Cobbett 
asserts that the poor have a natural right to subsistence off the land; they have a right 
to take whatever they need in order to keep themselves alive: "the law of nature bids 
man to take whenever he can find it, whatever is necessary to life, health, and ease" 
(1026). Cobbett attacks Malthus by unraveling his sophistry: "I'm glad, however, that 
you blundered upon the law of nature; because that is the very ground, on which I 
mean to start in endeavouring clearly to establish the right of the poor" (1027). 
Malthus blunders on the ploy of the law of nature in order reinforce his weak 
arguments, and Cobbett shows that Malthus has drowned in rhetorical depths. Cobbett 
argues, following Locke, that men leave that state of nature for their mutual benefit. 
But if any men, or class of men, are worse off in society than when in the state of 
nature, then the social compact is dissolved since there can be no social compact that 
does not guarantee men the right to live by their labour (1028-32). The law of nature 
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bids men to procure a sufficiency for themselves and their children by helping 
themselves to the produce of the land. This was sufficient demonstration, Cobbett 
argued, that the security of property rested on the poor having enough food and 
clothing. 
Ian Dyck notes Cobbett's strategy of attempting to "recover for popular culture 
the proverbs and adages that had been appropriated by the elite, such as the quotation 
from the scriptures, which was used by the opponents of outdoor relief: "if any shall 
not work, neither shall he eat" (194). According to Cobbett, it was particularly 
immoral to deny relief to the poor when there were untold numbers of government 
placemen living off the fruits of the their labour. British society had reversed the 
scriptural maxim, since it was now those who worked who did not eat, while those 
who did not work consumed far too much. Cobbett's strategy is to unpack the rhetoric 
by which the ruling classes had justified the oppression and impoverishment of the 
labourers. Occasionally, he is very amusing: "The pension list, " he writes in Advice to 
Young Men, "may be justly regarded as the poor-book of the aristocracy" (118). At 
the same time, Cobbett is also advancing evidence of his own facility with the writer's 
tools, showing, in this instance, that he is a superior workman to Malthus. 
Cobbett makes brilliant use of this strategy in his "Letter from the Labourers 
[... ] to Alexander Baring, the Loanmonger. " Baring had argued in the House of 
Commons against changing the system of nominating MPs, against giving the people 
the right to nominate all the members of parliament instead of having half nominated 
by the people and half by the aristocracy. To put this additional power in the hands of 
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the people, Baring argued, would be to give them an unlimited power. Cobbett cites 
Baring's speech at length in his Register, italicizing those figures of speech which he 
intended to take up in his reply: 
True it was that the Commons had not, at present, unlimited power. It might 
be compared to a man with one hand tied behind him; the people required 
that the other hand should be released, and the rational answer was, "No: he is 
a violent dangerous fellow, and is not to be trusted with the use of both his 
hands. " If the other hand were released, it would be employed in the 
destruction of the people who demanded that it should be set at liberty. 
(Cheers. ) The people ought only to have that degree of power which was 
consistent with their own interests; and it was at least perilous to destroy the 
fabric which had fostered their industry, and protected their liberties. The 
people were no more to be trusted with power than children with edge-tools. 
(CPR 73 [1.09.1831]- 612). 
Speaking in the voice of the labourers themselves, Cobbett makes short work of 
Baring's rhetoric, and at the same time illustrates his precept from the Grammar that 
figurative language is itself an edge tool. In the hands of incompetent practitioners like 
Baring, indeed, it is a tool liable to be used to inflict rhetorical self-harm. Baring 
argued that the proposed reform of the Commons would amount to giving the 
politically irresponsible commoners the use of two hands, and that they were not yet to 
be trusted with this additional power. This analogical reasoning was spurious, Cobbett 
asseverated. What would be said, Cobbett asks, if the labourers went to work with one 
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hand behind their back or went to war with one hand behind their back? When the 
labourers are called upon to labour for the rich, or to fight for them, they are not 
considered too dangerous in the possession of really dangerous tools like swords and 
bayonets (613). Baring implied that reform would put too much power in the hands of 
ordinary labourers, though he himself is kept in his privileged situation by that same 
power: the work of the labourers' hands (619-20). Speaking throughout in the voice of 
the labourers ("we"), Cobbett goes on to show that the labourers are politically mature 
because they understand fully the real reasons for their misery (620-2 1). As in his 
reply to the "shallow and muddle-headed" Malthus, Lobbett demonstrates that it is 
Baring who is barely competent to be let loose with the edge tool of language. In both 
articles, Cobbett shows his own superiority to the enemies of the labouring poor who 
advanced specious arguments against giving the poor their economic and political 
rights. In the letter to Baring, Cobbett speaks in the voice of the labourers and uses the 
pronoun "we" in order to show that the labourers not only know something of their 
own trade but can teach Baring a thing or two about his occupation. The article works 
so well because by speaking in the voice of the labourers, by using the collective 
pronoun, Lobbett suggests that the labourers are becoming politically and linguistically 
adept. He simultaneously assumes that the labourers are enlightened and continues the 
process of their political education. The "we" might also include Cobbett, however, 
and it this ambiguity that cinches the article's rhetorical achievement. Manual and 
mental labourers--the labourers and Cobbett himself--are gathered into political union 
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through the resemblance between a writer's tools and the real edge tools handled by 
physical labourers. 
George Spater remarks upon an "evolutionary development" in Cobbett's 
writings for the Register after his emigration to the United States in 1817. Although he 
still advocated peaceful methods of Reform, Cobbett talks increasingly of retribution 
and the right of resistance, and his writings "could be interpreted as incitements to use 
force" (369). "He encourages in the multitude the worst possible human passion 
revenge, " wrote Mary to Percy Shelley in September 1817, "or, as he would give it, 
that abominable christian name retribution" (Letters 1: 49). The basis of Cobbett's 
radicalism is the position outlined in the letter to Malthus, that the workers have a 
right to bread with or without labour, because the right of self-preservation and the 
right to a subsistence off the land is the first and fundamental law. While Cobbett had 
always urged that the right to outdoor relief was a constitutional right under an 
Elizabethan statute providing for the poor, following 1817 he explicitly drew from his 
labour theory of value the full implications of the Lockean tenet that all property rights 
originate in labour bestowed on the land. 
In his second of his Two Treatises of Government (1690), Locke had argued 
that the ends of political society and government are the mutual protection of 
property, that is, of life, liberty, and estate (para. 123-31). People enter into society 
because, in the state of nature, the property they acquire is insecure. Locke's state of 
nature is a state of equality. Men (the gendered noun is no accident) can earn the right 
to own property by mixing their labour with nature, but since no-one can engross more 
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possession than he can use without violating the law of nature, there will always be 
enough land for everyone. Only by the use of money or some non-perishable 
instrument of exchange can individuals appropriate more property than they can make 
immediate use of, only by mutual consent (to the value of money) do people agree to a 
"disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth" (para. 47-50). It follows that 
all members of a community will consent, at least tacitly, to this state of inequality, if 
they feel themselves better off than they would have been in a precarious state of 
equality. However, the first law of nature remained that of self preservation: "God and 
Nature never [allow] a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation" 
(para. 168). If someone finds himself worse off in civil society than he would have 
been had he stayed in the law of nature, then, Locke implies, political society can be 
dissolved by the same principle of self-preservation and self-interest by which it was 
inaugurated: "since no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with 
an intention to be worse" (para. 131). Locke denies that this lays a "perpetual 
foundation for disorder" since the principle only operates when "the inconvenience is 
so great that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it 
amended" (para. 168). Increasingly, Cobbett felt that this point had been reached. 12 
In A Legacy to Labourers (1834) Cobbett gives his most detailed exposition of 
the revolutionary implications of Locke's doctrine by claiming that the majority were 
reaching a state where self-preservation demanded that they revert to a state of nature. 
If the labourers were not able gain a subsistence from the land for their labour then 
they had a right to the land itself. The right to preserve life is more fundamental than 
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the right of property, and, therefore, Cobbett implies that the rights of the labourer 
override those of the landlord. "A nation may exist without landlords; but without 
labourers, not only its political, but its physical, existence is impossible" (A Legacy to 
Labourers 139). Without labour there can be no food or shelter or clothing for 
anyone, and "a farm is worth no more than an equal number of acres of the sea, or of 
the air" (138). The government has no right to take away by taxes the fruits of the 
labourers in order to support the sinecurist placemen who lived in idleness; to the 
landlords' claim that they must keep rents high because the government takes away 
their profit in taxes, Cobbett answers that the landlords should withhold the payment 
of taxes rather than pass on the burden to the labourer: "This is a matter with which 
the labourer has nothing to do" (139). The new poor-law, it was being urged by its 
apologists, was designed to protect estates from being broken up by the expense of 
providing relief, but Cobbett contended that by telling the poor that they must rely on 
their own resources, the poor-law commission was inviting them to help themselves to 
what they needed to survive (132-3,136). The new law dissolves the social compact, 
and was, effectively, the end of property, not its security (124,128,140). 13 
The basis of Cobbett's position was Locke's dictum that labour on the land is 
the original foundation of all property (Legacy 45,47; CPR 71 [29.01.1831: 288). 
But what of those who work with their minds, writers and other professional men? 
Can they have a right of ownership, too? I have already emphasised that Cobbett was 
beset by the question of what kind of activity writing is. Occasionally, he asserts that 
writing and thinking are just as valid as any other kind of labour: "A man has a 
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property in his writings, [... ] and what are these but his labour? " (CPR 32 [2.08. 
1817] : 574). Elsewhere he writes as though there was a fundamental distinction to be 
made: "the order of the world demands that some shall think, while others work" 
(CPR 71 [29.01.1831]: 287). Here, in The Legacy to Labourers, he dexterously 
suggests that the labours of the mind are different from but analogous to physical 
labour, In Locke's society, the right of non-manual labourers to property arises 
through common consent to use money as a medium of exchange. Cobbett accepts this 
argument but tries to show that the right of ownership through exchange is derived by 
an analogy with the original right. The claim of mental labourers to own property is 
founded in the original right: "The capacity to labour with the mind is the gift of God 
as completely as is the capacity to labour with the hands, [... ] hence, the foundation 
of their property is labour as completely as if they had first broken up the earth, 
subdued it, and made it fruitful by the labour of their bodies" (emphasis added) (45-9). 
The simile is meant to suggest that money earned and given in exchange is as valid a 
source of property as the labour bestowed on the land had been in the state of nature. 
In Cobbett's hands, however, mental work is made to sound like a poor imitation of 
that original right; the metaphor nicely captures his sense of the equivocal connection 
of mental labourers to the primary labour on the land. 
Cobbett's project, I have argued, is to diminish the distance implied by that "as 
if, " by claiming that his writings return, albeit indirectly, to help fructify the land. 
Cobbett makes amends for his dependence upon the labour of others by putting his 
own labour at the service of manual workers; as the manual labour sustains the writer 
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so the author's works return, in some measure, to ease the labours of the physical 
labourers. As I have argued, one way in which Cobbett believes his writings help the 
common labourers is by his constant attack on their oppressors. He also conceived 
that his writings could be of more direct benefit to the poor. Cottage Economy was 
first published in 1821-22 in seven parts at two pence a part, a price that put it within 
the range of the intended audience of labourers, and was published as a complete book 
in 1822. The work sold 100,000 copies in the first ten years (Spater 437-8), and this 
would have delighted Cobbett, who envisioned Cottage Economy as a practical guide 
to be carried into the fields, where his instruction would be of immediate benefit to the 
labourers (Cottage Economy 102). 
In the opening pages of Cottage Economy, Cobbett points out that Britain's 
labourers are living in poverty amidst the abundance which they themselves have 
produced (2-4). But there is no reason why the labouring poor should not have an 
"abundant living" (4). The basis of good living is skillful labour and Cobbett's book 
shows the labourer how to turn his labour to the best account (9). Cobbett's purpose 
was to teach traditional, though lost, skills--such as brewing beer, making bread, or 
keeping a cow on forty rods of ground--which would provide the rural household with 
the wherewithal to make an independent living, and make it less dependent on 
commercial products (Gilmartin, "This is very material" 81). This material sufficiency 
or good living is also related to political independence, since a man's skill and ability as 
a labourer render him stronger and more independent as well as better off financially 
(Cottage Economy 63). Dependence of any kind favors tyranny: "I despise the man 
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that is poor and contented; for such a content is a certain proof of a base disposition, a 
disposition which is the enemy of all industry, all exertion, all love of independence" 
(2-3). Cobbett's advice to the labouring poor in Cottage Economy appears to 
recommend self-help and honest toil (8,10); in fact, as Dyck points out, Cobbett's 
counsel to the poor was sometimes misread, by the well-off, as an ethical imperative 
which acquitted the ruling class of any social obligation (107-8). In improving the skill 
of the labourer, however, Cobbett was not trying to improve the labourer's 
productivity in order to benefit the employer. His goal, rather, was to show them how 
to "jostle" closer to the land: to give wage labourers a degree of security from the 
vicissitudes of their employment and to cushion them from the government's 
appropriation of the fruits of labour via the tax on commodities. Cobbett's attempt to 
increase the self-reliance of the workers was opposed in its political and economic 
suppositions to the interests of agrarian capitalism, since a self-sufficient rural 
populace would undermine that dependence on wage-employment which capitalism 
needed (Dyck 108-9). Cobbett is at his most Spencean when he insists that access to 
the land was the foundation of political as well as economic independence, and when 
he criticises the enclosure movement for shutting out the poor from the commons 
(Cottage Economy 57,81,90-1; Dyck 109,123). 14 
Cottage Economy contains one of Cobbett's swipes at book-learning: giving 
children book education is evidence of a desire to help them live "upon the labour of 
other people" (6), Schooling merely makes the children of the labouring classes 
conceited, spoiling them as labourers, as well as keeping them servile (7). "[N]ine- 
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tenths of us are, from the very nature and necessities of the world, " Cobbett asserted 
"born to gain our livelihood by the sweat of the brow" (7). At the same time, Cobbett 
himself is obviously one of those endowed with "extraordinary powers of mind, " who 
has had the opportunity to develop those powers and to save himself the 
unpleasantness of bodily labour (7). Cobbett's defence would certainly have been that 
his writings had been instrumental in bettering the material conditions of the poor. He 
frequently compares the superior utility of his own writings to religious tracts and 
sermons, by pointing out how many poor families had benefited from his directions, in 
Cottage Economy, on how to establish a cottage industry in straw-plat. He finds one 
family who have increased their combined income by six shillings a week by plaiting 
straw to make bonnets: "This is indisputably my work; and when I reflect that there 
must necessarily be, now, some hundreds, and shortly, many thousands of families, in 
England, who are and will be, through my means, living well instead of being half- 
starved; I cannot but feel myself consoled" (Rural Rides 136-7). How long will it be, 
he demands, before the entire London press "do as much good as my pen has done in 
this one instance" (184). While a Methodist parson, for example, might concern 
himself with the moral improvement of the poor, Cobbett argued that good conduct 
followed from a full stomach: "I will allow nothing to be good, with regard to the 
Labouring classes, unless it make an addition to their victuals, drink, or clothing. As to 
their minds, that is a much too sublime matter for me to think about" (Rural Rides 
137). Cobbett neglects to mention here that he has a more subversive agenda: 
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although he puts the physical needs of the poor first, this material sufficiency served as 
a basis on which to build their political independence. 
In his Advice to Young Men and (Incidentally) to Young Women in the Middle 
and Higher Ranks of Life (1829-30), Cobbett records that he had received many 
letters of gratitude from readers of his Grammar of the English Language, his Cottage 
Economy, and his books on Woodlands and Gardening, testifying to "the great benefit 
which they have derived from my labours" (6). In this same book--which Sambrook 
calls Cobbett's apologia pro vita sua (William Cobbett 156)--Cobbett recounts events 
from his life to illustrate other ways in which ordinary people had directly benefited 
from his industriousness. Thus, he describes his career as a soldier in New Brunswick 
in the 1780s and he tells of his rapid promotion to sergeant-major, owing to his ability 
to write and to his habits of "husbanding well" his time. As an officer, his early rising 
and industrious ways meant that the morning exercise of the regiment was finished at 
an early hour. When other officers were in charge the men would be doing their 
exercise in the heat of the day; how different on the days when Cobbett was 
commander: 
the men had a long day of leisure before them: they could ramble into the town 
or into the woods; go to get raspberries, to catch birds, to catch fish, or to 
pursue another recreation [... ]. So that here, arising solely from the early 
habits of one very young man, were pleasant and happy days given to 
hundreds. (40-1) 
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For Nattrass this passage displays a "'glorious disregard for the work-ethic" (203), 
Another reading might be to think of the passage as defining more precisely what 
counts as valuable labour. The passage shows how Cobbett's industry eased the 
burden of the fairly useless labour of military exercise on others, allowing them to get 
on with the more fundamental labour of supplementing a meagre diet. As in Cottage 
Economy, Cobbett imagines his labours multiplying to supply the whole community 
with an "abundant" living. It is worth considering Advice to Young Men in more detail, 
for, in this book, Cobbett defends the view expressed in the Grammar of the English 
Language: that the pen is the greatest foe of tyranny and that writing is the most 
valuable labour of all. At the same time Advice continues to vent Cobbett's suspicion 
that mental work was only equivocally connected to real (physical) labour. 
Advice to Young Men was published in 14 monthly parts in 1829-30, its price 
of sixpence-a-part directing it at a wealthier audience than that intended for Cottage 
Economy. Cobbett says that the object of the book is to communicate knowledge 
which will add to the "personal ease and happiness" of the middle classes (1-2). 
Happiness is to be found only in independence (9-10), and the source of independence 
is to depend on your own exertions for your own living (10). Turning on the middle 
classes the moral imperatives directed at the poor, Cobbett tells them that they have no 
right to live in the world without doing work of some sort or another; to want to live 
off the labour of others is tantamount to fraud or theft (9). But whereas Cottage 
Economy, addressed to the lower classes, viewed book-learning as a way of avoiding 
labour, Advice to Young Men, addressed to those, like Cobbett himself, who might live 
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by their literary talent, concedes that mental labour is a valid way of making a living 
(59-60). Book learning is essential to the kinds of professional occupations where one 
might be of great assistance to other members of the community (270-1). 
As in Cottage Economy, Cobbett's theme is the independence of his audience, 
but now the audience is assumed to be the enfranchised part of the community or 
middle-class professionals, people like Cobbett himself who had escaped, by talent or 
good fortune, from a life of bodily labour. Independence here refers less to the 
material self-sufficiency of the poor than to autonomy from power, and to the 
conditions under which useful intellectual work was possible. Again, as in Cottage 
Economy, Cobbett recommends parsimony or thrift as the source of independence. He 
acknowledges that the middle ranks are not living close to the poverty line and what 
threatens their finances is a false pride, and the desire to imitate the consumption 
habits of the rich (11,14-18). The condition for intellectual freedom is freedom from 
poverty, not only because thinking is hampered by financial care, but also because fear 
of poverty--or, more exactly, the desire for comfort and ease--leads intellectuals to 
abandon principles for expediency and to serve the powerful (12,58-9). Cobbett gives 
the example of William Gifford, former editor of the Quarterly Review, a man of 
genuine intellectual attainments, who was allured by the promise of a comfortable 
living into being "a sinecurist, a pensioner, and a hack" (60-1). Cobbett also takes aim 
at the writings of Burke, Johnson, and Shakespeare. All these writers have attempted 
to deceive the people about the nature of power in order to keep them enslaved, and 
they were all "in one shape or another, paid by oppressors out of means squeezed from 
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the people" (295-8). Political independence could be secured by working for one's 
living and living within one's means; this would allow literary men to exercise their 
influence on behalf of the oppressed. " 
In Advice to Young Men, as in the Grammar of the English Language, Cobbett 
extols the ability to write, both because it is the source of his influence, and because it 
is the foundation of his autonomy; writing gives him an independent source of 
livelihood (51-2). The final paragraph of Advice to Young Men, a passage which 
Cobbett quotes from his own Grammar, makes this point: 
With English and French on your tongue and in your pen, you have a resource, 
not only greatly valuable in itself, but a recourse that you can be deprived of by 
none of those changes and chances which deprive men of pecuniary 
possessions, and which, in some cases, make the purse-proud man of yesterday 
a crawling sycophant of today. (334; Grammar 151) 
Writing is a trade which allows one a degree autonomy from the state and from the 
rich and powerful, as long as one is content to work for one's living and is not lured by 
the trappings of wealth to accept a state pension. Cobbettf s identification of the 
grounds of a writer's independence is apparently corroborated by a reference to 
Rousseau. Cobbett declares himself to be in agreement with Rousseau, who had 
observed that the artisan or craftsman is the most independent of all men "because he 
carries about, in his own hands and person, the means of gaining his livelihood; " 
furthermore, Cobbett adds, the more common the articles he produces, the more 
perfect his independence (307-8). The passage from the Grammar cited above, on the 
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autonomy of the writer, seems to align the writer with other craftsmen who carry 
about on their own persons the means of their livelihood. 
Paradoxically, however, the reference to Rousseau establishes not that the 
writer has the same means of earning his livelihood, but that he has no means of 
independence whatsoever. Cobbett argues in Advice to Young Men that the price one 
pays for "exemption from [... ] bodily labour" is dependence of one kind or another 
(307-8). Since a writer does not produce anything materially useful with his hands, he 
must rely for his food and clothing either on the labouring classes, or on the state. A 
writer may earn fame or riches, but he sacrifices the certainty of independence to be 
found in humbler life (308). In the most fundamental sense, all intellectuals are, by 
Cobbett's reckoning, dependent on the people who support their physical existence. 
This places all writers and intellectuals uncomfortably in the same situation as the 
pensioned writer living off the taxes paid by the labourer. All writers, then, have a 
moral responsibility to give something back to the labourers: "To those who labour, 
we, who labour not with our hands, owe all that we eat, drink and wear; all that shades 
us by day, and that shelters us by night [... ] and therefore, if we possess talent for the 
task, we are ungrateful or cowardly or both, if we omit any effort within our power to 
prevent them from being slaves" (323-4). The appeal to Rousseau supports two 
different positions: Cobbett's labour is both the source of his independence, insofar as 
he claims to have earned his living by his trade, and the source of his dependence, in 
that he concedes that he owes his material existence to the more material labour of 
others. Once again we find Cobbett's ambivalence about the toil of the mind. Advice to 
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Young Men is the book where Cobbett defends most strongly the utility of the life of 
the mind, and the book is all about the opportunity which a writer has for an 
independent existence. However, even in this his apologia, Cobbett cannot avoid 
feeling that writing and thinking are not as authentic as bodily labour. Exemption from 
manual labour again takes the sense of having somehow escaped or evaded one's fair 
share of the real work. 
As if to make amends for this desertion, Cobbett often imagines defecting from 
writing back to the land. In Advice to Young Men, Cobbett recounts an incident, from 
his time as a soldier in Canada, when he met a young farmer's daughter whose family 
lived in the woods of New England. Cobbett is enchanted, not only, or even primarily, 
by the girl, but by the North American landscape, the simple rustic manners and way of 
life of the independent New Englanders. At the time, Cobbett relates, he was engaged 
to be married to Anne ("Nancy") Reid, his future wife, who was in England awaiting 
his return. This is how Cobbett presents his dilemma: "Here was the present against 
the absent: here was the power of the eyes pitted against that of memory, [... ] here 
was the spot of all spots in the world, and here were also the life, and the manners and 
the habits and the pursuits that I delighted in" (146). Eventually the young Cobbett 
decides against the rural idyll, and determines to return to England, to his future wife, 
and to his destiny as political writer. Cobbett reflects, in Advice to Young Men, on the 
uncertainty of fate; if his fiancee had but let him know, by a letter, of some lack of 
affection on her part, his destiny might have lain in the North American woods: 
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Young as I was; able as I was as a soldier; proud as I was of the admiration 
and commendations of which I was the object; fond as I was, too, of the 
command, which, at so early an age, my rare conduct and great natural talents 
had given me; sanguine as was my mind, and brilliant as were my prospects: 
yet I had seen so much of the meannesses, the unjust partialities, the insolent 
pomposity, the disgusting dissipations of that way of life, that I was weary of 
it: I longed, exchanging my fine laced coat for the Yankee farmer's homespun, 
to be where I should never behold the supple crouch of servility, and never 
hear the hectoring voice of authority again; and, on the lonely banks of this 
branch-covered creek, which contained (she out of the question) everything 
congenial to my taste and dear to my heart, I, unapplauded, unfeared, unenvied 
and uncalumniated, should have lived and died. (149-50) 
There is a constant refrain in Cobbett's writing which regrets the loss of humble 
anonymity. In this mood, the success, fame, and relative freedom from want that have 
been his lot as a writer are not sufficient compensation for the loss of simplicity and 
independence which are to be found only in humbler occupations. Hence, Cobbett 
laments that he did not remain on the land--"I have never desired to have any rank, 
station or name, or calling, more and other than that of a farmer"--and he speaks 
longingly of the benefits of bodily labour: "It is free from the torments of ambition, and 
from a great part of the causes of ill health" (Reitzel 226, Cottage Economy 8). 16 
Cobbett also imagines discovering, in an alliance with other labourers, a more 
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satisfactory form of community, unblemished by the envy and ambition that he finds in 
the putative republic of letters. '7 
The counter-appeal of writerly distinction and laborious anonymity is, I 
suggest, another manifestation of the warring impulses of egotism and self-effacement 
in Cobbett's writing. As I noted earlier, Cobbett sometimes stressed the agency of the 
labourers themselves and thereby down-played his achievements. In his writings on 
parliamentary reform, for example, Cobbett gave the working classes credit for 
instructing him as much as he instructed them. In Advice to Young Men, while Cobbett 
boasts of his own great labours, we again see evidence of this self-effacement when he 
gives credit for what he has achieved to his wife and children. 18 Had he remained a 
bachelor, he states, he would not have performed a "thousandth part of those labours 
which have been, and are, in spite of all political prejudice, the wonder of all who have 
seen or heard of them" (101). This point is reinforced: "A fourth part of the labours I 
have performed never would have been performed if I had not been a married man" 
(206); and, again: "I had other and strong motives [... ] but after all a very large part 
of my nearly a hundred volumes may be fairly ascribed to the wife and children" (206); 
once more: "I might have done something, but, perhaps, but a thousandth part of what 
I have done [... ]. I have always said that if my country feel any gratitude for my 
labours, that gratitude is due to her as full as much as to me" (206-7). 19 At the same 
time as Cobbett disperses the credit for his literary achievements, however, he also 
claims to have shared in the domestic labours of his wife. His time at home was, he 
avows, "chiefly divided between the pen and the baby" (157,176). If Nancy Cobbett 
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was responsible to a large degree for Cobbett's achievement, then, by the same token, 
Cobbett does not hesitate to say that he partook of what he deemed the woman's work 
and "rendered the mother's labour as light [he] could" (157,23 5). By "mother's 
labour" Cobbett means child-care rather than child-birth, but the ambiguity is perhaps 
intentional. It is as though a more authentic, because more bodily, form of labour 
serves as a ballast for the deracinated activity of writing. Cobbett partly effaces his 
own talents, but only to anchor himself in a more essential, rudimentary and elemental 
form of labour. 
The tension between his literary egotism and his longing for obscurity 
continues even in Cobbett's anticipation of his own death and after-life. In the 
dedication to his last book, A Legacy to Labourers (1834), Lobbett hoped that his 
book would be bought in every parish in the kingdom and would be to the labouring 
classes the "most useful and faithful companion, " reminding the labourers of their 
rights and explaining to them the causes of their oppression (9). He explained the title 
thus 
I call it a LEGACY, because I am sure, that [... ] long after I shall be laid 
under the turf [... ] this little book will be an innate of the cottages of 
England, and will remind the working people, whenever they shall read it, or 
see it, that they once had a friend, whom neither the love of gain, on the one 
hand, nor the fear of loss, on the other, could seduce from his duty towards 
God, towards his country, and towards them; will remind them that friend was 
born in a cottage and bred to the plough. (41-2) 
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Cobbett imagines his posthumous fame and, simultaneously, erases his gigantic 
presence; he lives on and, as it were, lies low. His political writings are his monument, 
commemorating the cottager and ploughman who became a political writer; but the 
passage also realises his desire to "jostle" himself closer to the land. As his writings 
continue to speak to the labouring classes, his body returns to replenish the communal 
soil which had nourished him. 
Throughout his career, as I remarked at the beginning of this chapter, Cobbett 
established his competence to speak by emphasising his labourious life, by reeling off a 
sort of resume of his remarkable career, his progress from humble plough boy to 
famous public figure. Paradoxically even in the passages where he is boasting most 
openly of his accomplishments, the impulse to distinguish himself is undermined by a 
desire to efface himself, and to become one with the labourers who worked in less 
metaphorical fields. In a lengthy sentence from Advice to Young Men, which is worth 
quoting in its entirety, he offers a kind of precis of his achievements. What he boasts of 
is not talent but labour, not the quality but the quantity of his exploits: 
Thrown (by my own will, indeed) on the wide world at a very early age, not 
more than eleven or twelve years, without money to support, without friends 
to advise, and without book-learning to assist me; passing a few years 
dependent solely on my own labour for my subsistence; then becoming a 
common soldier, and leading a military life, chiefly in foreign parts, for eight 
years; quitting that life after really, for me, high promotion, and with, for me, a 
large sum of money; marrying at an early age, going at once to France to 
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acquire the French language, thence to America; passing eight years there, 
becoming a bookseller and author, and taking a prominent part in all the 
important discussions of the interesting period from 1793 to 1799, during 
which there was, in that country, a continued struggle carried on between the 
English and the French parties; conducting myself, in the ever-active part 
which I took in that struggle, in such a way as to call forth marks of 
unequivocal approbation from the Government at home; returning to England 
in 1800, resuming my labours here, suffering, during these twenty-nine years, 
two years of imprisonment, heavy fines, three years' self-banishment to the 
other side of the Atlantic, and a total breaking of fortune, so as to be left 
without a bed to lie on, and, during these twenty-nine years of troubles and 
punishments, writing and publishing, every week of my life, whether in exile or 
not, eleven weeks only excepted, a periodical paper, containing more or less of 
matter worthy of public attention; writing and publishing, during the same 
twenty-nine years, a "Grammar of the English Language" of the French and 
another of the English language, a work on the "Economy of the Cottage, " a 
work on "Forest Trees and Woodlands, " a work on "Gardening, " "An Account 
of America, " a book of "Sermons, " a work on the "Corn-plant, " a "History of 
the Protestant Reformation; " all books of great and continued sale, and the 
last unquestionably the book of greatest circulation in the whole world, the 
Bible only excepted; having, during these same twenty-nine years of troubles 
and embarrassments without number, introduced into England the manufacture 
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of straw-plat; also several valuable trees; having introduced, during the same 
twenty-nine years, the cultivation of the corn-plant, so manifestly valuable as a 
source of food; having, during the same period, always (whether in exile or 
not) sustained a shop of some size in London; having, during the whole of the 
same period, never employed less, on an average, than ten persons, in some 
capacity or another, exclusive of printers, bookbinders, and others, connected 
with papers and books; and having, during these twenty-nine years of troubles, 
embarrassments, prisons, fines, and banishments, bred up a family of seven 
children to man's and woman's state. (2-4) 
This long sentence seems to display Cobbett's enormous conceit: "Who, what man, " he 
demanded "ever performed a greater quantity of labour than I have performed? " (26). 
But he specifically disavows the idea that his deeds are the result of superior mental 
endowments alone: "there must be something more than genius: there must be 
industry: there must be perseverance: there must be, before the eyes of the nation, 
proofs of extraordinary exertion'" (4-5). Cobbett's enumeration of his work makes 
mental labour as tangible, that is, as ploughing the land. In the previous chapter, I 
quoted the long sentence in which Burke describes the characteristics which fit a 
"natural aristocracy" for government of a nation's affairs. Burke's enormous sentence 
enacts the ability to take a "large view of the widespread and infinitely diversified 
combination of men and affairs in a large society" which he claims is the prerequisite 
for political participation (An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs 129-30). In 
Cobbett's Advice to Young Men, it is not the advantage of birth or acquired 
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endowment but the sheer volume of labour that fits Cobbett to teach and guide. Like 
Burke's sentence, Cobbett's writing performs the virtues he claims to possess, and 
presents to "the eyes of the nation, proofs of [his] extraordinary exertion" (5), 20 
When Cobbett boasts of his "Herculean" labour, we are meant, I think, to take 
him literally. His labours, he says with some justification in Advice to Young Men, 
"have been, and are [... ] the wonder of all who have seen or heard of them" (101). 
We, too, may wonder at his enormous productivity, but, in rehearsing Cobbett's 
quantitative achievement, we are apt to overlook his ability as a writer. Spater notes 
this problem: "Immured within this vast edifice of words is some of the finest writing 
our language has produced" (2). Cobbett's contemporaries, his political opponents as 
well as a political fellow-traveler such as Hazlitt, certainly acknowledged his abilities 
as a writer and thinker. In Hazlitt's appreciation, Cobbett was "not only unquestionably 
the most powerful political writer of the present day, but one of the best writers in the 
language" (Complete Works 8: 65). For Southey "there never was a better or more 
forcible writer, " and Coleridge, in a letter of 1819, spoke grudgingly of the 
"overmatch" of Cobbett's intellect for those of the government ministers (Spater 446; 
Coleridge, Collected Letters, volume 4: 979,714). Several recent critics, in pointing 
out that Cobbett was a skillful and able writer, whose carefully-wrought texts are 
calculated to produce quite precise political effects, have assisted in disinterring 
Cobbett's reputation from the "edifice" of his labour and, more concretely, from the 
biases of a Romantic historiography (Nattrass 4,9-10,13; Gilmartin, "This is very 
material" 82-5). Likewise, I have assumed throughout this chapter that we must read 
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Cobbett with the same attention to detail, to complexity, and to paradox with which 
we would read Burke, Hazlitt and Carlyle. It should be noted, however, that the 
relative critical neglect of Cobbett between his own time and ours, the interment of his 
genius within the edifice of his labour, is a problem to which Cobbett himself may have 
contributed and an outcome he partly desired. For to point out the tension between 
Cobbett's quantifiable and qualitative achievements also restates the problem I have 
discussed in this chapter. In talking of his great writing labours, Cobbett is caught 
between stressing his exceptionalism and emphasising his ordinariness, between 
boasting of his distinctive talent, of his great and unmatched endeavours, and desiring, 
to embed himself, figuratively, in the community of labourers for, to, and with whom 
he speaks. 
The paradoxical "literary labour, " the "labours of the mind, " is the source both 
of Cobbett's typicality and his uniqueness, the means by which he places himself within 
the industrious classes and the source of his distance from this constituency. There is a 
contradictory impulse, we might say, towards both embeddedness and towards 
individuation, a tension that Anne Janowitz has identified as a dialectic characteristic 
of Romanticism (1-8). This same dialectic is more explicit, as I shall argue in the next 
chapter, in the essays of William Hazlitt. Of all the writers I discuss, Cobbett most 
clearly wants to construct a political solidarity between mental workers and the 
labouring poor. In Hazlitt's hands the mental! manual analogy seems almost solely a 
way of figuring divisions and conflicts within the literary domain. Nevertheless, I shall 
contend that when Hazlitt represents his literary labour through an analogy with 
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physical labour, he writes to counter the individualism implicit in his liberal theory of 
art 
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Notes 
1 References to Cobbett's Weekly Political Register are abbreviated CPR, and 
cited by volume number, date of publication, and page number. Even after he became 
a radical, several critics have noted, Cobbett retained certain Burkean accents, such as 
his reverence for tradition, custom, and organic community. For Nattrass, for example, 
this is one way in which Cobbett "avoids condemning himself to the margins" of 
political discourse (112-18). My own view is that of Dyck, who argues that while 
Cobbett expressed admiration for traditional social order, including an unbroken chain 
of connection, the necessity of rank and gradation, and ridiculed the doctrine of 
equality, the eighteenth-century model he praised was "so loaded with conditioners 
and riders as to make it unworkable and almost meaningless as a code of social and 
economic behaviour" (71). 
2 On the social and economic background to the "Address to the Journeymen 
and Labourers, " see Spater (341-4,409-12). 
3 Most critics agree that the specific radicalism of the cheap Register lies in the 
political education of the "swinish multitude" (Spater 347-9). A major strategy of the 
"Address, " as Olivia Smith argues, was to define its addressee and to challenge 
existing definitions of that readership; the "swinish multitude" become a literate, 
politically thoughtful, and economically valuable part of society (227,230). Further, 
as Nattrass has pointed out, in Cobbett's "Address" not only are political outsiders 
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included in the political nation, but political insiders are placed in the unfamiliar 
position of outsiders. Cobbett is, in effect, addressing two audiences at once. Although 
Cobbett's language becomes "increasingly colloquial" as he addresses the lower orders, 
he continues to speak, albeit indirectly, to the politically powerful, "by ostentatiously 
excluding them" (109-12,13 5-6). Dyck is certainly right to say that the early cheap 
Registers are among Cobbett's most inconsistent writings as he sought to "unite 
workers and employers of both town and country in the reform movement" (81), but 
this inconsistency is what makes them interesting. 
4 Noel Thompson summarises Cobbett's theory of labour exploitation: "the 
value input of the labouring class was not matched by the economic value of their 
wages, " because the fruits of labour were being given away to the idle and 
unproductive members of society (113). As Thompson says, Cobbett, like other 
radicals, sought not to produce a labour theory of value, but to defend "the utility, 
dignity, status, and primacy of labour and, by association, of the labouring classes" 
(111-12). 
5 Nattrass looks at Cobbett's rhetorical deployment of the singular pronouns 
"I" and "you, " and argues that Cobbett's singular pronouns counter Burke's oppressive 
"we" and substitute a dialogue among living persons for a set of timeless laws (115-6). 
6 This article is paginated separately in volume 32 of Cobbett's Political 
Register. 
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For an excellent example of what Gilmartin calls Cobbett's "tactical gesture of 
self-effacement, " see CPR 32 (2.08.1817): 558-9. For a good illustration of Cobbett's 
bragging about his own power and influence, see "Address to the Tax-Payers of 
England and Scotland on the Subject of the Seat in Parliament, " (CPR 69 [10.04. 
1830]: 452). For Gilmartin, Cobbett's contradictions are part of a more general 
problem for the writers of the radical reform movement: "To sustain political 
disaffection alongside popular affiliation was a difficult task, since the independence 
and personal autonomy that enabled criticism also required professional self-definitions 
that distinguished the writer from the community" (Print Politics 42). Hence, while 
Cobbett distinguished himself from the party hacks, the writers who sold their 
independence and became the Government's hirelings, he also risked separating himself 
from his "less enlightened readers, " who could be figured simply as "passive 
receptacles to be informed and instructed" (42-3,47). 1 agree with Gilmartin's 
presentation of the problem, but argue that the means by which Cobbett separates 
himself from the hired press--by emphasising his own labours--are the same means he 
employs to connect with his readers. 
8 Again, he writes of the editor of a rival newspaper: "A spade or shovel would 
[... ] become the hands of this blunderheaded editor of Bell's messenger better than a 
pen" (Rural Rides 168). Cobbett had already used the strategy of attacking his 
opponents' grammatical solecisms in 1794 in his "Observations on Priestley's 
Emigration" (33-5). 
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9 "He who writes badly thinks badly, " Cobbett summarised (152). 
10 The question of Cobbett attitude to extending book learning to the rural 
labourers has not been satisfactorily answered, because Cobbett never fully resolves a 
fundamental contradiction. He certainly appears to accede to the idea that the division 
of labour was permanent, and that poverty and inequality were inevitable. In Cottage 
Economy, for example, he insists that nine tenths of the population must work the soil 
and live by the sweat of their brow, and that education would spoil the labourer as a 
labourer (3,7,79). Further, he argued, explicitly at times, that poverty was necessary 
in order to incite industry and induce the great part of the people to endure the pain of 
bodily labour (The Poor Man's Friend, para. 90; Advice to Young Men 322-3; Legacy 
to the Labourers 102). However, Cobbett also says that the labourers produce a 
surplus, 10, or 50, or 100 times more than they consume (Rural Rides 304-5,316, 
319,372; Legacy to Labourers 138; Spater 551-3). The problem, then, is one of 
distribution, not one of production, and there is, in principle, no reason why Cobbett 
cannot allow for the plough-boy to rise. 
11 Connell notes that in some respects Malthus and Cobbett were not far apart 
ideologically, especially in their advocacy of an agrarian politics (197-202). On the 
other hand, Connell recognises, the speculative economics of men like Malthus were 
evidence, for Cobbett, of the "attenuated grip upon the actual" of establishment 
politicians (207). 
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12 11 No man upon earth, unless he be one who lives upon the labour of others, 
will pretend to believe that men entered into civil society, in order that those who did 
no work, that lead idle lives, that created nothing, should have bread and flour and 
beer and clothing and all sorts of good things a hundred times more than they wanted 
while those that laboured and made all these things, were compelled to live upon a 
miserable watery root or die of starvation" (CPR 31 [29.01.1831]: 289; CPR 31 [12. 
03.1831]- 652). 
13 Earlier, in The Poor Man's Friend (1829-3 0), Lobbett argued that as "stern 
necessity" is given as the reason for denying the poor their legal right to relief, so, as 
the first necessity is the preservation of life, necessity can also be given as the reason 
for dispensing with the laws of property (para. 88). 
14 As Dyck points out, the subtext of Cottage Economy is that where honest 
means were not sufficient then the labourers were invited to revert to customary and 
extra-legal practices such as helping themselves to fuel and evading the game laws 
(114). 
"Gilmartin discusses the radicals' redefinition of independence from "money 
and land" to "independence of mind" (Print Politics 33-5,169-71). 
16 In Rural Rides, Cobbett constantly laments the fact that he has been torn 
away from a rural existence. He sees a shepherd boy in a blue smock-frock, similar to 
the one he wore as a boy, and this sets along a train of association and fills him with 
wonder that "a heart and mind so wrapped up in everything belonging to the gardens, 
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the fields and the woods, should have been condemned to waste themselves away 
amidst the stench, the noise and the strife of cities" (294). At Billingshurst, Sussex, a 
similar blue smock-frock makes him reflect that, but for the intervention of accident, 
he too would have spent his life in such surroundings. But he immediately counters his 
own wishes: "how many villains and fools, who have been well teazed and tormented, 
would have slept in peace at night, and have fearlessly swaggered by day! [... ]. Will 
this lively, but, at the same time, simple boy, ever become the terror of villains and 
hypocrites across the Atlantic? " (114-5). At another point he contemplates retirement 
from politics: "Why I think that I have laboured enough. Let others work now. " But 
then he quashes that temptation with the thought of the "complete triumph that I have 
yet to enjoy, " and he thinks of Canning and Sidmouth and the rest of that crew who 
would rest easier for having Cobbett in retirement (392-3). Gilmartin notes this 
pressure in Cobbett's writing against writing, his attempt to create a world in which his 
writing will not be required (Print Politics 190). 
17 "The race that write' are [... ] full of envy, " he complained (CPR 32 [22.02. 
1817]: 255). When Cobbett talks of other writers' envy of his success and popularity, 
he has in mind not only his political opponents, but also other radical journalists, such 
as Wooler, who had attacked him for deserting the reform movement when he left 
England for the United States in 1817 (CPR 32 [4 10.1817]: 802-15). 
18Sambrook's view that "the dominant theme of Advice to Young Men is 
Cobbett's domestic happiness" is essentially correct, even while what we now know of 
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Cobbett's family life at this time makes this domestic bliss a literary creation rather 
than a true account of his situation (William Cobbett 159). George Spater has shown 
that the idealisation of his domestic life in Advice to Young Men takes place against the 
reality of his growing estrangement from his wife and children (516-23). 
19 Cobbett asserts that the earnings from a man's labours are morally, if not 
legally, the property of the wife as much as of the husband. This ought not to obscure 
Cobbett's traditional and conservative views on female roles and behaviour (177,180- 
1,184,192-6,199). 
20 Cobbett says he owes more to his good habits--to industry and perseverance, 
to early-rising and general sobriety, to abstinence and thrift--than to his innate talents 
(5,25-6,39,41-2). The virtues he recommends are seemingly available to all, and 
everyone who attends to his Advice to Young Men will "perform a great deal more 
than men generally do perform, whatever may be his situation in life. " Cobbett 
suggests, on the other hand, that no amount of abstinence and early rising can make up 
the natural differences of talent. Hence, not every young man who reads the book will 
be able to perform "labours of equal magnitude and importance" (5-6). 
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Chapter Four. The Division of Labour in William Hazlitt's Republic of Letters 
In previous chapters, I argued that both Burke and Cobbett have good--that is 
to say comprehensible--ideological reasons for identifying mental with manual labour. 
In Burke's political economic writings, the assimilation of mental and manual work 
underlies his apology for the unfettered operation of the laws of the market. Cobbett, 
although he sedulously avoids Burke's easy identification of intellectual and physical 
labour, still resorts to the analogy to suggest his solidarity with rural workers. William 
Hazlitt--metaphysical thinker, consummate prose stylist, romantic aesthetic theorist-- 
would seem, on the face of it, less likely than either Burke or Cobbett to form 
rhetorical links with manual labourers. Hazlitt's intellectual and artistic elitism, indeed, 
are frequently adduced as evidence of his political equivocation. A recent critic, 
expressing what is something of a scholarly consensus, has argued that Hazlitt found it 
"increasingly difficult to transcend his own class bias" in order to align himself with the 
labouring classes (Dart, Rousseau, Robespierre and English Romanticism 160,225). 
In this account, Hazlitt is presented as an intellectual, who, while he attacked apostate 
intellectuals like Burke and criticised the utilitarian bent of middle-class reformers such 
as Bentham, was unable to overcome his bourgeois aversion to "radical combination" 
in order to join with the labouring classes in the way Cobbett, for example, was able to 
do (160,225,240-1). 1 will argue that the recurrence, in Hazlitt's writings, of images 
comparing the writer to the labouring artisan invites us to modify this view of him as a 
prisoner of the sensibilities belonging to a "middle-class" intellectual. Although the 
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analogy with manual labour is primarily, for Hazlitt, a way of figuratively describing 
his position in a socially stratified republic of letters, I will claim that his self- 
representations consistently project a collectivity of labourers to which the writer, 
albeit obliquely, belongs. ' 
Commentators on Hazlitt's writings are correct to point out that there is a 
potential for conflict between his romantic notion of artistic and literary genius, on one 
hand, and his political views, on the other. I will begin by claiming that this conflict can 
be most clearly articulated as a tension between the opposed values of indolence and 
labour 
In the Advertisement to the 1798 Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth noted that the 
poem "Expostulation and Reply" and its companion poem, "The Tables Turned, " arose 
out of a "conversation with a friend who was somewhat unreasonably attached to 
modern books of moral philosophy" (Gill 492). The friend is usually assumed to have 
been Hazlitt, who later recalled a "metaphysical argument with Wordsworth" at 
Alfoxden in the spring of 1798, the time of Wordsworth's composition of both poems 
(Complete Works IT 119). In "Expostulation and Reply" the poet is reprimanded by 
his "good friend Matthew"--Hazlitt--for squandering his leisure time: "Where are your 
books? that light bequeathed / To beings else forlorn and blind! / Up! up! and drink the 
spirit breathed / By dead men to their kind" (lines 5-8). The poet responds by 
advocating a "wise passiveness" rather than the continual seeking after knowledge: 
"there are powers / Which of themselves our minds impress" (21-4). "The Tables 
Turned" repeats this advice. Wordsworth's strategy in both poems is to turn the 
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criticism back on the critic, so that it is Matthew who is squandering his time (and his 
powers) by labouring to extract from books that which can only be imbibed from 
nature. Together with "Lines, written at a small distance from my house, " penned two 
months earlier and addressed to his sister, these poems express some of the central 
tenets of Wordsworth's poetic philosophy. As Nicholas Roe observes, Wordsworth's 
verses are directed, at least in part, against William Godwin's "severely rational 
arguments for disinterested benevolence, [... ] asserting natural spontaneity and 
cheerfulness as the sources of wisdom and truth--not the labouring mind worrying 
away at 'decisions of the intellect"' (242-4). Reading, Wordsworth proposes, especially 
reading abstruse philosophy, closes the mind; walking and idling outdoors, absorbing 
the lessons that nature teaches, is not only a more pleasurable way of spending one's 
leisure time than reading books, but is also the path to true wisdom: "Books! tis a dull 
and endless strife, / Come, hear the woodland linnet, / How sweet his music; on my life 
/ There's more of wisdom in it" (9-12). Less obviously, perhaps, reading also disfigures 
the body; hence, in "The Tables Turned, " Wordsworth reminds his bookworrnish 
interlocutor of the benefits of the outdoors and cautions him about the dangers of 
over-study: "Up! up! my friend, and clear your looks, / Why all this toil and trouble? / 
Up ! up! my friend, and quit your books, / Or surely you'll grow double" (1-4). 
Wordsworth's deformed reader is, of course, a figure of speech, one that clinches the 
valorisation of idleness over labour that organises the poem's figuration of mental 
activity. Metaphysical thinking is portrayed as a dull and arduous endeavour--nicely 
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captured by Roe's "labouring mind"--which, in the impression it leaves on the body, is 
likened to the performance of a repetitive mechanical task. 2 
Whether or not he took Wordsworth's playfully admonitory lines to be 
addressed to him, Hazlitt seems to have absorbed the lesson of Wordsworth's 
extempore philosophising. Although he later cited "The Tables Turned" as evidence of 
Wordsworth's congenital aversion to analytical thinking, to "taking things in pieces or 
looking into the reasons for them, " Hazlitt's own Essay on the Principles of Human 
Action (1805) takes issue with Godwin's rationalism, his optimism about human 
reason, by arguing that imaginative sympathy provides alternative grounds for faith in 
disinterested human action (9: 5-6; Roe 240-2). Hazlitt seems, too, to have heeded 
the poet's advice about the benefits of idleness. In the essay in which he records the 
meeting with Wordsworth at Alfoxden, "My First Acquaintance with Poets" (1823), 
Hazlitt writes: "So have I loitered my life away, reading books, looking at pictures, 
going to plays, hearing, thinking, writing on what pleased me best" (17: 116). Tom 
Paulin comments that this passage "expresses his idea that hanging around, indolently 
loitering, lazily doing nothing, is an essential part of the creative process" (194). 
Making a slightly different, but related, point to Paulin's, Stanley Jones claims that 
Hazlitt's frequent invocation of indolence also sounds a longing after peace and 
solitude, a romantic desire for withdrawal from the world (29-30). "For many years of 
my life I did nothing but think, " Hazlitt recalls in an 1821 essay: "I had nothing else to 
do but solve some knotty point, or dip in some abstruse author, or look at the sky, or 
wander by the pebbled sea-side [... ]. I cared for nothing, I wanted nothing" (8 : 91-2). 
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Thinking, reading, hearing, watching, wandering: Hazlitt's evocation of the life of the 
mind often conveys indolence, freedom, and a sense of ease. 
This version of mental activity is closely associated with Hazlitt's estimation of 
genius, of a spontaneously creative imagination. In "On Posthumous Fame, " Hazlitt 
writes that the works of highest genius are produced "with too much facility (and, as it 
were, spontaneously) [... ]. [They] appear to come naturally from the mind of the 
author, without consciousness or effort. The work seems like inspiration--to be the 
gift of some God or of the Muse" (4: 24). Elsewhere, he writes that "[t]he definition of 
genius is that it acts unconsciously, [... ] unseen [... ] with as little ostentation as 
difficulty. Whatever is done best, is done from the natural bent and disposition of the 
mind" (12: 118). In his comparison of Shakespeare and Ben Jonson, Hazlitt comments 
that "[t]here was nothing spontaneous, no impulse or ease about [Jonson's] genius: it 
was all forced, up-hill work, making a toil of a pleasure" (6: 41). He contrasts 
Shakespeare's "independence of mind and original thinking" to Jonson's "studied 
passages, forced from the sweat and labour of his brain; " Jonson "labours hard, lashes 
himself up, and produces little pleasure with all his fidelity and tenaciousness of 
purpose" (6: 39). By contrast, men of genius, like Shakespeare, hardly work at all. 
There is a close connection, as Uttara Natarajan suggests, between Hazlitt's preference 
for the inspired over the laboured in poetry and his preference for the passionate over 
the mechanical. The affirmation of a spontaneous, intuitive intellect is integral to 
Hazlitt's critique of "Bentham's Utilitarianism and its consequences in the progressive 
mechanization of men" ("One Undivided Spirit" 256). In Hazlitt's thought, mechanism 
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is opposed by "a parallel theory of dynamic constructivism [... ] which stems directly 
from a concept of imaginative power instinct within poetic creation" (256-57). 3 
The idea of genius, then, has a critical-ideological as well as an aesthetic 
inflection for Hazlitt, and, as a corollary, his evocation of idleness is also more than 
just a recognition of the Wordsworthian nexus between indolence and creativity. In 
recommending idleness, I believe, Hazlitt is also opposing the doctrine of the utility of 
work. In the following passage from "On a Sun-Dial" (1827), for example, he makes it 
clear that he does not necessarily expect to profit from doing nothing: "What I like 
best is to lie whole mornings on a sunny bank on Salisbury Plain, without any object 
before me, neither knowing nor caring how time passes, and thus with 'light-winged 
toys of feathered Idleness' to melt down hours to moments [... ]. At length I rouse 
myself from my reverie, and home to dinner, proud of killing time with thought, nay 
even without thinking" (17: 245). There is no expectation here of some future return; 
Hazlitt is content to waste his time without trying to recuperate the time squandered 
through a metaphor of investment, or an economy of loss and gain. 
Hazlitt's resistance to the imperative to "labour" is clarified in his 1815 essay 
"On Manner. " Here he praises the "grace" or the "inward harmony of the soul" 
possessed by people from southern and eastern countries: "The people of the East 
make it their business to sit and think and do nothing. They indulge in endless reverie; 
for the incapacity of enjoyment does not impose on them the necessity of action" (4: 
45-6). As an example of a people possessing this easy grace, he cites the Gypsy 
population, and in a long footnote takes the opportunity to attack Wordsworth for 
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reneging on his earlier philosophy of indolence. In the poem "Gipsies, " published in 
1807, Wordsworth meditated on a group of travelers whom he encountered both on 
his way out for a walk in the morning and on his return that evening: "Twelve hours, 
twelve bounteous hours, are gone while I/ Have been a traveller under open sky, / 
Much witnessing of change and chear, / Yet as I left I find them here" (lines 10-12). 
Wordsworth delivers a hyperbolic rebuke to the apparently unmoving Gypsy group: 
"better wrong and strife / Better vain deeds or evil than such a life! " (21-2). If 
Wordsworth (perhaps in jest) redeems his loitering by representing it as a kind of 
purposeful activity, Hazlitt rejects such a self-justification. He responds by turning the 
poet's advice against him, and extracts from Wordsworth's philosophy what is most 
critical in it: 
We did not expect this turn from Mr. Wordsworth, whom we had considered 
as the prince of poetic idlers, and patron of the philosophy of indolence, who 
formerly insisted on our spending our time in a "wise passiveness. " Mr. W. will 
excuse us if we are not converts to his recantation of his original doctrine [. . 
J. What had he been doing in these four and twenty hours? Had he been 
admiring a flower, or writing a sonnet? We hate the doctrine of utility even in a 
philosopher, and much more in a poet: for the only real utility is that which 
leads to enjoyment [... ]. [The Gypsies] are an everlasting source of thought 
and reflection on the advantages and disadvantages of the progress of 
civilisation: they are a better answer to the cotton manufactories than Mr. W. 
has given in the Excursion. (4: 45-6) 
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Hazlitt is an adherent of Wordsworth's "original doctrine" of idleness because he sees 
in it a resistance to the ethic of industriousness that was an important ideological 
component of the social formation emerging in Britain in the early-nineteenth century, 
a social formation which Hazlitt summarizes with the phrase "cotton manufactories. " 
As I detailed in chapter one, throughout the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries 
labour became central to notions of individual and collective identity. The cultural 
valorisation of labour was not simply an economic injunction to work, but, as I 
suggested, centered too on questions of morality and religion. In Hazlitt's prose, the 
imperative to labour is opposed both by the errant individuality of the poet and by 
customary pre-industrial forms of sociality embodied by the Gypsies. The poet's 
eccentric habit of spending the daytime hours roaming the Lake District, 
contemplating nature, like the Gypsies' normal practice of disposing of their own time 
as they deem fit, is a repudiation of the work ethic and the tyranny of "progress. i4 
In this chapter I want to set Hazlitt's memorialisation of his own indolence and 
his honouring of genius against the constant reference in his writing to the labour and 
pains, the "toil and trouble" of mental work. For if the image of loitering or of 
wandering provides Hazlitt with one way of figuring the life of the mind, 
Wordsworth's image of the writer or reader bent "double" by over-work gives him 
another way of figuring intellectual activity. In Hazlitt's essays, that is, the disfigured 
body is not just a way of reinforcing Wordsworth's point about the benefits of idleness, 
but is also a sign of honourable toil. In his brilliant, self-justificatory essay, "A Farewell 
to Essay-Writing" (1828), Hazlitt, describing himself as an extreme example of the 
229 
"scholastic character, " claims that there is an inverse ratio between intellectual 
integrity and a prepossessing physical presence. His own shy and nervous manner and 
awkward disposition, he posits, were the natural consequence of the inveteracy and 
sturdiness of his principles, of his having "brooded over an idea till it has become a 
kind of substance in my brain" (17: 317). "[T]hat which I have found out with much 
labour and pains, and to which I can scarcely do justice without the utmost violence of 
exertion, " he writes, is not attested by "my standing upright, speaking loud, entering a 
room gracefully" (317). The unmanly stoop, the want of "animal spirits, and "the 
neglect of "the ordinary means of recommending myself, " are an index of a firmness of 
mind acquired through the palpable labour of sustained thinking (317). In view of 
Hazlitt's celebration of the pleasurable freedom of the life of the mind and in view of 
his high estimation of spontaneity, however, what are his reasons for depicting himself 
as a labourer, shaped--both physically and ideologically--by the very discourse he 
elsewhere flatly rejects? 
The first exigency for Hazlitt was that he had to work for a living, and he 
equates mental and physical labour in order to stress that writing was, for some 
authors at least, a necessity, a drudgery, a type of arduous labour. However, if 
Hazlitt's presentation of himself as a labourer arose out of his economic circumstances 
as an author, like Cobbett he was aware, also, of the ideological possibilities of the 
assimilation of mental to manual work. Hazlitt's vacillating rhetoric can be explained in 
part, therefore, by his opposition to two different ideological discourse formations. If 
Hazlitt commemorates his own indolence in order to oppose the progressive and 
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modernising ideals of reformers like Bentham, he prizes labour to attack, politically, 
those whom he labels the "aristocracy of letters, " those writers whose reputation 
depended on extrinsic factors such as wealth, birth and political connection. The 
analogy of intellectual and physical activity, that is, describes a division of labour 
within mental activity itself, between those who earn their living from their own 
resources and those who profit from extrinsic, social and political, advantages, and 
who, in return, use their cultural status to defend the establishment. ' To explore 
Hazlitt's metaphorics of labour, I focus on four Table Talk essays written between 
1818 and 1822, and make reference to several other essays written between 1820 and 
1827.1 consider both "The Ignorance of the Learned" (1818) and "The Aristocracy of 
Letters" (1 822) in the context of the contemporary cultural debate over education. 
Haziitt criticises the ideological uses of a classical education, and he invokes the 
analogy with physical labour to demystify learning and to describe the unequal division 
of labour within the intellectual domain. I discuss, too, how "On the Qualifications 
Necessary to Success in Life" (1820) and "On the Look of a Gentleman" (1821) 
employ images of the labouring body and of bodily practices in order to criticise the 
possession of extrinsic advantages in the supposedly meritocratic republic of letters. 
The persistence of the image of the labouring author, I contend, counteracts 
Hazlitt's claims about transcendental genius. Roland Barthes argues, in the context of a 
discussion of French literature, that it is around the middle of the nineteenth century 
that "labour replaces genius as a value, " when writing comes to be valued according to 
"the work it has cost" rather than to the use which it might be put (69). More recently, 
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Evan Watkins has claimed that underlying the recent changes in terminology in 
contemporary literary criticism--from talking about the "creation" of an aesthetic 
artifact to talking about the "production" of ideological discourse--is a "shift [.. ] of 
analogical perspective": "If since the Romantics it was an organic analogy that best 
lent itself to description of both a process of creation and the aesthetic subject that 
results, [now] instead it is the material production of commodities that supplies the 
analogical force" (77-8). The point is well made, but in Hazlitt's writings, at least, the 
"Romantic" preference for the inspired over the laboured, for the spontaneous genius 
over the toiling scribe, is already uncertain. 6 As I will argue, when Hazlitt illustrates 
the concept of genius by borrowing the metaphor of "division of labour" from Adam 
Smith's conceptualisation of eighteenth-century commercial society, he rhetorically 
collapses the conflicting evaluatory principles--indolence and labour, art and politics-- 
whose opposition are taken to structure his writing. 
In the sense that he made his living almost entirely from selling his writing, 
Hazlitt was a "professional" writer. 7 From 1812, when he began to work as a 
parliamentary reporter for the Morning Chronicle, to 1817, Hazlitt contributed as 
many articles to periodicals as he did throughout the rest of his life (over 300), and 
lived on a small weekly income, the only time during his life, notes Stanley Jones, 
when he had a dependable salary. He was appointed to the Chronicle at four guineas a 
week and was able to supplement his income, in the intervals between parliamentary 
sessions, by writing occasional pieces for the paper. In September 1813 he was 
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appointed as the Chronicle's theatre critic. On falling out with the paper's editor, 
James Perry, Hazlitt became a freelance journalist; he wrote regularly for the 
Examiner, as well as publishing in the Champion, and, from 1815, the Edinburgh 
Review. In May 1815 he became the regular dramatic critic for the Examiner (Jones 
72,101-3,146,185). Hazlitt's reputation as a writer and critic began to rise in 1817, 
the year he published the Round Table volume of essays and of his Characters of 
Shakespeare's Plays (262,280-85). In 1818 he gave up his job writing for The Times 
to work on his three series of lectures, and in this year he published two more books of 
literary criticism, A View of the English Stage and Lectures on the English Poets. The 
success of his Characters of f Shakespeare's Plays, which went to a second edition in 
1818, enabled him to give up writing for the daily papers, and by 1819, the year in 
which he published Lectures on the English Comic Writers and Political Essays, he 
was also able to do without writing for the weeklies (229). Between 1818 and 1823 he 
wrote about 60 familiar essays for periodicals like the London Magazine, essays which 
were popular enough to be re-issued in book collections: two volumes of Table Talk 
(1821,1822) and The Plain Speaker (1826). The trajectory of Hazlitt's career as a 
writer, we might summarise, was from wage-labourer to freelance author. 
During his lifetime, Jones conjectures, Hazlitt must have earned a good deal 
without acquiring property and without ever saving enough to get ahead (23 8). Jones 
attributes this to the chronic improvidence of the poor person who has never learnt the 
value of money, and to the principled dislike of self-interest and indifference to 
material welfare (238-9). 8 In a version of the "class" explanation of Hazlitt's 
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behaviour, Jones argues that Hazlitt was an intellectual whose concerns are not the 
material concerns of the poor; he felt less touched by the physical sufferings of the 
poor, for instance, than by the thought of their being deprived of constitutional liberty 
and political rights (236-7). His determination to pursue a career as a freelance writer, 
for Jones, is of a piece with this hostility to the norms of his society (238-9). 
Nevertheless, as Jones acknowledges, the one-off payments he received for his 
lectures and for the copyrights for his books were not such an effective source of 
income as his regular salary, and he was continually worried by financial difficulties 
(305-6). If he was freed from the routine grind and the drudgery of wage labour, he 
was still subject to the necessity of writing to live. If Hazlitt's attitude, as Jones 
contends, is one of intellectual aloofness to material things, we must still take into 
account his concern, expressed regularly in his prose, for the more mundane matters of 
relative poverty and dull, unrewarding labour. Hazlitt returns persistently to his own 
hazardous occupational position, an anxiety that is conveyed through the importance 
he attaches to his reputation. 
In his account of Liber Amoris, Duncan Wu has insisted that the crucial 
context for understanding Hazlitt's writings in this period is the "running battle waged 
between [him] and his critics" (202,205,209,212). Hazlitt's acrimonious exchange 
with the Quarterly and with Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine illustrates clearly how 
alert he was to the need to protect his hard-earned intellectual reputation. Whatever 
standing Hazlitt secured for himself by his literary criticism might be undermined 
because of the polemical battle with writers and reviewers of different political colours 
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(Jones 229). In August 1818, Blackwood's printed a vituperative personal attack on 
Hazlitt, most probably written by John Gibson Lockhart, one of the periodical's joint 
editors. The article, "Hazlitt Cross-Questioned, " was signed "An Old Friend with a 
New Face, " whose identity Hazlitt took to be the same as that of "Z"--the signature 
attached to the series "On the Cockney School of Poetry" authored by Lockhart. In 
the article, Hazlitt is represented as a "mere quack [... ] one of the sort that lounge in 
third-rate bookshops and write third-rate books" (550). He is described as a "review, 
essay, and lecture manufacturer, " an "impudent charlatan" and an uneducated 
"scribbler, " who deceives his ignorant and unsuspecting employers at The Edinburgh 
Monthly into publishing "all manner of gross blunders, and impudent falsehoods, and 
outrageous extravagancies" (550-1). The article, as Hazlitt perceived, was intended as 
an attack on the Edinburgh Monthly and the Edinburgh Review, periodicals under the 
proprietorship of Archibald Constable, as well as an attack against himself (9: 7; Jones 
298,301). In July 1818, Hazlitt had embarked on a series of contributions to the 
Edinburgh Monthly, the one monthly periodical already in existence in the Scottish 
capital when William Blackwood launched his own magazine in April 1817. Hazlitt, 
already a contributor to the Edinburgh Review, was thereby lending his status as a 
critic to an attempt to revive a periodical controlled by Blackwood's rival. 
In September 1818, Hazlitt wrote to Constable: "The various fabrications in 
that article were objected to me as lessening the value of my literary estate. My 
writings are before the public: my character I leave to my friends: but I conceive the 
law is the proper defence of my property" (Letters 189). But what exactly is Hazlitt's 
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property or literary estate, and how is it separate from his writings and from his 
character? Jones writes that Hazlitt's property is his earning capacity and future 
writings (300). On what, however, is this earning capacity based? The object of the 
Blackwood's article, Hazlitt believed, was to deprive him of the possibility of making a 
living from his writing. Blackwood's had insinuated that Hazlitt had only stooped to 
write for the Edinburgh Monthly--"a work better fitted for [his] merits and 
attainments"--because he had been "expelled" from the more prestigious Edinburgh 
Review (550-51). In his unpublished riposte to Blackwoods, "A Reply to Z, " Hazlitt 
accuses Lockhart of intending to make a breach between me and my employers and 
prevent me getting other employers" (9: 7). The imputation that he had been expelled 
from the Edinburgh Review "was meant as a prediction to fulfill itself, " he writes, and 
"strikes at my reputation as an author and my livelihood in the most direct and 
deliberate way" (7). Hazlitt's property, then, was his reputation, his stature as an 
author, which was inseparable from his character and which was what determined his 
capacity to place his writings. 9 
One important source of his reputation as a writer, as Hazlitt recognised, was 
his association with the Edinburgh Review. Between 1814 and 1824, he contributed 
intermittently to this publication, which was widely admired for the high quality of its 
critical writing, and which was known to recompense its contributors generously. "To 
be an Edinburgh reviewer is, I suspect, the highest rank in modern literary society, " he 
wrote in the August 1818 edition of the Edinburgh Monthly (12: 365). In personal 
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letters to the editor of the Edinburgh Review, Francis Jeffrey, Hazlitt acknowledged 
his indebtedness to Jeffrey's continuing support. In April 1817, he wrote: 
I take the liberty of troubling you with a copy of a work I have just 
finished relating to Shakespear. I thought perhaps if you approved of it you 
might take a brief notice of it in the Edinburgh Review. I should not make this 
abrupt proposition, but from the necessity of circumstances. My friends may 
praise what I write, but I do not find that the public read it, and without that, I 
cannot live. If I could dispose of the copyright of the Round Table and of this 
last work, I could find means to finish my work on Metaphysics, instead of 
writing for three newspapers at a time to the ruin of my health and without any 
progress in my finances. A single word from you would settle the question, 
and make what I write a marketable commodity. (Letters 171) 
Hazlitt again wrote to Jeffrey in August: "I wish you could at your leisure favour me 
with a line to say [... ] whether you think it likely you can insinuate The Shakespear 
Characters in the next no. The book does very well, I understand, and your notice 
would at once lift me from the character of a disappointed author to that of a 
successful one" (176). Hazlitt's writing is his property, but the value of this property is 
determined by the possibility of finding a market for his writings, which is dependent 
on Jeffrey's "puffing" as much as any intrinsic merit of the writing. As a sought-after 
lecturer and a prestigious Edinburgh Reviewer, Hazlitt's stock was rising, and with it 
the value of his property, but he was always aware of the erratic value of his cultural 
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capital. If Jeffrey could make his reputation, then the politically motivated ad 
hominem attacks on him in the Tory press could just as easily ruin it, '° 
When he talks of his earning ability as his "property, " as if reputation were akin 
to a skill in a particular trade, it is possible that Hazlitt hints at an identification with 
traditional artisans. "To be an author, to be a painter, is nothing, " he once remarked: 
"it is a trick, it is a trade" (8: 162-3). The demeaning of traditional skills might have 
strengthened Hazlitt's sense of the resemblance between his own situation and that of 
the artisan. Until the Statute of Apprentices of 1814, the possession of a skill in trade 
had been protected, formally at least, by a requirement that practitioners of certain 
trades serve a qualifying apprenticeship. The statute, part of the laissez-faire assault on 
customary regulations, refused to recognise the "knowledge and skills acquired by 
apprenticeship as a form of 'property' eligible for legal protection" (McNally Against 
the Market 37). Hazlitt frequently comments on the modern spread of literacy as a 
kind of de-skilling: "I can write a book: so can many others who have not even learned 
to spell" (8: 79); "All now can read and write equally; and, it is therefore presumed, 
equally well" (17: 210). As we shall see, the sense of an analogy between the writer's 
situation and that'of manual worker recurs in Hazlitt's essays. However, while Hazlitt's 
"property" suggests something solid and substantial, reputation is instead always 
something volatile, intangible. "All professions are bad that depend on reputation" he 
advised, "which is 'as often got without merit as lost without deserving"' (Letters 235; 
17: 99). It is the lack of commensuration between merit and reputation--and, therefore, 
between merit and success--that consistently militates against the profession of 
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authorship for Hazlitt: "reputation runs in a vicious circle, " he laments, "and merit 
limps behind it, mortified and abashed at its own insignificance" (8: 290). 
Gregory Dart has helpfully drawn attention to the way Hazlitt, aware of the 
extent to which "his literary conditions were determined by social and economic 
circumstances, " dramatised his own precarious situation in the creation of a literary 
persona (Rousseau, Robespierre, and English Romanticism 210,236; "Romantic 
Cockneyism" 159). Hence, when Blackwood's portrayed Hazlitt "as an ill-educated 
and spiteful Cockney vagabond, they were merely offering a malicious caricature of 
several traits that he himself had actually cultivated in his writings, [... ] in his 
opposition to aristocratic elitism and his scorn of literary prestige" (236). 11 While Dart 
is right to suggest that Blackwood's representation of Hazlitt as a hack repeated 
Hazlitt's self-presentation, it is worth noting that the Blackwood's article, "Hazlitt 
Cross-Questioned, " was specifically a riposte to a recently published essay of Hazlitt's, 
"The Ignorance of the Learned, " an article whose very title was deliberately 
provocative, and was aimed, as Jones suggests, at the pretensions of John Wilson and 
John Gibson Lockhart, the two Oxonians who shared the editorship of Blackwood's 
(Jones 297-8). "Hazlitt Cross-Questioned, " referred to "The Ignorance of the 
Learned, " which had appeared in the Edinburgh Monthly in July 1818, as "trash. " 
Blackwood's opined that the article had the motive of "congratulat[ing] yourself, and 
the rest of your Cockney crew, on never having received any education" and ridiculed 
Hazlitt for his assumed knowledge of Greek and Latin (551). The dispute between 
Hazlitt and the contributors to Blackwood's centred on the question of education, 
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specifically on the ideological use of classical education, and this is the context in 
which I will consider "The Ignorance of the Learned" and another essay from the 
Table Talk volumes, "The Aristocracy of Letters. " 
As Hazlitt himself acknowledged, his essays on classical learning appear to 
defend inconsistent positions. "On Classical Education" and "On Pedantry" both make 
the case for classical learning, while "On the Ignorance of the Learned" and "The 
Aristocracy of Letters" attack the same. "I have been accused of inconsistency, " he 
wrote, "for writing an essay, for instance, on the Advantages of Pedantry, and another, 
on the Ignorance of the Learned, as if ignorance had not its comforts as well as 
knowledge" (17: 313). Again, in his Letter to William Gifford of February 1819, 
Hazlitt defended his apparent inconsistency: 
I have not been wedded to my particular speculations with the spirit of a 
partisan. I wrote, for instance, an essay on pedantry to qualify the extreme 
contempt into which it has fallen, and to show the necessary advantages of an 
absorption of the whole mind in some favourite study, and I wrote an essay on 
the Ignorance of the Learned to lessen the undue admiration of learning and to 
show that it is not everything. (9: 30) 
Natarajan believes that Hazlitt's conversational essays can be arranged into thematic 
groups, so that rather than exploring a subject in detail and from different perspectives 
in a single essay, Hazlitt, amplifies "an idea or theme, by returning to it in its different 
aspects" in different essays (Hazlitt and the Reach of Sense 185). This certainly 
accords with Hazlitt's explanation of his inconsistency. In a letter to MacVey Napier, 
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he made a similar admission: "I confess I am apt to be paradoxical in stating an 
extreme opinion when I think the prevailing one not quite correct. I believe however 
this way of writing answers with most readers better than the logical" (Letters 158). 
By paradoxical, Hazlitt means contrariness, the willingness to go against received 
opinion, rather than self-contradiction or logical absurdity. The point is pertinent, 
nevertheless, for it is Hazlitt's predilection for paradox that explains his inconsistency. 
He defended his "love of paradox" as a form of provocation, necessary to counteract 
deep-seated prejudice, and in his paradoxical style of writing he had found the secret 
of "convey[ing] subtle and difficult trains of reasoning" in a "popular mode" (9: 30-1). 
In giving popular expression to difficult ideas, Hazlitt expanded, he occasionally found 
it necessary to "oversho[o]t the mark" running to "hyperbole and extravagance, " and 
his remedy was to correct this excess in another essay (17: 312-13). With reference to 
the apparently contradictory positions in "On Classical Education" and "The Ignorance 
of the Learned, " however, I argue that Hazlitt's views do possess a consistent 
argumentative logic. Roe contends that Z's polemic on the Cockney School "reflected 
and contributed to the controversy surrounding educational practices during the 
Romantic period" (10). The coherence of Hazlitt's essays on education appears only in 
the context of his participation in this ideological quarrel over education, and in his 
resistance to the political and ideological uses made of classical learning. 12 
Despite Blackwood's animadversions on the quality of his education and on his 
presumed knowledge of the classics, Hazlitt did receive a very good education, at the 
Unitarian New Academy at Hackney. Indeed, as a number of historians have 
241 
concluded, most serious scholarship was, at this time, carried out at the "morally well- 
conducted dissenting academies, " where the classics were taught alongside modern 
languages and pragmatic subjects; these institutions provided a more well-rounded 
education than the public schools, preparing students more adequately for careers in 
commerce and manufacture, as well as for the professions of law and medicine 
(Bowen 166; Alan Richardson 80). Contrary to the insinuations of Blackwoods, 
Hazlitt was not opposed to learning per se. In "On Classical Education" Hazlitt says 
that a study of the classics "gives men liberal views" and teaches them the power of 
abstraction: 
it accustoms the mind to take an interest in things foreign to itself, to love 
virtue for its own sake; to prefer fame to life, and glory to riches; and to fix 
our thoughts on the remote and permanent, instead of narrow and fleeting 
objects. It teaches us to believe that there is something really great and 
excellent in the world, surviving all the shocks of accident and fluctuations of 
opinion, and raises us above that low and servile fear, which bows only to 
present power and upstart authority. (4: 4) 
As Roe points out, radical writers frequently noted the values of classical civilisation in 
politically contentious ways (63). Like Keats, Hazlitt emphasises the liberal and 
democratic associations of classical culture, thus challenging the establishment's 
interpretation of the classics, and it was, in part, the challenge to the establishment's 
ownership of the classics that was resented by Blackwood's. Lockhart's representation 
of the low social background and the inadequate education of the Cockney School, 
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therefore, was an attempt to counter the erosion of received cultural values and 
traditional authority (Roe 14-20,63,69). 
The attack on classical learning in "The Ignorance of the Learned" must be 
seen in the context of the education debate. The article begins: "Anyone who has 
passed through the regular gradation of a classical education, and is not made a fool by 
it, may consider himself as having had a very narrow escape" (8. - 71). Whereas "On 
Classical Education" commended a knowledge of the classics for raising our views 
above the "low and servile, " in this essay Hazlitt argues that a classical education at 
one of the public schools merely inculcates servility and docility. The object in both 
essays is not learning as such, but the purposes to which education is put. The target 
of criticism in "The Ignorance of Learned" is the use of classical education to 
reproduce social privilege. 
A training in the classics acquired through the public schools and the two 
universities, as James Bowen argues, traditionally had helped to maintain the ruling 
class by providing a common cultural knowledge for a tiny proportion of the 
population (Bowen 162-4,166). The educated elite, the sons of the ruling class, went 
on to fill all the important positions of power in parliament, the bureaucracy, the 
judiciary, and the church (162-3). During the eighteenth century the reputations of 
both Oxford and Cambridge, as well as that of the public schools, came under scrutiny 
(161-2,166). Adam Smith's criticism of the teaching at Oxford in The Wealth of 
Nations, based on his own experience there, is one instance of the increasingly vocal 
critique of traditional institutions of learning. For Smith, the richest and best endowed 
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institutions had been the slowest to take on improvements in learning, and were 
content to be sanctuaries for "exploded systems and obsolete prejudices [... ] after 
they had been hunted out of every other corner of the world" (Wealth of Nations 2: 
761,772). The Dissenting Academies and the Scottish Universities provided a more 
useful education, training their students for careers in the professions or preparing 
them for business, and by the standards of scholarship that they established, they 
effectively presented an ideological challenge to the educational hegemony of the two 
universities (Bowen 168). By the early-nineteenth century, then, as Bowen argues, 
education had become an object of contention between the traditional ruling class and 
the new urban bourgeoisie of traders, financiers, and manufacturers; canvassing for 
political reform was accompanied by demands for educational reform that would grant 
greater access to the power conferred by an exclusive education (161-2,168). 
It is important to emphasise, though, that the dispute over education was not 
simply one of competition for the accreditation of scarce but increasingly diversified 
educational resources; the clamour for wider access coexisted with the expression of 
outright rejection of the system of privilege. " The main point of Hazlitt's criticism in 
"The Ignorance of the Learned, " is to suggest the way that educational privilege 
legitimates and reproduces social distinction and confers social advantages on the 
undeserving. In this stance, "The Ignorance of the Learned, " is remarkably similar to 
Cobbett's Grammar of the English Language, written at about the same time. Hazlitt 
argues that what appears as dullness in children is usually a lack of motivation to 
concentrate on the "dry and unmeaning pursuits of school learning" (8: 72). The boy 
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who is considered an idler at school because he fails to do well at Greek or Latin, is 
only unwilling to submit to a dry and meaningless academic discipline, and is likely to 
be "one who has high health and spirits, who has the free use of his limbs, with all his 
wits about him, who feels the circulation of his blood and the motion of his heart, " one 
who would rather "feel the open air in his face, look at the fields or the sky, follow a 
winding path [... ] than [... ] sit so many hours pinioned to a writing desk" (8: 72). 
Hazlitt makes some scathing comments on the kind of intellect produced by a classical 
education. Success at school requires only the ability to learn by rote the inflection of 
a Greek verb, and, therefore, does not exercise either "the highest or the most useful 
faculties of the mind" : "The best capacities are as much above this drudgery, as the 
dullest are beneath it [... ]. A mediocrity of talent, with a certain slenderness of moral 
constitution, is the soil that produces the most brilliant specimens of successful prize- 
essayists and Greek epigrammatists" (8: 71-2). Here, Hazlitt seems to be expressing 
what Alan Richardson calls a "new consensus" on education, one which opposed the 
traditional methods of rote learning of factual knowledge and of early education in 
classical languages (60). As Richardson points out, the educational rationalists and 
their Romantic critics often agreed on these issues (59-60). Hazlitt's quarry, though, is 
less the efficacy of traditional methods of education for their own sake, than the 
ideological function which the education system fulfills. 
In attacking public school education, Hazlitt also has in his sights the two 
ancient universities: "You will hear more good things on the outside of a stagecoach 
from London to Oxford, than if you were to pass a twelvemonth with the 
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Undergraduates or Heads of Colleges of that famous university" (75). Uneducated 
people, he continues, "have most exuberance of invention and the greatest freedom 
from prejudice. Shakespear's was evidently an uneducated mind" (77). There is no 
connection, Hazlitt maintains, between learning and literary genius, between a classical 
education and genuine intellectual or artistic merit. Shakespeare, the romantic epitome 
of an intuitive, untutored genius, was, Hazlitt seems to suggest, an idler at school. 
Hazlitt invokes Shakespeare, who, it is suggested, accomplished great things without 
the benefit of social or educational privilege, in order to attack the kind of intellect 
produced by a traditional schooling. As a cultural resource, moreover, Shakespeare 
was available to be appropriated without a classical education; hence, if quoting Latin 
or Greek was a sign of membership of a social and cultural elite, to quote 
Shakespeare and to write in a "familiar style" was, by contrast, to address the people 
(Bate, Shakespearean Constitutions 195). 
Like Cobbett, Hazlitt repeatedly makes style into a political question. In "On 
Familiar Style" (1822), Hazlitt advocates natural, colloquial language--"plain words 
and popular modes of construction"--and rejects the use of pompous, pedantic, 
artificial, formal diction (8: 242-4,247). Artificiality and pomposity were a way of 
dressing up bad arguments: "Not a glimpse can you get of the merits and defects of 
the performers; they are hidden in a profusion of barbarous epithets and wilful 
rhodomontade" (8: 246). In an essay on George Canning ("the cleverest boy at Eton"), 
for The Spirit of the Age, Hazlitt devoted much time to describing Canning's 
monotonous style of speaking and writing (11: 150). Canning's superficially elegant 
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oratory relied on the mechanical aids to style, such as "scholastic pedantry, " political 
jargon, and technical flourishes learnt by rote (151-3). The espousal of a "plain style" 
is a trickier task for Hazlitt than for Cobbett, however. For he admits that his own 
style is "paradoxical" and "embroidered, " a style he had to adopt, he claims, in order to 
appeal to a wide public; having discovered the secret of popularity, he decided to 
employ all the "ornaments and allusions, " "tropes and figures" at his disposal (17: 
312). In his Letter to William Gifford, Hazlitt again claims that he resorted to 
"figurative language and gaudy phraseology" in order to counteract his "first dry 
manner" (9: 30-1). Hazlitt implicitly distinguishes his own figurative language from 
Canning's empty verbosity, however: while Canning's style conceals the want of ideas 
or thought, his own writing makes palatable, for popular consumption, what is of its 
nature difficult, abstruse or abstract. 14 
Throughout "The Ignorance of the learned, " Hazlitt's intellectual critique 
shades into a political one. A classical education, Hazlitt suggests, only prepares the 
student for the most menial and servile of intellectual occupations in later life: "The 
learned are mere literary drudges. If you set them upon any original composition, their 
heads turn, they know not where they are" (8: 71). This is a curious reversal. We 
might expect that the appellation of "drudgery" and "drudge" with its connotations of 
servile, menial and labourious work, to have been applied by the contributors to 
Blackwoods, for instance, to the work of mere "scribblers" or "hacks, " like Hazlitt, 
who had to write to earn a living. Hazlitt uses the term drudge not to describe 
conditions of employment, but to suggest the political servility of the Blackwood's 
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writers: "The faculties of the mind, when not exerted, or when cramped by custom and 
authority, become listless, torpid, and unfit for the purposes of thought and action. 
Can we wonder at the languor and lassitude which is thus produced by a life of learned 
sloth and ignorance" (8 : 71). The classically educated have no independence of mind 
and no originality of ideas, not only because they are trained by rote learning, but 
because they are in collusion with power: "there is no dogma, however fierce or 
foolish, to which these persons have not set their seals, and tried to impose on the 
understandings of their followers as the will of Heaven, clothed with all the terrors and 
sanctions of religion" (76). Hazlitt attacks classical education because the educational 
system serves to reproduce social distinctions, and because the learned provide a 
mystifying veneer to sanction the power of the ruling class. 
To demystify the awe which a classical education commands, Hazlitt sets up a 
contrast between learning and the practical knowledge possessed by common people; 
learning is simply one human practice amongst many others. The mere scholar, the 
learned pendant: 
knows no liberal or mechanic art; no trade or occupation; no game of skill or 
chance. Learning "has no skill in surgery, " in agriculture, in building, in 
working in wood or in iron; it cannot make any instrument of labour, or use it 
when made; it cannot handle the plough or the spade, or the chisel or the 
hammer [... ]. The learned professor of all arts and sciences cannot reduce any 
one of them to practice, though he may contribute an account of them to an 
Encyclopaedia. He has not the use of his hands or of his feet; he can neither 
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run, nor walk, nor swim; and he considers all those who actually understand 
and can exercise any of these arts of body and mind, as vulgar and mechanical 
men; --though to know almost any one of them in perfection requires long time 
and practice, with powers originally fitted, and a turn of mind particularly 
devoted to them. It does not require more than this to enable the learned 
candidate to arrive, by painful study, at a Doctor's degree and a fellowship, and 
to eat, drink, and sleep the rest of his life! 
The thing is plain. All that men really understand, is confined to a very 
small compass; to their daily affairs and experience; to what they have an 
opportunity to know, and motives to study or practice. The rest is affectation 
and imposture. The common people have the use of their limbs; for they live by 
their labour or skill. (8: 74-5) 
In a move which he makes repeatedly, as we shall see, Hazlitt appropriates the terms 
of the division of labour for his attack on privilege and the idleness of the learned: "All 
that men really understand, is confined to a very small compass; to their daily affairs 
and experience. " Cobbett's influence on Hazlitt is quite clear in this essay. Another 
influence, one that might lie behind the passage just quoted, is the model of community 
which informs the description of commercial society in the first five chapters of Adam 
Smith's The Wealth of Nations. The division of social labour is a result, according to 
Smith, of the propensity in human nature to "truck, barter, and exchange"(1: 25). It is 
the natural sociality of human beings that enables them to make use of their "different 
geniuses and talents; " each individual is able to specialise in the production of the one 
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commodity to which his talents are adapted because "every man may purchase 
whatever part of the produce of another man's talents he has occasion for" (1: 29-30). 
Thus, Smith blithely concludes, every individual "lives by exchanging, or becomes in 
some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a 
commercial society" (37). As David McNally explains, Smith's account of the benefits 
of the division of labour according to particular individual ability assumes a one-class 
society of autonomous petty-commodity producers, from which social organisation 
Smith expected two benefits to accrue: first, the increase in national wealth and its 
general dispersion, and, second, the unfolding of individual capacities through the 
specialisation of work (Against the Market 52-3). Hazlitt never mentions the economic 
benefits, but over and over again he tacitly advocates a society in which individuals 
develop their innate abilities in the pursuit of one endeavour. Hazlitt's paradigmatic 
manual labourer, I will argue, is Smith's independent artisan embedded within a 
community of other producers, by a relationship of dependence predicated on 
exchange. I will return to Hazlitt's use of the vocabulary of the division of labour, for 
the reference to Smith also underpins Hazlitt's explanation of his concept of genius. is 
In the passage from "The Ignorance of the Learned, " quoted above, acquiring 
knowledge is likened to any other practical skill, and perfecting such aptitude involves 
no less "painful study" than that which justifies the learned scholar leading a life of 
ease and indolence. From the point of view of the labouring subject, idleness is less an 
heroic resistance to the work ethic than the effect of unearned privilege. The rhetoric 
of Hazlitt's passage strives to undo not only the scale of social superiority based on 
250 
classical education, but also the unjustified elevation of mental over manual labour. In 
another essay, "The Indian Jugglers, " Hazlitt memorably worries over the question as 
to why intellectual operations could not be brought to the same level of perfection as 
physical exercises, and concludes, paradoxically, that the superiority of intellectual 
attainments--art and literature--lies in the fact that they are not susceptible to the same 
improvement by repetitive, mechanical exercise (8: 80-3). In this passage from "The 
Ignorance of the Learned, " however, he intimates that some intellectual attainments-- 
such as the kind needed to succeed at a public school or graduate from one of the two 
universities--can be practiced with the same unvarying mechanical attention. 
Consequently, Hazlitt sees no reason why rote learning should be valued more highly 
than learning to juggle or learning to plough. Missing from this passage from "The 
Ignorance of the Learned, " however, is a sense of Hazlitt's own location in the litany 
of activities and occupations. Clearly, if he does not affiliate himself with the learned, 
neither is he exactly in the position of the ploughman, the farmer, and the builder, in 
being devoid of any educational capital. In attacking classical education, Hazlitt 
attacks the ideological domination of the people by the learned, but he also implies that 
there are different kinds of intellectual positions, prepared for, as it were, by different 
kinds of education. I turn, now, to the essay on "The Aristocracy of Letters, " where 
Hazlitt compares his own work to that of the manual labourer in order to insinuate 
himself into the community of physical activities invoked in "The Ignorance of the 
Learned. " 
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Crucial to the rhetoric of "The Aristocracy of Letters" is Hazlitt's sense that 
pure literary merit counts for very little in the putative republic of letters; what really 
matters is reputation, no matter how it is acquired. Hazlitt claims that just as there is a 
social hierarchy, so there is a privileged order in the republic of letters. This 
ascendancy, he writes, is not based on merit or worth, but on some "unmeaning, 
unanalysed reputation" (205,207). On inquiring further into the substance of this 
reputation, we find that "they had a great reputation at Cambridge, that they were 
senior wranglers or successful prize-essayists" (8: 205). The "preposterous and 
unfounded claims of mere scholars to precedence in the commonwealth of letters [... ] 
are partly owing to traditional prejudice: there was a time when learning was the only 
distinction from ignorance, and when there was no such thing as popular English 
literature" (208). Now that classical learning is not the only distinction from 
ignorance, there have to be other, more obvious and outward signs of merit and worth; 
the diffusion of learning means that knowledge must be marked in some way 
intelligible to all. Intellectual capacity or attainment must be certified before it can be 
capitalised: "the real ore of talent or learning must be stamped before it will pass 
current" (210). Among the "spurious credentials" upon which intellectual reputations 
are founded, Hazlitt mentions the advantages of a knowledge of Greek or Latin and 
the "extrinsic advantages of birth, breeding, or fortune" (207,210). In addition, 
political patronage or membership of a literary coterie, such as that around the 
Quarterly Review, are ways of attaining reputation (211-12). Mere literary 
achievements alone were not enough to guarantee success. Hence, Hazlitt writes 
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elsewhere of the "misery of pretensions beyond your situation, and which are not 
backed by any external symbols of wealth or rank, intelligible to all mankind" (8: 284). 
The self-elected aristocracy of letters do not have to scratch out a living from 
their writing alone, and are not required to dash off their work to a deadline. Their 
writings are not "the ephemeral offspring of haste and necessity, " and they can 
condemn the solecisms of less privileged writers at their leisure (206). For there is 
another class of writers on the contemporary literary scene who do not possess any of 
the extrinsic sources of reputation: "the Grub street authors, who write for bread, and 
are paid by the sheet" (205). From their exalted station, the aristocracy of letters look 
down "on those who are toiling on in this lower sphere, and earning their bread by the 
sweat of their brain" (207). We can recall that Hazlitt used the same figure of speech 
in his essay "On Shakespeare and Ben Jonson, " when he contrasts the facility of 
Shakespeare's poetic imagination to Jonson's "studied passages, forced from the sweat 
and labour of his brain" (6: 39). The aristocracy of letters does not here carry the 
positive connotation of transcendental mental activity, however; Hazlitt is not, here, 
arguing for the superiority of works of inspired genius over the compositions of 
labouring hacks. The aristocracy of letters refers to those who possess extrinsic 
advantages, and who do not have to make their living by the sheer labour of turning 
out sheets of copy. Writers who depend on their own labour have more integrity than 
those whose learning has been validated by some extrinsic advantage, such as a 
classical education, the support of a wealthy patron, a noble birth, or membership of a 
literary coterie. Whereas a literary reputation is evidence of compromise with power, 
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the sweat of the brow is an indication that one has preserved one's independence and 
one's commitment to political principle. The bifurcation of the cultural field into an 
aristocracy and a labouring population is analogous to the division of the social sphere, 
and we might venture that Hazlitt's representation of intellectual labour is slanted to 
suggest the intellectual's choice of political allegiances. There is a strong implication, 
that is, that if the learned are complicit, through situation and patronage, with the 
powerful, then mere authors, writing for bread and paid by the sheet, are aligned by 
their labour with the disenfranchised and oppressed majority. 
Hazlitt is implying a causal as well as an analogical relationship between power 
and culture, of course. While Burke lamented in the Reflections on the Revolution in 
France that learning had cut itself free from authority, in Hazlitt's view not all learning 
had done so. Burke's fear of the revolutionary tendencies of ambitious men of letters 
was ill-founded because serving the powerful was a more certain method of improving 
one's position in society than revolutionary activity. In a reference to Burke's Letter to 
a Noble Lord, Hazlitt comments: "We have never yet seen that greatest calamity that 
can befall mankind, deprecated by Mr. Burke, namely, literary men acting in corps, and 
making common cause for the benefit of mankind, as another description of persons 
act in concert and make common cause against them (7: 256-7). Like Burke, Hazlitt 
believed that literature, the printed word, and the force of public opinion, were the 
combined agents of political liberty, the levers by which tyranny would be deposed. 
Many of his post-war writings try to explain why the wished-for outcome had not 
materialised, by showing how literature had been "turned [... ] against itself' (Cook 
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140). The treason of intellectuals, for Hazlitt, was their betrayal of the cause of the 
people, not their repudiation of their other-worldly function. 16 
As a consequence of the lure of power, Hazlitt perceived, the literary field was 
divided against itself In the Letter to William Gifford (1819), his invective against the 
editor of the Quarterly Review, Hazlitt argues that the easiest way for a self-educated 
man of humble origin and limited abilities to acquire a literary reputation was by 
becoming a tool of wealth and power. Hence, too, in his sketch of Gifford in the Spirit 
of the Age (1825), Hazlitt says that lacking the advantage of a classical education, he 
possessed nevertheless that sort of reputation which comes from political service to 
the great and powerful. Gifford makes his own reputation by "bowing to established 
authority and ministerial influence, " ingratiating himself with those in power by 
attacking the reputation of every writer "not a hireling and a slave" (11: 115,117, 
124). Under Gifford's editorial leadership, the Quarterly Review intended to "pervert 
literature, from being the natural ally of freedom and humanity, into an engine of 
priestcraft and despotism" (124). The term "reputation" occurs almost like a mantra in 
Hazlitt's Spirit of the Age. In his essay on Walter Scott, Hazlitt claims that Scott, like 
Grifford, secured his own status, by his willingness to strike at "the reputation of every 
one who was not the ready tool of power" (11: 68). A number of articles in the 
collection of Political Essays (1819) focus on this division in the ranks of intellectual 
and literary men. The political apostasy of intellectuals is explained in terms of their 
desire for "place or pension" (7: 251). The essay "On the Clerical Character" takes the 
established clergy as the type upon which the state recruits literary men to serve the 
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cause of power; the clergy are an emblem of the temptation to collusion with power of 
any profession which is dependent on the state for temporal advancement (7: 250-1, 
255,257-8). As in "The Ignorance of the Learned, " where he claims that there is "no 
dogma [... ] to which [the learned] have not set their seals" (8- 76), Hazlitt suggests 
that there is a symbiosis between political and social power, on one hand, and literary 
prestige on the other. 
Some of Hazlitt"s most vituperative polemic is reserved for Thomas Malthus, 
and his Reply to the Essay on Population gives a good idea of why Hazlitt thought it 
politically efficacious to attack the reputations of reactionary intellectuals of a different 
political persuasion. Like Cobbett, Hazlitt understood that the refutation of Malthus' 
ideas would have material consequences, and he devotes much time to attacking the 
invidious and ill-founded assumptions behind the population principle. Hazlitt 
demolishes Malthus' arguments--"crude and contradictory reasoning [... ] a miserable 
reptile performance"--and argues that his adversary's intellectual status depended 
wholly on his having ingratiated himself, through his doctrines, with the rich and 
powerful. Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population was essentially a convenient 
justification for the most selfish instincts of his readers. Malthus' Essay was fatal to the 
poor, Hazlitt claimed, because its reputation for scientific objectivity gave currency to 
its pernicious and specious doctrine, which amounted to starving the poor to keep the 
rich in luxury (Reply to the Essay on Population 4-5,19-20). Hazlitt's 
acknowledgment of the influence of Adam Smith need not be at odds with his critique 
of Malthus, in particular, and political economy, in general, as I made clear in chapter 
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one. Smith's thought was frequently appropriated by radicals in the early nineteenth 
century, for they sensed that Smith was predisposed to favour labour over capital. 
In his writings on Malthus and in his other articles on political economy, 
Hazlitt makes clear that he is on the side of the poor against the rich; his self- 
representation as a writer living by the "sweat of his brain" signals this fundamental 
social and political allegiance. At bottom, the choice of affiliation was a 
straightforward one, even though Malthus tried to remove the possibility of choice or 
agency in human actions. Hazlitt trenchantly opposed what he considered to be the 
pseudo-science of political economy, from the early reply to Malthus to a series of 
articles for the Examiner in 1828 (7: 332-61; 11: 103-14; 19: 278-302). Political 
economy claimed for itself the status of a science in order to lend the appearance of 
necessity to what are ideological claims. "The condition of the poor [... ] will not be 
ameliorated by making a science out of the caprice, insolence, luxury, prejudices, and 
insensibility of the rich" (19: 284). Hazlitt was not completely sanguine even about 
some of Smith's assumptions concerning the benefits of an unfettered commercial 
society. In an 1828 article on political economy, Hazlitt writes that the ideological 
claim that the market laws of supply and demand are fair and impartial is undermined 
by the existence of unequal exchange relationships. In the labour market, workers are 
compelled to accept a lower price for their labour than its true value because 
employers can take advantage of the worker's destitution to force him to accept their 
(unjust) conditions (19: 298). In itself, we should acknowledge, Hazlitt's attack on the 
unmerited reputation of establishment intellectuals is no less important than 
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campaigning on more pragmatic issues. As Jeffrey Cox points out, cultural critique is 
politically efficacious when political power is reinforced by cultural activity; like other 
members of the Hunt circle, Hazlitt was interested in attacking the "intellectual, 
emotional, and ideological grounds" which keep power in place (Cox 59-61). 
I want now to show how Hazlitt's perpetual concern with the disproportion 
between merit and reputation--and, therefore, merit and success--is repeatedly relayed 
through images of the disfigured body, implying the physical depredations of working 
as a journeyman or hack writer. In the letter to Francis Jeffrey, cited earlier, Hazlitt 
links the state of his finances to his health-- "writing for three newspapers at a time, to 
the ruin of my health and without any progress in my finances"--and it is this physical 
manifestation of his straitened circumstances that I wish to trace in Hazlitt's writings. 
Again, though, Hazlitt's self-representation is meant to convey his political affiliation 
as well as his own "proletarianisation. " With particular reference to two further Table 
Talk essays, I argue that the image of the writer's diminished body articulates a 
criticism of aristocratic deportment on behalf of a "labouring" population. If the class 
of intellectual labourers, whom Hazlitt describes as existing by "the sweat of their 
brain, " are not stamped by any authority and carry no external sign of reputation, they 
are marked, nevertheless, by the impression of their occupation on the body. Authors 
who have to earn their bread are marked by their carriage as belonging to the same 
class of vulgar and mechanical men who habitually labour with their bodies. These 
essays illustrate Hazlitt's progressive disillusion with a radicalism sustained by an 
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intellectual elite merely, and his tentative movement to embed himself within a larger 
population. 
In the essay "On the Qualifications Necessary to Success, " which appeared in 
the London Magazine in June 1820 as "Table Talk No. 1, " Hazlitt again makes use of 
bodily attainments to attack intellectual pretension. The essay begins with a proverbial 
wisdom which the rest of the essay, and many of his other essays, elaborates: "Fortune 
does not always smile on merit: --'the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the 
strong"' (12: 195). It is with the lack of recognition accorded to intellectual merit that 
Hazlitt is most concerned. He argues that the recognition of a man's intellectual 
attainments depends to some degree on his physical presence and "constitutional 
talent" 
I mean, in general, the warmth and vigour given to a man's ideas and pursuits 
by his bodily stamina, by mere physical organisation. A weak mind in a sound 
body is better, or at least more profitable, than a sound mind in a weak and 
crazy conformation [... 1. Let a man have a quick circulation, a good digestion, 
the bulk, and thews, and sinews of a man, and the alacrity, the unthinking 
confidence inspired by these; and [... ] he shall strut and swagger and vapour 
and jostle his way through life, and have the upper-hand of those who are his 
betters in every thing but health and strength. (201) 
Paulin argues that this passage "exults, slightly too emphatically, in the manly physical 
constitution it seems literally to embody, and it's just one among many examples of the 
rude good health [Hazlitt] wants his prose to possess" (97). This interpretation seems 
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not quite right, however. Hazlitt recognises that physical accomplishments can be used 
to make up deficiencies of the intellect, but it is difficult to make good physical 
shortcomings by mental superiority: "The one shall never feel the want of intellectual 
resources, because he can back his opinions with his person; the other shall lose the 
advantages of mental superiority [... ] shall never get rid of the awkward, uneasy 
sense of personal weakness and insignificance, contracted by early and long-continued 
habit" (202). In order to get along in the world, outward appearance ("an active body 
and a stout pair of shoulders") is of more importance than a powerful intelligence 
(202). The important point here is that while Hazlitt may be lamenting the fact that he 
doesn't have the physical presence to back up his intellectual arguments, the 
"unthinking confidence" coupled with the "strut and the swagger" suggest a spurious 
assumption of superiority. 
Hazlitt seems to have in mind Wordsworth's warning about the dangers of too 
much reading, when in On the Qualifications Necessary for Success, " he cites the 
example of Pope, a professional writer who, it was said, continually laboured at 
correcting and revising his poems. Pope, says Hazlitt, "bent himself double and ruined 
his constitution by over-study when young" (12: 206). Again, in a letter written to his 
son in March 1822, Hazlitt advises that the habit of a "graceful carriage, " acquired at 
an early age, is advantageous for getting along in society. "Whatever may be the value 
of learning, " he advises, "health and good spirits are of more" (Letters 222). As if to 
illustrate the consequences of failing to heed Wordsworth's advice, Hazlitt cautions 
against 
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por[ing] over your books till you are bent almost double--a habit you will 
never be able to get the better of, and which you will find of serious ill 
consequence. A stoop in the shoulders sinks a man in public and in private 
estimation [... ]. Do nothing to take away the use of your limbs, or the spring 
and elasticity of your muscles. As to all worldly advantages, it is to the full of 
as much importance that your deportment should be erect and manly as your 
actions. (222) 
It is not only that intellectual capacity is relatively unimportant as a criterion for 
worldly success, but an over-exertion of the mind, like the drudgery of manual work, 
is positively deleterious to one's prospects because of its effects on the body. In "On 
the Qualifications Necessary to Success in Life, " Hazlitt makes this point through the 
analogy of mental and manual labour: 
consciousness of internal power leads rather to a disregard of, than a studied 
attention to external appearance. The wear and tear of the mind does not 
improve the sleekness of the skin, or the elasticity of the muscles. The burthen 
of thought weighs down the body like a porter's burthen. A man cannot stand 
so upright or move so briskly under it as if he had nothing to carry in his head 
or on his shoulders. (12: 206) 
The scholar's stooped and unmanly physical appearance is not likely to impress the 
non-intellectual majority; not the least of a scholar's miseries, Hazlitt complains, is that 
"the common herd do not by any means give him full credit for his gratuitous 
sympathy with their concerns; but are struck with his lack-lustre eye and the wasted 
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appearance" (206). Hazlitt apparently expresses dismay, here, with the ignorant and 
undiscriminating majority who make superficial judgments based on "personal 
appearance, not by proofs of intellectual power" (206). At the same time as he voices 
his disappointment with the insensibility of the majority to intellectual excellence, 
however, Hazlitt identifies with the cause of the common herd ("a gratuitous sympathy 
with their concerns"). The burden of thought, which his empathy with the 
unappreciative populace seems to entail, aligns him still more closely to them by 
suggesting an analogy between their labours and his own. If the common herd cannot 
recognise merit, this is partly because they are led by the arbiters of taste ("the few 
who are judges of what is called real and solid merit") who are themselves motivated 
by intellectual envy and the desire for personal distinction (207). 
In "The Shyness of Scholars, " the same differences of physical appearance are 
used to distinguish between the genuine scholar and the learned pedant. A scholar is 
defined as someone who toils patiently over many years to master any art or science 
where a successful or satisfactory end result is doubtful; long study only teaches the 
uncertainty of wisdom and humbles the student (17: 255-6). Hazlitt bewails the bodily 
effects of mental labour when he writes of the years of "patient toil" which take their 
toll on the "shattered sickly frame and trembling nerves" of the studious man: "The 
labours of the mind, like the drudgery of the body, depress and take away the usual 
alacrity of the spirits" (17: 256,259). Both the labour of study and the sense of 
humility that ensues have their effect on the body; a student "naturally loses the 
smartness and ease which distinguish the gay and thoughtless rattler, " and finds that 
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the world prefers health and animal spirits to the shattered and sickly frame of the 
scholar (255). To succeed in life a man should "carry about with him the outward and 
incontrovertible signs of success, and of his satisfaction with himself and his prospects" 
(257). The merit of the genuine scholar manifests itself in his modesty, while the 
"pedant swells into self importance and renders himself conspicuous by pompous 
arrogance and absurdity" (259). Those mental workers who labour to achieve a 
thorough knowledge of their subject are virtually disqualified from worldly success 
because the world values the appearance of "smartness and ease" which is 
incommensurate with hard labour. Hence, Hazlitt refers in his "Farewell to Essay- 
Writing" to his own "want of animal spirits" arising from his excessive "scholastic 
character" (17: 317). 
While Hazlitt professes to envy the sleek skin and elastic muscles of the healthy 
body for the advantages it confers, these signs of success are hardly held up for the 
reader to admire; rather, a sound constitution to back up one's intellectual 
shortcomings is a symbol of having achieved success without deserving it. In contrast, 
the disfigured body is frequently invoked in Hazlitt's prose to signify integrity, and is a 
sign of having succeeded by merit alone. If the ostensible concern of "On the 
Qualifications Necessary to Success" is with the way in which a good appearance can 
make good intellectual deficiencies in the eyes of the public, however, Hazlitt's 
emphasis on personal appearance is also a bit misleading. His real grievance in this 
essay is with the use of extrinsic advantages of any kind to secure an advantage in the 
republic of letters. In order to succeed, an author "must be something more than an 
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author, " he writes: "the simple literary character is not enough" (12: 208). The reason 
why Blackwood's magazine praises Shelley and critises Keats, says Hazlitt, is because 
of their difference in social standing (12: 208). In "The Aristocracy of Letters" 
(1822), Hazlitt makes the same point about the different critical reception accorded to 
Byron and Keats: Byron's "reputation culminates from his rank and place in society, " 
while Keats had not the protection of rank or wealth (8: 209-11). "The way to fame, 
through merit alone, " he writes, "is the narrowest, the steepest, the longest, the hardest 
of all others" (12: 196). Merit means having laboured to earn what one has without 
relying on what Hazlitt calls extrinsic advantages. In presenting himself as a hack 
writer or uneducated scribbler, Hazlitt, an author comparatively lacking in cultural 
resources, emphasises the virtue of sheer labour. '? 
It is not obvious, from Hazlitt's essays, why intellectual merit should not be 
recognised. In a long footnote to "On the Qualifications Necessary to Success in Life, " 
partly suppressed in the published article, he offers one answer to this question. Hazlitt 
compares authorship to racket-playing in order to make clear the palpable absurdity of 
basing literary judgments on extrinsic criteria: 
I am so sick of this trade of authorship, that I have a much greater ambition to 
be the best racket-player, than the best prose-writer of the age. The critics 
look askance at one's best-meant efforts, but the face of a racket-player is the 
face of a friend. There is no juggling there. If the stroke is a good one, the hit 
tells. They do not keep two scores to count the game, with Whig and Tory 
notches. The thing is settled at once, and the applause of the dedans follows 
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the marker's voice, and second the prowess of the hand, and the quickness of 
the eye. The accomplishments of the body are obvious and clear to all: those 
of the mind are recondite and doubtful, and therefore grudgingly 
acknowledged, or held up as the sport of prejudice, spite, and folly. (12: 207, 
409) 
If Hazlitt's strategy in comparing mental to material activity is to make intellectual 
work more palpable, to show the injustice of denying a good "hit, " then the contrast 
implies, instead, the impossibility of establishing any unquestionable criterion of merit 
and success for purely intellectual attainments. Hazlitt seems to acknowledge that 
intellectual accomplishment simply cannot be identified in the same unambiguous way 
as bodily prowess. Hazlitt makes the same point in "On the Disadvantages of 
Intellectual Superiority" (1822), when he comments that intellectual power is not the 
same as bodily strength; intellectual advantages count for nothing because those one 
wants to impress cannot judge of one's excellences (8: 281-2). 
John Whale claims that, in the essay "The Indian Jugglers, " Hazlitt 
acknowledges that the activity of genius (as against that of juggling) exists in the 
"relativistic arena of opinion and aesthetics" (Whale, "Indian Jugglers" 213). In the 
context of "The Qualifications Necessary to Success, " however, an essay which 
purports to criticise the advancement of the undeserving, it is curious that Hazlitt 
should suggest that there is something inherently unclear ("relativistic") about mental 
attainments. Reputation ("often got without merit and lost without deserving") is 
something spurious and superficial, is a precarious, unreliable, and fickle commodity; 
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by implication merit should be something reliable and substantial. Hazlitt's point seems 
to be that in the absence of clear and uncontested criteria for determining intellectual 
merit, decisions about literary and artistic value are either distorted by the 
indiscriminateness of popular taste, or are corrupted by being blatantly motivated by 
external (social and political) considerations. Advancement is denied the meritorious 
individual because literary judgments are either in the hands of judges who have extra- 
literary criteria in mind ("Whig or Tory notches"), or in the hands of an audience (the 
onlookers) who merely follow the voice of the marker. While he certainly repeats the 
quintessential romantic anxiety that the artist or writer's alienation is a consequence of 
the inability of the general public to make refined artistic judgments, Hazlitt is more 
obviously concerned that the lack of correspondence between merit and success is a 
consequence of the reproduction of the unearned privileges of social background, 
educational credentials, or political patronage in the cultural domain. The market for 
intellectual good is not merely a lottery, but, worse, a lottery that has been fixed. 
"There can be no true superiority but that which arises out of the presupposed ground 
of equality, " he insisted in "The Aristocracy of Letters" (8: 208). 
The same point, in fact, is made more obliquely in "The Indian Jugglers. " As I 
have already noted, this essay develops the "Romantic" antinomy between the 
mechanical and the imaginative. The essay begins by suggesting that perfectible, 
mechanical skill is more impressive than intellectual achievement, but goes on to argue 
instead for the superiority of the non-mechanical and non-perfectible "involuntary 
power" (genius) over "voluntary power" (talent) (8: 84). Hazlitt ends the essay, rather 
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oddly, with "a singular instance of manual dexterity, " by reproducing an obituary to 
the fives player, John Cavanagh, which he had written for The Examiner in 1819. In 
this obituary, Hazlitt again observes the difference between a physical and an 
intellectual hit: "His blows are not undecided and ineffectual--lumbering like Mr. 
Wordsworth's epic poetry, nor wavering like Mr. Coleridge's lyric prose, nor short of 
the mark like Mr. Brougham's speeches, nor wide of it like Mr. Canning's wit, nor foul 
like the Quarterly, not let balls like the Edinburgh Review" (87). The essay's end is 
curious because it is not immediately clear how the tribute to Cavanagh mediates the 
central idea of the essay. I would argue that Hazlitt is again pointing out the difference 
between the democratic and meritocratic game of fives and the undemocratic 
"republic" of letters. The game of fives is a model, in the mechanical domain, of what 
literature could be in the intellectual. If the intellectual sphere was truly meritocratic, 
Hazlitt points out, none of the writers and speakers and none of the periodicals he 
mentions would have attained the status they hold. In racket games there is a 
"presupposed ground of equality. " The obituary to Cavanagh makes sure that the 
comparison between rackets and letters is not lost on the reader: Cavanagh is "an 
Irishman by birth and a house painter by profession, " yet he is universally admired 
wherever he plays (88). The fact that literary and artistic judgments are relativistic is 
less the cause of Hazlitt's concern, then, than the absence of a level playing field. 
In his essay on the learned, as I have shown, Hazlitt draws on the language of 
the division of labour to critique social distinctions based on claims of intellectual 
superiority; learning is no different from any other exclusive endeavour and so cannot 
267 
be used to legitimate social hierarchy. The identification of mental and manual labour 
occurs to similar purpose in the essay "On the Look of a Gentleman. " Published in the 
London Magazine in January 1821 as part of the Table Talk series and reprinted in a 
1826 collection of essays, The Plain Speaker, it constitutes something of a companion 
piece to "On the Qualifications Necessary to Success. " The look of a gentleman is 
defined as the "constant and decent subjection of the body to the mind": a man should 
have command "not only over his countenance, but over his limbs and motions" (12: 
209-10). Hazlitt adds, however, that the look of a gentleman is more admirable "when 
it rises from the level of common life, and bears the stamp of intellect, than when it is 
formed out of the mould of adventitious circumstances" (212). For the greatest 
obstacles to the appearance of a gentleman are the accidents of "education and 
employment" : 
A shoe-maker, who is bent in two over his daily tasks; a taylor who sits cross- 
legged all day; a ploughman, who wears clog-shoes over the furrowed miry 
soil, and can hardly drag his feet after him; a scholar who has pored all his life 
over books, --are not likely to possess that natural freedom and ease, or to pay 
that strict attention to personal appearance, that the look of a gentleman 
implies. (212-13) 
The scholar who has to make his way through hard labour or study rather than by 
"adventitious circumstances" (birth, breeding, or fortune) is likely to be marked in the 
same way ("bent in two") as other labourers are marked by the imprint of their 
occupations on their bodies. Writing and study are, under certain conditions, a 
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laborious toil which, like a mechanical occupation, takes its toll on the body. A 
gentleman's demeanour, on the other hand, is a consequence of being "relieved from 
the necessity of following any of those laborious trades or callings which cramp, strain 
and distort the human frame. He is not bound to do any one earthly thing; to use any 
exertion, or put himself in any posture, that is not perfectly easy and graceful, 
agreeable and becoming" (213). Awkwardness and rusticity of manner arise from the 
"unremitting application to certain sorts of mechanical labour, unfitting the body for 
general or indifferent uses" (213). A gentleman is "free from all these causes of this 
ungraceful demeanour, " and his deportment ingratiates him into the good opinion of 
all with whom he associates (213). 
It is clear, again, that the purpose of the essay is not simply to admire the 
appearance of the gentleman. Hazlitt critiques aristocratic deportment from the 
perspective of the labouring subject, and attacks, from the perspective of political 
economy, the philosophy of civic humanism, which sees the disposition of a gentleman 
as the essential qualification for a comprehensive view of society. Instead of producing 
enlarged ideas, the unoccupied life which is favourable to the look of a gentleman 
leads only to the dissipation of energies; in a gentleman's expression "instead of the 
expansion of general thought or intellect, you trace chiefly the little, trite, cautious, 
moveable lines of conscious, but concealed self-complacency" (216). The perception 
of society in terms of the division of labour suggests that, since there can be no general 
knowledge of society, useful knowledge grows out of laborious occupations. 
269 
It can be suggested, too, that here, as in "The Ignorance of the Learned, " 
Hazlitt's model of a community of commodity producers--the shoemaker, the tailor, 
the ploughman, the scholar--derives from Adam Smith's description of the equitable 
social division of labour in the first five chapters of The Wealth of Nations. In "On the 
Look of a Gentleman, " the exclusion of the aristocratic gentleman of independent 
circumstances from this putative community of labourers renders the community less 
than complete; if some members of the community are idle, are exempted from the 
necessity of labour, then Smith's one-class society of independent producers gives way 
to a class-divided society. If "The Ignorance of the Learned" reiterates Smith's model 
of independent producers in order to criticise the privileges accruing from a classical 
education, then "On the Look of a Gentleman" holds up the same utopian model of 
society, that of a network of labourer-merchants, to support a critique of the existing 
exploitative social order. An ideal, equitable distribution of tasks among individuals is 
opposed to the actuality of an unequal distribution of the quantity of work between 
social groups: labourers, manual and mental, on one hand, and non-labourers, 
government placemen, learned authors, on the other. In both "The Ignorance of the 
Learned" and "The Look of a Gentleman, " mental and manual labour are compared to 
rhetorically construct "the people" as a homogenous class of producers. Like Cobbett, 
Hazlitt employs productiveness against aristocratic ease. Unproductive labourers are 
essentially non-workers or idlers, who live off the taxes paid by productive workers, 
tax which "bows their industry to the ground, and deprives them of the necessary 
means of subsistence" (7: 223). It is the same rhetoric, again, which informs Hazlitt's 
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perception of a divided society in "What is the People? " where he depicts the great and 
powerful living off the labour of the people: "If the Government take a fourth of the 
produce of the poor man's labour, they will be rich and he will be in want" (7: 262-4). 
The genial view of the division of labour, the equal distribution of tasks among 
specialised and unalienated producers, derived from Smith, is contrasted to the 
actually existing division of labour: an unequal allocation of the quantity and quality of 
labour according to social and economic position. 
There are problems, of course, with Hazlitt's persistent resort to metaphors 
which liken mental and manual labour. In his laments about the difficulty of 
manifesting intellectual merit in the same way as physical accomplishment, for 
example, Hazlitt implies that manual work was always adequately rewarded. To put 
this kind of pressure on Hazlitt's metaphors, however, is perhaps to overlook the very 
self-consciousness of his figurative language. Hazlitt was perfectly aware of the 
unequal distribution of the quality as well as the quantity of labour. In his essay "On 
the Want of Money" (1827), he acknowledges that the work of writing is not the same 
as that incessant hard labour which alleviates absolute necessity. In this essay, he says 
that the need of money he alludes to is not that which "arises from absolute poverty-- 
for where there is a downright absence of the common necessaries of life, this must be 
remedied by incessant hard labour, and the least we can receive in return is a supply of 
our daily wants--but that uncertain, precarious, casual mode of existence in which the 
temptation to spend remains after the means are exhausted" (17: 175-6). Want is both 
a relative and an absolute state. Uncertainty, inconvenience, and loss of pride are the 
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painful conditions of the writer's existence, not absolute destitution or "incessant hard 
labour" (17: 175-6). The scholar, bent double by poring over his books, does not, by 
virtue of this labour, belong to the same class as a shoemaker or ploughman. 
Despite Hazlitt's avowal of a solidarity with other labourers, the primary 
intention of the analogy in his writing, as I have argued, is to make political 
differentiations between intellectuals, and he stresses the point that the labour of 
writing is not identical to the hard, unremitting labour that can only be compelled by 
physical necessity. A. contrasting case to Hazlitt's is that of Anthony Trollope, who 
later in the nineteenth century made unsparing use of the analogy between writing and 
other trades in order to suggest that his own prodigious output was a result of his 
strict observance of regular work pattern; "There are those [... ] who think that a man 
who works with his imagination should allow himself to wait till inspiration moves him 
[... ]. To me it would not be more absurd if the shoemaker were to wait for inspiration 
[... ]. A shoemaker when he has finished one pair of shoes does not sit down and 
contemplate his work in idle satisfaction [... ]. The shoemaker who as so indulged 
himself would be without wages half his time" (120-1,323). At one level, Hazlitt's 
frequent references to shoemakers is intended, like Trollope's, to suggest his ability to 
produce essays on demand, making phrases with the same facility as a shoemaker 
makes shoes. As I have been arguing, however, Hazlitt's assimilation of mental and 
manual labour is not primarily a self-glorification--as Trollope's undoubtedly is--but 
part of a polemic directed against the intellectual supporters of the status quo. 
'8 
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It might be objected, quite reasonably, that, by focusing on Hazlitt's self- 
representations as they appear in relatively few essays, I have not effectively countered 
his view of himself as part of an intellectual and literary aristocracy. In order to clarify 
my reasons for focusing in such detail on the images of the writer as labourer that 
permeate these essays, I want to return now to the antagonism between Hazlitt's 
valorisation of labour and his celebration of genius. 
Any appraisal of Hazlitt' romantic notion of genius, I contend, has to be set 
against his regard for the labouring writer; his idealisation of the transcendent 
imagination must be seen against the persistent presence of images of the deformed 
authorial body. Hazlitt is unwilling to dispense either with the idealist vocabulary of 
genius or with the more materialist conception of creativity conveyed by the language 
of labour, for both the theory of intuitive genius (innate ability) and the language of 
labour (hard-earned merit) oppose the use of extrinsic advantages to gain intellectual 
reputation. But there is a tension between the two conceptions of intellectual 
endeavour. As transcendental mental activity and spontaneous self-expression, genius 
opposes materialist or utilitarian values; it also asserts the mind's freedom from 
necessity--including the necessity of labour--and implies the individual's lack of 
connection to a social matrix. By contrast, Hazlitt also prizes the very qualities of 
laboriousness and connectedness that the concept of genius opposes. From the 
perspective of the writer-labourer, genius is equivocal because Hazlitt sees that the 
idea of literary and intellectual practice it entails is indebted to elevated ideas of 
writing as gentlemanly ease. Clearly we can see this opposition as one which Hazlitt 
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was unwilling to resolve, as a permanent tension between his individualism and 
intellectual elitism, on one hand, and his socially responsive and democratic sentiments 
on the other. This will not do, however, for, as I now want to show, Hazlitt's neatly 
oppositional rhetoric is complicated when he explains his notion of genius through 
borrowing Adam Smith's concept of the division of labour in the social sphere. This 
surprising metaphor demonstrates Hazlitt's deep ambivalence about the aristocratic 
character of the concept of indolent genius and evinces his commitment to the idea of 
a collectivity of labourers. 19 
Hazlitt utilises the discourse of the division of labour to make the point that a 
specialisation of tasks is necessary for achieving real excellence in any endeavour. 
Over and over again, Hazlitt gives expression to this idea. In "On Genius and Common 
Sense, " he argues that genius works by a principle of exclusivity: "it excels in some 
one pursuit by being blind to all excellences but its own" (8: 42-3). He then draws an 
analogy between the ornamental and mechanical arts: 
The division of labour is an excellent principle in taste as well as in mechanics. 
Without this, I find from Adam Smith, we could not have a pin made to the 
perfection it is. We do not, on any rational scheme of criticism, inquire into the 
variety of a man's excellences, or the number of his works, or his facility of 
production. (49) 
Hazlitt makes the same point in the essay "On Pedantry, " where he defines pedantry 
thus: "Pedantry in art, in learning, in everything, is the setting an extraordinary value 
on that which we can do, and that which we can understand best, and which it is our 
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business to do and understand" (4: 86). Here again, Hazlitt argues that there is a 
"natural division of labour in the ornamental as well as in the mechanical arts of human 
life" : any one settled pursuit is "quite enough to take up the whole of our thoughts, 
time and affections, and anything else will, generally speaking, only tend to dissipate 
and distract the mind" (85-6). Similarly, in the essay "On the Qualifications Necessary 
to Success, " he writes: "In common life the narrowness of our ideas and appetites is 
more favourable to the accomplishments of our designs, by confining our attention and 
ambitions to one single object" (12: 197). "To do anything best, there should be an 
exclusiveness, a concentration, a bigotry, a blindness of attachment to that one object; 
so that the widest range of knowledge and most diffusive subtlety of intellect will not 
uniformly produce the most beneficial results" (197). The man of genius, he asserts in 
"On the Conversation of Lords", does not try "to do what others can do (which in the 
division of mental labour he holds to be unnecessary) but to do what they all with their 
joint efforts can do" (17: 172). And, in his essay "The Periodical Press, " Hazlitt sums 
up: "all the greatest things are done by the division of labour--by the intense 
concentration of a number of minds, each on a single and chosen object" (16: 216). 
The idea is clear enough: that exclusivity, concentration, even bigotry, are required in 
order to achieve great things. But why use the term "division of labour" as an 
illustrative metaphor? I will conclude this chapter by tracing the implications of 
Hazlitt's conflation of his two inimical evaluatory principles: labour and genius. 
The one writer who, to my knowledge, has commented extensively on this 
peculiar figure of speech is John Barrell. In a seminal piece, Barrell argues that 
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through his theory of art Hazlitt resolves the conflict between elitism and populism in 
his meritocratic social theory. For Hazlitt, Barrell observes, while the principle of 
universal suffrage is applicable to politics, it is not applicable to matters of taste, which 
can be adjudicated only by "an aristocracy of genius and taste" (The Political Theory 
of Painting 337). Hazlitt always attacks social or political elitism, but his own republic 
of taste is made of "aristocrats of intellect and sensibility" (324-5). The point of artistic 
appreciation, Barrell argues, is that it identifies a meritocratic elite composed of both 
producer and consumers, whose intellect and innate sense of beauty distinguishes them 
(332,335). As Barrell summarises: 
The function of art in such a civilisation [in a mass civilisation, democratically 
organised] is to provide a refuge, not for all, but for those few who are 
individuals, and whose individuality is left out of account in determinations by 
popular consent; for it is only in the private sphere of art that they can recognise 
themselves as individuals, and can come to understand how they differ not only 
from other individuals, but from the undifferentiated herd (337). 
Barrell argues that Hazlitt's views on art were formed as a challenge to the discourse 
of civic humanism, and to the civic theories of art put forward by Joshua Reynolds and 
James Barry, by which painting had been represented as a public art. Barrell cites the 
following important passage from Hazlitt's article on the "Fine Arts": 
There is a certain pedantry, a given division of labour, an almost exclusive 
attention to some one object, which is necessary in Art, as in all the works of 
man. Without this, the unavoidable consequence is a gradual dissipation and 
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prostitution of intellect, which leaves the mind without energy to devote to any 
pursuit the pains necessary to excel in it, and suspends every purpose in 
irritable imbecility. (3 31) 
For Barry the appreciation of art countered the narrowing of outlook which was a 
result of the social division of labour. By contrast, Barrell contends, the consequence 
of Hazlitt's account of the particularity of genius would be to increase the tendency 
toward the privatisation of society: 
The power of extensive vision which seems to guarantee, for earlier theorists, 
the power of perceiving the public interest, has now become an ability which has 
nothing to do with the public world, whose interests are served by submission, 
not resistance, to the division of labour. The meritocratic elite group, those 
capable of extensive vision, are now those whose refinement of taste elevates 
them above the world of the public and the common. (332) 
Hazlitt protects the individuality of the talented few, and, in so doing, establishes, 
perhaps inadvertently, the grounds of a new elite. The reason Hazlitt insists on the 
necessity of keeping domains of politics and art separate, Barrell argues, is because he 
wants to disallow the possibility that an elitism of taste "might replicate, or in any way 
re-organise, the structure of the political republic" (335). In this explanation, we find 
the spectre of Hazlitt's "class bias" raised again; for Barrell implies, at least, that a 
concern for his own interests--Hazlitt is after all defending the standards of taste which 
constitute his own cultural prestige--and a loyalty to the individualistic values of 
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middle-class intellectuals get in the way of Hazlitt's more popular and democratic 
instincts. 20 
It is important to note that Barrell is looking specifically at Hazlitt's theory of 
painting and that he is focusing his analysis on one article: Hazlitt's 1816 supplement 
on the "Fine Arts" to the fourth and fifth editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica. It 
would probably not be possible, Barrell concedes, to extract a coherent overall theory 
from Hazlitt's numerous writings on art (315-16). Because Hazlitt's figure of speech is 
ubiquitous in his writings and because Barrell''s reading has been profoundly influential, 
some caveats are in order. It should be acknowledged, for instance, that far from 
repudiating the suggestion that the republic of letters might replicate or reorganise the 
structure of the political republic, as Barrell claims, Hazlitt was acutely aware, first, of 
the extent to which social hierarchies and political alliance were, in fact, manifested in 
the republic of letters, and, second, that cultural processes had an important role in 
reproducing political power. Writing had by no means been emancipated from social 
and political concerns. Barrell implies, at least, that Hazlitt envisioned the greatest 
threat to a meritocratic ethos arising from the spread of a leveling politics, but I would 
reiterate that what undermined the possibility of an untrammeled meritocratic realm of 
letters, for Hazlitt, was the reproduction of existing social (class) distinctions in the 
cultural domain. My main contention, however, is not that Barrell's criticism is 
incorrect, but that it is partial; by leaving unexplored the central tension between 
Hazlitt's romantic vocabulary of the imagination and his metaphorics of labour, Barrel! 
gives us a somewhat incomplete account. For if Hazlitt's confusing use of the division 
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of labour analogy implies anything, then it is the collapsing into each other of the 
domains of politics and art, whose opposition Barrell, along with other critics, takes to 
be defining in Hazlitt's work. 21 
The use of the term "division of labour" as a way of illustrating and defending 
the exclusive concentration required to produce great works is singularly inapt. Given 
that, as I have already detailed, the man of genius is almost by definition not engaged 
in laborious pursuits, it is, at the very least, a perplexing choice of illustrative 
metaphor. It doesn't follow from his allusion to the division of labour, however, that 
Hazlitt is advocating the privatisation of society. As I have already suggested, Hazlitt 
seems to have in mind Smith's one-class model of market society. As McNally points 
out, Smith's division of labour presupposes mutual cooperation and natural sociability 
rather than self-seeking individualism (Against the Market 51,54). Smith was 
optimistic that an equitable social arrangement would result from the unfettered 
commercial exchange among choosing individuals, and that community would emerge 
from the dependence of each producer on the others (54). Hazlitt seems to have 
shared Smith's optimism about the genial effects of the division of labour. The 
important point to make, however, is that the idea of divided social labour, which 
underlies Hazlitt's conceptualisation of genius, also underlies Hazlitt's description of 
the labouring author in the passage where he invokes Smith's society of independent 
craftsmen-merchants to attack the look of the gentleman: "A shoemaker, who is bent 
in two over his daily tasks; a taylor who sits cross-legged all day; a ploughman, who 
wears clog-shoes over the furrowed miry soil, and can hardly drag his feet after him; a 
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scholar who has pored all his life over books" (12: 212-13). The intellectual is here 
one amongst a community of labouring individuals, all bearing the marks of their 
labour on their bodies, ranged against an idle and unproductive aristocracy. The 
person of genius is assimilated into just another labourer, though, perhaps, an 
exceptionally talented one. 
I suggested in my discussion of "The Ignorance of the Learned" that Hazlitt's 
praise of practical skills tends to undo the social valorisation of mental over manual 
labour; similarly, it is possible to argue that Hazlitt's deployment of the division of 
labour is directed against the presumption of superiority on the part of intellectuals. In 
his "On the Periodical Press" Hazlitt argued that the progress of knowledge had been 
at the cost of individual genius and originality (16: 213,216,218). The lineaments of 
this argument were familiar. For example, in an 1813 review Francis Jeffrey claimed 
that "the age of original genius, and of comprehensive and independent reasoning, 
seems to be over" (Edinburgh Review 21 [February 1813]: 20). Jeffrey's point is part 
of a skeptical rebuttal of the argument for human perfectibility. The brunt of his 
argument is that however necessary the principle of division of labour might be to 
progress in the mechanical arts, the sub-division of labour "could never be introduced 
into literature without depriving its higher branches of all force, dignity, or 
importance" (20). As Philip Connell has remarked, the notion of genius entails the 
view that the progress of knowledge depends on the cultivation of the talented and 
original individual, or a small group of such cultured individuals, rather than on 
enlightening the mass of the population through the diffusion of knowledge (73). 
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Jeffrey believes that the progress of knowledge will be halted, as it were, because 
society is becoming less conducive to the emergence of geniuses. Although he agrees 
with Jeffrey's main point--the age of heroic genius has gone--Hazlitt does not share 
Jeffrey's pessimism. The loss of individual genius might be compensated for by a 
diffusion of knowledge: "We have collected a superabundance of raw materials: the 
grand desideratum now is, to fashion and render them portable. Knowledge is no 
longer confined to the few: the object therefore is to make it accessible and attractive 
to the many [... ]. We are optimists in literature, and hold, with certain limitations, 
that, in this respect, whatever is, is right" (16: 219-20). 
Hazlitt's article contains another, more implicit, reversal of Jeffrey's position. In 
particular, he confronts Jeffrey's distinction between mechanical or manual arts and 
intellectual ones. Hazlitt's position is that the age is inconducive to genius not because 
of the increasing sub-division of labour but because there is less division of labour (16: 
216). It is clear, I think, that what Jeffrey means, when he borrows Smith's figure of 
the division of labour, is the breakdown of complex activities into smaller and simpler 
component parts, while Hazlitt means the specialisation of employments; this 
ambiguity of meaning was already present in The Wealth of Nations. Moreover, I 
would argue that Hazlitt is making a polemical rather than an analytic point. By 
claiming that "all the greatest things are done by the division of labour" (216), he 
suggests that intellectual labour is already subject to division and fragmentation. The 
man of genius is an illustration of the division of labour principle, not an exception to 
it. The implication of Hazlitt's analogy is that intellectual pursuits are not a special 
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case, but that the same laws, applied with profit to the mechanical arts, had already 
been applied with advantage to the ornamental arts. It is not the accuracy of Hazlitt's 
analysis that interests me, but the suggestion of his resistance, once more, to the 
valorisation of intellectual accomplishments over manual ones. 22 
For Hazlitt, the specialisation of work is, on the whole, a positive development. 
He recognises that the exclusivity of the division of labour (and of genius) can lead to 
a narrowing of one's world view and thereby to a selfish individualism, yet, he argues, 
the reflection that no one can expect to excel in more than one field of endeavour 
should discourage the individual pride arising from the contemplation of one's own 
abilities: "No one is (generally speaking) great in more than one thing--if he extends 
his pursuits, he dissipates his strength--yet in that one thing how small is the interval 
between him and the next in merit and reputation to himself' (12: 164). Hazlitt makes 
the point repeatedly, that specialisation ideally leads not only to the cultivation of 
particular and individuating talents, but also to humility arising from a sense of the 
limitations of our own abilities (164). From the distribution of abilities there ought to 
follow, logically, a mutual respect for the different but equal talents of others. For 
example, he writes elsewhere that "the minds of men are as various as their faces--that 
the modes and employments of life are numberless as they are necessary--that there is 
more than one class of merit (17: 88). Every individual ought to be encouraged to 
excel in that which he can excel, but there is no necessary hierarchy of attainments. 
"There is an endless variety of excellences, " he writes, "nearly equal in different ways, 
if we had but the sense and spirit to enter properly into it" (20: 263). Against what is 
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designated Hazlitt's elitism, then, we should note the catholicity of his taste and his 
appreciation of popular culture. Paulin, for one, has drawn attention to "Hazlitt's 
interest in popular culture, " and to the way "the life of the London streets helps to 
shape his writing" (112,175). And Cook points out that while Coleridge, for instance, 
was toeing the Burkean line in arguing that culture depends upon an elite, Hazlitt--and 
in this, we might add, he is akin to Cobbett--"stresses the origins of culture in the 
activity of a whole society" (143). Hazlitt's analogy between the division of labour in 
society and the division of labour in the arts can be taken to support Cook's view 
rather more readily than the position derived from it by Barrell. 
By attending to Hazlitt's liberal individualism, his allegiances to an aristocracy 
of intellect, and to his idealisation of genius, current criticism reinforces the view that 
Hazlitt's model intellectual is disembedded from the life of the community. To redress 
the balance, I have argued that Hazlitt mitigates the writer-intellectual's isolating work 
practice by imagining his connection to a wider community and his political solidarity 
with other kinds of workers. It is worth recalling that, in E. P. Thompson's judgment, 
Hazlitt was the "most 'Jacobin' of the middle-class Radicals and the one who, over a 
period of years, came closest to the same movement as that of the artisans" (746-7). 
Similarly, Natarajan stresses the collectivist values which coexist with the individualist 
values in Hazlitt's writings. In his political essays, for example, Hazlitt defends "the 
equitable distribution of resources, [... ] the rights of unionisation of labour, and the 
necessity of welfare provisions" (Hazlitt and the Reach of Sense 177-8). The direction 
in which Hazlitt is tending, albeit tentatively, in the Table Talk essays is away from the 
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heroic notion of an aristocracy of intellect and toward a sense of allegiance to a 
collective of labourers. This is suggested as much by his rhetoric as his stance on 
specific issues; the figure of the writer, marked like the shoemaker by his labour, is 
Hazlitt's representation of his allegiance. 
While it is a truism that Hazlitt wrote primarily for a polite audience and did 
not directly address the working classes in the way that Cobbett for instance did, it is, 
nevertheless, a mistake to dismiss too quickly the attempts of writers like Hazlitt and 
"[Leigh] Hunt to ally 'middle-class' intellectuals with plebeian movements" (Cox 51). 
As Cox argues, the object of the writers and artists in the Hunt circle was to preserve 
the attachment of "'middle-class" reformers to the popular radical movement (58). 
Again, it is true that Hazlitt cannot transcend his "class bias"--if by that it is meant that 
he is concerned about his own financial interest, or that he wants to protect the value 
of his cultural capital--but this does not mean that he cannot envision a more 
democratic and egalitarian social arrangement. And while it is true that Hazlitt values 
individuality and individual freedom, he also projects his idea of an individual writer 
into a community of other individuals through invoking Smith's account of the division 
of labour. We might, of course, conclude that his version of community is deeply 
attenuated for being indebted to Smith's notion of a co-operation among independent 
craftsmen, or we might decide that his writings offer only a "token form of resistance" 
(Dart 23 8) to the separation of the classes. It should to be recognised, nevertheless, 
that Hazlitt's vision, insofar as it is communicated through his recurrent image of the 
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division of labour, is not of a simple individualism, nor of a straightforward 
collectivism, but of an individual embedded within a community. 
Hazlitt's insistence that the writer-intellectual is located within the social 
division of labour, finally, is directed not just against the aristocratic contributors to 
the Tory periodicals, or against the elitist view of culture perpetrated by Burke and 
Coleridge; Hazlitt also positions himself against radical liberal intellectuals of his own 
stripe, including the liberal aristocrats Shelley and Byron. His appraisal of the 
contribution of each of these exiled aristocrats is ambivalent. In his 1824 Edinburgh 
Review article "Shelley's Posthumous Poems, " Hazlitt argues that Shelley's poems are 
too intellectual, too removed from the material world, and create a world which is "all 
air! (16: 265). Hazlitt does not say so, but there seems to be a connection between 
Shelley's poetic insubstantiality and his distance, both social and geographic, from his 
readers; his fault was that he had "no deference for the opinions of others, too little 
sympathy with their feelings" (267). It is not through self sufficing intellectual activity, 
but through connecting with the real emotions of real people, Hazlitt says, that reform 
will come about (268-9). In another essay, Hazlitt's criticism of Shelley's "levity" 
echoes even more obviously Burke's attack on speculative theorists (8: 149). Nothing 
acts as a "ballast to the poet's mind: " Shelley is held back by "no dull system of 
realities, no earth-bound feelings, no rooted prejudices [... ] but is drawn up by 
irresistible levity to the regions of mere speculation and fancy" (8: 149-50). The same 
faults form the basis of Hazlitt's sketch of Byron in The Spirit of the Age. Byron is a 
"creature of his own will. He holds no communion with his kind" (11: 69). Although 
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Byron is liberal in politics, Hazlitt suggests that his "haughty and aristocratic" poetic 
practice make him an uncertain political ally. His satire, for instance, "is the satire of a 
lord, who is accustomed to have all his whims or dislikes taken for gospel [... ]. The 
satire of a person of birth and quality, who measures all merit by external rank" (74), 
Byron's liberalism is "preposterous" because, while he "may affect the principle of 
equality, " he can also "resume his privilege of peerage" (77). Unlike Byron and 
Shelley, who have the benefit of an outsider's view, Hazlitt does not believe that the 
intellectual can be a detached observer of his own culture. The intellectual's insider 
identity is suggested by the writer's place within the division of labour. The view 
perpetrated by the aristocratic poets, Shelley and Byron, represents a challenge to 
Hazlitt's sense of the intellectual's proper role, and his criticism of the detached view 
underlines his own sense of the intellectual's mission. Social and geographic distance, 
the view from outside, or from above, is the stance that Hazlitt wants to rebut. 23 
In the first chapter I discussed at length Edward Said's openly romantic 
delineation of the oppositional intellectual. Said's notion of the unco-opted intellectual 
is of some exceptionally talented individual who is either actually or metaphorically in 
exile, without the comforts of accommodation that come from acquiescence to the 
status quo (52,59). The metaphors of exile and marginality appear, on first sight, to 
put Said's adversarial intellectual in the tradition of Grudzinska Gross' displaced 
aristocrats of the French Revolution. Said makes clear, however, that his exiled 
intellectual belongs to the community. The dilemma facing the intellectual is one of 
loyalty; he or she is "beset and remorselessly challenged by the problem of loyalty, [. . 
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.] no one, no matter the volume of protestation, 
is above the organic ties that bind the 
individual to family, community, and of course nationality" (40). Said emphasises that 
an intellectual's representations ideally "are always tied and ought to remain an organic 
part of an ongoing experience in society; " that his or her convictions and judgments 
are arrived at "by a sense of association with others, other intellectuals, a grassroots 
movement, a continuing history, a set of lived lives" (113,120). Throughout his 
writings, Hazlitt represents, both in idea and practice, the intellectual identity Said 
defines: the emphasis on intellectual independence and political opposition, the 
commitment to individualistic modes of intellectual practice, a dogged determination 
to reassert the value of the cultural resources that constitute his intellectual capital, and 
a propensity to forge rhetorical connections with the unsympathetic masses. The 
intellectual ideals Hazlitt represents, I think, are ones we still inhabit, so that all 
criticism of Hazlitt's "class" inhibitions are, at some level, an examination of the values 
and vocabularies by which we define our place in society. Up to a point, Hazlitt might 
have agreed with what Said sees as the pleasures of exile and marginality, the romance 
and challenge of opposition, of fighting for the underdog (xvii); but only up to a point. 
Said can stress the romance, I think, only because he ultimately has massive 
institutional backing. In making a living solely from his writing and without the safety 
of institutional affiliation--apart from the loose circle, identified by Cox, gathered 
around Hunt--Hazlitt was often too close to poverty, to disenfranchisement, to be able 
to idealise the condition of marginality. 
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Even as he continued to employ the analogy for political-ideological effect, 
Hazlitt, like Cobbett, was well aware of the problematic nature of the assimilation of 
mental to manual work. For Carlyle, I argue in the next chapter, the inherent danger of 
metaphors linking the intellectual and the physical becomes almost a topos in itself 
Carlyle's provocative representation of the work of "guidance" led his contemporary, 
John Stuart Mill, to deny emphatically that writing was analogous to physical toil. 
Given Carlyle's antagonistic strategy of making his point, it is possible that this was 
exactly his intention. 
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Notes 
1I cite Dart because his is a well-argued and nuanced reiteration of the 
dominant view of Hazlitt as a detached intellectual and liberal individualist. Dart claims 
that Rousseau's "transgressive egotism" provides Hazlitt with a resource from which 
he could fashion an oppositional political stance that avoided Toryism, populism, and a 
reformism that had been appropriated by the philosophic radicals (160-2,209,212-13, 
222). The Benthamites' appropriation of the discourse of middle-class reformism had 
left Hazlitt (and other middle-class intellectuals) stymied; unable to acquiesce to the 
objectification of the poor by the utilitarians, he was, on account of his own class bias, 
"unwilling to make common cause with Bentham's lowly creatures of necessity" (160, 
212,240-4 1). Hazlitt is "a fundamentally middle-class writer addressing himself to a 
middle-class audience [... in a] bourgeois style, " argues Dart (237). Interestingly, he 
concedes that Hazlitt's essays offer a "token form of resistance to the Malthusian 
separation of mind from matter which was being effected by the middle-class reviews" 
(23 7-8) 
Hazlitt's radical political sentiments are usually seen to be inseparable from his 
commitment to an intellectual elitism in politics or art, an affiliation that compromises 
his democratic credentials. Critics explain Hazlitt's political values either by alluding to 
the constraints of his occupation (writing for a middle-class audience), which is what 
Dart seems to emphasise, and/or by referring to his upbringing in a radical dissenting 
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culture (he was the son of a Unitarian minister who was educated at Hackney 
College). Butler, Jones and Paulin all stress the importance of Hazlitt's Dissenting 
background in explaining his politics (Butler, Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries 
144,171-3; Jones 238; Paulin 3-14). Cook, one of Hazlitt's most sympathetic 
commentators, agrees that Hazlitt's critical outlook was limited by his ideas of liberty 
which are embedded in the liberal, individualistic values of freedom of speech and 
conscience, and free rational enquiry (151-2). Cook partly anticipates Dart's thesis 
when he suggests that Hazlitt "failed to respond to a radicalism whose source was in 
mass insurgency and not in the espousal of the cause of liberty by small groups of 
intellectuals" (152). Barrell, in The Political Theory of Painting from Reynolds to 
Hazlitt, and Whale, "Hazlitt on Burke: the Ambivalent Position of a Radical Essayist, " " 
argue that it is Hazlitt"s commitment to aesthetics that conflicts with his political 
radicalism. Against the dominant view of Hazlitt, partly propagated by Hazlitt himself, 
as a detached and unsociable intellectual, Cox places Hazlitt within the "Cockney" 
group of "writers, artists and intellectuals organised loosely around Leigh Hunt and his 
various journals, " a group including John Hunt, Percy and Mary Shelley, Byron, 
Godwin, Lamb, Keats, Benjamin Robert Haydon, John Scott, and Thomas Love 
Peacock (20- I ). Cox argues that despite class differences based on rank and sources of 
income, these intellectuals were bound by political affinities (31,48-50). One value 
they shared was a belief in collective and collaborative forms of cultural work--of 
which Haziitt and Hunt's Round Table was an instance--which they saw as a 
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communitarian alternative to the isolation of workers and writers under a system of 
economic individualism (22,60,62). 1 follow Cox's view of Hazlitt rather than those 
that stress his extreme individualism, and I accept Cox's premise that "middle-class" 
ideology was hardly homogenous at this time. As I will point out, however, Hazlitt's 
sense of himself as an intellectual is articulated against fellow-travellers like Shelley 
and Byron, as well as against Burke, Coleridge, Bentham and Malthus, and that we 
should be wary of identifying "class" as an explanation for intellectual affiliations. As 
Zones laconically notes, as an intellectual Hazlitt does not belong, unambiguously, 
either to the working class or to the middle class (236). 
2 All references to Hazlitt's writings, unless otherwise stated, are to Howe's 
edition of the complete works which I cite by volume and page numbers. 
3 On Hazlitt`s comparison of Shakespeare and Jonson, see Natarajan (Hazlitt 
and the Reach of Sense, 64-5,75). Natarajan's work is an especially strong statement 
of the idealist tendency in Hazlitt; for Natarajan, the entire basis of Hazlitt's 
metaphysics, as it is laid out in his Essay on the Principles of Human Action (1805), 
can be summarised as the "subordination of the senses to the mind" (11). Natarajan 
argues that the celebration of the transcendental power of the intellect (the exercise of 
the imagination), directed against the empirical basis of Benthamite utilitarianism, is 
the intellectual foundation and the principle of unity in all Hazlitt's writing (1-2,176). 1 
emphasise the polemical impulse behind all of Hazlitt's writings. In this I follow the 
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Quarterly Review, which criticised Hazlitt for allowing his politics to infect all his 
writings (Quarterly Review 26 [October 1821]: 103-8). 
' For a sustained discussion of the tension between liberal, individualistic and 
customary, embedded forms of selfhood, see Janowitz (1-9), 
5 Siskin claims that, during the eighteenth century, the "hierarchical binary of 
mental over physical was reproduced within writing itself, splitting it into the creative 
versus the critical" (The Work of Writing 24-5). My argument is that in Hazlitt's 
writings this trope articulates a political and social rather than (or as well as) a generic 
distinction, so that Hazlitt aligns himself with the physical side of the binary to 
differentiate himself from his political foes. 
61 build on the insight of Kinnaird who argued that in the Table Talk essays, 
"Hazlitt was, in effect, bidding good-bye to the concept of 'intellectual' greatness as 
individual transcendence--to the heroic notion of genius as capable of realising and 
propagating its 'truth, ' its 'idea' in the world through individual power alone" (299- 
300) 
' On the Romantics' contribution to the discursive constitution of the category 
"professional, " see Siskin, "Wordsworth's Prescriptions, " and Goldberg, "Romantic 
Professionalism. " Goldberg quotes Byron as saying that Southey was the "only 
existing entire man of letters" (681). Southey, Goldberg explains, was "defined by his 
literary vocation. He depended on it for his living and for his social standing" (681). 
Hazlitt, just as dependent on writing as Southey for his income and status, defined 
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himself not as an "entire man of letters, " but, less grandly, as a mere author (12: 208). 
"I am unfit, " he admitted to Francis Jeffrey in 1817, "for almost any other profession 
than that of an author" (Letters 175). To be a mere author was considered 
discreditable, as Jones points out, and the fact of writing for a living implied a 
difference in social status. "The want of a profession could only be excused on 
grounds of noble birth (as Byron and Shelley) or of having gone to one or other of the 
English Universities (as Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey, and De Quincey)" (Jones 
164) 
8 In 1814, Hazlitt was paid twenty guineas a sheet for contributions to the 
Edinburgh Review (Jones 17 1n). In February 1822, while working on the second 
volume of Table Talk, Hazlitt figured he could "do ten pages a day, which mounts up 
to thirty guineas' worth a week" (9: 112). Could he have sustained this productivity, 
Grayling calculates, it would have amounted to relative affluence (258,275). Hazlitt's 
letters, however, reveal his constant need to have advance payment on his lectures and 
books in order to devote his time to writing them (Letters 147,182,198,211-12). 
9 After Blackwood had refused his request to disclose the names of the authors 
of the article, Hazlitt commenced a libel suit against him as publisher, a suit which was 
eventually settled out of court. Although summoned to defend a suit for 2000 pounds 
damages by the Court of Session, Blackwood eventually paid 100 pounds to Hazlitt 
personally and accepted responsibility for costs. One immediate consequence of the 
article, Hazlitt discovered, was that Taylor and Hessey were now unwilling to pay the 
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200 pounds they had promised for the copyright of his lectures on the English Comic 
Writers (Jones 300,304). Jones suggests additional repercussions of the Blackwood's 
article, such as the refusal of Taylor and Hessey to undertake the publication of his 
Political Essays volume of 1819 (304). Wu also remarks that the attacks made on 
Hazlitt by the Tory periodicals diminished the commercial value of his writings (203-4, 
209). Howe believes that the decline in Hazlitt's popularity as a lecturer between his 
course of lectures on the English Poets and his third course of lectures on the English 
Comic Writers (December 1818-January 1819) was attributable to the attacks made 
on him by Blackwood's and the Quarterly Review (6: 367). Howe also suggests that 
the Blackwood's article may have been responsible for a breach between Hazlitt and 
Francis Jeffrey, editor of the Edinburgh Review. Hazlitt made no contribution to the 
Edinburgh Review between December 1818 and May 1820 and no political writings 
were invited from him after 1817 (7: 368). 
10 Again, in 1821, Hazlitt was concerned that his Table Talk volume of essays 
might adversely affect his reputation, and importuned Jeffrey for a favourable review 
(Letters 209,242-3). Hazlitt's falling out with Leigh Hunt in 1821 was a result, in part, 
of Hazlitt's perception that Hunt had not been as willing to promote Hazlitt as he 
himself had been in forwarding Hunt's reputation (Letters 204-6; 17: 317). On the 
other hand, Hazlitt pointed out, the "coterie" of reactionary writers affiliated to the 
Quarterly Review were always ready to puff one another, each fueling the reputation 
of each in a "vicious circle" (8: 211-12). 
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" As an example of Hazlitt's conscious "proletarianisation of himself, " his 
cultivation of "a self-consciously low current, " Dart points to Hazlitt's essay "On the 
Aristocracy of Letters, " where "Hazlitt depicted the freelance journalists of London as 
a body of urban beggars, a kind of revolutionary canaille. And during the course of 
this essay he identified closely with this 'corporation of Mendacity"' (Rousseau, 
Robespierre, and English Romanticism 236-8). Marilyn Butler was the first to observe 
that Hazlitt's representations of himself are hard to separate from his calculations as a 
writer (Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries 172). Butler observes that the letters 
written by Hazlitt, which were eventually collected into his autobiographical epistolary 
novel Liber Amoris, "were clearly begun with at least half an eye toward publication" 
("Satire and Images of Self' 216,220). 
12 Hazlitt's even-handed critical strategy has raised the question of how we can 
extract any logic from his argumentative positions. While Natarajan defends the overall 
consistency of Hazlitt' writings, which is based on the underlying metaphysical belief in 
the mind's formative power (Hazlitt and the Reach of Sense 2-3), most critics have 
found it impossible to identify a consistent perspective. In Barrell's view, Hazlitt 
defends "a range of critical beliefs" in response to particular disputes (315-6). 
Gilmartin argues that Hazlitt's famed independence of mind is a "spectacular mobility, " 
a critical flexibility, that makes it impossible to identify or position him as a writer; 
Hazlitt "alternately attacks and defends partisanship, public opinion, religious dissent, 
and even the legacy of Edmund Burke" ("'Victims of Argument, Slaves of Fact"' 91). 
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Dart insists that Hazlitt's writings are even more "self-contradictory" than previous 
critics have allowed (Rousseau, Robespierre, and English Romanticism 210). We 
should be careful, however, not to explain away Hazlitt's defence of opposite positions 
as a lack of strong commitment. I agree with Eagleton, who contends that Hazlitt 
keeps his critical terms flexible to counter the different ideological positions arrayed 
against him: his "antithetical style [... ] expresses a dialectical rather than a vacillating 
mind" ("William Hazlitt" 115,117). 
13 In considering actual class difference (social origin) less important than 
political orientation in the dispute between Lockhart and the "Cockney" writers I 
follow Roe, Cox (31), and Wheatley (6). 
14 Pascoe argues that the target of Hazlitt's "disavowal of ornament and 
ostentation are the 'theatrical, ' indeed stagy, personas of the Della Cruscans" (93). For 
Pascoe, Hazlitt seeks to make poetic distinctions that are gendered (93). The question 
of style is more complicated than Pascoe suggests, however; Hazlitt has other targets 
in mind. 
is Adam Smith would have been an important influence on Hazlitt via what 
Paulin calls the "Dissenting counter-culture, " and especially through his father who 
studied under Smith at the University of Glasgow (Paulin 68). In chapter six of The 
Wealth of Nations, where Smith breaks down the price of a commodity into its 
component parts of rent on land, profits on capital, and wages of labour, his one-class 
society gives way to a more realistic three-class society of landowners, capitalists, and 
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wage labourers (1: 68). By treating a class-divided society as a community of free and 
independent merchants, Smith was, as McNally observes, unwittingly formulating "one 
of the classic apologetic claims of vulgar bourgeois economics" (Against the Market 
54-5). This is the ideological baggage that Hazlitt inherits when he appropriates 
Smith's figures of thought and speech. 
16 Hazlitt's ambivalence about public opinion has been recorded many times. 
While Hazlitt views the diffusion of ideas and the growing strength of public opinion 
as a force for political liberty, he also envisions it as a tool for producing conformity at 
the expense of personal integrity and freedom of conscience. See, for example, "On 
Living to One's Self' (8: 97-100); "On the Disadvantages of Intellectual Superiority" 
(8: 284); "On Public Opinion" (17: 303-8); and "On the Causes of Popular Opinion" 
(17: 308-13). As I have suggested, however, the real targets of Hazlitt's attack are the 
opinion-makers: writers and intellectuals who manipulate public opinion. 
17 Gilmartin argues that Hazlitt's social criticism is "meritocratic rather than 
levelling, " although he points out, is not "by itself a rejection of plebeian radical culture 
which also endorsed terms like merit and talent" (Print Politics 228-9). We could go 
further than this. Perkin points out that while intellectuals articulated a social ideology 
based on merit, in the early-nineteenth century, merit extended to all systems of 
justification and signified differently to different groups. In terms of the professional 
ideal it connoted an expertise that could only be adequately measured by a jury of 
one's peers. On the other hand, merit could mean adjudication by a patron, success in 
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the impersonal market, or acceptance by one's fellow labourers (Perkin 258). In the 
quite general way in which Hazlitt uses the term, "merit" has little positive content, but 
signals, by force of contrast, dissatisfaction with the injustices of a particular system of 
selection and reward. 
18 Hazlitt°s frequent references to shoemakers might have been intended to 
invoke the traditional radicalism of the shoemakers, which was still, in the postwar 
period, among the largest single artisan trades (E. P. Thompson, The Making of f the 
English Working Class 234,255). In his mind, too, may have been the radical 
dramatist, Thomas Holcroft, whose memoirs Hazlitt completed after his death in 1809, 
and who was an apprentice shoemaker for a time before he attempted to make his 
living by literary labour. 
19 It is certainly possible to reconcile the conflict of idleness and toil in Hazlitt's 
writings. For Paulin, for example, these characteristics are signs of the opposing 
qualities Hazlitt wants his prose to possess. Paulin argues that Hazlitt identifies prose 
writing with physical activity (boxing, rackets, juggling) to assuage his sense of the 
inferiority of prose to imaginative, poetic writing (87,94,269). Hazlitt aims for a 
strong, vigorous and muscular prose style, and the recurring image of the healthy body 
is intended to capture a vigorous and muscular writing and an upright Whiggish 
politics (21-2). In addition, Hazlitt's project is to redeem the prose style of radicals and 
Whigs, and to make the body stand for graceful, aesthetic qualities as well those 
sterner virtues: "He wants to incarnate the body in his prose so that his writing takes 
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on the body's fluid actions, its restful being or tense power" (281). Paulin draws 
attention, therefore, to Hazlitt's representation of prose writing both as sheer hard 
work (114-5,154) and as indolence, ease or grace (185). Hazlitt wants "ruggedness 
and difficulty combined with graceful, flexible lightness" (26). Paulin's is a stimulating 
close analysis of Hazlitt's prose style, but my sense is that he moves too quickly over 
these rhetorical contradictions. The one point where Paulin pauses over the competing 
evaluatory principles at work in Hazlitt's criticism is in his discussion, at the end of the 
book, of the essay "On the Look of a Gentleman" (295). 
Another way of reconciling labour and indolence in Hazlitt's writing is to 
argue--and Paulin implicitly makes this point (115,194)--that Hazlitt is suggesting that 
there must be a rhythm of work and rest in any creative activity. However, labour and 
indolence are usually presented as competing versions, rather than as complementary 
aspects, of the same process. Hence, in "The Shyness of Scholars, " Hazlitt remarks 
that "Either great things are accomplished with labour and pains, which stamp their 
impression on the general character and tone of feeling; or if this should not be the 
case (as sometimes happens), and they are the effect of genius and a happiness of 
nature, then they cost too little to be much thought of, and we rather wonder at others 
for admiring them, than at ourselves for having performed them" (emphasis added) 
(17: 260). 
20 Although he makes no acknowledgment, Barrell's argument may be 
assimilated to Bourdieu's more general assessment of intellectual practices. Bourdieu 
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has argued that intellectuals' struggles to maximize the autonomy of the cultural field 
and to raise the social value of their own specific competencies as cultural capital leads 
them to resist the idea of cultural democracy even if they mobilise the concepts of 
equality and political democracy against the dominant class. The logic of the cultural 
struggle which values rarity and distinction, therefore, tends to exclude the dominated 
class and legitimate class distinctions as cultural distinction ("The Market of Symbolic 
Goods" 19-23). 
21 Gilmartin agrees with Barrell: Hazlitt"s anxieties about merit and vulgar 
influence are "channelled from politics into culture, resulting in a split social vision" 
(Print Politics 229). Although, Gilmartin believes, Hazlitt was genuinely democratic in 
politics, his construction of the political field involved class prejudices articulated 
through cultural categories (227-9). Other critics who note the tension of politics and 
aesthetics in Hazlitt's work are Whale ("Hazlitt on Burke") and Dart ("Romantic 
Cockneyism" 158). Both Gilmartin and Dart concede, however, that on occasions, at 
least, Hazlitt happily resigned himself to the loss of aesthetic standards and to the 
inevitable "trade-off between high art and democratic politics" (Gilmartin, Print 
Politics 232; Dart, "Romantic Cockneyism" 159). Bate is right to say that Hazlitt was 
well aware of the potential for conflict in being both politically democratic and 
defending greatness in art (Shakespearean Constitutions 7). 
22 Tenger and Trolander discuss the competition between the earlier concept of 
genius--genius as the variety of mental endowments rather than as originality--and the 
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theory of the division of labour during the mid-eighteenth century when, they claim, 
both discourses tried to "define and structure social and economic relation" (171). 
23Natarajan concurs: Hazlitt''s stance is "not of detachment, but participation, in 
the very structures of power that are the subject of his critique" (Hazlitt and the Reach 
of Sense 178). As Dart points out, while Hazlitt might occasionally fantasise about the 
possibility of retirement, it was impossible for him to renounce the world in a Byronic 
gesture ("Romantic Cockneyism" 159). 
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Chapter Five. Daily Bread and Bread of Life: 
Thomas Carlyle and the Labour of Guidance 
"Our Whole Duty, " Thomas Carlyle tirelessly reminded his countrymen, is "to 
work, --in the right direction" (Sartor Resartus 127). Labour, he urged, "is the mission 
of man on this earth" (Works 29: 133). 1 To work was not only a duty, painful and 
difficult, but was also potentially redemptive. Carlyle attached to even the meanest 
hand-labour a mystic significance, provided it was done wholeheartedly and in the 
spirit of service to one's fellow men: "All true work is sacred; In all true work, were it 
but true hand-labour, there is something of divineness. Labour, wide as the earth, has 
its summit in Heaven. Sweat of the brow; and up from that to sweat of the brain, [... ] 
if this is not worship, then I say, the more pity for worship" (Past and Present 202). 
One source for Carlyle's "gospel of work" was his upbringing. The oldest son of poor, 
Scottish peasants, the Calvinistic belief in the importance of honest work had been 
instilled in him from an early age. After attending university to prepare for a ministerial 
vocation, and then deciding against the ministry, Carlyle sought a way of turning his 
education into a means of earning a living which would also fulfill the idea of a calling. 
The 1820s were, for Carlyle, a decade of great anxiety as he struggled to realise his 
sense of mission while living by literary hack-work (translation and reviewing) and 
private tutoring. Superimposed on the Calvinist doctrine of salvation in practical action 
was the influence of the German transcendentalists--Goethe, Schiller, Fichte--whom 
Carlyle read voraciously in the 1820s, and whose writings seemed to have helped 
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sustain him during this difficult time. Carlyle was especially indebted to Goethe's 
insistence that even in quotidian tasks lay the opportunity for expressing and 
developing one's special innate capacities, and hence his frequent iteration of Goethe's 
exhortation to do the nearest duty: "whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy 
whole might" (Sartor Resartus 119,196). Although, for Carlyle, the "sweat of the 
brow" was the "wholesomest blessing" rather than the "curse" it was for Burke, there 
is the same troubling attempt, in both writers, to encourage the physical worker to 
submit to his drudgery (Collected Letters 4: 246). 2 
Carlyle asserted, then, that the individual might find fulfillment in purposeful 
activity. His gospel of work was advanced, too, as a remedy for what he perceived to 
be the social ills of the nation: labour was the basis of a healthily functioning society. 
As Charles F. Harrold notes, Carlyle found in the Goethean doctrine of capabilities not 
only an ideal of self-realisation through discovering the work for which one had a 
specific aptitude, but also an ideal of social arrangement whereby each individual 
should labour obediently according to his abilities for the benefit of a society in which 
the apportioning of rewards would be just though unequal. This was Carlyle's ideal of 
order: "Recognised or not recognised a man has his superiors, a regular hierarchy 
above him; extending up, degree above degree, to heaven itself and God the Maker, 
who made His world not for anarchy but for rule and order" (Sartor Resartus lvi-lvii; 
29: 189). Doing the duty nearest to hand meant labouring ardently in the station to 
which one was fitted by mental or physical powers. While his contemporaries pointed 
out that Carlyle's doctrine of work was hopelessly impractical as a solution to the 
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social problems he claimed to be addressing (Seigel 166-7,208-10,243), there is no 
question that Carlyle's recommendations were seriously intended. A healthy, orderly 
polity, he believed, would result from a right ordering of human relationships, founded 
on the correct distribution of work between the head and hands, between the 
governing, or "speaking, " classes and the governed, or "toiling" classes (29: 168,185). 
If one class of people produced material necessities, the other class ought to provide 
the no less necessary spiritual goods: "If the poor and humble toil that we have Food, 
must not the high and glorious toil for him in return, that he have Light, have 
Guidance, Freedom, Immortality? " (Sartor Resartus 228). The arrangement was a just 
one as long as these complementary labours were reciprocal and analogous. In his own 
day, Carlyle claimed, this relationship of reciprocity had ceased because the ruling 
class had failed to undertake the work of guidance: the speaking class had become an 
un-working one. In this chapter, I will focus my discussion of Carlyle's "work" by 
considering his use of the analogy between intellectual and physical labour as a vehicle 
for a political critique. Discussing three texts written in the 1830s--Sartor Resartus 
(1831-2), "The Corn Law Rhymes" (1832), and Chartism (1839)--I argue that Carlyle 
draws on the analogy between mental and manual to berate the ruling class for 
eschewing the work of guidance. ' 
In Carlyle's treatment, then, the assimilation of mental to manual work is both 
politically reactionary and politically radical. For him, as for Burke, the analogy is a 
way of urging the physical labourers to submit to their condition. However, the 
analogy is also, for Carlyle as for Hazlitt, a way of attacking the status quo. What I 
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wish to pursue, in this chapter, is the way the figures of speech equating mental and 
manual labour change their significance between Sartor Resartus, written at the 
beginning of the 1830s, and Chartism, composed at the end of the decade. 
Throughout the 1830s Carlyle became more outspokenly antidemocratic as he moved 
towards the authoritarian stance of his most influential work of social criticism, Past 
and Present (1843), where, as Chris Vanden Bossche claims, in order to reform 
society Carlyle turns from inspiring belief to coercing obedience (113-5). Although the 
mental/ manual analogy continued to be a way for Carlyle to inveigh against the 
"unworking" ruling classes and to demand more effective government, the same 
metaphors serve a reactionary, authoritarian agenda. Carlyle increasingly overlooks, I 
shall suggest, the metaphorical nature of his identification of guiding work of the 
speaking classes with physical labour, and the literalisation of the analogy encourages 
the reader to think of the masses as material to be fashioned. Hannah Arendt, alert to 
the dangers of political rhetoric, has warned that the belief that we can make 
something in human affairs, as we fabricate a thing in the material world, is not a 
harmless metaphor; it arises from despair at the futility of the democratic process, and 
at political action in general, and leads to faith in the strong, isolated leader and to the 
utopian belief that humans can be treated and shaped as we treat other material (The 
Human Condition 188,220-30), Curiously, however, in an early essay, "Signs of the 
Times, " Carlyle had explicitly cautioned against the unreflective metaphoric conflation 
of mental and physical power. This leads me to suggest that Carlyle's provocative 
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rhetoric may have been intended to draw attention to the dangers of the figurative 
appropriation of physical labour in the representation of intellectual work. 
I want to expand, first, on Carlyle's idiosyncratic diagnosis of the social 
malaise, which remained constant throughout his writings. In Carlyle's view, the 
French Revolution of 1789 epitomised the just revolt of the lower classes against the 
governing classes, and the latest embodiments of this rebellion were the signs of 
working class unrest in Britain in the 1830s. According to Carlyle, the feudal system of 
government had been a stable and enduring one, because it had been able to claim the 
willing obedience and loyalty of the populace. Both the temporal rulers, the king and 
nobility, and the spiritual rulers, the Clergy, had given real guidance to the people; the 
king and nobles kept order and enforced justice and the Clergy provided education and 
a set of beliefs for people to live by. For centuries prior to 1789, however, the two 
bodies had waived the work of governing, but had continued to draw the wages of 
governing, effectively boarding on the labour of the lower classes. Even worse, the 
former ruling class had continued to "cant" about religion and about loyalty as a way 
of keeping order among a lower class who had ceased to honour and reverence their 
social superiors (26: 215-16; Past and Present 225). The misery of the labouring 
population had been increasing for centuries, then, although they had remained silent 
until 1789. In the French Revolution, according to Carlyle, the masses found a 
rudimentary voice with which to express their dissatisfaction: "A dumb generation; 
their voice only an inarticulate cry" (2: 34); "this monstrous twenty-million class, 
hitherto the dumb sheep which these others had to disagree about the manner of 
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shearing, is now arising with hopes! It has ceased or is ceasing to be dumb; it speaks 
through Pamphlets, or at least brays and growls behind them, in unison" (2: 115-16). 
In Carlyle's view, the Swing riots, Chartism, and other working class demonstrations 
of political and economic discontent were, like the French Revolution, the protest of 
the labouring population against the neglect of their political leaders (29: 149-50). 
These events testified to the end of the social relation: "How have ye treated us; how 
have ye taught us, fed us and led us, while we toiled for you" (2: 227,279). 
The French Revolution, in Carlyle's interpretation, was occasioned both by 
philosophic scepticism (26: 416; 28: 180) and by the insupportable poverty of the 
labouring poor (2: 262). But these were immediate rather than original causes of the 
Revolution, symptoms rather of the larger phenomenon. It was the failure of 
leadership that had caused both the discontent of intellectuals and the hunger of the 
multitude. Through a sustained intellectual critique, the philosophes had negated the 
old, bankrupt religious beliefs, but had not, Carlyle averred, instilled new ideals, new 
principles on which to worship in their place. Similarly, the revolutionaries had not 
been able to create new institutions to replace the ones they had destroyed. Society, 
Carlyle always insisted, was held together by a common faith, by shared convictions or 
beliefs, which were embodied in its secular institutions, and in the absence of a shared 
social belief, society could not rejuvenate itself (2: 215-17; 28: 12-14,42). Because 
the sceptical philosophy of the eighteenth century had failed to articulate ideals on 
which to base social cohesion, it was impossible that the revolutionists could have 
founded a new social order. Carlyle's view was a kind of idealism, since he believed 
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that there was always a spiritual malaise underlying and determining physical disease 
(28: 20-3). Nevertheless, spiritual deprivation always manifested itself, finally, in the 
material hardship of the labouring classes. Lies, untruth, Carlyle explained in The 
French Revolution, are always passed down, "shifted from back to back, and from 
rank to rank; and so land ultimately on the dumb lowest rank, who with spade and 
mattock, with sore heart and empty wallet, daily come in contact with reality, and can 
pass the cheat no further" (2: 65). 
The old order was effectively dead, and a new one needed to be built. The void 
left by the collapse of feudal government, by the renunciation of leadership by the 
landed aristocracy and the Catholic priesthood, had to be occupied by a genuine 
working aristocracy. The solution to the problem of finding a new system of 
government was not democracy, which, for Carlyle, was a mere procedure. 
Democracy, or self-government of the multitude by the multitude, was a manifestation 
in the political sphere of the "principle" of laissez-faire, which was really the absence 
of any principle whatsoever (29: 158-9). The various ideologies of selfish 
individualism in social life were simply an abdication by the ruling class of the 
responsibility of governing and guiding. 4 Neither economic self-interest nor the 
extension of the sufrage was an adequate principle of social integration; the vital 
element of society was not individual liberty but a living relationship between 
governing and governed (29: 160). Although Carlyle attacked, in particular, the 
dilettante landed aristocracy who protected their own financial interests, through 
legislation such as the Corn Laws, he also criticised the selfish, materialist, utilitarian 
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outlook of the industrial and commercial middle-classes, with their subordination of 
every ideal to profit. 
Repugnance for the "blind chance" of laissez-faire also underlay Carlyle's 
criticism of the organisation of literature. The current unregulated condition of writers 
and their productions was the epitome of the disorganised condition of society, the 
"summary of all other disorganization--a sort of heart, from which, and to which, all 
other confusion circulates in the world" (5: 158-9,168). Carlyle put great emphasis on 
society's treatment of its authors because he hoped that a properly organised literary 
class could fill the void left by the feudal clergy, become a modern priesthood who 
would infuse new ideals to regenerate society. "Since it is the spiritual always that 
determines the material, the Man-of-Letters Hero must be regarded as our most 
important modern person, [... ] of all Priesthoods, Aristocracies, Governing Classes at 
present extant in the world, there is no class comparable for importance to that 
Priesthood of the Writers of Books" (5: 155,168). On occasion, Carlyle seems to 
argue that writers had already become a modern clergy. The rise of print and the 
spread of literacy had conferred enormous influence on "writers of Newspapers, 
Pamphlets, Poems, Books, " he argued, so that they had replaced priests as the "real 
working effective church" of a modern nation (5: 160-2,170). Vanden Bossche 
observes that journalism, which Carlyle associated with the mechanisation of literature, 
could hardly be, at the same time, a true religion (45,184n 10). Indeed, Carlyle's point 
is exactly this. As things stood, it was the press, newspaper editors and journalists, 
who had become the effective rulers of the nation (Sartor Resartus 45; 27: 77). Power 
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was invested in the wrong people, and the predominance of journalists in society was a 
symptom of the absence of real values, of the dominance of the cash nexus. The noble 
calling of literature ought not to be undertaken for profit, nor degraded into a mere 
dilettantism. ' 
In time, perhaps, Carlyle himself might come to occupy the position of 
influence currently held by the press, but this was not the "strangely anomalous 
external position" in which he found himself at the beginning of the 1830s: "My whole 
trade is to think and speak, " Carlyle wrote to John Stuart Mill in 1833, as he was 
trying unsuccessfully to find a publisher for his first book, Sartor Resartus, "but as the 
world goes, I have absolutely no permission to speak" (Collected Letters 7: 25). His 
view that his position was an "anomalous" one was not eased by the publication of his 
novel, however. Carlyle's writings continually register his sense that the writer is an 
anomaly within a society organised around the reciprocal labour of its members. As 
Kaplan observes: "His Calvinistic heritage and his attitude towards work and the world 
had saddled him with ambivalent feelings about whether what he did as a writer was 
actually work" (361). In preaching the gospel of work, as Paul Barlow elaborates, 
Carlyle "advocates a condition from which his own advocacy necessarily alienates 
him" (13 8). Despite Carlyle's veneration of thinking over doing that was the corollary 
of his valorisation of the spiritual over the material, he was also fond of citing Goethe's 
maxim that "doubt of any sort cannot be removed except by Action" and the 
Aristotelian adage that "the end of man is an Action, and not a Thought" (Sartor 
Resartus 196,155; 28: 25). It was not clear, to Carlyle, that thinking and speaking 
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count as action or doing in any ordinary sense, so, rather than claiming to do anything, 
he represents himself as showing others what needs to be done. ' 
Sartor Resartus was written in 1830-31 as Parliament was considering the first 
reform bill. Carlyle was unable to get the manuscript published as a book--it eventually 
appeared serially in Fraser's Magazine in 1833-34--and he attributed his failure to find 
a publisher to the political uncertainty of the times (Collected Letters 5: 327,376,436) 
6: 16,24,64; Kaplan 161-6). Many intellectuals believed that revolution was imminent 
unless reform passed parliament, a fear substantiated by the July Revolution in France. 
The point is often made, and it is a claim supported by his own statements, that Carlyle 
believed in "radical inward reform" rather than in tinkering with the machinery of 
government (Collected Letters 5: 204; 27: 72). While Carlyle's social criticisms are 
frequently tempered by the qualification that it is only the reform of each individual of 
himself that can really change society, the extent of his dissatisfaction with the status 
quo--his detestation of the corrupt ruling class and his sympathy with the plight of the 
industrial and agricultural poor--should not be underestimated. Carlyle was a radical in 
the sense that he believed that society had to be fundamentally altered. "A second 
edition of the French Revolution, " he wrote in 1831, "is distinctly within the range of 
chances; for there is nowhere any tie remaining among men" (Collected Letters 6: 52). 
Society had to be regulated by more viable bonds than the cash nexus: reverence for 
one's superiors, for example, duty to one's inferiors, and loyalty between classes. 
Social revolution would be one way of clearing away the unsupportable system that 
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existed, preparatory to building a new social order (Collected Letters 5: 144-5,6: 85, 
128; Kaplan 154-7,184-5). 
The ending of Sartor Resartus dramatises Carlyle's sense of the increasing 
polarisation between the social classes of England in the highly metaphorical style of 
Diogenes Teufelsdröckh, the fictional German philosopher and protagonist of the 
novel. Rich and poor are ironically presented as though they were competing 
speculative or religious tendencies: the Dandiacal Sect, dedicated to idleness and 
excess, and the Drudge or Poor-slave Sect, dedicated to labour and poverty: 
Such are the two Sects which, at this moment, divide the more unsettled 
portion of the British People; and agitate that ever-vexed country. To the eye 
of the political Seer, their mutual relation, pregnant with the elements of 
discord and hostility, is far from consoling, [... ] they extend through the entire 
structure of Society, and work unweariedly in the secret depths of English 
national Existence; striving to separate and isolate it into two contradictory, 
uncommunicating masses. (285) 
Teufelsdröckh likens the two Sects to two bottomless whirlpools whose diameter was 
daily widening to devour between them all the solid ground of the country; or, in 
another metaphor, describes them as being like positive and negative poles of batteries 
dividing the country between wealth and hunger, until there exists no healthy neutral 
ground (286; 28: 20-1). Sartor Resartus seems to end in a revolutionary situation, 
with the refusal by the ruling classes of their duty of government and the increasing 
repulsion of the lower classes from their erstwhile rulers. Teufelsdröckh seems to 
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offer no solutions and appears to accept the necessity of revolution. However, Carlyle 
often keeps an ironic distance from his protagonist. As Janice Haney has argued, in the 
final three chapters of the novel Carlyle turns deliberately away from a Romantic irony 
that "apotheosizes self-activity, " and, instead, "gives us social actuality and demands 
that we work in it" (328-9). Carlyle's writings after Sartor Resartus consistently take 
up in a serious way the problem that is posed half-ironically at the end of that book. ' 
However, while Teufelsdröckh is apparently dismissed at the conclusion of the 
novel, Carlyle's own answer to the problem of authority is apparently adumbrated 
within Sartor Resartus by Teufelsdröckh. Because it describes the ideal relationship of 
guiders and guided, this important passage is worth quoting at length. "Two men I 
honour, and no third, " declares the clothes philosopher: 
First, the toilworn Craftsman that with earth-made Implement labouriously 
conquers the Earth, and makes her man's. Venerable to me is the hard Hand, 
crooked, coarse; wherein notwithstanding lies a cunning virtue [... ]. 
Venerable too is the rugged face, all weather-tanned, besoiled, with its rude 
intelligence; for it is the face of a Man living manlike. 0, but the more 
venerable for thy rudeness, and even because we must pity as well as love thee! 
Hardly-entreated Brother! For us was thy back so bent, for us were thy straight 
limbs and fingers so deformed: thou wert our Conscript, on whom the lot fell, 
and fighting our battles wert so marred. For in thee too lay a god-created 
Form, but it was not to be unfolded; encrusted must it stand with the thick 
adhesions and defacements of Labour: and thy body, like thy soul, was not to 
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know freedom. Yet toil on, toil on: thou art in thy duty, be out of it who may; 
thou toilest for the altogether indispensable, for daily bread. 
A second man I honour, and still more highly: Him who is seen toiling 
for the spiritually indispensable; not for daily bread, but the bread of Life. Is 
not he too in his duty; endeavouring towards inward Harmony; revealing this, 
by act or by word, through all his outward endeavours, be they high or low? 
Highest of all, when his outward and inward endeavour are one; when we can 
name him Artist; not earthly Craftsman only, but inspired Thinker, who with 
heaven-made implements conquers Heaven for us! If the poor and humble toil 
that we have Food, must not the high and glorious toil for him in return, that 
he have Light, have Guidance, Freedom, Immortality? (227-8) 
Despite Carlyle's ironic distance from Teufelsdröckh, he would certainly have 
approved of the social relationship evoked in this passage. The society Teufelsdröckh 
foresees is based on an exchange of labours which, if different and complementary, are 
posited as equal and analogous: food for enlightenment and guidance. As Harrold 
observes in his introduction to Sartor Resartus, the two forces indispensable in the 
reconstruction of a decayed society were physical labour and the new church of 
literature: the one to supply material necessities, the other to give knowledge, 
education, and moral purpose, without which nothing of lasting worth could be 
achieved by mere strength of arms (1-li; Sartor Resartus 229). Carlyle's passage also 
indicates where his intuitive sympathies lie: with the hard-working, impoverished 
labouring population and with the man of letters trying to make a living in the modern 
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world (Kaplan 156). Teufelsdröckh implies that the intellectual (or "spiritual") worker 
is allied with the impoverished classes; his trade--like Hazlitt, Carlyle consistently 
refers to writing as a "trade" (Collected Letters 7: 25)--and his impoverishment seem 
to align him naturally with other workmen. This alliance makes the revolutionary 
situation at the end of the book more threatening, for the view that the dissatisfaction 
of intellectuals instigated the overthrow of the aneien regime in France was a common 
one, powerfully articulated by Burke, and one that Carlyle himself had occasionally 
expressed (26: 416). 
Carlyle is adroit at insinuating himself into a discourse from which he had 
seemed to be absent. This passage encourages the reader to see Carlyle himself as the 
"spiritual" labourer. In his perceptive 1847 review of Carlyle's works, a review which 
delighted Carlyle, Henry David Thoreau recognised that Carlyle saw himself as the 
"inspired thinker" of Sartor Resartus. Quoting the above passage in full, and 
employing the same metaphor ("bread of life") as Carlyle had used in the original 
passage, Thoreau nominated Carlyle as a real working literary man: 
There is no more notable working-man in England, in Manchester or 
Birmingham, or the mines round about. We know not how many hours a day 
he toils, nor for what wages exactly; we only know the results for us [... ]. 
Literature has come to mean to the ears of labouring men, something idle, 
something cunning and pretty merely, because the nine-hundred and ninety- 
nine really write for fame or for amusement. But as the labourer works, and 
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soberly by the sweat of the brow earns bread for his body, so this man works 
anxiously and sadly, to get bread of life, and dispense it. (243-4) 
In reproducing Carlyle's writerly self image so faithfully, here and throughout the 
review, Thoreau seems to take Carlyle's metaphors at face value. I want to suggest, 
however, that Carlyle's figurative performance is far from unreflective. "It is not 
because of his toils that I lament for the poor, " Teufelsdröckh continues in this same 
passage, "we must all toil [... ] no faithful workman finds his task a pastime" (228). 
However, the spiritual labourer cannot be "seen toiling [... ] for bread of life" in quite 
the same way that the manual worker can be seen producing food, clothing, and 
shelter (Sartor Resartus 227). We can recall that in Ford Madox Brown's painting, 
Work (Figure 1), what distinguishes the "brain-workers, " like Carlyle, is that they 
"seem to be idle" (Hueffer 189-90). In what way, then, are physical labour and 
intellectual labour related as toil? What kind of workman is the writer? 
While it would be difficult to isolate one meaning of "work" in Sartor 
Resartus, Carlyle's first programmatic statement of his doctrine of work, the notion of 
making order out of disorder, gathers together several of his ideas. Capabilities were 
given to each man, says Teufelsdröckh: 
to give battle, in some small degree, against the great Empire of Darkness: 
does not the very Ditcher and Delver, with his spade extinguish many a thistle 
and puddle; and so leave a little Order, where he found the opposite? [... ]. 
How much more, one whose capabilities are spiritual, who has learned, or 
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begun learning, the grand thaumaturgic art of Thought! [... ]. Truly a Thinking 
Man is the worst enemy the Prince of Darkness can have. (118) 
As the manual labourer makes a fertile land out of wilderness, the writer creates order 
by revealing the idea of a moral or divine purpose in a seemingly chaotic world, and 
instills in his fellow men high ideals and convictions. Again it is the intellectual or 
spiritual that is singled out for particular praise: "in this so solid-seeming world [... ] it 
is appointed that Sound, to appearance the most fleeting, should be the most 
continuing of all things. The WORD is well said to be omnipotent in this world: man, 
thereby divine, can create as by a Fiat" (171-2,199). Appropriately, then, 
Teufelsdröckh's discovery of his life-work as a writer of books is the first climax of the 
novel: he will attempt to create a new religion for men to live by. In finding what he 
can work at he not only finds his identity, an ordered self, but also plays his part in 
ordering and subduing the chaotic universe. "Be no longer a Chaos, but a World, " 
Teufelsdröckh tells himself, "Produce! Produce! Were it but the pitifullest infinitesimal 
fraction of a Product, produce it, in God's name! " (197). The new "priesthood" of 
writing, Teufelsdröckh makes clear, can only be fulfilled by the true poet, working out 
of a sense of duty rather than for fame or money. This high calling is degraded into a 
mere "handicraft" by journalists and other literary day-labourers (199). 
Despite Teufelsdröckh's disdainful dismissal of mercenary and hack writing as 
"handicraft"--earlier in the novel he dismisses his overly-pedantic schoolteachers as 
"hodmen" (105)--Carlyle, through his protagonist, brazenly assimilates the intellectual 
and physical labourer. The description of the artist as "toiling for [. . .] the 
bread of 
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Life " seems to "offer an idealization, " in Frederic Jameson's phrase, of writing and 
cultural production as material labour, and gives substance to the idea of the "inspired 
thinker" (Sartor Resartus 228; Jameson, "On Negt and Kluge" 56-7). Further, the 
dogged English editor who, in Carlyle's fiction, is charged with laboriously making 
order out of Teufelsdröckh's chaotic philosophical creation, Die Kleider, Ihr Wirden 
und Werken (Clothes: their Origin and Influence), and of "transplanting" it into English 
soil, frequently complains that his "incessant toils" have affected his health (34,79-80). 
It is not difficult to show that the appropriation of the toil of the manual labourer 
underlies the construction of literary labour in Sartor Resartus. Furthermore, I 
suggest, through his protagonist's representations Carlyle makes transparent the 
problematic nature of the assimilation of mental to manual labour. For example, 
Teufelsdröckh's admonishment to himself to "produce, produce" (197) anticipates his 
words of encouragement to the toilworn craftsman to "toil on, toil on" (228). By 
urging both himself, the writer, and the physical labourer to "toil on, " Teufelsdröckh 
treats both manual and literary labour as if they were responsive to the same 
enthusiastic injunction to work. The exhortation to "toil on, " one would think, can 
only be an appropriate incitement to someone for whom work is potentially a reward 
in itself, a vocation; no such injunction can reconcile the manual worker to his 
drudgery. Only poverty and necessity, what Teufelsdröckh himself calls the "prompt 
nature of hunger" (Sartor Resartus 120), can compel pain, trouble, and deformation of 
the body. On the other side, Teufelsdröckh's exhortation to himself to "produce, 
produce" is curious because the principle of "more is better, " which might apply to the 
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production of bread or cotton, is not appropriate for the evaluation literary production, 
where evidence of real labour, as Carlyle himself insisted, is not more but less product 
(29: 26-8,33,73-4). 
Although Teufelsdröckh does unquestionably present Carlyle's own views on 
just social arrangements in the passage on the physical and spiritual labourers, the use 
of a persona, I argue, allows Carlyle to maintain an ironic scepticism about the figures 
of speech used to depict mental work and to construe the relation of the two workers 
to each other. Teufelsdröckh's questions--"must not the high and glorious toil for him 
in return? "--suggest the tentative nature of the analogy which underlies the principle of 
reciprocation. This leaves the reader some room, if not for dissenting from the 
principle of reciprocity itself, then at least for questioning the sufficiency of what 
Carlyle terms the "imperfect" medium of language--even of highly figurative language- 
-for describing the social bond, the mystical union of man and man (28: 12). In a novel 
that contains a metaphorical reflection on metaphor, it is probably safe to say that 
Carlyle's openly metaphoric representations of intellectual activity are not made 
unreflectively (Sartor Resartus 73-4). This is a point to which I will return throughout 
this chapter. 
The key passage on the spiritual and earthly labourers also has a third 
component. Carlyle immediately goes on to say that nothing is more sublime than 
finding the two kinds of labour united in the "Peasant Saint, " who both toils 
"outwardly for the lowest of man's wants" and toils "inwardly for the highest" (227-8). 
Both manual and spiritual labour are united in the Peasant Saint, who "combines the 
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creative powers of the artist with the forceful labour of the craftsman" (Mellor 118). 
The honoured peasant-saint poses a problem for Carlyle's neat division of the classes, 
however. What becomes of the relation of the governed and the governing when the 
poor begin to think, to speak, to write, to become capable of self-guidance? Carlyle's 
ideal community depends on each knowing his place in the social division of labour; 
the relationship is based on silent and unquestioning acceptance by both parties of the 
arrangement, for manual workers are supposed to recognise and acknowledge superior 
wisdom when they see it. But the figure of the Peasant Saint suggests that some poor 
people are already capable of both labour and guidance, of producing both daily bread 
and the bread of life (poetry, say). 
This problem arises in different forms throughout Carlyle's writing in the 
1830s. The labouring classes were beginning to find a collective voice and throughout 
the decade they articulated their grievances--their dissatisfaction at political 
disenfranchisement and their desperation at poverty and unemployment--both through 
direct action and through petitioning parliament. For Carlyle, working class speech, 
the assumption by the labouring class of the activity of their superiors, whatever else it 
might herald, was a sure sign of disorder in social relations, embodying a challenge to 
the distinction between knowing and doing, and threatening the occupation of the 
speaking and thinking class. The question of who has "permission to speak" (Collected 
Letters 7: 25), therefore, is not only an issue, for Carlyle, of establishing his own 
authority as an author, but also of marking the boundaries which separate the activities 
of the governing and the governed. The two issues are closely linked, however, since 
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one of Carlyle's strategies for authorising his own voice is to claim to be speaking for 
the inarticulate toiling classes. I want to look in detail at two of Carlyle's responses to 
evidence of working class speech, his article on Ebenezer Elliott's "Corn-Law 
Rhymes, " ostensibly an appreciation of the cultural achievement of a working class 
poet, and Chartism, an essay in which he addresses directly the worsening plight of the 
working poor. Although both pieces continue to see the social crisis as the fault of an 
"unworking" ruling class, and while Carlyle seeks to reform that class into a true 
working aristocracy, I want to attend particularly to the perceptible shift in Carlyle's 
political sympathy, insofar as this sympathy is signified by his different deployment of 
the analogy between mental and manual work. 
Carlyle's article on Ebenezer Elliott's "Corn-Law Rhymes" was written and 
published in the Edinburgh Review in 1832 while Sartor Resartus was still in 
manuscript. While Carlyle, like other middle-class reviewers, treats Elliott as though 
he were a genuine working-class poet, an identification which Elliott might have 
encouraged, it should be pointed out that Elliott was in fact a small capitalist and 
employer who owned his own iron foundry in Sheffield (Vicinus 97, Maidment 48-9). 
In some respects, this fact is not germane to the article, for Elliott's importance to 
Carlyle is that he is a representative figure for an increasingly vocal labouring class. 
The phenomenon Carlyle is addressing in this essay is not only that of the talented 
artisan, but of the coming-to-consciousness of an entire class of manual labourers, for 
which Carlyle, mistakenly, takes Elliott to be the representative. In "Corn-Law 
Rhymes, " anticipating his argument in The French Revolution, Carlyle declares that 
321 
the "hitherto mute and irrational" have found an intelligible voice (28: 138), but he 
also claims that this voice is not yet aware of its own interests. His sympathy for the 
plight of the labouring poor vies with his need to put working-class speech in its place 
and to preserve the proper ordering of social activity. The article shows Carlyle at his 
best, as he tries to contain the contradictions that his conflicting agendas produce. 9 
In 1829 Carlyle had published a generous, though deeply contradictory, 
assessment of another self-educated poet, Robert Burns. "Burns" is a celebration of 
achievement under conditions of adversity, but the essay also contains an explicit 
social criticism, for Carlyle argues that social circumstances are crucial in determining 
literary success. Burns struggled under poverty and without education, so his genius 
was wasted in unrewarding and unrewarded toil (26: 258,262-3). At a time when the 
power of thinking is in short supply, and which is at all times what is most wanted, 
Burns is told by his superiors "'You are to work, not think. ' Of your thinking faculty, 
the greatest in the land, we have no need; you are to gauge beer there; for that only 
you are wanted" (5: 197). The example of Burns supports Carlyle's attack on the 
laissez-faire system of authorship as an institution, and, more generally, on the 
inequality of opportunity in society. 10 Characteristically, Carlyle qualifies his social 
criticism, however, by arguing that the real fault lies in Burns himself, in inward, not 
outward, circumstances (26: 264,310-11). Poverty, hardship, incessant drudgery, and 
persecution have been the lot of many great poets. Burns fails for want of moral 
strength; he lacks "unity in his purposes [and] consistency in his aims" (291-5,310- 
18). Carlyle advises that Burns might have succeeded had he divided his time between 
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poetry and virtuous industry, reconciling himself to a life of labour while being content 
to fulfill his calling (314-15). This is precisely the ground for Carlyle's professed 
admiration of Elliott, who divides his time between producing daily bread (iron) and 
bread of life (poetry). 
In "Corn-Law Rhymes, " as in Sartor Resartus, Carlyle thinks of labour as the 
imposition of order on a chaotic world: "A troublous element is his. A life of 
painfulness, toil, insecurity, scarcity; yet he fronts it like a man; yields not to it, tames 
it into some subjection, some order" (147). Elliott is admired because he labours both 
at composing poetry and at hammering metal, "is a man who can handle both pen and 
hammer like a man" (139); "there shall he stand, and work, with head and with hand" 
(145). The manual labourer has begun to speak as well as to work, and Elliott's voice 
is worth listening to, not because he rises above his condition but because he 
represents clearly authentic working-class experience: 
Here is a voice coming from the deep Cyclopean forges, where Labour, in real 
soot and sweat, beats with his thousand hammers "the red son of the furnace; " 
doing battle with Necessity, and her dark brute Powers, to make them 
reasonable and serviceable; an intelligible voice from the hitherto Mute and 
Irrational, to tell us at first-hand how it is with him, what in very deed is the 
theorem of the world and of himself, which he, in those dim depths of his, in 
that wearied head of his, has put together. To which voice [... ] let good ear 
be given. (13 8) 
323 
Like Burns' poetry, Elliott's writing is sincere and genuine; he is "an earnest truth- 
speaking man [... ] a practical man of work and endeavour" who delivers himself 
"articulately, and with a certain degree of meaning" (145,138). It is the experience and 
knowledge of real physical labour which is the basis of this sincerity. From having 
worked he has obtained "authentic insight and experience, [... ] rugged and 
homegrown understanding; " this man "has worked himself loose of cant and 
conjectural halfness, idle pretences and hallucinations, into a condition of Sincerity" 
(146). 
Whereas Carlyle had lamented Burns' poverty and lack of education, now he 
argues that education is a disadvantage for a man who wants to be a writer (139). It is 
not education but work and struggle--"were it only with poverty and hard toil"--which 
is required. It is a fact, says Carlyle, that "he, whose other wants were beforehand 
supplied; to whose capabilities no problem was presented except even this, How to 
cultivate them to the best advantage, should attain less real culture than he whose first 
grand problem and obligation was nowise spiritual culture, but hard labour for his daily 
bread !" (141). The purely cultured man is likely to be a literary dilettante, while the 
writer who has to support himself through manual labour will be in earnest about 
literature. Here, as throughout the article, Carlyle plays on the meaning of "culture. " 
"In the vocabulary of land-farming and husbandry, culture meant activity, effort, 
purposeful action, " Bauman tells us, "to culture (cultivate) land, meant to select good 
seed, to sow, to till, to plough, to fight weeds and undertake all the other actions 
deemed necessary to secure an ample and healthy crop" (Bauman 94). Carlyle 
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frequently resorts to husbandry metaphors to convey the idea that it is through labour, 
not learning, that the individual acquires "real culture. " Summary will not do justice to 
Carlyle's rhetoric; his prose must be quoted: 
All woodmen [ ... 
] will tell you that fat manure is the ruin of your oak; 
likewise that the thinner and wilder your soil, the tougher, more iron-textured 
is your timber, [... ] so too with the spirit of men [... ] he who has battled, 
were it only with poverty and hard toil, will be found stronger, more expert, 
than he who could stay at home from the battle, concealed among the 
Provision-wagons. (28- 140-1) 
The source of all knowledge and cultivation, Carlyle insists, is practical work, were 
this only the humblest "hewing of wood and drawing of water" (146). The reader 
might be forgiven for supposing that it is the working classes who should be offering 
guidance to their superiors: 
the first principle of human culture, the foundation-stone of all but false 
imaginary culture, that men must, before every other thing, be trained to do 
somewhat, has been, for some generation, laid quietly on the shelf [... ] 
consider what advantage those same uneducated Working classes have over 
the educated Un-working classes, in one particular; herein, namely, that they 
must work. To work! What incalculable sources of cultivation lie in that 
process [... ]. He that has done nothing has known nothing [... ]. Truly a 
boundless significance lies in work; whereby the humblest craftsman comes to 
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attain much, which is of indispensable use, but which he who is of no craft, 
were he never so high, runs the risk of missing. (143) 
If knowing comes from doing, where does this leave the trade of thinking and 
speaking? If education is not an advantage, what kind of benefits do the labouring 
classes receive from guidance? Maidment notes that Carlyle menaces, with accounts of 
Elliott's radical energy, a middle-class already nervous about labour insurgency (297). 
He also informs them of the source of working-class discontent: the educated classes 
had neglected the work of governing responsibly. If the educated are content to remain 
an "Un-working" class, then the working class are capable of cultivating and guiding 
themselves. Elliott manages his own cultivation; the labourer who provides daily bread 
is also the best provider of bread of life. 
Carlyle's sympathy with the working class, afflicted by poverty and the threat 
of the workhouse, is real enough. It was not, in his opinion, the governed but the 
governing who were failing to fulfill their part of the social compact (158-9). As the 
article continues, however, it becomes clear that Carlyle's tirade against education is 
really an incitement to the ruling class to put their education to work. Consequently, 
there is a movement in the article, pulling against his praise for the labouring poet; 
although Elliott is described as articulate and intelligible and cultivated, Carlyle also 
attempts to belittle his intellectual capacity in order to make room for the work of the 
thinking class. It is not possible for Carlyle to ignore the political thrust of Elliott's 
poetry--he is a "Reformer, at least stern Complainer, Radical to the core, " grimly 
indignant at his suppressed rights (148)--so he depicts Elliott as having little political 
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acumen, as possessing no more than an instinct for injustice (148-50). Carlyle 
admonishes Elliott for his vituperative and sarcastic manner, his tone of "pert 
snappishness, " his anger and uncharitableness (154-55,166). Although he concedes 
that Elliott's experience of hard, unremitting labour might be one cause of his anger, he 
dismisses this as an excuse: "for what man [... ] is not hard worked? " (154-5). Having 
established that what distinguishes Elliott is his "life of painfulness and toil, " now 
Carlyle paradoxically, though quite characteristically, claims that this is not a 
distinction; as in Sartor Resartus, he universalises the necessity of labour: "we all must 
toil" (Sartor Resartus 228-9). Carlyle advises his reader to pay no heed to Elliott's 
analysis of the social and political malaise. He feels, as all men do, the disorganised 
state of society, but, like other complainers, he sees only the evil nearest him. 
Repealing the bread tax, however necessary, will not of itself deliver society from its 
present state of dissolution. Only true guidance by intellectual superiors will do that 
(28: 149-50,163). 
As the essay progresses, much less importance is attached to Elliott's voice, to 
his ability to speak and write. Not only is his political philosophy inchoate, his poetry 
is unintelligible. Of Elliott's long poem, The Village Patriarch, Carlyle says it is an 
"inarticulate, half-audible epic, " "imperfectly sung" (161-2). In the poem, meaning 
"lies struggling" and needs interpretation to make out the "real purport of his message" 
(162-3). The Village Patriarch is an epic of the times; the true epic of the industrial 
age is of man fighting, like Enoch Wray, the protagonist of Elliott's poem, not against 
other men but to subdue disorder and chaos: not "Arms and the Man, " but "Tools and 
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the Man" is the modern epic (162). "What indeed are tools, " inquires Carlyle, "from 
the Hammer and Plummet of Enoch Wray, to this Pen we now write with, but Arms, 
wherewith to do battle against UNREASON without or within, and smite in pieces not 
miserable fellow men, but the Arch-Enemy that makes us all miserable; henceforth the 
only legitimate battle" (162). This is the moment at which Carlyle places himself into 
his own discourse. Whereas Elliott had been the one to handle both hammer and pen, 
to bring order to his chaotic world, here Carlyle's pen is likened to Enoch's hammer 
and makes order of Elliott's chaotic epic. It is Carlyle who interprets both Elliott's 
"half-audible" poetry and his half-formed political views. 
Carlyle acknowledges that there are some, presumably only a few, members of 
the ruling classes who do work in exchange for their exemption from manual labour. 
"Among our Aristocracy there are men [... ] who feel they also are work-men, born to 
toil, ever in the great Taskmaster's eye, faithfully with heart and head, for those that 
with heart and hand do [... ] toil for them" (163). As in Sartor Resartus, the speaking 
classes justify themselves by labouring in their own province as the labouring class 
must do in theirs. The work of the head, now sundered from the work of the hand, is 
the noblest and hardest work of all: it is toiling to deliver out of "bondage to 
Wretchedness and Ignorance and Sin, the hardhanded millions; of whom this 
hardhanded earnest witness and writer is here representative" (163). The duty of the 
ruling class is to "lovingly interpret" Elliott's obscure, "dark" message so that they 
might understand the demands of the lower class (163). This, of course, is what 
Carlyle has just done. It is worth noting just how inconsistent is Carlyle's 
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representation of Elliott, whose thinking and speaking capacity disappears as he 
reverts to a mere hand-labourer. Although Carlyle rebuked Elliott for his vituperative 
tone, he qualifies this criticism by purporting to find in him a principle of religion and 
reverence, of loyalty towards his true superiors (150). If Carlyle intends to alarm his 
readers by his depiction of Elliott's radicalism, he also recommends the Corn-Law 
Rhymer to the "loving" guidance of his superiors by presenting him as an honest and 
independent worker, a radical "not without devoutness; passionate, affectionate, 
thoroughly in earnest" (160; Collected Letters 6: 116). 
There are members of the ruling class, however, who do not feel themselves to 
be "workmen, born to toil" (163). Addressing this "unworking" aristocracy, at the end 
of the article, Carlyle cites the fable of Balaam the Mesopotamian soothsayer from the 
Book of Numbers, for he can find no other historical parallel to the present situation 
(163-5). Carlyle's use of religious and mythical fables, it must be said, is often obscure. 
This biblical story records the Israelite sojourn in the wilderness, during which the 
Israelite tribes are encamped on the plain of Moab (22.1-24.25). Balak, king of Moab, 
sends messengers to ask Balaam to lay a curse on the Israelites to help him to defeat 
them. Against God's instructions, Balaam agrees, but the ass carrying Balaam to Moab 
refuses to pass a point in the road because she sees the Angel of the Lord with a drawn 
sword in hand blocking the path. Balaam beats the ass repeatedly until God opens the 
animal's mouth: "Am I not your ass, upon which you have ridden all your life long? " 
The Angel then appears to Balaam and says that the ass has saved his life by turning 
away from the path. Balaam repents and God allows him to proceed to Moab on 
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condition that he bless rather than curse the Israelite tribes. Carlyle apparently finds 
resemblance between the biblical story and the way the working-class, through Elliott, 
had spoken to the ruling class: "His Ass not only on the sudden stood stock-still 
defying spur and cudgel, but began to talk, and that in a reasonable manner" (164). 11 
The point of his rendering of the Balaam story in the context of his article on Ebenezer 
Elliott might be to summarise the warning of the article as a whole. The ass is an 
appropriate emblem for the working class because it literally carries, or supports, the 
idle, unproductive aristocracy. Carlyle suggests that the traditional prejudice and 
complacency of the aristocracy will be eroded by this unprecedented act of a member 
of the working class beginning to speak. "'Farewell, " Balaam laments, "to all my 
greatness: the spirit-stirring Vote, ear-piercing Hear; the big Speech that makes 
ambition virtue [... ] Balaam's occupation gone" (164-5). A speaking working class, 
as it were, makes the traditional distinction of thinking and doing untenable; if the 
working class can speak, then the speaking class must actually work. The aristocracy, 
he implies, must find new ways of treating and relating to the poor, or must offer more 
substantial guidance. They cannot assume that the mere ability to speak justifies their 
privilege; nor will beatings and hectorings, as if the working class were an ass, suffice 
in a democratic era. 
Insofar as it presents a parallel for the relationship of the classes, however, the 
story is a curious one. The "occupation" of the traditional aristocracy is not literally 
threatened by the lower-class writer. The democratisation of writing and speaking is 
really a threat to intellectuals, like Carlyle, whose cultural capital depended entirely on 
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their claim to be the providers of knowledge. The fable, like the article as a whole, 
therefore, strives to protect the role of the literary seer. Like the ass, the working-class 
poet speaks in a reasonable manner only because of the intervention of another agent. 
Elliott, as a representative of the working class, speaks, but his own inarticulate speech 
is only recognisable speech when Carlyle interprets the message and translates it. Real 
culture, Carlyle had averred, belonged not to those who had leisure to read and write 
merely, but to someone who had also to labour. Elliott is praised throughout the 
article for fusing labour and poetry, for producing his daily bread as well as the bread 
of life (141). The alloy of material labour initially made Elliott's voice worth listening 
to. Finally, however, the amalgamation of labour and speech--the assimilation of 
Elliott's pen to his hammer--makes his voice only half-intelligible. It is Carlyle who 
interprets the message of the working class poet. The mediation of a translator is 
required, the services of one whose "first grand problem" is indeed spiritual culture: 
thought and speech (141). The article ends by imagining the reassertion of order, as 
the thinking classes take on, once more, the work of guidance, so that Elliott can go 
back to producing brass and iron. 
In "Corn Law-Rhymes, " the writer-critic, Carlyle himself, "works" only 
inasmuch as he represents the wants of the working class to the ruling class. Carlyle's 
claim to have access to the wants of the working class adds weight to Carlyle's own 
voice, makes him, rather than Elliott, worth listening to. This is a strategy that Carlyle 
repeats later in 1839 when he writes on Chartism, the largely working-class suffrage 
movement. Chartism announces a more authoritarian tone in Carlyle's writing. He 
is 
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still arguing, ostensibly at least, that the problem is that the ruling-class has abdicated 
real leadership, and he evokes the analogy between mental and manual labour in order 
to incite the country's governing class to work at guidance as other (material) 
labourers work in their own sphere. Carlyle's sympathy with the condition of the 
working class is still real enough in Chartism; however, there is a change in emphasis 
in Carlyle's view, as he implies, at least, that the main problem was a thriftless 
labouring class which required effective regulation. One way of registering the change 
in Carlyle's thinking is to notice the different purposes for which he employs the 
analogy between mental and manual labour, and one way of explaining this difference, 
I propose, is to suggest that Carlyle overlooks, whether deliberately or not, the 
figurative status of the analogy. 
To explain my argument, I want briefly to consider "Signs of the Times" 
(1829), Carlyle's first major work of social criticism, in which he attacks the 
materialistic and mechanistic outlook of the age. Carlyle's thesis is that his own era is 
characterised by an overweening faith in mechanism and machinery and by the worship 
of physical things, and his main criticism is that humans err in applying the same 
principles to the improvement of their moral life as they have devoted to the 
improvement of the material labour process: By our skill in Mechanism, it has come 
to pass, that in the management of external things we excel all other ages; while in 
whatever respects the pure moral nature, in true dignity of soul and character, we are 
perhaps inferior to most civilised ages" (27: 73). Intellectual, spiritual, or moral 
strength, he maintains, cannot be increased by the aid of the same mechanical 
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contrivance by which we increase physical capacity. The whole lamentable situation 
that Carlyle describes turns out to have an idealistic cause: 
Civil government does by its nature include much that is mechanical, and must 
be treated accordingly. We term it indeed, in ordinary language, the Machine 
of Society, and talk of it as the grand working wheel from which all private 
machines must derive, or to which they must adapt, their movements. 
Considered merely as a metaphor, all this is well enough; but here, as in so 
many cases, "the foam hardens into the shell, " and the shadow we have 
wantonly evoked stands terrible before us and will not depart at our bidding. 
(66) 
Conventional ways of speaking and of seeing in one sphere of human activity come to 
prevail over the entire range of human action, Carlyle argues. Because society is 
customarily figured as a machine, the relationship between rulers and the ruled is also 
imagined to be susceptible to mechanical laws, rather than to the moral feelings of duty 
and guidance, loyalty and obedience. As the metaphor becomes common-place ("the 
foam hardens in to the shell"), Carlyle explains, we forget the figurative nature of our 
conception. 12 "We are but fettered by chains of our own forging, " he concludes, "and 
which ourselves also can rend asunder. This deep, paralysed subjection to physical 
objects comes not from Nature, but from our own unwise mode of viewing nature" 
(80-1). Carlyle refers to the invidious effects of metaphor again in the article. In a 
mechanistic and materialistic age, he writes, people imagine that everything can be 
achieved by institutions, by social arrangement, nothing by individual effort (74-5): 
333 
"Now all this is grounded on little more than a metaphor. We figure society as a 
'Machine, ' and that mind is opposed to mind as body is to body; whereby two, or at 
most ten, little minds must be stronger than one great mind. Notable absurdity! " (75). 
This distinction is the basis of Carlyle's argument against democracy, against tinkering 
with mere political arrangement: the same weight of number which increases physical 
strength does not multiply wisdom or moral force; widening the franchise will not 
produce better government. The relationship of mind to mind, he argues, is quite 
different from that of body to body, and simply adding together all the intellects of 
men who do not possess wisdom will not produce a wise man (75). It is the tendency 
to forget that ways of conceiving of the world are no more than figures of speech 
which leads the present age to fetishise physical power: "the veneration for the 
physically Strongest [... ]. In all senses, we worship and follow after Power" (27: 78- 
9). 
In the transformation of Carlyle's thought, between "Signs of the Times" and 
Past and Present, it is possible to see, as Raymond Williams remarks, the capitulation 
of his first "civilising insight" to the danger it had described: the submission to the 
worship of physical strength. (Culture and Society 76-7). Carlyle increasingly seems to 
despair of finding true leaders anywhere except in the very industrial strongmen who 
were gaining enormous power to dispose of their work force as they pleased, and his 
vision of social relationships, therefore, "found its final expression in a conception of 
human relationships which is only an idealised version of industrial class-society" 
(Culture and Society 77). Carlyle's essentially "ennobling" vision, Williams claims, was 
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corrupted by "the very situation, the very structure of relationships, to which it was 
opposed" (77). It is true that "Signs of the Times" cautions against taking literally 
analogies which confute mind and body, spiritual power and physical strength, but, as I 
have already discussed, even in Sartor Resartus Carlyle frequently resorts to the very 
metaphors he abjures in order to link intellectual activity to physical work. The 
problem, Carlyle implies, is how one reads these metaphors. At the end of the 1830s, I 
will suggest, he seems to disregard his own warnings about the constitutive power of 
metaphor, and he forgets or ignores the analogical nature of his conception of the 
work of guidance. As a result, in Carlyle's vision, governing or guiding seems to 
require the same exercise of physical force needed to subdue and order recalcitrant 
matter. By analogy, that is, the working classes come to be seen as inert matter, 
material to be shaped rather than subjects to be guided. 
Of course, I am not claiming that the literalisation of the metaphor is the sole 
cause of Carlyle's changing political perspective. There may be something to be gained 
by seeing the problem in the way I have described it, however. Another way of 
expressing Williams' insight--that Carlyle's vision finally succumbs to the same 
situation he warned against--is to say that "Signs of the Times" provides a standard 
from which we can measure Carlyle's own later deviation. In his 1847 review, Thoreau 
made this very point: "he supplies us with arguments and illustrations against himself' 
and this invites us to "try him by [... ] his own standard" (247,266). As Thoreau 
insisted--and he was not the only one among Carlyle's contemporaries to do so-- 
Carlyle's strategy was to "startle and provoke" rather than to inform, to compel action 
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rather than prompt reflection (235,253,267). Such is the discrepancy, indeed, 
between the warning issued in "Signs of the Times" about the constitutive force of 
ways of seeing and Carlyle's later, increasingly problematic, use of the metaphors 
likening mental and manual work, that we might suspect that Carlyle is provoking his 
readers to try him by his own arguments. In any case, whether or not it was his 
intention, Carlyle's figuring of the work of guidance eventually succeeded in inciting a 
response from one of the most prominent of his contemporaries, John Stuart Mill. 
Carlyle conceived of writing a discourse on the working class in the spring of 
1838 when the Chartist movement began. When parliament rejected the Chartist 
petition in August 1839, he began working on Chartism, which he published as a 
pamphlet at his own expense because he was unable to find a place for his essay in the 
political reviews. As in "Corn-Law Rhymes, " Carlyle describes the labouring class--the 
"hitherto mute and irrational"--finding a "voice, " but whereas Elliott's voice had been 
"half audible, " the collective voice of the working class is not recognisable as speech at 
all: "Chartism with its pikes, Swing with its tinder-box, " he comments, "speaks a most 
loud though inarticulate language'" (29: 148). He refers repeatedly in the pamphlet to 
the "great, dumb toiling class which cannot speak" (121); to "these wild inarticulate 
souls, struggling there, with inarticulate uproar, like dumb creatures in pain, unable to 
speak what is in them" (122). As in "Corn-Law Rhymes, " it is understanding and 
interpretation that are required: how useful would be a genuine understanding by "the 
upper classes of society of what it is that the under classes intrinsically mean" (122). 
Again, understanding and interpretation are, not surprisingly, the services Carlyle finds 
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himself qualified to offer. Just as he interprets Elliott's poetry, so he translates the 
inarticulate speech of the working class in order that their real wants can be addressed. 
His interpretation was familiar to his contemporary readers: the meaning of Chartism is 
not a demand for an extension of franchise, but a call for better guidance or more 
government (134,155,160). Social malfunction cannot be corrected by democracy, 
but only by the introduction of rule and order into human relationships (189). The 
most fundamental of the rights of man is the right to be guided, or ordered, by the 
wiser and stronger (157-9,160). Here, as in "Corn-Law rhymes, " by representing 
himself as an interpreter of working-class action, Carlyle seems to place himself 
outside the social relationship of leading and led. His role is not to "do" any kind of 
work, but to enable others to do and act: "there can be no acting or doing of any kind, 
till it be recognised that there is a thing to be done; " "the preliminary of all things, we 
must repeat, is to know that a thing must needs be done" (155,166,190). Although he 
loudly espouses "work, " therefore, Carlyle's own activity, even in his ideal conception 
of it, remains "strangely anomalous" (Collected Letters 7: 25). 
Carlyle's strategy for authorising his own interpretation is again to claim to 
understand the demands of the workers. For Carlyle such "events" as the mammoth 
working-class demonstration are "written lessons, glaring in huge hieroglyphic picture- 
writing, that all men may read and know them" (155). Clearly, it is not open to all to 
know the meaning of theses signs; only the speech of the thinking and speaking 
classes, specifically of Carlyle himself, can restore to Chartism its proper meaning. The 
reason that Carlyle erases the clearly articulated demands of the Chartists for political 
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representation is so that he can substitute his own preferred solution to the condition 
of the working class while still claiming the authority that speaking for the masses 
gives him. To those few who can hear, the meaning of Chartism is a demand for more 
government and better guidance: "Guide me, Govern me! I am mad and miserable, and 
cannot guide myselfl " (157). What this amounts to, as Plotz has nicely capsulated, is 
that the working class is "ordering itself ordered" (102). 13 
There is an important shift in Chartism, illustrative of Carlyle's changing 
perspective on the reciprocal relationship between governing and governed. In Sartor 
Resartus, the labouring classes provided the speaking classes with food and shelter in 
exchange for guidance (228); now Carlyle assumes that the speaking classes are the 
ones who are able to provide food and shelter, even though daily bread is the result of 
the toil of the dumb millions. By Chartism, the labourer means "food, shelter, due 
guidance, in return for his labour" (29: 186). Carlyle assumes that the produce of 
labour already belongs to those who preside over labour. He also finds himself in 
agreement with the governing class, whom he is supposedly criticising, over some 
specific legislative measures designed to encourage the labouring classes to work. For 
example, he begins by attacking the Poor-Law Amendment Act of 1834, which was 
one of the issues over which he and John Stuart Mill disagreed. 
14 Carlyle repudiates 
the assumption of the new law that the poor man who is willing to work can always 
find work and is always able to live by his work (128). Further, he argues that well- 
being is constituted by the quality as well as quantity of employment--the security of 
employment, the prospects of advancement, and the relationship of the employed to 
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their employers (126-7,143). While he denies that work was available to all those who 
sought it, however, Carlyle concedes that the act of 1834 had its uses, in its 
centralisation of administration and, especially, in its encouragement of labour. "Let 
the New Poor Law Administrators be considered as useful labourers, " he writes, 
apparently without irony: "He that will not work according to his faculty, let him 
perish according to his necessity: there is no law juster than that" (132-3). The act is at 
least a protection of the thrifty against the thriftless and dissolute. While one would 
expect, here, for Carlyle to repeat his criticism of a ruling class living off the labour of 
the manual labourers, he asserts that the law "no work, no recompense" should first of 
all be enforced on the manual labourer, even while other people from other classes 
escape the application of the law (132). 
The purpose of Carlyle's criticism is to castigate and reform a lazy ruling class, 
but it is the working class who are assumed to be in need of encouragement to work. 
Despite his frequent repudiation of the principle of working only for monetary 
remuneration, Carlyle tacitly recognises that only misery and poverty and necessity-- 
the "prompt nature of hunger" (Sartor Resartus 120)--can induce the hard manual 
labour of supplying the necessities of life. And, by the same token, he seems to admit 
that other kinds of work, such as the work of governing, are not as susceptible to the 
dictates of necessity. This recognition is symptomatic of a shift in Carlyle's writing. It 
is not of itself evidence of a change of sympathy from ruled to rulers, but it is a change 
in the way the problem is conceived. Which class is it that will not work? Does he aim 
to convince the ruling class to work, or is he pointing out to them the arduous work to 
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be done in compelling work among the thriftless population? The changes in Carlyle's 
thinking about the nature of the problem, as I will now argue, are accompanied by a 
change in the meaning of his figurative assimilation of guidance to physical labour. 
It must be emphasised that it is not at all Carlyle's intention to construct the 
English labourer as thriftless, since his whole point is that the work of guidance should 
be equal to the work done by the manual worker. Thus, just as he represents Elliott in 
such a way as to recommend him to the "loving" guidance of his superiors, in 
Chartism, Carlyle sanitises the English working class by constructing English identity 
around a common aptitude for practical work. Looking back to English history, he 
sees the capacity for productive labour as a distinctive facet of national character. 
"Were not forests felled, bogs drained, fields made arable, towns built, laws made, and 
the Thought and Practice of men in many ways perfected? " he inquires (172). The 
work of making England habitable had been the labour of "brawny arms, " "noble 
hearts, " and "wise heads, " a cooperative effort by the various classes that indicated a 
common industriousness and diminished the distance between them (171-2). Early 
historical events seem to contain later developments as an inevitable consequence, and 
lead ineluctably to the cotton mills of Manchester. Appealing to an outcome which is 
difficult to gainsay, Carlyle's extraordinary prose makes English industrialisation seem 
a realisation of manifest destiny: 
The Staffordshire coal-stratum lay side by side with iron strata, quiet since the 
creation of the world. Water flowed in Lancashire and Lanarkshire; bitumous 
fire lay bedded in rocks there too [... ]. But God said Let the iron missionaries 
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be; and they were. Coal and iron, so long close unregardful neighbours, are 
wedded together; Birmingham and Wolverhampton, and the hundred Stygian 
forges, with their fire-throats, and never-resting sledge-hammers, rose into day 
[... ]. England, I say, dug out her bitumen-fire, and bade it work. (184-5) 
At the same time as it erases the specific agency of physical labourers, Carlyle's poetic 
celebration of industrial productivity and the triumph of machinery attributes England's 
industrial pre-eminence to the innate industry of its people throughout history, and 
establishes the national character as its capacity for productive labor. 
The purification of the "slothful" English depends on a contrast with another 
people, the Irish, against whom Carlyle can predicate a common national identity. The 
Anglo-Saxon worker cannot find work because he is forced to compete with Irish 
labourers willing to work for lower wages. While the Saxon has cleared the soil and 
made it arable and fertile, the Irishman arrives belatedly to undertake any work that 
can be done "by mere strength of hand and back; for wages that will purchase him 
potatoes" (138). The noble Saxon worker is impoverished through having to compete 
with the Irish in an economic system where the only laws regulating the organization 
of labour are those of supply and demand. Carlyle's point is that wages and work 
should be protected. The blame for the lowering of wages is transferred from the 
capitalist system to its victims, however, as Carlyle attributes to the Irish character the 
depredations which are the result of poverty: "The Irish National character is 
degraded, disordered, [... ] immethodic, headlong, violent mendacious [... ]. There 
abides he, in his squalor and unreason, in his falsity and drunken violence, as the ready- 
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made nucleus of degradation and disorder" (137-9). The problem is not that the 
necessity of doing certain kinds of menial labor has a degrading effect on the Irish 
worker; rather, the suitedness of the Irish character to the most degrading unskilled 
work results in the downward spiral of wages to the point where the Saxon worker is 
driven out, unable to compete in this market for labour (138). If this problem is not 
solved, writes Carlyle, then the English worker will become as degraded as his Irish 
counterpart, for the Irish people "circulates not order but disorder through every vein 
of it" (137). The imputation is that English employers must put aside their rule of 
buying labour in the cheapest market and take on the real work of responsible 
leadership. 
Too frequently, Carlyle's diagnosis of social problems, not to speak of his 
proposed solutions, degenerate into banality, so it is necessary to make an effort to 
recall the problem, not in itself trite, he is addressing. In Carlyle's view, the 
organisation (the distribution, the recognition, and the reward) of work was the most 
important social problem facing any society (29: 205). In Chartism, he writes to 
promote the desire for an integrated community, and articulates a vision of the nation 
based on the organisation of its collective labour capacity. Ostensibly, what threatens 
the unity of this community is that the speaking classes do not toil, have abdicated the 
only work by which they could justify their social position. Through Chartist 
demonstrations, he writes, the toiling millions of England ask of their English 
Parliament foremost of all, Canst thou govern us or not? [... ]. The toiling Classes of 
mankind declare in their confused but most emphatic way, to the Untoiling, that they 
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will be governed" (168). As in "Corn-Law Rhymes, " the joining of the two classes is 
effected through the intervention of Carlyle, who, while he appears not to do anything, 
tells others what to do. 
In Chartism, Carlyle suggests that the alienation of the toiling from the 
speaking classes can be rectified only if the latter undertake the work of guidance in 
the same way that the manual labourers engage in physical toil: "Why does the one toil 
with his hands, if the other be not to toil, still more unwearidly with heart and head? 
The brawny craftsman finds it no child's-play to mould his unpliant, rugged masses; 
neither is guidance of men a dilettantism" (158). The separation of the classes is 
resolved, that is, by imagining governing as equivalent to physical labour and the 
governed as inanimate material ("unpliant rugged masses") to be shaped. There could 
hardly be a clearer illustration of what Hannah Arendt sees as the dangers of 
metaphors of fabrication when applied to human affairs (The Human Condition 220- 
30). It is worth noting, though, the tentative manner in which the analogy is advanced 
here; Carlyle often introduces his extravagant figures of speech or of thought with a 
question, and we are left to infer that guidance, too, is a kind of moulding of unpliant 
masses of men. The question is answered in the affirmative, however, and becomes an 
assertion in Carlyle's writings after Chartism. 
The tendency to see the labouring class rather than the ruling class as the 
problem becomes more apparent in Carlyle's writings after Chartism. Past and Present 
(1843), for example, intensifies the tendency, already apparent in Chartism, of seeing 
the work of governing through an analogy with physical labour. It is this metaphor that 
343 
determines the authoritarian tone of the book. 15 Past and Present continues the 
Carlylean critique of the profit-and-loss philosophy of the commercial and industrial 
middle classes, but, at the same time, Carlyle solves the problem of temporal guidance 
by calling on middle-class industrialists to become "Captains of Industry" and to take a 
more active and responsible role in solving the problem of how to organise the work 
of the nation's "Labouring Millions" (255-73): "The main substance of this immense 
problem of Organizing Labour, and first of all of Managing the Working Classes, will, 
it is very clear, have to be solved by those who stand practically in the very middle of 
it; by those who themselves work and preside over work" (267). The ideal social 
relationship is still conceived of as one between the labouring masses and a nobility 
toiling at the work of guidance. But there is a difference. To reiterate Williams' point: 
Carlyle's conception of social relationships ends up as an "idealised version" of those 
already pertaining in a capitalist industrial society (Culture and Society 77). Making an 
almost identical point, Vanden Bossche argues that Carlyle`s"reliance on the 
commercially-minded middle class ends up justifying the very commercial spirit he had 
condemned" (197n37). 16 
The tone is different, too. Although Carlyle insists, repeating a point he had 
made in "Corn-Law Rhymes, " that labour is nobler than fighting and that the true epic 
is now work not battle, he also describes "a battlefield" as "a kind of Quintessence of 
Labour; Labour distilled into its utmost concentration" (Past and Present 191,192). 
Labourers are portrayed as heroic soldiers doing battle now with Necessity, with 
Barrenness, Scarcity, with Puddles, Bogs, tangled Forests, unkempt Cotton; --now 
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with the hallucinations of his poor fellow Man" (191), At the beginning of the 1830s, 
Carlyle occasionally compared working men to God's soldiers on earth (28: 43), and 
the analogy need not be reactionary in any simple way. John Ruskin's favourite 
metaphor, almost certainly derived from Carlyle, "soldiers of the ploughshare, " is 
avowedly antimilitaristic and anticapitalist in its intention (The Library Edition of the 
Works of John Ruskin 16: 26; Unto this Last 202). As Vanden Bossche has remarked, 
however, Carlyle's battle metaphors in Past and Present suggest that captains of 
industry are military leaders charged with making order not only of a chaotic world but 
of a human chaos (Vanden Bossche 115; Past and Present 272). In the following 
passage, for example, regulating men is the same kind of activity as taming the 
wilderness: 
What is immethodic, waste, thou shalt make methodic, regulated, arable; 
obedient and productive to thee. Wheresoever thou findest Disorder, there is 
thy eternal enemy; attack him swiftly, subdue him; make Order of him, the 
subject not of Chaos, but of Intelligence, Divinity and Thee! [... ]. But above 
all, where thou findest Ignorance, Stupidity, Brutemindedness [... ] attack it, I 
say; smite it widely, unweariedly, and rest not while thou livest and it lives; but 
smite, smite, in the name of God! (Past and Present 201) 
As Vanden Bossche summarises, Carlyle's view "entails a transition from compelling 
belief to compelling obedience [... ]. Captains of Industry not only turn wasteland 
into fertile land, but may force others to join them in the task" (115). Carlyle begins by 
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trying to induce a lazy aristocracy to work for their keep and ends by justifying force 
to coerce the mutinous masses. 
It is not, I think, that work has cease to be valued, but now it is the work of 
organising and inspiring-and, if need be, of coercing-labour that is principally to be 
admired. In a curious circular movement, Carlyle instructs the leaders of industry to 
take on the important work of arranging social labour. However, among those 
occupations whose work was insufficiently well organised, as Carlyle repeatedly 
reminded his readers, was that of literary men (5: 158-9,168). Curiously, then, Carlyle 
represents writers, as well as manual labourers, as requiring direction. No less than the 
working classes whose voice he translates in "Corn-Law Rhymes" and in Chartism, 
Carlyle seems to be ordering himself ordered (29: 158; Plotz 102). 
As if the justification of force in Past and Present had not been clear enough or 
sufficiently provocative, the point was driven home in an article on the notorious 
Paraguayan dictator, Dr. Francia, published in the same year as Past and Present. 
Here, Carlyle makes the same legitimating argument for a strong, rigorous military 
leader; it is the depiction of the labouring population as lazy and immethodic that 
legitimates the methods employed by Francia. The purpose of the article, quite 
openly, is to "shock" the "constitutional" sentiments of liberal intellectuals in Britain 
(29: 271,281). He describes the Paraguayans as an idle people unfit for "constitutional 
liberty" (228): 
The people of that profuse climate live in a careless abundance, troubling 
themselves with few things, [... ] at three in the afternoon, you will find the 
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entire population just risen from its siesta; slipshod, half-buttoned; sitting in its 
front verandas open to the street; eating pumpkins with voracity, --sunk to the 
ears in pumpkins [... ]. They are a rude people; lead a drowsy life, of ease and 
sluttish abundance. (287-8) 
Francia is the "one man of talent and veracity" willing to toil to drive out sloth and 
able to "drill" the Paraguayan population into some semblance of order (289,296,299, 
309,312), and improvement is only proportional to the cruelty and vigour he exercises 
(305-6). He first tries the whip to compel work, and finally turns to the "workman's 
gallows" to threaten all shoddy workmen with death (313-15). Carlyle seems to 
fantasise about introducing this contrivance in Britain--"Such an institution of society, 
adapted to our European ways, seems pressingly desirable"--but concedes that it 
would probably be deemed unacceptable (315). 
It is important not to overstate the case for Carlyle's conversion to physical 
force. Democracy he knew to be inevitable; the problem of political authority in the 
mid-nineteenth century, as he saw it, was how to reconcile "inevitable Democracy" 
with "indispensable Sovereignty" (5: 164; Past and Present 249). The nation's leaders 
would have to earn the loyalty of their workers: "no man is, or can henceforth be, the 
brass-collar thrall of any man; you will have to bind him by far nobler and cunninger 
methods" (Past and Present 249). As an example of such noble methods, Carlyle 
proposes granting the workers "a permanent interest in his enterprise, [... ] so that it 
becomes, in practical result, what in essential fact and justice it ever is, a joint 
enterprise" (278). Moreover, it is worth noting that in Past and Present, as in 
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Chartism, Carlyle characterises the English as a laborious people, as a nation with a 
particular aptitude for practical labour: "A terrible worker; irresistible against marches, 
mountains, impediments, disorder, in civilization; everywhere vanquishing disorder, 
leaving it behind him as method and order" (Past and Present 163). Why, then, does 
he state that the threat of punishment is necessary to compel labour? 
One explanation, at least, is that he is trying to provoke a response from liberal 
intellectuals in England. If this was his intention, then he was successful. For it is 
possible to see 1843 as the moment when John Stuart Mill's disillusionment with 
Carlyle began, although the potential for conflict was evident earlier and open 
disagreement came later. The description of the Paraguayan population anticipates 
Carlyle's deliberately provocative depiction of former slaves in An Occasional 
Discourse on the Negro Question, an article which, when it appeared in 1849, elicited 
a caustic reply from Mill. '7 In his reply Mill takes up directly Carlyle's own vexed 
relationship, as a writer, to the doctrine of work that he propounds. 
In the Occasional Discourse, Carlyle advocated a return to compulsory labour 
for the emancipated blacks in the British West Indian colonies. As Catherine Hall has 
argued, at the time of writing this article, Carlyle was in a minority among British 
intellectuals in being prepared to speak on behalf of the West Indian planting interest 
(White, Male, Middle Class 269). Since the emancipation of slaves in the British 
owned colonies in 1834, the economic fortunes of the planters had worsened, and in 
1846 the Whig administration threatened to compound their woes by removing the 
protective duties on sugar (269). The abolitionist sentiment and the free-trade ethos 
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were closely associated, for Carlyle, with what he considered to be the prejudices of 
the liberal intellectual formation whose views he is challenging in the Occasional 
Discourse. The article is framed as a lecture delivered to an anti-slavery philanthropic 
organisation, and this device is clearly meant to signal its criticism of what Carlyle saw 
as a liberal orthodoxy. In the article the Carlyle represents the Black West Indians as 
indolently living off the abundant pumpkins that grow in that fertile climate, while the 
previously fertile colony edges towards ruin, the sugar crop rotting uncut. For Carlyle 
the situation demonstrated the bankruptcy of laissez-faire; since half an hour of labour 
a day would suffice to supply the ex-slaves with the necessities of life, they could not 
be induced to work (29: 350-52). All must work, Carlyle insists in the article, 
"according to the faculty they have got, making a little more divine this Earth which 
the gods have given them" (378). He who will not work, shall not eat, and where 
inducement fails, compulsion, even by the whip, is justified: 
[W]ith regard to the West Indies, it may be laid down as a principle [... ] that 
no Black man who will not work according to what ability the gods have given 
him for working, has the smallest right to eat pumpkin, or to any fraction of 
land that will grow pumpkin, however plentiful such land may be; but has an 
indisputable and perpetual right to be compelled, by the real proprietors of said 
land, to do competent work for his living. This is the everlasting duty of all 
men, black or white, who are born into this world. To do competent work, to 
labour honestly according to the ability given them; for that and for no other 
purpose was each one of us sent into this world; and woe is to every man 
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who, by friend or by foe, is prevented from fulfilling this the end of his being. 
That is the "unhappy" lot: lot equally unhappy cannot otherwise be provided 
for man. Whatsoever prohibits or prevents a man from this his sacred 
appointment to labour while he lives on earth, --that, I say, is the man's 
deadliest enemy; and all men are called upon to do what is in their power or 
opportunity towards delivering him from that. If it be his own indolence that 
prevents and prohibits him, then his own indolence is the enemy he must be 
delivered from: and the first "right" he has, --poor indolent blockhead, black or 
white, --is, That every unprohibited man, whatsoever wiser, more industrious 
person may be passing that way, shall endeavour to "emancipate" him from his 
indolence, and by some wise means, as I said, compel him, since inducing will 
not serve, to do the work he is fit for. Induce him, if you can: yes, sure 
enough, by all means try what inducement will do; and indeed every coachman 
and carman knows that secret without our preaching, and applies it to his very 
horses as the true method: --but if your Nigger will not be induced? In that 
case, it is full certain, he must be compelled; should and must; and the tacit 
prayer he makes (unconsciously, he, poor blockhead), to you, and to me, and 
to all the world who are wiser than himself, is "Compel me! " For indeed he 
must, or else do and suffer worse, --he as well as we. It were better the work 
did come out of him! It was the meaning of the gods with him and with us, 
that his gift should turn to use in this Creation, and not lie poisoning the 
thoroughfares, as a rotten mass of idleness, agreeable to neither heaven nor 
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earth. For idleness does, in all cases, inevitably rot, and become putrescent; -- 
and I say deliberately, the very Devil is in it. (29: 355-6) 
Carlyle argues that it was not the black Africans who had made Jamaica productive, 
clearing jungles and draining bogs, but the European settlers. The white European is 
formed by his superior intelligence for the work of guiding, or of compelling, the 
negro. There is some debate over how far Carlyle colludes with racism in this article; 
some critics have claimed that the Occasional Discourse is a Swiftian satire whose 
primary motive is to draw attention to the condition of the poor in England and 
Ireland. While Carlyle's offensive rhetoric cannot be so easily brushed aside, it is 
almost certainly the case that the real objects of Carlyle's criticism are liberal 
intellectuals in England, who coupled their expressions of humanitarian concern for the 
well-being of ex-slaves in Jamaica with a disregard for the suffering caused nearer 
home by the very system of economic laissez-faire that was put forward as the 
instrument of emancipation. '8 
In the January 1850 edition of Fraser's Magazine, an irate Mill published a 
brief but comprehensive response. In reply to Carlyle's assumption that the master- 
slave relationship is more humane than that of the employer and employee under 
capitalism, Mill affirms the principle of the essential equality of all people, and argues 
that each individual ought to be independent and free to develop his or her own human 
capacities ("The Negro Question" 92-3). Mill also reveals that there are economic as 
well as social suppositions underlying Carlyle's argument, and that the interests he 
advances are those of the planter class (91). What interests me about Mill's reply, 
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however, is that he avails himself of an opportunity to attack Carlyle's gospel of work: 
"This pet theory of your contributor about work, we all know well enough, though 
some persons might not be prepared for so bold an application of it. Let me say a few 
words on this 'gospel of work"' (90). To give the doctrine of work a rational meaning, 
says Mill, "it must first be known what he means by work" (90). It does not mean 
laborious exertion (since hunting for game involves as much muscular fatigue as 
ploughing the land); it does not mean useful exertion (since Carlyle constantly scoffs at 
the idea of utility); it does not mean earning a living (since the population to whom 
Carlyle refers do actually cultivate the pumpkins they consume) (90). There is nothing 
laudable, Mill argues, in work for its own sake, in work leading on to work upon work 
and so on without end. Neither "turning up the earth, nor driving a shuttle or a quill" 
can be an ends in themselves, nor the end of human existence (90-1). In fact, for Mill, 
the inability to distinguish the objects worthy of labour is one of the evils of the 
present time. 
In opposition to the "gospel of work, " I would assert the gospel of leisure, and 
maintain that human beings cannot rise to the finer attributes of their nature 
compatibly with a life filled with labour. I do not include under the name 
labour such work, if work it be called, such work as is done by writers and 
affordance of "guidance, " an occupation which, let alone the vanity of the 
thing, cannot be called by the same name with real labour, the exhausting, 
stiffening, stupefying toil of many kinds of agricultural and manufacturing 
labourers. To reduce very greatly the quantity of work required to carry on 
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existence, is as needful to distribute it more equally; and the progress of 
science, and the increasing ascendancy of justice and good sense, tend to this 
result. 
There is a portion of work rendered necessary by the fact of each 
person's existence: no one could exist unless work, to a certain amount, were 
done either by or for him. Of this each person is bound, injustice, to perform 
his share; and society has an incontestable right to declare to every one that, if 
he work not, at this work of necessity, neither shall he eat, [... ] let the whole 
produce belong to those who do the work which produces it. (91) 
This is Mill at his most socialistic; the whole produce of labour belongs to those who 
actually labour, and all burdensome, socially necessary work should be shared equally 
among members of a community. '9 By this criterion, says Mill, the whole produce of 
the West Indies would go to the ex-slaves, who in fact supplied the "thews and 
sinews" of making the West Indian colonies productive in the first place (91-2). The 
African manual worker could have accomplished more without the "guidance" of the 
white European coloniser than the latter could have done without the black slave (92). 
The aspect of Carlyle's "bold application" of his doctrine of work that 
especially annoys Mill, and which he takes the opportunity of commenting on, is 
Carlyle's metaphoric assimilation of guidance to physical labour, by which, Mill 
believed, Carlyle intends to glorify, among other things, his own work of thinking. It is 
worth setting Mill's criticism of Carlyle against what he wrote elsewhere concerning 
the importance of purely intellectual work. In Principles of Political Economy, first 
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published in 1848, only two years prior to his reply to Carlyle, Mill describes the 
"labour of invention and discovery" as mental work which, if less immediate, is just as 
important to the ultimate product as manual labour (Principles of Political Economy 
1: 41-2). The "labour of the savant, or speculative thinker, " the labour of "mere 
thought, " is significant even from a "purely productive and materialistic point of view" 
(42-3). Because of its influence on the productive labour of society, society should 
employ part of its revenues in "remunerating such labour, as a highly productive part 
of its expenditure" (43). Although Mill's predilection for laissez-faire is partly based on 
the view that any increase in responsibility and power of government will tend to 
oppress the "originality of mind and individuality of character which are the only 
source of any real progress" (2: 939-40)--hence, his enthusiasm for the provisions of 
the new poor-law--he argues that because the labour of "mere thought" benefits the 
entire community, the government should provide means of support to enable a 
"learned class" to devote a sufficient portion of time to their "peculiar pursuits" (968- 
9). Again, in an 1840 article, Mill had praised Coleridge for, among other 
achievements, vindicating "the principle of an endowed class for the cultivation of 
learning and for diffusing its results among the community (Mill, "Coleridge" 148). 
Mill was in agreement with Carlyle, therefore, over the necessity of providing for a 
clerical class to educate and guide the community. Mill does not really tackle the 
question of why government should not bear the responsibility for other kinds of 
mutually-beneficial labour, such as providing for the material needs of the community. 
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For Mill, clearly, some species of mental labour are "real" enough, and even a 
privileged sort of labour. 
The Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question succeeded, as it was surely 
intended to do, in provoking Mill's ire. Although Mill attacks Carlyle's assimilation of 
the intellectual work of guidance to material labour in this article, it is worth pointing 
out that he was free to criticise Carlyle's representation of guidance as "real labour" 
well before 1850; the metaphors yoking intellectual and physical work were a constant 
element of Carlyle's social criticism in the 1830s, and, indeed, a staple of intellectuals' 
self-representation before Carlyle. Mill's remarks on Carlyle's representation of brain 
work, we might suspect, are not the real issue, but are intended, primarily, to form a 
moral basis for his political and ideological disagreement with Carlyle. Mill's comments 
call to mind Frederic Jameson's chastisement of other materialist critics, which I 
discussed briefly in chapter one, for their metaphoric assimilation of intellectual to 
material labour (The Political Unconscious 45). 1 suggested that Jameson's comments, 
insofar as they give a sense of political and terminological conscientiousness to his 
position in an intellectual debate with other Marxist intellectuals, are no less self- 
serving than those of the intellectuals he criticises; the appropriation of the real, 
genuine "work" of physical labourers appears as a trump card, we might say, in a 
dispute between the thinking classes. Similarly, Mill's scrupulous re-appropriation of 
the "real" labour of the masses, from Carlyle's metaphoric misuse, adds moral force to 
his disagreement with him on the issue of Jamaican slavery. Mill's protestations of 
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concern for those who do the "real" labour, Carlyle might have countered, are not 
supported by his attitude of "let alone" on the issue of poor law relief. 
By drawing attention to the constitutive powers of the metaphors by which 
intellectuals represent their own activity, I have argued, Carlyle highlights the 
problems of appropriating physical labour in intellectual self-representations; his 
ambiguous, parodic style of writing, however, makes the question of whether or not he 
intended to dramatise the dangers of the metaphoric assimilation of mental to manual 
labour, finally, an open one. Mill's criticism of Carlyle's unfettered use of the analogy 
linking intellectual and physical labour is valid and necessary. It is possible, though, 
that Mill's censure of Carlyle's construction of guidance ("if work it be called") raises 
the questions that Carlyle, throughout his writings, wants to provoke. Clearly, Mill is 
correct to say that the intellectual work of thinking, speaking, and writing cannot be 
called by the same name as the "exhausting, stiffening, stupefying toil of many kinds of 
agricultural and manufacturing labourers" (Mill, "The Negro Question" 90). Why is it, 
then, that the analogy between mental and manual labour is such a persistent trope in 
intellectuals' self-representations? How is it that the same analogy appears in 
ideologically competing discourses? These are the questions I have been addressing in 
this thesis, and, in conclusion, I will briefly summarise my argument. 
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1 All references to Carlyle's writings, unless otherwise stated, are to the 
Centenary Edition of Carlyle's works, cited by volume and page number. 
2 Hence, as Treadwell writes, the "disconcerting quality of his paeans to 
labour" is that "labour appears as its own reward" (230). Carlyle's indebtedness to 
German idealism has been exhaustively traced by Harrold (209-12; Sartor Resartus, 
introduction xxviii-vii, lvi-lvii). Information on Carlyle's upbringing and his early 
anxiety about finding work is taken from Kaplan's biography (52,55-6,65,78-80,87, 
98,153,167-68). 
3In addition to the work of Harrold and Kaplan, I have found helpful Vanden 
Bossche's critical interpretation of Carlyle's career as the "search for authority" (13). 
Two other critics who deal with Carlyle's claim for cultural prestige must be 
mentioned. Catherine Hall has written on the struggle for intellectual prestige between 
Carlyle and Mill over the Governor Eyre controversy in 1965 ("Competing 
Masculinities: Thomas Carlyle, John Stuart Mill, and the Case of Governor Eyre" in 
White, Male, Middle Class 255-95; and a later version of the same article "The 
Economy of Intellectual Prestige"), while Plotz discusses the way Carlyle appropriates 
the rhetorical strategy of the Chartists to underpin his own intervention in the public 
sphere. Recent writing on Carlyle and "work" or "labour" is primarily concerned with 
the ideological valence of Carlyle's rhetoric. Treadwell, for example, brings out the 
ambiguity of Carlyle's representation of the work of writing in Sartor Resartus in order 
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to make visible Carlyle's "ideological construction of labour": Carlyle invokes both the 
self-sufficiency of mere honest industry and an imposed ideological framework where 
labour is valued for some transcendental purpose which it signifies (234-6). See also 
Ulrich ("The Re-Inscription of Labour in Carlyle's Past and Present"). While work and 
labour are recurring motifs in Carlyle criticism, no critic has focused Carlyle's use of 
the mental/ manual analogy. 
4 As Vanden Bossche points out, proponents of economic freedom generally 
advocated increased democracy (6). In Carlyle's perspective, the principle of freedom 
destroys the sense of social responsibility and atomises individuals; hence, he 
advocated a return to hierarchical authority (5-14). 
S For a detailed discussion of the vexed relationship of middle-class writers to 
the institution of the literary marketplace, see Poovey (101-8). 
'Ford Madox Brown's picture Work (Figure 1), which I discussed in the 
chapter one, captures what I consider to be Carlyle's own sense of the intellectual's 
equivocal relationship to the labour he espouses. While Brown's written explication 
clearly recapitulate Carlyle's own idealised self-image--"two men who appear as having 
nothing to do. These are the brain-workers, who, seeming to be idle, work, and are the 
cause of well-ordained work and happiness in others" (Hueffer 189-90)--the picture 
itself works against the commentary: Carlyle is depicted "leering, " in Barlow's 
description, "on the margins of Work" (53). 
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Carlyle shared enough common ground with the Saint-Simonians for there to 
develop between him and Gustave D'Eichtal a regular sympathetic correspondence, 
and for Carlyle to translate Saint-Simon's Nouveau Christianisme (Kaplan 154-6). On 
Carlyle's indebtedness to the Saint-Simonians, see Shine. While it is true that Carlyle 
kept his distance from traditional politics in the early 1830s, Kaplan suggests that 
Carlyle's elliptical and aphoristic style was also a cover for his radical sympathies (171, 
184). 
8 Haney is not the only critic to make this point. Mellor, for example, claims 
that Sartor Resartus is intended as a "goad to action" (133). In a similar vein, 
Treadwell suggests that the expulsion of Teufelsdröckh at the end of Sartor Resartus 
signifies Carlyle's rejection of Teufelsdröckh and of a kind of writing that substitutes 
"symbolic figuration for action" : "0 enough, enough of likenings and similitudes" 
(Treadwell 225,227,241; Sartor Resartus 287). On this same point, see also Reide 
(93,97) and Barlow (45). 
9Maidment points out that that Carlyle's essay is both generous and dismissive, 
appreciative of Elliott's energy and honesty, but condescending about his "verbal 
clumsiness" and "naive indignation" (297). 
lo As Vanden Bossche points out, the waste of Burns' genius was proof, 
constantly adduced by Carlyle, that the present organisation of literature, on the 
principle of free trade, was the worst possible one, for poets could not be adequately 
judged by the laws of the market (5: 166,189-92; Vanden Bossche 186 n22). 
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11 The story as it is told in Numbers is pieced together from various sources 
and is hardly without contradiction. My information on the Balaam oracles is taken 
from Noth (166-94). In a secondary interpretation of the Balaam story of Numbers, 
one not to the point of the original, Balaam goes astray for the sake of profit. This is 
how Carlyle connects Balaam to the English ruling class. 
12 In Sartor Resartus, Diogenes Teufelsdröckh's view is that all language is 
figurative, all metaphor, alive or dead (73). In Past and Present, Carlyle says that even 
the coldest word was once a glowing new original metaphor (131-2), 
13 In an insightful article on Chartism, Plotz describes the ingenious though 
paradoxical strategy by which Carlyle appropriated the physical presence of the crowd 
to further his own claims (90). Carlyle relies on the priority of action over speech-- 
ascribing to the working classes an understanding superior to that of the non-labouring 
speaking classes of the condition of the nation--in order to insist on the importance of 
the message the crowd conveys. At the same time as he deprives the crowd of any 
language in which to explain their wants, he insists on his own ability to understand 
and explain the crowd better than they explain themselves (90,97). True 
understanding is pre-linguistic but must be given a voice somehow, and Carlyle himself 
explains the crowd's true desire: more guidance (102). Carlyle both disputes the 
Chartists' own claims and bolsters his own claims by appropriating the "threatening 
physicality" of the crowd (95,107). 
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The brilliance of Carlyle's response to the Chartist phenomena, according to 
Plotz, was the "remarkable efficacious logic he finds--on short notice and under the 
pressure of rapidly changing events--to wrest control of those demonstrations from the 
hands of the Chartists who had actually taken part in them" (95). 1 must agree with 
Plotz that Carlyle's strategy of making the rational irrational and then providing a 
competing interpretation is particularly audacious in Chartism because he is 
responding to a contemporary English crowd (112n51). But while Carlyle's response 
was "lightning-fast" (94), he was not thinking on his feet entirely. The French 
Revolution had already employed the same "trope of depersonalization" by which he 
makes agency uncertain in Chartism (2: 270,276,281,286; Plotz 95-6). As I have 
been arguing, Carlyle is doing here what Burke and Cobbett had done, which is to 
claim to understand the grievances of the working classes and to claim to speak of and 
for the masses. Throughout the 1830s, Carlyle claimed to understand the speech of the 
labouring population both to attack the ruling classes and to give weight to his own 
idiosyncratic interpretation of events. 
14 When Carlyle approached Mill with his projected essay on Chartism for the 
London and Westminster Review, Mill refused to countenance his criticism of, among 
other things, the new poor law. (Collected Letters 10: 15; 11: 117; 12: 11; Vanden 
Bossche 94-5 ). 
is Carlyle began writing Past and Present in August 1842, completing it within 
a few months. The condition of the working people had, if anything, worsened by that 
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year. A series of bad harvests since 1836 and the detested Corn Laws kept the price of 
bread high. Too, a serious economic depression led to falling wages and to high 
unemployment. In 1842 one person in eleven was a pauper, and the Poor Law 
Amendment Act of 1834 had abolished outdoor relief. M. W. Flinn has written that the 
"deprivation commonly associated with the 'Hungry Forties' might, with more 
accuracy, be ascribed to the period 183 8-42 than to the whole decade" (Chadwick 42). 
In the spring of 1842, a second, much larger, Chartist petition was presented to 
Parliament, and summer brought a series of strikes and riots throughout industrial 
cities. 
16 Vanden Bossche makes this point apropos the Latter-Day Pamphlets 
(1850), but, as he recognises, the problem is already budding within Past and Present 
(115,197n37). 
17 Carlyle's Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question was published in 
Fraser's Magazine 40 (December 1849) and reprinted as a separate pamphlet in 1853 
as Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question. Mill's reply, "The Negro Question, " 
was published in Fraser's Magazine 41 (January 1850). The cooling off between 
Carlyle and Mill is hard to date exactly. Mill's first public criticism was over Carlyle's 
"Repeal of the Union" article in 1848 (Seigel 304), but the two men disagreed over 
many issues even when they were closest (Kaplan 225-6,235). Vanden Bossche notes 
the changed emphasis of Carlyle's Latter Day Pamphlets, of which the Occasional 
Discourse is a precursor. These later works were and are offensive not so much 
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because of change in doctrine, but because Carlyle "shifts the blame for social 
problems from the ruling classes to the working class" (133). Evidence of this shift 
occurs as early as Chartism, as I have shown. 
18 On the background to Carlyle's Occasional Discourse, see Campbell, 
Christianson, Tarr, and Hall (White Male Middle Class 268-74). Collins advances an 
argument that exonerates Carlyle from the charge of racism on the grounds of the 
"parodic ambiguity" of the Occasional Discourse. Vanden Bossche disagrees and 
argues that at some level rhetoric is meaning (202n 67). 
19 For another statement of this socialistic perspective, see Mill's 
Autobiography (175). The argument Mill rehearses in his reply to Carlyle's Occasional 
Discourse, that the burden of physical labour should be reduced and that the necessary 
labour of supplying food, shelter, fuel, ought to be parceled out equally among the 
members of a community, is similar to Godwin's in An Enquiry Concerning Political 
Justice (474-5,711-13,752-4). 
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Afterword 
For Marx and Engles, writing in The German Ideology (1845-6), the most 
rudimentary form of social, as opposed to natural, division of labour was the 
separation of manual and mental work (51-2), a view that was shared by another of 
Carlyle's contemporaries, John Ruskin. It is possible to suggest that one reason for the 
historical durability of the analogy assimilating intellectual activity to physical labour is 
the intellectual's sense of this fundamental splitting of human society and of human 
faculties. For the separation of hand and head not only creates two distinct classes, but 
also produces incomplete human beings: a machine or instrument, on one hand, and a 
deracinated intellect on the other. As I suggested in chapter one, with reference to 
John Jewel's defence of the labour of kings and bishops, in general terms it is true that 
the analogy always seems to have had both the intention of alleviating the non-manual 
worker's guilt over this injustice and the ideological effect of obfuscating the unequal 
distribution of labour and reward in society. This sort of generalisation, however, 
does not help to explain why intellectuals have continued to draw on this cliched figure 
in their representations of their own activity, nor, more importantly, does it help to 
explain why it is used to articulate different ideological positions. 
It is in the period following the French Revolution, I argue, that the analogy 
between mental and manual labour begins to assume a contemporary ideological 
resonance. With the entry of the mass of the population into the political equation, 
intellectuals asserted their relationship to ordinary labourers as a way of consolidating 
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their own authority vis-a-vis other non-manual labourers. By grounding their own 
work in the real labour done on the land, writers like Burke and Cobbett attacked 
other intellectuals whose activity, they alleged, was less rooted in the material life of 
the community. Burke's "sweat of the mind, " I claim in chapter two, was a way of 
distinguishing himself from his political opponents, however defined. Burke's 
appropriation of the activity of the labouring poor, I argue in chapter three, presented 
itself as a problem for Cobbett of how to represent himself to his labouring audience; 
Cobbett tries to repudiate Burke's easy assimilation of writing and thinking to physical 
labour, at the same time as he tries to create a solidarity between himself and his 
readers by asserting the similarity of their labours. For Hazlitt, I contend in chapter 
four, the analogy with manual work was primarily a way of articulating what he takes 
to be an internal stratification of the republic of letters, according to social and 
political rather than intellectual criteria; I suggest, too, that Hazlitt eventually 
concludes that the "proletarianised" writer must form his political alliance with a 
community of manual labourers rather than with other intellectuals. Finally, I argue in 
chapter five that Carlyle employs the analogy, not primarily to encourage the 
identification of writing and manual toil, but to support his criticisms of an 
"unworking" ruling class. I argued, too, that Carlyle draws attention to the constitutive 
force of the metaphors by which intellectuals represent themselves. While all of these 
writers assert the similarity or identity of mental and manual work, they also 
acknowledge the irreducible difference of the two kinds of activity, and it is this 
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recognition that produces the tensions and contradictions that I have found in their 
writings. 
The propensity of writers and academics to represent intellectual activity by 
invoking the labour of other kinds of workers has persisted, as I argue in chapter one. 
Moreover, as I have intimated, and as I will now explain in more detail, even a writer's 
sincere disavowal of the equivalence between mental and manual work, such as Mill's 
or Jameson's, may have polemical motives. In the second chapter of The Road to 
Wigan Pier, a book profoundly influenced by the tradition of reportage of which 
Cobbett's Rural Rides is a forerunner, George Orwell demonstrates, in a literal and 
highly self-conscious way, how the figures that ground his own intellectual activity in 
more elemental types of labour serve as the basis for the deprecation of other 
intellectuals. "In the metabolism of the Western world, " Orwell asserts, at the 
beginning of the chapter, "the coal-miner is second only to the man who ploughs the 
soil. He is a sort of grimy caryatid upon whose shoulders nearly everything that is not 
grimy is supported" (19). Then, in a dozen pages, Orwell records his own experience 
following the miners in their day's work. He then repeats his conviction, using a 
different metaphor, that all life depends on the fundamental importance of this 
rudimentary labour: "The lamp-lit world down there is as necessary to the daylight as 
the root is to the flower" (30). Orwell describes his relationship to the manual worker, 
of whom the miner is the type, in yet another analogy: "it keeps us alive, and we are 
oblivious of its existence [... ] we are capable of forgetting it as we forget the blood in 
our veins" (31). The extent to which his own life and work depends on this prior 
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labour prompts Orwell to voice his own feeling of inferiority, an admission that is 
made into the occasion for a characteristic attack on other intellectuals: "It raises in 
you a momentary doubt about your own status as an 'intellectual' and a superior 
person generally, [... ] it is only because the miners sweat their guts out that superior 
persons can remain superior. You and I and the editor of the Times Lit. Supp., and the 
Nancy poets and the Archbishop of Canterbury and Comrade X, author of Marxism 
for Infants" (31). An air of indisputable truth and self-effacing honesty undergirds 
Orwell's suggestion, for this is the nub, that his own radical credentials are more 
genuine, and his own work more real, than those belonging to what he slightingly 
refers to as the enlightened left. By chronicling his own movements underground, 
Orwell has already made sure that the "I" of this passage is able to denounce his fellow 
intellectuals from a secure footing. 
The same critical strategy is usually employed less reflectively, however. 
Hence, to return to Frederic Jameson's rebuke to other materialist critics in The 
Political Unconscious, Jameson, like Orwell, can be understood as bolstering his 
leftist credentials and his intellectual authority when he asserts the essential difference 
of mental and manual labour: 
One cannot, without intellectual dishonesty, assimilate the 'production' of texts 
[... ] to the production of goods by factory workers: writing and thinking are 
not alienated labor in that sense, and it is surely fatuous for intellectuals to seek 
to glamorize their tasks--which for the most part can be subsumed under the 
rubric of the elaboration, reproduction, or critique of ideology--by assimilating 
367 
them to real work on the assembly line and to the experience of resistance of 
matter in genuine manual labor. (45) 
It would not be impertinent to suggest that Jameson's assertion of difference can be as 
obfuscating as the homology he censures. Part of the problem is that he neglects to 
reveal the material conditions of his own criticism. Not all intellectuals occupy 
identical positions of privilege, as Hazlitt was at pains to point out. If Jameson does 
not feel that intellectual activity is labour, one might respond, it is partly because the 
labour of the academy is not distributed equally. 
What I have called intellectuals' contrapuntal understanding of mental work is 
evinced as much by attempts to distinguish mental and manual labour as by attempts to 
identify similarities between them, and continues today. As evidence of this I will 
mention the title of the editor's column of the March 1998 edition of PMLA, written by 
Martha Banta in her role as president of the Modern Language Association, "Mental 
Work, Metal Work. " The article engages a debate on the role of the intellectual in the 
twenty-first century, begun in an earlier edition of the journal (PMLA 112.5 [1997]: 
1121-41). The argument of Banta's column is that intellectual work cannot be judged 
by standards--primarily those of enhanced productivity--appropriate to material 
production (199,205). This is a defensible position. Nevertheless, Banta makes use, 
perhaps self-consciously, of hackneyed metaphors--academics are "toilers [... ] in 
intellectual vineyards" she says--which suggest that intellectuals labour just as 
assiduously as manual labourers (199,206). More problematic is her attempt to 
distinguish intellectual from physical labour by the passion that ought to be attached to 
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doing it: "passion does not easily fit into sanctioned programs for rational, productive 
behaviour, [... ] passion is, should be, part of the life of the mind" (206). Rather more 
prescriptively, she tells her readers how authentic passion is to be recognised: "Joy: 
remember that feeling? If you do not, try to regain it. If you never had it, then you 
ought not to be in this business" (206). "If one can still believe in the value of mental 
work, " she concludes, mixing Walter Pater with Julien Benda, "the hard, gemlike flame 
of passionate intensity will return" (208). Again, it hardly needs to be pointed out that 
"joy" in academic work might depend on the position one occupies in the profession, 
although this counter seems not to have crossed Banta's mind. In focusing on the 
mental/ metal division, she, like Jameson, assumes that mental work can best be 
understood in relation to its material other, rather than according to the internal 
divisions and stratifications which obtain within the academy. 
Historically, the meaning of the category of the intellectual has been 
continually redefined in response to events and to changing material conditions. 
Clearly the role of an intellectual today cannot be defined in the same way as it was in 
Britain in the Romantic period, for example. This makes all the more surprising, 
therefore, the tenacity of particular strategies of self-representation. If it is true, as 
Edward Said states in the passage which I have used as an epigraph to this thesis, that 
it matters how intellectuals represent themselves to themselves and their audiences, 
and if it is true that intellectual identities are formed, in part, by their own 
representational practices, then it is important to recognise that those practices have a 
369 
history. It is one especially enduring aspect of that history that I have tried to 
elucidate in this thesis. 
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